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Ann Genovese, Trish Luker and Kim Rubenstein
Until the late 20th century, ‘an archive’ generally meant a repository for 
documents, as well as the generic name for the wide range of documents 
the repository might hold. An archive could be visited, and then also 
searched, to discover past actions or lives that had meaning for the present. 
While historians and historiographers have long understood the contests 
that archives contain, and represent, the very idea of ‘the archive’ has, 
over the last 40 years, become the subject and object of widening, and 
intensified, consideration. This consideration has been intellectual (from 
scholars in a wide range of disciplines) and public (from communities 
and individuals whose stories are held captive, or sometimes hidden or 
excluded from official archives), as well as institutional. It has involved 
scrutiny and critique of official archives’ limitations and practices, as well as 
symbolic, affective and theoretical expansion and heightened expectation 
of what ‘the archive’ is, or should be. The very language of ‘the archive’ 
now carries freight as administrative practice, normative value, metaphor, 
description and aspiration in different ways than it did in the 20th century 
(or even 10 years ago, when we began our collaboration). 
The Court as Archive offers a unique contribution to these reinvigorated—
and sometimes new—conversations about what an archive might be, what 
it can do as a consequence and to whom it bears custodial responsibilities. 
In particular, this collection addresses what it means for contemporary 
Australian superior courts of record not only to have constitutional and 
procedural duties to documents as a matter of law, but also to acknowledge 
obligations to care for those materials in a way that understands their 
public meaning and public value for the Australian people, in the past, 
in the present and for the future.
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The Court as Archive Project
This collection began its life in a prosaic manner: from a sense of practical 
frustration—unique perhaps to scholars who work with documents 
generated and located in courts—with the difficulties that occur in 
attempting to access these rich materials. These difficulties, although 
neither uniform across jurisdictions or academic pursuits, nor new, are 
strikingly similar when scholars step back from their research to share with 
each other experiences of restriction and inaccessibility of court materials, 
and the implications of these experiences for their research. Indeed, 
the grounding for this book, and the subsequent project collaboration, 
had its genesis in such a conversation in 2008 at a workshop hosted by 
the Centre for International and Public Law (CIPL) at The Australian 
National University (ANU). Kim Rubenstein, then director of CIPL, 
invited scholars from history and law to engage with the book Rights and 
Redemption: History, Law, and Indigenous People.1 This book analysed and 
examined the use and production of historical expert evidence in Australian 
litigation involving Indigenous parties in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
The Rights and Redemption Project involved direct engagement with the 
Federal Court of Australia, examining (under court order) the historical 
materials adduced in those matters at a time when there was a genuine 
sharpness to public debate surrounding the status of Indigenous litigants’ 
claims against the past and present Australian state. 
The difficulties of access to court material emerged as a common 
theme in the CIPL workshop. Each of the presenters had encountered 
roadblocks in scholarly research due to a lack of access to key material 
held by the court. For example, Trish Luker, who had completed a PhD 
on the Stolen Generations case Cubillo v The Commonwealth,2 and Kim 
Rubenstein, in seeking the transcript of the David Hicks Federal Court 
matter concerning questions of citizenship.3 Whether it be transcripts of 
evidence, submissions of parties or a range of other material that could 
help enlighten our respective research, we had all been interested to draw 
insights from the court experience around the ways that individual citizens 
had challenged the exercise of state power within the judicial context and 
what that may mean in a range of scholarly interventions. 
1  Ann Genovese, Ann Curthoys and Alexander Reilly, Rights and Redemption: History, Law, and 
Indigenous People (UNSW Press, 2008).
2  Cubillo v Commonwealth (2000) 103 FCR 1; Trish Luker, The Rhetoric of Reconciliation: Evidence 
and Judicial Subjectivity in Cubillo v Commonwealth (PhD Thesis, LaTrobe University, 2007).
3  Hicks v Ruddock (2007) 156 FCR 574.
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At the CIPL workshop, we also discussed how the Federal Court 
recognised that it was at a formative moment in its own institutional 
history and practice regarding its responsibilities as a court and, potentially, 
as an archive. This recognition is encapsulated by former Native Title 
Registrars of the court, Louise Anderson and Ian Irving, in an interview 
we conducted for our research, which appears as Chapter 8 in this book. 
In particular, the arrival of native title litigation and the legal necessity for 
Indigenous peoples to tender enormous amounts of evidentiary proof of 
‘continuity’ to country resulted in exponential funding and growth 
of cognate disciplinary research about Indigenous experience on country. 
It  also led to the production and preservation of Indigenous parties’ 
law, including testimonial evidence recorded in on country hearings, 
artworks and other material objects tendered as evidence. These materials, 
although fraught, given they were produced for a legal proceeding, were 
nevertheless understood by the court (as well as Indigenous parties and 
scholars) as carrying a weight and purpose for which the court assumed 
a significant responsibility. In that context, the court became acutely 
aware of its ill-defined function as an archival repository. However, it also 
realised that coming to terms with those native title holdings made visible 
its role as custodian of law stories not only confined to that jurisdiction. 
It reminded the court, and those scholars meeting at the CIPL workshop, 
about the nature, status, access, preservation and location of all of the 
materials courts hold that are of value to the Australian citizenry and 
public more broadly.
So began a series of regular meetings, over the course of five years, which led 
ultimately to the Australian Research Council (ARC) Discovery grant that 
took that research interest seriously. In 2013, we began our investigation 
on general questions about Chapter III courts as archives, centred on 
the paradigmatic example of the Federal Court of Australia.4 One of our 
purposes has been very practical: to think alongside the Federal Court 
about how, as an institution of law and of the state, it might also function 
4  The Federal Court of Australia provides an ideal site for investigation of the contested 
issues associated with the civic role of courts in administering legal archival records of national 
significance. Established as an innovative response at a key moment in the development of Australian 
administrative law (Commonwealth, Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report 1971, 
Parl Paper No 144 (1971) (‘Kerr Report’)), the court has a unique mandate and jurisdictional scope, 
specifically in adjudicating disputes between citizens and the state. It is a court established under 
Chapter III of the Australian Constitution and by statute, thereby illuminating core issues concerning 
the judicial power of the Commonwealth. As a superior court of record (SCOR), the Federal Court 
makes determinations that are binding and conclusive, unless or until set aside on appeal. Further, 
it has an expanding jurisdiction and legislative responsibility.
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as an archival repository. That question goes beyond, and potentially 
complicates, its status as a court of record (a legal status we explain in 
the following section). To address the question methodologically, we 
deliberately chose to examine the Federal Court’s archive of administrative 
practices, rather than an exploration of the rich litigation materials the 
court holds. This approach holds firmly to Australian public law principles 
and, at the same time, relates these to the broad innovations occurring 
in research institutionally situated and focused on and in ‘the archive’. 
We describe our method, and how it exists in conversation with current 
fields of related inquiry, in more detail below; however, note here that this 
approach has enabled us as a research team to examine, through a range of 
diverse records and sources, how the Federal Court has conceived its own 
citizenship and its own place and role in shaping a modern democratic 
nation.
Alongside close empirical and analytical work of our own, the Court as 
Archive Project was also envisaged as a way to extend a key insight of 
our earlier meeting: the necessity of collaboration, cross-disciplinary and 
cross-institutional dialogue when addressing difficult questions of law 
and public meaning. The problems that come into view once a court 
of record is conceived of, and engaged with, as an archive are complex. 
They do not lend themselves to analysis situated solely within universities, 
government agencies, courts, or diverse public communities—nor are 
they limited to Australia. We interviewed court officials facing similar 
problems, in similar jurisdictions, with similar histories. For example, in 
‘Sentencing Acts:  Appraisal of Court Records in Canada and Australia’, 
Trish Luker includes Canadian and Australian jurisdictional approaches 
to the sentencing of court records and in ‘Archiving Revolution: Historical 
Records Management in the Massachusetts Courts’, our research assistant, 
Andrew Henderson, highlights the values of international comparison.
Most significantly for the genesis of this book, our project design was 
predicated on convening a symposium, which was again held at CIPL, 
in 2016. We invited collaborators and interlocutors who had diverse 
official and scholarly duties to archives and their use to consider with us 
how to recognise the implications of a court of record’s responsibilities 
to the materials it holds and the communities it serves. A core outcome 
of the symposium was clarification of a key point: this work requires 
close networked thinking to engage well with practical questions 
of custodianship, access, legal and constitutional requirements, and 
preservation and future use of court materials. As we elaborate below, this 
book is a direct reflection of the symposium.
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The Court as Archive Project: Methods 
in Scholarly Conversation
Before we introduce the chapters in this book, it is important to briefly 
set the scholarly scene. Our grounding objectives in the Court as Archive 
Project have been to interpret and clarify the institutional purpose and 
civic responsibilities of courts through their archival role; to consider 
explicitly, and for the first time in Australia, the unique role of the 
Federal Court as a site of production of significant national archives since 
its establishment in 1976, and to develop principles through empirical 
research to inform the administration of materials held by Australian 
superior courts of record as responsive civic institutions in 21st-century 
Australia. In designing a method to join and undertake these objectives, 
it was important to situate our objectives and institutional approach in 
relation to theoretical and empirical scholarship around archives and 
public law jurisprudence on superior courts. 
The Archival Turn in Law
In the Court as Archive Project, we are joining the contemporary 
scholarly interest in, and interventions into, how archives are perceived 
and used.5 The shared challenge in this diverse work is to make visible and 
scrutinise the 19th-century presumption that state archives exist to sustain 
and promulgate the nation and, in the process, to underwrite a particular 
account of history.6 This redirection in archival thinking includes paying 
attention to materiality and material culture, including documentary 
theory and practices of documentation.7 In settler colonial contexts like 
Australia, the scrutiny and rethinking of archives and documentation 
5  See Chapters 1, 4 and 11, this volume. For leading examples across the scholarly and disciplinary 
spectrum, see Antoinette Burton (ed), Archive Stories: Facts, Fictions, and the Writing of History (Duke 
University Press, 2005); Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial 
Common Sense (Princeton University Press, 2009); Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian 
Impression (University of Chicago Press, 1996); Carolyn Steedman, Dust: The Archive and Cultural 
History (Rutgers University Press, 2002); Matthew S Hull, Government of Paper: The Materiality 
of Bureaucracy in Urban Pakistan (University of California Press, 2012); Arlette Farge, The Allure of 
the Archives (Yale University Press, 2013); Francis X Blouin Jr and William G Rosenberg, Processing 
The Past: Contesting Authority in History and The Archives (Oxford University Press, 2011); Cornelia 
Vismann, Files: Law and Media Technology (Stanford University Press, 2008). 
6  See, for example, Derrida, above n 5; Steedman, above n 5; Blouin Jr and Rosenberg, above n 5; 
Stoler, above n 5; and Chapter 4, this volume.
7  Vismann, above n 5; Annelise Riles, ‘Anthropology, Human Rights, and Legal Knowledge: 
Culture in the Iron Cage’ (2006) 108 American Anthropologist 991. 
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is also a matter of justice and politics: it is understood by Indigenous 
scholars, communities and institutions as an engagement in political 
relationships that have been driven by Indigenous peoples as an assertion 
of their sovereignty and a performance of their citizenship.8
In the time since we began our research, interest in archives and archival 
theory and its relationship with law and jurisprudence has grown.9 
In a  critical legal context, it has been described as a ‘counter-archival’ 
practice, taking up a long-established tradition in historiography and 
directing it to law: reading legal texts against the grain; revealing lacunae, 
silences and omissions in the archive; or exposing layers of meaning 
in archival documents.10 Alternatively, a close reading of transcripts of 
trials and court records may identify bias, discrimination or deference to 
flawed knowledge.11 Other projects are creating and re-creating archives 
of law and of legal lives. This includes oral history projects enlarging the 
archive on women lawyers reflecting on their lives, their own sense of 
active citizenship and their contributions to the state.12 In Australia, the 
National Library of Australia now houses over 50 full life oral histories 
of ‘trailblazing women lawyers’ who have practised in Australia and 
internationally,13 with parallel projects in other countries.14 It also includes 
rewriting conspicuous and established legal archives. In addition, feminist 
judgments projects have emerged in a number of common law jurisdictions 
to produce imagined judicial decisions that serve to correct the archive 
8  For recent examples, see Tahu Kukatai and John Taylor (eds), Indigenous Data Sovereignty, 
CAEPR Research Monograph No 38, (ANU Press, 2016), doi.org/10.22459/CAEPR38.11.2016; 
Darren Jorgensen and Ian McLean (eds), Indigenous Archives: the Making and Unmaking of Australian 
Art (UWA Press, 2017); Kim Rubenstein, ‘Power, Control and Citizenship: The Uluru Statement 
from the Heart As Active Citizenship’ (Speech delivered at the Transnational, International and 
Comparative Law and Policy Network Biennial Interdiscplinary Conference, Bond University, 
26 May 2017).
9  Renisa Mawani, ‘Law’s Archive’ (2012) 8 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 337; Katherine 
Biber and Trish Luker (eds), Evidence and the Archive: Ethics, Aesthetics and Emotion (Routledge, 2017); 
Stewart Motha and Honni van Rijswijk (eds), Law, Memory, Violence: Uncovering the Counter-Archive 
(Routledge, 2016), doi.org/10.4324/9781315737157.
10  Motha and van Rijswijk, above n 9; Trish Luker, ‘Animating the Archive: Artefacts of law’, cited 
in Motha and van Rijswijk, above n 9.
11  Emma Cunliffe, Murder, Medicine and Motherhood (Hart Publishing, 2011).
12  See The Trailblazing Women and the Law Project (ARC Linkage LP120200367) <www.tbwl.
esrc.unimelb.edu.au> and the online exhibition as one output of the project at <http://www.women 
australia.info/lawyers/>.
13  See the full list at <http://www.womenaustralia.info/lawyers/browse_oralhistories.html>. 
14  In the United States of America, the American Bar Association houses a Trailblazing Women 
Lawyers oral history collection at <www.americanbar.org/groups/senior_lawyers/women_trailblazers_




of common law jurisprudence.15 Rather than engaging a critical outsider 
position, participants in these projects take on a performative ‘drag’ that 
serves to parody the judicial subject, while simultaneously correcting the 
archive of judicial decisions. 
At the same time, legal historians are conducting projects where they 
interrogate the operation of legal authority and legal procedure by 
rethinking, recovering and reanimating a range of court archives.16 Others, 
working as historians of jurisprudence, are attending to the writing of 
jurisprudence itself in official and unofficial forms, styles and genres to 
question the conduct of lawful relationships and the expectations of 
what an archive of and for law might look like, and for whom.17 Further, 
and building on long-held traditions of empirical scholarship in court 
and public administration and legal ethnography, court records have 
become sites for analysis in different ways, with attention to documentary 
meaning-making practices,18 as well as public law jurisprudence.19
As legal scholars with interests and training in other disciplines, we have 
been actively participating in these developments. However, it was clear 
to us that further work was necessary to consider the questions of courts’ 
duties to the people they serve, through the question of how their records 
are preserved, curated or accessed. In particular, we recognised that it was 
necessary to connect the innovations in thinking about how scholars might 
address ‘an archive’ with long-standing legal principles about a superior 
court’s role and function. For us, as a research team, it seemed clear that 
15  Heather Douglas, Francesca Bartlett, Trish Luker and Rosemary Hunter (eds), Australian 
Feminist Judgments: Righting and Rewriting Law (Hart Publishing, 2015).
16  See, for example, Shaunnagh Dorsett, Juridical Encounters: Maori and the Colonial Courts 
1840–1852 (Auckland University Press, 2017); Mark Finnane, Andy Kaladelfos, Alana Piper, Yorick 
Smaal, Robyn Blewer and Lisa Durnian, The Prosecution Project Database (17 July 2016) <https://
prosecutionproject.griffith.edu.au/prosecutions>; ANU College of Law, Dr Heather Roberts receives 
DECRA for judicial research (10 November 2017) <https://law.anu.edu.au/news-and-events/news/
dr-heather-roberts-receives-decra-judicial-research>.
17  Ann Genovese and Shaun McVeigh, ‘Nineteen Eighty Three: A Jurisographic Report on 
Commonwealth v Tasmania’ (2015) 24(1) Griffith Law Review 68; Ann Genovese, Shaun McVeigh 
and Peter D Rush, ‘Lives Lived with Law: An Introduction’ (2016) 20 Law Text Culture 1; Ann 
Genovese, ‘About Libraries: A Jurisographer’s Notes on Lives Lived With Law’ (2016) 20 Law Text 
Culture 33.
18  Bruno Latour, The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil d’Etat (Wiley, 2010); Vismann, 
above n 5. 
19  Judith Resnik, Dennis E Curtis and Allison Tait, ‘Constructing Courts: Architecture, the 
Ideology of Judging, and the Public Sphere’, cited in Richard Sherwin and Anne Wagner (eds), Law, 
Culture & Visual Studies (Springer Publishing Company, 2013); Judith Bellis, ‘Public Access to Court 
Records in Australia: An International Comparative Perspective and some Proposals for Reform’ 
(2010) 19(4) Journal of Judicial Administration 197.
THE COuRT AS ARCHIvE
8
by returning to core questions of public law scholarship—namely, who 
is the court for, as much as what it must do—we would be able to begin 
to think about the court as an institution that records contemporary 
Australian life for the future.
Public Law and Courts of Record
Our questions circulated around superior courts of record because they 
have an institutional mandate to maintain a conclusive ‘testimony of all 
that has taken place’.20 As a matter of common and constitutional law, 
courts of record can unmake and redecide decisions that are otherwise 
determinative, and the ‘record’ of their own proceedings is limited by, 
and subject to, legal requirements.21 Superior courts of record are guided 
by the civil law principle of ‘open court’, which encourages the public 
to witness the court’s functions to promote the rule of law so that justice 
can be seen to be done. Federal superior courts of record are also subject 
to other constitutional imperatives, such as the principle of separation of 
powers. However, they must also respond to competing legal imperatives 
that arise because of the diverse accrued national jurisdictions, notably 
the right of individual litigants to privacy; the need to respect Indigenous 
control of cultural knowledge; the maintenance of legal professional 
privilege; and the protection of copyright. These matters of jurisdiction 
carry deeper public law issues underlying the institutional role of federal 
superior courts of record that are civic, as well as constitutional. When 
resolving disputes between parties (whether between individual citizens 
or between a citizen and the state), a federal superior court of record 
inevitably has an impact beyond those parties, through the democratic 
values it espouses and pronounces, the methods of administrative and 
judicial decision-making undertaken, as well as its engagement as one 
arm of government in the overall constitutional make-up of the state. 
The documents produced by and for federal superior courts of record as 
a result of litigation, which must be recorded, clearly have significance 
beyond the resolution of disputes. They are also rich records of public 
interest and importance about the relationship between the individual 
20  Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of 
Edward I (Cambridge University Press, 1898), vol 1, 688.
21  Historically, only certain decision-making bodies create a ‘record’ for the purposes of judicial 
review. See Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163; Kirk v Industrial Court of New 
South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531; and Automative, Food Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred 
Industries Union v ALS Industrial Australia Pty Ltd (2015) 234 FCR 305.
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and the state that are not readily accessible elsewhere, as the ‘archival turn’ 
across scholarship in legal history and theory has demonstrated. However, 
through our experience as researchers, we were also aware that there is no 
comprehensive, national approach or principled framework to administer 
or recognise how the preservation of a court’s documents and records may 
also act as an archive of Australian jurisprudence, of Australian citizenship 
and of Australian civic life.22
It was these issues and contradictions that we had to place centrally, 
rather than to the side, while considering appropriate methods for the 
project. For example, while the principle of open court is well established 
in Australia, there is no common law right of access to court records.23 
Significantly, court records are also exempt from the operation of the 
Archives Act 1983 (Cth) (‘Archives Act’), despite a recommendation to the 
contrary.24 The complex, inconsistent and restrictive regime governing 
public access to court records across Australian jurisdictions has attracted 
concern, and different kinds of response, from public lawyers and scholars 
22  Despite urgent and repeated calls for action (see, for example, Bellis, above n 19; Ernst Willheim, 
‘Are Our Courts Truly Open?’ (2002) 13(3) Public Law Review 191; Ernst Willheim, ‘Australian legal 
procedures and the protection of secret Aboriginal spiritual beliefs: a fundamental conflict’ in Peter 
Cane, Carolyn Evans, and Zoe Robinson (eds), Law and Religion in Theoretical and Historical Context 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008), doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511493843.010; Justine Twomey, 
‘Legal and practical considerations in managing access to materials held by NTRBs and Land 
Councils’ (Speech delivered at the National Native Title Conference 2007, Cairns, 6–8 June 2007) 
<http://ntru.aiatsis.gov.au/collections/pdfs/AIATSIS %20Native%20Title%20Conference%20
Materials%20Access%20Policy%20J%20Twomey.pdf>), no comprehensive, national approach or 
principled framework for administering access to court records exists. Preliminary work towards a 
state access regime in Victoria was initiated in 2005 (County Court of Victoria, Discussion Paper: 
Access to Court Records (2005)), without large impact on public access rights. In NSW, the Court 
Information Act 2010 (NSW) was passed in July 2010, but is still not in force, with acknowledgement 
by the relevant standing committee that the root of the delay lies in the unresolved ‘contradiction 
in the act between open information and privacy’ (Richard Coleman, quoted in Nicola Shaver, 
‘How privacy hobbles push for open justice’, The Australian (online) 3 June 2011 <https://www.
the australian.com.au/business/legal-affairs/how-privacy-hobbles-push-for-open-justice/news-story/
fe622d 88862f6cd810f6f0512a8ff940?sv=7cb3819c07653fff99a97c9ca992109d>). At the same 
time, no specific consideration has been given to the structural or practical implications of the 
mounting judicial records of Indigenous knowledge on file. As Willheim points out, Australian law 
has ‘failed to resolve a fundamental conflict between, on the one hand basic common law values 
including openness and transparency in public administration … and on the other hand, Aboriginal 
religious value, in particular, the secret nature of much Aboriginal religious belief ’. This research will 
assist in developing that principled framework for federal SCORs and will also be of value to broad 
conceptual and practical application in other jurisdictions.
23  Public Service Board (NSW) v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656.
24  A recent discussion of the development of the Archives Act and which documents would be 
exempt can be seen in the judgment of Griffith J in Hocking v Director-General of National Archives 
of Australia [2018] FCA 340, [29]–[36] in the context of assessing access to certain documents of the 
office of the Governor-General.
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of court administration,25 the judiciary,26 government27 and the media.28 
In general, these responses argue that without the ability to meaningfully 
witness the judicial process, the operation of open justice—famously 
called the ‘hallmark of the common law system’29—is significantly 
curtailed, and the institutional legitimacy30 and public confidence31 
held in these superior courts is compromised. The absence of public 
access to the records of ‘public interest claims’ under adjudication32 
also has detrimental consequences for understanding the court’s role in 
promoting the rule of law and judicial process, as well as societal norms 
and behavioural standards.
There are also procedural problems, perhaps less publicly debated, that 
complicate these questions. Court procedures designed to enhance the 
efficiency of judicial administration now commonly require evidence 
in chief by way of affidavit. Written submissions are filed without oral 
explanation and pleadings are not ordinarily read in full.33 Even meaningful 
public access to oral evidence is frequently now sought via the written 
record as few people now attend judicial proceedings,34 and the severe 
truncation of spoken evidence has made ‘the adjudicative process less 
and less comprehensible to the person in the public gallery’.35 Similarly, 
substantive media and academic access has been curtailed, further limiting 
public access to information about courts’ daily business. Therefore, the 
complexity for courts to uphold their constitutional duties and, at the same 
time, recognise the function the records play for the public (historical or 
otherwise) speaks to profound issues underpinning civics and citizenship 
25  Bellis, above n 19; Willheim (2002), above n 22; Sharon Rodrick, ‘Open Justice, the Media and 
Avenues of Access to Documents on the Court Record’ [2006] University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 40.
26  McCabe v British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited [2002] VSC 150.
27  Australian Law Reform Commission, Australia’s Federal Record: A Review of Archives Act 1983, 
Report No 85 (1998); Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy 
Law and Practice, Report No 108 (2008); New South Wales Attorney-General’s Department, Review 
of the Policy of Access to Court Information, Discussion Paper (2006).
28  Chris McLeod, ‘Reporting the courts’ (2006) 15(2) Australian Press Council News 10.
29  Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348.
30  JJ Spigelman, ‘Seen to be Done: The Principle of Open Justice’ (2000) 74 Australian Law 
Journal 290.
31  Beverley McLachlin, ‘Courts, Transparency and Public Confidence—To the Better Administration 
of Justice’ (2003) 8(1) Deakin Law Review 1.
32  See, for example, Habib v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) (2009) 175 FCR 350.
33  Willheim (2002), above n 22.
34  Rodrick, above n 25, 90.
35  McCabe [2002] VSC 150, [19]. 
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in our own time. As civil law scholar Hazel Genn has explained, ‘for civil 
justice to perform its public role—to cast its shadow—adjudication and 
public promulgation of decisions are critical’.36
An Institutional, Interdisciplinary Method
In addressing these problems, our project placed at the centre of its 
inquiry the unique institutional role of the Federal Court of Australia 
and how it  is distinct from other bodies that produce and curate 
comparable records of rich national significance. We were, in short, 
interested in the Federal Court as a legal institution: how it developed 
(as a matter of jurisprudence and history) and how it now operates and 
exists in relationship not only with the people it serves, but also with 
other institutions that share responsibilities for civic organisation and 
experience in Australia, and over time. This institutional approach had 
a unique starting point. As an interdisciplinary team, with expertise in 
citizenship and public law doctrine and jurisprudence (Kim Rubenstein); 
empirical court-based and historical archival research (Ann Genovese); 
and evidence law and documentary theory (Trish Luker), it seemed to 
us that to consider the role and duties of ‘a court as archive’ necessitated 
scrutiny of the Federal Court’s own administrative practices, rather than 
the rich seam of litigation materials the court also holds that are more 
usually the subject of scholarly and public inquiry. 
Our central contention has been that through viewing the operational 
decisions taken by the court, over time, it is possible to learn a great deal 
more about its past, present and future priorities. These priorities pertain 
to file management and record-keeping practices, as well as how the court 
has imagined itself and its relationship to the public, including how it 
grapples with the challenges of a what ‘an archive’ currently signifies in 
a settler colony like Australia.
To do this, we examined internal operational documents of the court 
housed at its registries, and documents about the court’s relationship 
with other branches of government and agencies housed at the National 
Archives of Australia (NAA). We did this to understand, and be able to 
tell a story about, how administrative decisions have been taken over time 
about what materials should be retained, how they are stored, how they 
36  Hazel Genn, Judging Civil Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 21.
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are organised and classified, and whether, how and by whom they can or 
should now be made accessible to broader society. We report on some 
of our findings in our respective chapters in this collection.
In undertaking this empirical archival work, there was a puzzle to piece 
together about which internal (and litigation) records are not currently 
available, to ask where they are held and why, and whether they have 
been subject to archival practices. We were reminded why scholars need 
more than official records to analyse and tell stories about their experience 
of institutions. In the case of the Federal Court of Australia, there are 
very few biographies, memoirs, public opinion pieces, scholarly articles 
or contemporary histories yet written that address the court as a national 
institution (in the ways that our project seeks to do) that we could draw 
on and that might help us contextualise these documentary traces and 
omissions. In addition, although there are farewell speeches by judges in 
open access, and also interviews undertaken with judges on the occasion 
of their retirement, for the most part, these form part of the court’s own 
internal archive and are not available for public disclosure.37 Further, and 
surprisingly for an institution that is only 40 years old, there are no records, 
beyond the files, of how court administrators or officers understood 
and experienced their duties, and perceived the court’s responsibilities: 
whether to the immediate question of our research (record management) 
or to what the records signified and carried, and for whom. What we 
noticed in undertaking our own archival research was an absence of oral 
histories about the Federal Court as an institution that mediates the 
relations between Australian people and their law. This has meant that 
to undertake our project aims adequately, we had to create sources of our 
own. We undertook oral histories with court officers rather than judges 
for the simple reason that these lives lived with law are generally under-
represented in scholarly conceptualisations of court histories, or in any 
archive broadly conceived.38 In conducting these interviews, we perceived 
37  The exceptions to this are Michael Black, ‘The Federal Court of Australia: The First 
30 Years—A Survey on the Occasion of Two Anniversaries’ (2007) 31(3) Melbourne University Law 
Review 1017; and Susan Kenny, ‘Federal Courts and Australian National Identity’ (2015) 38(3) 
Melbourne University Law Review 996.
38  These interviews are unique in an Australian setting. While county and state courts in the United 
States appear to publish recorded interviews with court officers on a range of issues, it is not a practice 
common to Australian courts. The Federal Court has started to undertake oral histories with some of 
its retiring judges; these are on file with the court, but are not open to the public at this time. Some of 
the women who have been judges in the Federal Court of Australia have been interviewed in another 
ARC project for the National Library of Australia’s oral history collection. See Kim Rubenstein, 




them clearly as oral histories, where our interview subjects’ life experience 
and professional experience could be considered in relationship to each 
other and, once recorded, could become a ‘significant part of our collective 
public memory’.39 The interviews we conducted have been included in 
this collection.
The Court as Archive Collection
In February 2016, we convened the Court as Archive Symposium to 
provide an opportunity to report on our research findings up to that point 
and to engage in roundtable discussions with scholars, archivists, judges 
and administrators of courts and tribunals who share intellectual and 
administrative concerns in their own work and practices.40 Participants 
were invited because of their important contributions to the field. These 
included senior members of the judiciary, court and public administration 
from Australia and Canada: the Hon Michael Black AC QC, former 
Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Australia; Warwick Soden OAM, 
Principal Registrar and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Court 
of  Australia; Ian Irving, then Native Title Registrar, Federal Court of 
Australia; Barbara Kincaid, General Counsel, Supreme Court of Canada; 
and Ernst Willheim, Visiting Fellow at ANU, who had headed several 
policy and professional divisions in the Australian Attorney-General’s 
Department. The concerns and perspectives of key archival and research 
institutions were addressed by Anne Lyons, Assistant Director-General, 
NAA; Dr Pamela McGrath, then Research Director, National Native 
Title Tribunal; Grace Koch, previous Director of Research, Australian 
Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies; and Mr Michael 
Piggott, a former Senior Archivist at the NAA with extensive experience 
in major archives and library institutions. Scholarly contributors joined 
us from the fields of law, jurisprudence, archival theory and history, and 
are represented by their chapters in this collection and discussed in more 
detail below. On the day, we were also joined by Katherine Biber (Law, 
University of Technology Sydney), Emma Cunliffe (Law, University of 
39  Kim Rubenstein, ‘“Alive in the Telling”: Trailblazing Women Lawyers’ Lives, Lived with Law’ 
(2016) 20 Law Text Culture 66, 70.
40  The Court as Archive Symposium, ANU College of Law, The Australian National University, 
17 February 2016.
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British Columbia) and Shaun McVeigh (Melbourne Law School), whose 
presentations were not developed for this collection, but whose work has 
been a valuable input to our thinking.41
The symposium was closely convened to provide productive engagement 
with the themes of the Court as Archive Project. We asked participants 
to consider specific questions in relation to three key areas around which 
the symposium was structured, as a way of focusing attention on the 
particular and unique issues relevant to our research. These themes were 
intended to draw together consideration of diverse institutional, legal and 
scholarly responsibilities around how courts and their records can also 
be understood as archives of national, and transnational, significance. 
The collection draws its arrangement from these themes, discussed below.
Public Law and Citizenship
The collection opens with the theme of public law and citizenship, linking 
court records to public law principles. This theme raises questions about 
the role of Chapter III courts and whether this can be extended to deepen 
our understanding of their function as guardians and producers of the 
civic experience, as well as the expectations of the Australian litigants who 
come before them. In ‘Court Records, Archives and Citizenship’, Kim 
Rubenstein (with Andrew Henderson) illustrates the importance of the 
Federal Court’s records as an archival resource by exploring its role within 
a broader context where it contributes to understandings of citizenship. 
As a superior court of record, the Federal Court performs a fundamentally 
important role within Australia’s democratic system. It has served as a site 
for the disputation, negotiation and resolution of issues important to 
Australian society. It does so in the context of a constitutional system 
affirming the principle of the separation of powers and the rule of law 
as a  means of preserving and enforcing the rights of individuals and 
navigating the boundaries of the powers of the state. In that context, its 
records, gathered both through the internal workings of the court and 
through the cases that come before it, contain a narrative shaping our 
contemporary understanding of the rights of the individual and the role of 
the state. It is this relationship that is central to a conception of Australian 
citizenship. Citizenship in Australia, as described by Kim Rubenstein 
41  Other participants who did not present papers on the day include Hollie Kerwin (who did 




through her broader scholarship,42 and in this chapter, represents an 
understanding of the changing balance between the power of the state 
(including its responsibilities and duties to its citizenry) and the citizen’s 
rights in relation to the state. Given that the Federal Court hears matters 
that reflect on and are central to that relationship, through contestation 
around federal laws that regulate and determine that relationship, the 
importance of its records in that narrative is key. Yet the preservation of 
and access to the Federal Court’s records continue to be seen through the 
lens of traditional understandings of the management of litigation. 
The ability of individuals to access records of court proceedings is the 
subject of Ernst Willheim’s contribution, ‘Aspects of Citizen Access to 
Court Archives’. Willheim, a former senior lawyer in the Australian 
Attorney-General’s Department, has unique legal and administrative 
insight into the consideration of court records as they exist in relationship 
to the principles of the separation of powers and open justice. In this 
chapter, he argues that the insistence on preventing access to records of 
proceedings is at odds both with the appearance of judicial independence 
and the implied freedom of political communication. In doing so, he 
provides a number of examples where maladministration in government 
may be concealed by the rigid application of existing controls of access to 
affidavit evidence and submissions. 
In ‘When the Carnival is Over: The Case for Reform of Access to 
Royal Commission Records’, public lawyers Hollie Kerwin and Maya 
Narayan investigate the unique role and status of royal commissions as 
archives. As executive bodies, royal commissions may be characterised 
as public record-keeping institutions. However, their central function of 
receiving evidence, often coerced, raises important questions about the 
appropriateness of public access to their records, notwithstanding their 
distinctive characterisation as public events intended to facilitate truth-
telling. Kerwin and Narayan argue that considering the royal commission 
as an archive raises risks, opportunities and imperatives for continued 
remembrance of significant public issues, critical engagement with state 
archives, as well as unpacking the royal commission as an instrument of 
government. The authors propose a sui generis regime for the management 
of and access to royal commission records involving a cooperative 
scheme between the Commonwealth and the states, supported by 
42  See Kim Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship Law (Thomson Reuters, 2nd ed, 2017).
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referrals of legislative power from the states. They remind and encourage 
policymakers to transcend the complex institutional identity of the royal 
commission, rather than accepting it as an organising principle to provide 
greater certainty around the management of archival material, and to set 
a benchmark for community expectations of records management during, 
and after, the life of a royal commission.
Histories and Jurisprudence of Australia
The second section of the book turns attention to the limits and 
possibilities of courts as archives from the vantage point of scholarly 
practice and production. Here, Ann Genovese, Susan Priest and Narrelle 
Morris, all Australian historians who are also legal scholars, consider what 
it means to publicise and attend to the records of courts, to write about 
how those records tell stories about the relationships between Australians 
and their law. They each consider distinct archives and institutions and 
the vulnerabilities of these institutions’ records and materials. Reading 
their papers together enables consideration of broader questions about 
the conduct and establishment of legal institutions and jurisdictions 
in an under-theorised and under-researched aspect of the 20th century in 
Australia. The section also offers insight into how Australian historians of 
jurisprudence and law reflect on questions of temporality, method and 
duty in their own archival and narrative practices, often in response to the 
nature of materials preserved and available to tell the story.
In ‘A Matter of Records: The Federal Court, The National Archives and 
“The National Estate” in the 1970s’, Ann Genovese uses materials drawn 
from the Court as Archive Project to give a short history of the institutional 
provenance of the Federal Court, the NAA and their relationship to each 
other. Despite the Federal Court being officially exempt from the Archives 
Act, which established the NAA, both were conceived as consciously 
modern ‘Australian’ institutions and shared a material concern with 
records that drew them into association. In telling this story, Genovese 
offers one of the only histories of the Federal Court’s establishment, 
written from archives and by a historian. In doing so, she also offers 
a side note about method and practice. She demonstrates and exemplifies 
that the records necessary to write modern histories of jurisprudence are 
precarious, contingent and require our attention, offering a particular 
view of writing histories. Genovese contends that fragmentation in the 
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way the documents are kept itself requires careful documentation and 
opens the historiographical conversation about the forms and nature of 
sources and records adequate to represent our past for the present.
Susan Priest locates her narrative and methodological inquiries in the 
High Court of Australia in its earliest years. In ‘Framing the Archives as 
Evidence: A Study of Correspondence Documenting the Place of Australia’s 
Original High Court in a New Commonwealth Polity’, Priest examines 
the archives of written communications that lead the original justices 
of the High Court, Chief Justice Samuel Griffith and Justices Edmund 
Barton and Richard O’Connor, in May 1905, to adjourn proceedings 
and famously ‘go on strike’. She examines the official correspondence—
namely, formal court and departmental letters—as well as the personal 
correspondence of the court at the time. For Priest, the personal nature 
of correspondence in the High Court’s archival collection is a rich source 
of detailed information not only about historical events, but also about 
the individuals involved. Alongside the historical narrative, Priest is also 
offering a careful consideration of her methods, and her relationship as 
a historian to the materiality of the available archive, through the questions 
that arise when ‘reading other people’s mail’. 
The ‘national interest’ has been a constant factor and idea in the state’s 
creation and preservation of records, as well as how it controls those 
same records to guard the ‘security’ of its citizens.43 In ‘Accessing 
the Archives of the Australian War Crimes Trials after World War II’, 
Narrelle Morris explores the creation and management of the extensive 
records of Australian war crimes trials conducted after World War II. 
Through short vignettes that describe the shifting relationships between 
Australia and Japan, as much as those between the institutions of the 
Australian Government, Morris demonstrates that despite the ‘public’ 
nature of Australian war crimes proceedings, they were later classified as 
confidential national records (not court records), and of such international 
political consequence that they had to be ‘zealously protected’ until our 
own times. In exploring the histories of archival access and international 
relationships, Morris, like Genovese and Priest, also offers insights into her 
own duties and practices as a historian. She shows how ‘protectionism as 
43  The control of access to those records is central to the recent Federal Court decision of Hocking 
[2018] FCA 340 in assessing the request for early access to the letters between the Governor-General, 
Sir John Kerr and the Queen around the dismissal by the Governor-General of the Prime Minister, 
Gough Whitlam.
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confidentiality’ operated to tell a history running parallel to the expected 
narrative of the trials themselves. Morris demonstrates how this has had 
‘an indelible effect on knowledge’, and it is only now that we can see in 
this tale of archival refusal how Australia may still have some way to go in 
coming to terms with what it means to recognise that a complex national 
past, in which government is an actor, ‘should be everyone’s property’, as 
Morris quotes former Attorney-General Kep Enderby from 1975.
Administration of Legal Records: Duties and 
Recommendations
In the final section of the book, we return to our project’s research 
objectives. We do so by drawing into the discussion the practices of 
archival use and production, public law and public value and meaning, 
with accounts of how legal records are administered. Central to this 
section is the description of, and commentary on, the problems of 
modern legal institutions in coming to terms with their public role as 
‘an archive’. As a whole, this section asks the questions: How might we 
reconcile, as a matter of policy, practice and theory, the current tensions 
and future problems that occur in relation to legal records as archival 
material, especially in settler colonial states? And, can we think between 
different public institutions, and in different jurisdictions, to address these 
questions responsively? The chapters take two different approaches to 
address these questions. The first is directly institutional: the oral history 
interviews we conducted as part of our research, including an interview 
with Warwick Soden, the current, and only the second, CEO (previously 
Principal Registrar) of the Federal Court of Australia; and a joint interview 
with Louise Anderson (the first) and Ian Irving (the second) Native Title 
Registrars at the Federal Court. We chose to interview Ian and Louise 
together to draw out the collaborative role they played in centring the 
archival responsibility for the court in the late 1990s, and also to examine 
their shared (but different) experiences in undertaking these roles. Read 
together, the interviews demonstrate the centrality of procedural and 
institutional reforms at the Federal Court in its recent history. These 
reforms relate to practice directions and trial management as much as 
the reconsideration of the formal agreements between agencies regarding 
custodianship and preservation of court records. The interviews also clearly 
give an account of how a court record is not only legally determined, but 
also creates and maintains the conduct of law that lies beneath each matter 
the court must determine. In addition, the interviews also contribute to 
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the history of the Federal Court more generally, giving insight into topics 
such as the transition to administrative independence from the executive 
arm of government, and the introduction of a native title jurisdiction. 
In different ways, we see what the legal professional conduct of an official 
life looks like, and the differences in time, location and gender in how 
those roles have been created and executed.
Therefore, court archives, in any form, are clearly not an impersonal or 
dehumanised collection of data but tell real stories about real people. 
Acknowledgement of what legal records carry, particularly in native title 
matters, has implications for litigants. However, as noted in the interview 
with Louise Anderson and Ian Irving, in a different way, it also has 
particular implications for those court officials charged with responsibility 
to institutionally care for the records. In ‘Providing Public Access to 
Native Title Records: Balancing the Risks Against the Benefits’, Pamela 
McGrath asks similar questions from her experience as an anthropologist 
who has worked in the field alongside Indigenous claimants and in her 
role as Research Director at the Native Title Tribunal. McGrath discusses 
some of the ethical concerns associated with the extensive archive 
of litigation materials and research reports produced for native title 
determinations in Australia. She argues that the potential significance and 
value of these collections far exceeds their original function as records of 
litigation, mediation and evidence gathering. Although there are some 
compelling reasons for making these records publicly available, there are 
many challenges around doing so. The chapter summarises, describes and 
complicates these from the perspective of a tribunal (rather than a court). 
McGrath argues that a seemingly incommensurable array of legal, 
cultural and ethical obligations around privacy and cultural authority are 
complicated by an overarching imperative to provide transparent justice. 
However, she concludes that the development of any future access policy 
for the Native Title Tribunal must recognise that ‘a fundamental intention 
of the [Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)] is to provide for the advancement and 
protection of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, and to progress 
the process of reconciliation among all Australians’. As such, McGrath 
reminds, and we agree, that it is ‘incumbent on those of us who are 
responsible for developing policy to put those interests and relationships 
at the centre of all decisions about the fate of native title records’.
In ‘Archiving Revolution: Historical Records Management in the 
Massachusetts Courts’, Andrew Henderson provides a comparative 
assessment of the treatment of court records as valuable social and 
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cultural records of the pre- and post-revolutionary United States by 
superior courts in Massachusetts. Massachusetts’ superior courts hold 
colonial records of civil and criminal proceedings as far back as the 17th 
century. The sheer volume of paper records, and the haphazard manner in 
which they had been collected and preserved, meant that Massachusetts 
courts were confronted with a challenging question about the application 
of resources for ongoing preservation and retention. Through a careful 
process of inspection and sampling, Massachusetts superior courts have 
sought to preserve a representative sample of almost 300 years of records. 
Although the Federal Court does not face the same substantial volume 
of materials, the experience of the Massachusetts courts illuminates some 
important considerations when determining a policy for the management 
of nationally significant records. 
In ‘Sentencing Acts: Appraisal of Court Records in Canada and 
Australia’, Trish Luker considers the role of courts as archives through 
an examination of approaches to appraisal and disposal of court records. 
Identifying a number of disputes over the preservation and destruction 
of records from legal inquiries and court processes from the Australian 
and Canadian contexts, she argues that these disputes highlight 
questions  about responsibilities in relation to preservation, curation, 
storage and access to records. While legal principles and obligations are 
necessary and important requirements for courts’ approaches to decisions 
about appraisal and disposal of records, Luker argues that courts can 
benefit from approaches reflected in contemporary archival theory, which 
recognises appraisal choices as political and ethical.
Finally, we conclude the book with a memorandum written for the 
Federal Court, with advice on a process for the selection of significant 
matters for its records authority regarding its archival responsibilities. 
The  advice is the culmination of our empirical work and thinking on 
the basis of the research conducted for the project. We include it in 
the collection, as a postscript, and in its form as a memorandum, as an 
official response from us as academic researchers to those charged with 
the responsibilities of administration of the significant files of the Federal 
Court into the future.
21
INTRODuCTION
The Court as Archive: Future Directions
As we finalise this book for publication, it is remarkable to reflect on the 
11 years that have passed since the CIPL symposium that ignited the 
project. That decade represents significant developments in scholarship 
around ‘the archive’, which we have been able to engage with, contribute 
to and draw upon to extend and grapple with our central research 
questions. Indeed, as we review the final proofs, judicial attention to the 
interpretation of the Archives Act itself has been of public interest through 
Jenny Hocking’s application to the Federal Court to review the decision 
of the NAA to refuse early access to what has been described as the ‘palace 
letters’.44 Throughout this project, with the benefit of the ARC grant, 
we have conducted extensive research with the support of our capable 
research assistants throughout the process, Peter Moore and Andrew 
Henderson. We have created an extensive database that has informed 
our approach and we have developed a protocol for the Federal Court’s 
consideration. This protocol reflects a methodology that recognises the 
relationship between records; the archive and the public it reflects; and 
the citizenry who benefit from understanding what it represents, both 
individually and institutionally, to the Australian community.
The research conducted for the Court as Archive Project has enabled us to 
interpret and clarify the institutional purpose and civic responsibilities of 
Australian superior courts of record through an analysis of their archival 
role. Therefore, this collection reflects and responds to our interest in 
the citizenship principles informing Australia’s evolution as a democratic 
society through the empirically based qualitative analysis of the Federal 
Court’s own archival practices. It has enabled us to engage with the 
question of how superior courts of record can address the demands of the 
Australian people who come before it.
In that sense, this book represents a significant moment, for it is the first 
time since its establishment in 1976 that the unique role of the Federal 
Court has been chosen for analysis as a site of production of significant 
national archives. In our view, this is the first step towards producing an 
institutional history of the Federal Court, which we believe needs further 
analysis to demonstrate how its constitutional role, and the way this 
44  See Hocking [2018] FCA 340; and Michaela Whitbourn, ‘Federal Court deals blow to early 
release of Palace Papers’ Sydney Morning Herald (online), 16 March 2018 <https://www.smh.com.au/
politics/federal/federal-court-deals-blow-to-early-release-of-palace-papers-20180316-p4z4r3.html>.
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has been interpreted by those responsible for its operations, reveals and 
complicates our thinking about the state and its relationship and duties 
to citizens.
Indeed, the content in our extensive database created from this research 
will be a rich resource on which to draw to inform future oral histories that 
should be undertaken, together with further research on the significance 
of Federal Court as an institution. It is research that will benefit from 
bringing multiple perspectives to bear on important civic projects that 
help Australia identify and come to terms with its own citizenship—its 
own institutional story, as a nation, grappling with its past, enlivened in 
doing so by focusing on the meanings attributed to, and use of, the court 
as an archive.
In conclusion, it is important to consider that as the papers for this book 
were being finalised and brought to completion in 2017, the Federal 
Court itself marked its 40th anniversary. This is a telling reminder that the 
questions we collectively engaged with in The Court as Archive are ongoing. 
Indeed, the issues relevant to our present inquiries will themselves become 
of archival value. The material gathered in the Court as Archive Project, 
and the conversations with collaborators represented in this book, will 
also enable future researchers to assess and analyse how, from 2008 to 
2019, we conceived of our own roles as active research citizens, committed 
to understanding the relationships between people and their institutions, 
in the past, present and for the future.





Court Records, Archives 
and Citizenship
Kim Rubenstein and Andrew Henderson
Introduction
The Federal Court of Australia performs a fundamentally important role 
within Australia’s democratic system. Since its commencement in 1977, 
it has served as a site for the disputation, negotiation and resolution of 
issues centrally important to Australian society. It does so in the context 
of a constitutional system affirming the separation of powers and the 
rule of law, as well as providing individuals an avenue to preserve and 
enforce their rights, and navigate the boundaries of the powers of the 
state. As  a  ‘court of record’, the records of its proceedings constitute 
a permanent and incontrovertible record of those events. In that context, 
its records, gathered both through the internal workings of the court and 
through the cases that come before it, contain a narrative shaping our 
contemporary understanding of the rights of the individual and the role 
of the state. In many ways, this is a record of the evolution of Australian 
citizenship.
Although originally invested with a similar jurisdiction to the High 
Court,1 over those 40 years, the Federal Court has experienced successive 
reforms to its jurisdiction in a diverse array of legal frameworks, including 
1  Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B.
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the review of government action;2 access to government information;3 
the regulation of corporations;4 the control of personal information;5 
Indigenous ownership of land;6 migration;7 and national security.8 This has 
seen the Federal Court accumulate a significant jurisdiction concerning 
important aspects of those disputations, negotiations and resolutions of 
issues central to the evolution of the Australian community.
However, despite those transformations in the Federal Court itself and 
the  important position it holds in our democratic system, accessing 
its records remains bound by traditional ideas of court files. Unlike 
bureaucratic and administrative records of government, access to which 
has been uniformly administered by the National Archives of Australia 
(NAA) under the Archives Act 1983 (Cth) (‘Archives Act’), the application 
of the doctrine of separation of powers embodied within the Australian 
Constitution has meant that the management of Commonwealth courts’ 
records of proceedings are administered by the courts themselves.9 
Therefore, access to records of proceedings is inconsistent between 
the executive and legislative arms of government on the one hand, and the 
judiciary on the other. 
Current access arrangements for the public, at least for court records 
over 20 years old, are also somewhat inconsistent. Although records of 
proceedings are not subject to the Archives Act,10 it does not mean that 
some of the materials that might currently be unavailable from the Federal 
Court are in fact unavailable from NAA. Within the records held by NAA 
exists agencies’ own records of litigation, including affidavits, copies of 
2  Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (‘Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act’).
3  Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth).
4  Michael Whincop, ‘The National Scheme for Corporations and the Referral of Powers: 
A Sceptical View’ (2001) 12(4) Public Law Review 263; Cheryl Saunders, ‘A New Direction for 
Intergovernmental Arrangements’ (2001) 12(1) Public Law Review 274.
5  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).
6  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (‘Native Title Act’).
7  Sigrid Baringhorst, ‘Policies of Backlash: Recent Shifts in Australian Migration Policy’ (2004) 
6(2) Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 131.
8  George Williams, ‘A Decade of Australian anti-Terror Laws’ (2011) 35 Melbourne University 
Law Review 1136; Paul Fairall and Wendy Lacey, ‘Preventative Detention and Control Orders under 
Federal Law: The Case for a Bill of Rights’ (2007) 31 Melbourne University Law Review 1072.
9  Archives Act s 19.
10  Ibid.
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exhibits and submissions that would be unavailable from the Federal 
Court.11 Nevertheless, this material is presumptively publicly available 
under the Archives Act. The reason for the inconsistency is not clear.
This inconsistency sits uncomfortably with ideas about open justice 
and does not sufficiently take into account the Federal Court’s role in 
Australia’s democratic framework beyond its role in determining disputes 
between the parties before it. The current approach of the Federal Court 
to its records, to its ‘archive’, we argue, represents and perpetuates the 
position of citizens as unequal ‘subjects’ and limits access to this rich and 
unique set of materials. It also limits society’s capacity to better describe 
and understand its own history of how citizenship has been shaped in 
Australia, both broadly and through the Federal Court’s work.
The Federal Court and Australian Citizenship
As Justice Susan Kenny explains,12 the origins of the Federal Court are 
often  identified in the proceedings of the Australian Legal Convention 
in 1963. In a paper to the convention, Maurice Byers and Paul Toose 
argued for the creation of a new ‘federal court’. The new court would be 
inferior to the High Court of Australia but vested with jurisdiction to 
hear and determine matters both in its original and appellate jurisdiction 
arising under Commonwealth law.13 In the convention proceedings 
that followed, the Commonwealth Solicitor-General announced that 
the Attorney-General, Garfield Barwick, had been given ‘authority 
[by  Cabinet] to design a new federal court’.14 However, as research 
conducted by the Court as Archive Project demonstrates, the convention 
was neither the first nor the last word on the new court. The project’s 
research also further reveals and affirms Justice Kenny’s observations on 
the development of an ‘Australian national identity’ as a driver for the 
creation of the Federal Court.
11  See, for example, the records of proceedings in Law v Repatriation Commission (1980) 29 
ALR 64 and Repatriation Commission v Law (1980) 31 ALR 140 contained in National Archives 
of Australia (NAA): A1209, 1980/558 PART 1 and NAA: A12930, 639.
12  Susan Kenny, ‘Federal Courts and Australian National Identity’ (2015) 38(3) Melbourne 
University Law Review 996; see also Michael Black, ‘The Federal Court of Australia: The First 
30 Years—A Survey on the Occasion of Two Anniversaries’ (2007) 31 Melbourne University Law 
Review 1017.
13  Maurice Byers and Paul Toose, ‘The Necessity for a New Federal Court (A Survey of the Federal 
Court System in Australia)’ (1963) 36 Australian Law Journal 308.
14  Ibid 325.
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Moreover, as Ann Genovese notes in her chapter in this collection, the 
first references to a new federal court appeared in 1959 in parliamentary 
debate on the territories and family law. Barwick had first proposed the 
establishment of a ‘new federal court’ to Cabinet in 1962, two months before 
the convention, noting that it was something that he had been working 
on ‘for some time’.15 Although the Solicitor-General’s statement to the 
convention was expressed in unconditional terms, the Prime Minister’s own 
department and the Cabinet were less enthusiastic. The breadth of the new 
court’s role led the Prime Minister’s Department to note on the submission 
that it went ‘too far, too soon’ and instead recommended examination by 
a committee.16 Barwick’s Cabinet colleagues ‘noted’ (rather than agreed 
to) the submission and authorised the Attorney-General to prepare draft 
legislation on conditions, including that all Ministers reserved ‘all rights to 
argue for or against the proposal’ (emphasis added).17 
Despite the laudatory announcement of the creation of a new court, at 
least within legal circles, the progress developing legislation to establish 
the new court following its first appearance in Cabinet was fitful. 
The proposal was prone to ongoing revision, particularly around the 
establishment of a ‘big court’ (superseding other Commonwealth courts 
and sitting continuously in capital cities) or a ‘small court’ (a ‘peripatetic’ 
court with a much smaller jurisdiction)18 and competing priorities.19 With 
successive general elections, responsibility for advancing the proposal also 
transferred between five Attorneys-General and a series of public servants, 
some of whom pressed enthusiastically for the creation of a new court,20 
15  The Federal Judicature—Proposed New Court—Submission 461, Minute 581, NAA: A5819, 
VOLUME 12/AGENDUM 461. Interestingly, Byers and Toose, who would subsequently advocate 
for the new court at the Convention that followed, appear to have provided advice to Barwick in 
preparing his Cabinet Submission; see NAA: A432, 1961/2132 Part 1.
16  NAA: A5619, C430.
17  NAA: A5819, VOLUME 12/AGENDUM 461. Barwick appears to have argued later that he 
had never agreed to those conditions (see NAA: A4940, C3706). In an article published after the 
Cabinet decision in the Federal Law Review, Barwick maintained that the new court should assume 
responsibility for industrial relations and bankruptcy, contrary to Cabinet’s ‘authority’; see Garfield 
Barwick, ‘The  Australian Judicial System: The Proposed New Federal Superior Court’ (1964) 1(1) 
Federal Law Review 1. Barwick’s interpretation of the Cabinet decision might also explain the question 
mark in the margin of a departmental memorandum to the Attorney-General repeating the condition 
(see HT Bennett, ‘Federal Superior Court: General Observations’, NAA: A432, 1961/2132 Part 1). 
18  For a discussion of the comparative elements of a ‘big court’ and a ‘small court’ model, see Bennett, 
above n 17 and Barwick, above n 17.
19  See, for example, Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 29 October 
1964, 2642 (William Snedden, Attorney-General) and ‘Extract from Minutes of Meeting of Executive 
of the Law Council of Australia, Canberra, March 1965’, NAA: A432, 1961/2132 Part 1.
20  See, for example, Letter from Attorney-General to Minister for Housing, Health and 
Immigration, 2 January 1969, NAA: A432; 1961/2132 Part 8. 
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while others recommended its abandonment.21 The withdrawal of support 
for a new court by its original architect, Garfield Barwick, now Chief 
Justice of the High Court, also hung heavily over the proposal’s success.22
However, these skirmishes over the form of the new court, and the 
on-and-off nature of its development, conceal the development of 
the consistent line of argument running through all discussions 
about the motivations for its establishment: the development of a more 
coherent body of ‘Australian’ (rather than state-based) jurisprudence 
driven by the formation of a  national identity. For example, in their 
presentation to the convention, Byers and Toose noted that:
There is no longer a strong State sentiment amongst members of the 
public. Two World Wars, the financial crisis of the depression, uniform 
tax and Australia becoming a fully independent nation with its own 
ambassadors &c [sic] and a member of the United Nations have all helped 
to make citizens regard themselves as Australians rather than as belonging 
to any particular State.23 
Barwick was more prosaic but nevertheless clear in his argument for 
a new court to administer the ‘distinctive and separate character’ of 
Commonwealth law. He also saw the new court’s role as indirectly 
developing an Australian jurisprudence by taking on part of the workload 
of the High Court, which then would be able to ‘concentrate on, and 
adequately perform, [its] primary responsibilities as interpreter of the 
Constitution and ultimate national court of appeal’.24 A similar argument 
was made by then Solicitor-General Anthony Mason in his briefing to 
Attorney-General Nigel Bowen some three years later25 and, ultimately, by 
Attorney-General Ellicott in his submission to Cabinet26 and the House27 
on the eventual introduction of what would become the Federal Court Act 
1976 (Cth) (‘Federal Court Act’).
21  ‘The Federal Judicature: Proposed Commonwealth Superior Court’, Submission no. 366, NAA: 
A5869, 366.
22  References to the withdrawal of Barwick’s support for a new court is recorded at various points 
throughout archived materials and eventually makes its way to Cabinet (see, for example, ibid and the 
collected materials in NAA: A432, 1961/2132 Part 9). However, the authors were never able to find 
a copy of the letter itself.
23  Byers and Toose, above n 13, 313.
24  Barwick, above n 17, 9.
25  See, for example, Anthony Mason, ‘A New Federal Court’, 10 January 1967, NAA: A432, 
1961/2132 Part 5.
26  ‘Federal Causes and Appeals Court: Transfer of High Court Jurisdiction to State Courts’, 
Submission no 303, NAA: A10756, LC445 PART 1.
27  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 21 October 1976, 2213 
(Robert Ellicott, Attorney-General).
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Evolution of Australian Citizenship
The description above reminds us that the Federal Court, in fulfilling its 
constitutional role, was intended to play a significant part in implementing 
basic concepts of national identity and citizenship in a democratic society. 
Moreover, the Federal Court is one of the democratic theatres in which 
the individual engages, disputes and negotiates with the executive arm of 
government, often referred to as the state. 
Thinking in these terms takes us back to the core concept of the ‘rule of law’ 
in a democratic society—that those who exercise power on behalf of the 
state are governed by the rule of law in the same way that the individual is 
bound by law.28 In that sense, there is an equality to the relationship in that 
both the state and the individual are governed by the law. This concept is 
also relevant to the way Australian citizenship as a status is different to the 
former ‘British subject’ status. The evolution from being a ‘subject’ to being 
a ‘citizen’ in Australia involves Australia’s changing relationship with the 
United Kingdom (UK) and the changing conception of the proper exercise 
of power of the state in relation to its citizens.
In 1901, when propertied, white, male Australians—those bestowed with 
formal, active voting rights—came together to write the Constitution, 
there was a democratic element to its formation. The participants were 
elected directly to the constitutional conventions established to draft 
the Australian Constitution, rather than drawing from the existing 
representative colonial parliaments. For that reason, those conventions 
were known as the ‘People’s convention’.29 That women and Indigenous 
Australians were not part of the people underlines an imbalance of power 
from the nation’s inception.30
This is not to discount the voice of the women who were campaigning for 
the vote and who, as active citizens, ensured that s 41 of the Constitution 
guaranteed that those who already had the right to vote in the colonies 
would be able to vote in a new Commonwealth of Australia’s federal 
28  A commitment to the rule of law is also seen by the court in the privative clause cases including 
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476.
29  The full records of these Conventions have now been scanned and are available online, see 
<https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/Records_of_
the_Australasian_Federal_Conventions_of_the_1890s>.
30  See Deborah Cass and Kim Rubenstein, ‘Representation/s of Women in the Australian 
Constitutional System’ (1995) 3(48) Adelaide Law Review 3. 
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elections.31 This included Indigenous and white women in South Australia 
who had the vote at that time and, by the time of federation, white women 
in Western Australia, too. Indigenous South Australian women would 
later lose their right to vote when the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1902 
(Cth), which introduced the franchise for women in federal elections, 
specifically excluded Indigenous people.32 The beliefs around people’s 
equality, or lack thereof, influenced the balance of power within society at 
that time. Indeed, it was not until 1962 that Indigenous Australians’ right 
to vote was passed into the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth).33
Formal citizenship status, which Indigenous Australians had by their birth 
in Australia,34 as did women, did not mean they had substantive citizenship 
rights.35 The 1967 referendum did not correct formal citizenship, which 
Indigenous Australians held, but, importantly, as the Uluru Statement 
from the Heart identified,36 led to them being counted.37 Indeed, formal 
legal membership status in 1901 was not Australian citizenship, which did 
not exist at that time, but rather was British subject status. A significant 
aspect of identity that influenced the compact of federal membership in 
Australia in 1901 was that the white male drafters saw themselves as British 
subjects, and not as Australian citizens. They did not seek to break their 
ties with empire at federation. In creating an Australian Commonwealth, 
they were establishing a compact that refigured the exercise of power in 
the Australian territory of the Empire between a central governing body 
(a federal government) and the continuing colonies (the states). Among 
other things, the male framers wanted to bolster their collective power to 
exclude immigrants (including non-white British subjects) and to create 
a uniformity of approach to questions of interstate trade.38
31  Section 41 states: ‘No adult person who has or acquires a right to vote at elections for the more 
numerous House of the Parliament of a State shall, while the right continues, be prevented by any law of 
the Commonwealth from voting at elections for either House of the Parliament of the Commonwealth’.
32  For an explanation of s 41 and the involvement of the South Australian women’s role in its 
evolution, see Elisa Arcioni and Kim Rubenstein, ‘R v Pearson; Ex parte Sipka [1983] HCA  6: 
Feminism and the Franchise’ in Francesca Bartlett, Trish Luker and Rosemary Hunter (eds), Australian 
Feminist Judgments: Righting and Rewriting Law (Hart Publishing, 2014) 55. 
33  See Kim Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship Law (Thomson Reuters, 2nd ed, 2017) [2.220] and 
[6.190].
34  See discussion about citizenship by birth in ibid [3.50], [4.50], [4.70], [4.200], [4.250], [7.8].
35  Ibid [1.20].
36  See Uluru Statement from the Heart (26 May 2017) <https://www.referendumcouncil.org.au/
sites/default/files/2017-05/Uluru_Statement_From_The_Heart_0.PDF>.
37  See some excellent material online about the 1967 Referendum at <https://www.nla.gov.au/
research-guides/the-1967-referendum>.
38  See Helen Irving, ‘To Constitute a Nation: A Cultural History of Australia’s Constitution’ 
in Anthony Blackshield and George Williams (eds), Australian Constitutional Law and Theory, 
Commentary and Materials (Cambridge University Press, 6th ed, 1999).
THE COuRT AS ARCHIvE
32
Ultimately, this led to a clear decision not to include a formal legal concept 
of Australian citizenship in the Australian Constitution.39 All individuals 
born in Australia were British subjects by birth until the introduction of 
the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth) on 26 January 1949.40 When 
that Act came into effect, Australian citizenship status arose automatically 
by birth in Australia41 and sat alongside the continuing British subject 
status. Australian citizens were both Australian citizens and British 
subjects until 1987.42
When British subject status was repealed, and Australians became solely 
Australian citizens in 1987, it represented an important shift. This was 
not only about a change around the relationship between Australia and 
the UK that had consequences for British subjects residing in Australia 
who were not Australian citizens,43 but it reflected a change to Australian 
conceptions of sovereignty. It was also a time when the Australian executive 
acknowledged that no matter which country a person came from, they 
had equal access to applying for Australian citizenship.44
The earlier position of being a ‘subject’ in a colonial, monarchical setting 
represented an imbalance of power that underpins British subject status 
compared to Australian citizenship. Being a British subject was at its core 
a relationship between the Crown and the subject where the individual 
was subjected to the power of the Crown or the state. This was not only 
in the sense that any form of power (whether called the Crown or the 
executive) has a ‘subject’ to which the power extends, but also because the 
Crown was entitled, by its own divine foundations, to control the subject. 
This lies in British subject status’s feudal origins, where the concepts 
of allegiance were tied up, as Peter Spiro explains:
39  See Kim Rubenstein, ‘Citizenship and the Constitutional Convention Debates: A Mere Legal 
Inference’ (1997) 25(2) Federal Law Review 295.
40  When first introduced, it was called the Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth) and was 
renamed the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth) in 1973. See Rubenstein, above n 33, [4.130].
41  There are various ways to become an Australian citizen: by birth, descent and naturalisation 
(now known as conferral). See Rubenstein, above n 33, [4.200].
42  See the discussions about British subject status in ibid [3.120], [4.140], [4.170], [4.180] and 
[4.190]. 
43  This included British subjects being able to be deported under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). 
See also Kim Rubenstein and Niamh Lenagh Maguire, ‘Citizenship Law’ in Ian Freckleton and Hugh 
Selby (eds), Appealing to the Future: Michael Kirby and His Legacy (Thomson Reuters, 2009) 105.
44  See Rubenstein, above n 33, [4.190].
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In a medieval world, [where] individuals were identified not so much by 
primitive national affiliations as by personal allegiances tied to natural law. 
The notion of personal allegiances persisted as Europe divided into distinct 
territorial units, each ruled by an individual sovereign. So conceived, early 
models of nationality and citizenship worked from the putatively personal 
relationship between the individual and the sovereign.45
The Crown could ultimately determine who it chose to protect and 
upon whom to bestow its benevolence. This translated into the common 
law identifying all people born within the Crown’s dominions as being 
subject to the Crown’s power and benevolence. This was the result of 
the relationship in feudalism between the individual and the soil upon 
which she lived.46 In terms of the subject−sovereign relationship, jus soli 
was justified on the grounds that the child was upon birth indebted to 
the King for her protection.47 While subjects gained some benefits from 
that relationship (although not uniformly, as Indigenous and Chinese 
Australians’ and women’s experiences affirm),48 there was a fundamental 
inequality in the relationship.
Becoming solely Australian citizens signified, linguistically, a move away 
from that foundational inequality. While Australia still had a Queen as 
Head of State, she became the Queen of Australia, and this move away 
from British subject status also changed the concept of power between 
the executive branch of government—those governing and making the 
law—and the people—those subject to the law. Citizenship, as opposed 
to ‘subjectivity’, philosophically and legally represents an equality between 
those exercising power and those subject to that power. In Australia, 
this also represented a move with parallels in timing to becoming 
a multicultural society. From that time on, all individuals, whether part 
of the Commonwealth or not, would have equal access to citizenship, 
compared to the earlier preference for British (white) subjects.
These changes are integral to the development of a democratic 
understanding of citizenship. It parallels a commitment to the principle 
that those exercising power are subject to the law in the same way that 
the citizenry is subject to the law. All citizens—those governing and those 
45  See Peter Spiro, ‘Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship’ (1997) 46 Emory Law 
Journal 1411, 1419.
46  Ibid, citing WE Hall, International Law (Clarendon Press, 7th ed, 1917), 234.
47  Ibid, citing William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press, 1768) 
vol 1, 369–70. 
48  See Peter Prince, Aliens in their Own Land (PhD thesis, The Australian National University, 2015).
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being governed—are formally equal before the law. While the story of 
Indigenous citizenship, even at that point, highlighted some of the flaws 
in translating this theory to practice, the move to Australian citizenship 
over British subject status was the first step towards a democratic concept 
of Australian citizenship. 
This change also built upon the growth of the application of administrative 
law principles in Australia with the ‘new’ administrative law framework 
introduced in the 1970s.49 Those changes, including the introduction of 
freedom of information laws, the office of the Ombudsman, the creation 
of Administrative Appeals Tribunals and codified judicial review processes, 
all articulated and implemented clear controls on the exercise of executive 
power. Individual citizens could challenge government exercises of power, 
primarily in the Federal Court of Australia, and this administrative law 
foundation amplified this newer understanding of Australian citizenship. 
Just as the concept of the rule of law emphasises that those who exercise 
power are ‘subject to the law’, so too was the sole status of citizenship 
central to democratic understandings of citizenship and the fact that those 
citizens who were exercising power, the executive branch of government, 
were also ‘subject to the law’.
It is within these ‘matters’, where individuals seek to challenge the exercise 
of executive power in the Federal Court, that we see a significant story 
of Australian citizenship.
The Federal Court as an Archive
The intent and history of the Federal Court is inherently linked to 
a narrative of national identity and is, therefore, not only a repository of 
legal procedure, but also an important legal, social, cultural and historical 
archive.
In practical terms, the traditional focus placed on the work of superior 
courts, like the Federal Court, is generally on their end product: 
judgments, orders and reasons. For the litigants, judgment represents 
the end the litigation, the consequence of which may be significant. The 
making of orders under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 
49  See Peter Cane, Leighton McDonald and Kristen Rundle, Principles of Administrative Law 
(Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2018).
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may represent protection from unlawful executive action. The making 
of orders under the Native Title Act may represent the recognition of 
deeply held spiritual and cultural connections to the land. For the legal 
profession in a common law system such as Australia’s, judgment might 
represent a statement of what the law is, with an eye to appeal if the 
statement is perceived to be wrong. For the public who do not generally 
see courts in action, judgments provide the opportunity to critically assess 
the performance of the courts and judges in terms of timeliness or even 
the extent to which they are ‘in touch’ with the community.50
For the High Court, the determination of a dispute between two or more 
parties is the fundamental purpose of a Commonwealth court established 
under Chapter III of the Constitution. The High Court’s jurisdiction is 
circumscribed by s 75 of the Constitution. A ‘matter’ must ‘involve some 
right or privilege or protection given by law or the prevention, redress or 
punishment of some act inhibited by law’.51 In its narrowest sense, the 
resolution of the dispute involves ‘attaching a definite legal consequence 
to a definite, detailed state of facts’.52
However, in common law systems reliant on precedent as both a body of 
law and a tool of statutory interpretation, the effects of judicial decision-
making are not bound in space or time, but may be felt well beyond 
individual disputes. The resolution of a dispute and the publication 
of reasons may have a far-reaching effect in defining a community 
and its relationship with the state.53 The application of a body of law 
derived from principles and precedent provides continuity, consistency 
and certainty in individuals’ relationships with one another and with 
the state.54 A  decision may also reach back in time to either affirm or 
reject previous interpretations of the law or redefine legal and personal 
relationships.55 In a broader sense, courts play an important role in 
50  Murray Gleeson, ‘Out of Touch or Out of Reach?’ (2006) 7 The Judicial Review 241, 241. The 
concept is not a new one. See, for example, the remarks of the Hon Samuel Griffith on the first sitting 
of the High Court reported in ‘The High Court: Opening Ceremony, Distinguished Gathering’, 
The Argus (Melbourne), 7 October 1903, 9 <http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-page333047>.
51  In Re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257, 266.
52  Ruggero Aldisert, ‘The Role of the Courts in Contemporary Society’ (1977) 38(3) University 
of Pittsburgh Law Review 438, 439.
53  Anthony Mason, ‘The Use and Abuse of Precedent’ (1988) 4 Australian Bar Review 93. See also 
traditional ideas of the common law representing common custom and usage in Rupert Cross and 
JW Harris, Precedent in English Law (Clarendon Press, 1991), 36–7.
54  Mason, above n 53. See also Mirehouse v Rennell (1833) 1 Cl & F 527, 546.
55  Oscar G Chase, ‘“Supreme” Courts and the Imagination of the Real’ (2015) 518 New York 
University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers 14.
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affirming the community’s understanding of ideas of identity, belonging, 
citizenship and rights. Through their reasons for decision, courts reinforce 
the acceptance of certain ideas while rejecting or disapproving of others.56
Traditional ideas about archives saw their contents as embodying a form 
of impartial ‘truth’ or ‘evidence’ derived from ideas about providence.57 
Postmodern critiques of this traditional construction have argued that 
the selection, retention and preservation of records in state-run archival 
institutions means that a particular view of the state is created and 
preserved.58 There is a strong parallel in this thinking between archives 
and reasons for decision. As a pronouncement of an impartial decision-
maker whose decisions are enforced by the state, reasons represent 
a state-sanctioned account of the parties’ relationship. As the product of an 
adversarial system, reasons are perceived to incorporate the distilled ‘truth’ 
of the matter. As a matter of providence, the pedigree of reasons is arguably 
impeccable. From a postmodern perspective, as a court established by 
Commonwealth legislation, the Federal Court’s decisions are explicitly 
endowed with state-sanctioned significance. Whereas archival institutions 
might be seen to exercise a type of ‘soft’ power in terms of defining the 
community, the precedential value of judicial decision-making means that 
courts are expected to engage actively in defining acceptable behaviour.59
So why not stop there and accept the extent of the Federal Court’s 
archives as currently understood? Shouldn’t its orders and reasons for 
decisions meet the needs of all their potential users, including historical 
researchers? We  argue that they represent the end point in litigation. 
Although the reasons for decision may provide a summary of the evidence 
and the proceedings at trial, they are just a summary. The summary is 
limited to only those facts that have been ‘ascertained’ by the court and 
identified as legally significant.60 In effect, the reasons present a narrow set 
of facts viewed through a particular lens of relevance and legal principle 
and rendered for a particular purpose.61
56  Ibid.
57  Francis X Blouin Jr and William G Rosenberg, Processing the Past: Contesting Authority in History 
and the Archives (Oxford University Press, 2011) 232; Brien Brothman, ‘Afterglow: Conceptions 
of Record and Evidence in Archival Discourse’ (2002) 2 Archival Science 311.
58  Joan Schwartz and Terry Cook, ‘Archives, Records and Power: The Making of Modern Memory’ 
(2002) 2 Archival Science 1; Blouin Jr and Rosenberg, above n 57, 151.
59  J Willard Hurst, ‘Legal Elements in United States History’ in Donald Fleming and Bernard 
Bailyn (eds), Perspectives in American History (Little Brown Books, 1971) vol 2, 3.
60  Michael McHugh, ‘Judicial Method’ (1999) 73 Australian Law Journal 37, 37.
61  Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (Basic Books, 2008) 
173.
37
1 . COuRT RECORDS, ARCHIvES AND CITIzENSHIP
A reliance on reasons alone is the study of precedent that is often referred 
to as ‘lawyers’ history’.62 To the extent that the decision reflects or affects 
the wider community, it tells only part of the story. Materials presented by 
the parties provide both the canvas and the frame for the decision. They 
provide the foundation for the decision and describe the broader context 
within which the decision is made. It is here that court records arguably 
hold more value to the researcher as a companion, or even contradictor, to 
state-run archives. As noted above, postmodern critiques of archives argue 
that to the extent archival institutions are created by, and contain records 
of, the state, they give primacy to a representation of the community 
constructed by the state and exclude contradictory voices.63 In the context 
of the individual’s relationship with the state, it might exclude or explicitly 
devalue or discredit voices of protest.
Within the court’s own records, contradictory voices are not just heard 
but are explicitly required. The evidence and other materials submitted 
to the court are representative of the voices of those who submitted 
them. They do not contain just one version of a series of events but may 
contain two or more or multiple stories told in different ways and from 
different perspectives. Statements of claim and collected evidence describe 
the litigants’ relationship and, to the extent that the eventual decision 
will affect that relationship in the future, their hopes or expectations of 
what it should be. Within these documentary accounts are cultural and 
social assumptions—both explicit and implicit—that provide insight 
into those relationships.64 Perhaps even more crucially, the requirement 
in Commonwealth courts of a ‘matter’ means that these are snapshots of 
those assumptions in conflict and contested ideas about what is acceptable. 
A more complete archive begins to explain ‘not only what went on in the 
law’s formal processes, but what were the full actual effects that law and 
the life environing the law had on each other’.65 
62  Kinvin Wroth, ‘Documents of the Colonial Conflict: Part I—Sources for the Legal History 
of the American Revolution’ (1976) 69 Law Librarians Journal 277, 277. 
63  Brothman, above n 57; Blouin Jr and Rosenberg, above n 57; Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: 
A Freudian Impression (Eric Prenowitz trans, University of Chicago Press, 1996); Nancy Cochran, 
Andrew Gordon and Merton Krause, ‘Proactive Records: Reflections on the Village Watchman’ 
(1980) 2(1) Science Communication 5; Ciaran B Trace, ‘What is Recorded is Never Simply “What 
Happened”: Record Keeping in Modern Organizational Culture’ (2002) 2 Archival Science 137. 
See also s 2A of the Archives Act and the definition of ‘archival resources of the Commonwealth’.
64  Michael Hindus, Theodore Hammett and Barbara Hobson, The Files of the Massachusetts 
Superior Court, 1859–1959: An Analysis and a Plan for Action (GK Hall & Company, 1979) 3.
65  Hurst, above n 59, 3.
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The Federal Court’s collected materials, therefore, allow the researcher 
to move beyond ‘lawyers’ history’ and state-focused constructs of 
community. The voices of litigants, while advocates in their own cause, 
are inherently authentic and in that sense true to themselves. In our 
understanding of an individual’s relationship with the state and with each 
other, in an understanding of this story of Australian citizenship, those 
records provide a time capsule of the assumptions, ideas and the conflicts 
between the state and its citizenry. To the extent that the law also reaches 
both forward and backward, these firsthand accounts also serve to explain 
how current relationships have evolved.
This concept of superior courts as archives is further strengthened 
by the historical development of the concept of ‘courts of record’—
ongoing, permanent and inconvertible records of the disputes that come 
before them.
Public Access to the Courts and 
Court Records
At its establishment, the Federal Court was created as a ‘superior court 
of record’.66 The concept of ‘courts of record’ is inherently linked with 
the origins of an Anglo-Australian legal system and defines the status of 
a court within a legal hierarchy. However, what constitutes ‘the record’, 
and the manner in which it is to be kept, remains largely undefined. 
It is determined by context.67 In the best traditions of the common law, 
what is ‘the record’ for the purposes of public access has therefore been 
determined by tradition and practice adopted as precedent. The Federal 
Court, as with other courts, has adopted a role as custodian and curator 
of records confined to traditional ideas of access.
The practice of courts creating and maintaining records of proceedings 
developed in or about the 13th century.68 Until that time, records of what 
had happened before the justices were largely oral. Over time, what were 
originally referred to as rolls developed from notes to aid memory to more 
66  Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 5.
67  For example, see the discussion of what constitutes an inferior court’s record for the purposes 
of a writ of certiorari in Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163.
68  SE Thorne, ‘Courts of Record and Sir Edward Coke’ (1937) 2(1) The University of Toronto Law 
Journal 24, 28.
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complete records containing detailed statements of what happened in 
proceedings. According to some accounts of the development of English 
courts, those holding records therefore become ‘courts of record’ and 
different from those that did not.69 From this relatively simply distinction, 
courts of record have accumulated further distinguishing characteristics, 
including the power to fine, imprison and punish contempt.70 In Australia, 
questions about whether a court is one ‘of record’ have generally been 
resolved by the legislation establishing it.71
The history of proposals to establish what is now the Federal Court is 
generally silent on its status, other than it was always intended to be 
‘superior’.72 However, it is implicit throughout the development of 
proposals for the Federal Court over the following decade that it should 
at least have the status equivalent to a superior court, or the state supreme 
courts, suggesting that it was always intended to be a court ‘of record’.
What is the Record?
While a court’s status may be clear, what constitutes its ‘record’, particularly 
for superior courts, remains vague. Decisions about the content of ‘the 
record’ are largely confined to administrative law and focus on the records 
of inferior courts, the content of which is to be determined by the court 
on an application for review73 or by reference to the legislation establishing 
the court or tribunal.74 
While not determinative, these definitions set a logical minimum content 
for the record. As the High Court notes, it provides an account of how 
the matter came before the court, the contentions of the parties and 
the orders made—the basic information necessary to record the dispute 
between the parties and its resolution. In that sense, it remains tied to 
69  Ibid 35. Interestingly, Thorne goes on to discuss the distinction argued for by Sir Edward Coke 
that only courts of record can fine and imprison and finds that there is no authority for the connection 
other than common lawyers’ desire to ‘cripple’ rival courts that kept no record.
70  Enid Campbell, ‘Inferior and Superior Courts of Record’ (1997) 6 Journal of Judicial 
Administration 249, 254. For a comprehensive history of the development of these other distinctions, 
see also Thorne, above n 68.
71  Campbell, above n 70, 257.
72  NAA: A432, 1961/2132 Part 1.
73  Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163, 182 quoting Hockey v Yelland (1984) 157 CLR 
124, 143; see also Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531, 576 and the 
discussion there of the Privy Council’s similar conclusion in R v Nat Bell Liquors [1922] 2 AC 128.
74  Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 578.
THE COuRT AS ARCHIvE
40
the historical purposes of the maintenance of a record, both as an aid 
to memory of how proceedings had been disposed and as a summary 
for the purposes of superior courts’ supervision.75 The advent of court 
registries and standard forms has arguably extended the idea of the record 
to include the documents filed with the registry.76
This idea of records reflects a traditional procedural and precedential 
understanding of how or why those records are important. However, it tells 
us very little about their character and ignores the larger context within 
which written records developed. That context reveals their significance 
and begins to describe how issues about their access and retention might 
be approached.
Perpetual Memorial, Incontrovertible Evidence 
and Status
While the practice of keeping records began as an aid to justices,77 their 
evolution as detailed accounts of proceedings endowed them with a sense 
of permanence. Holdsworth, in his history of English law, refers to courts 
of record as being courts whose ‘proceedings are enrolled in parchment 
for a perpetual memory and testimony’ (emphasis added).78 The nature 
of the record as being perpetual was echoed by Lord Denning 20 years 
later,79 and by the High Court,80 which defined the records of a court with 
a similar sense of permanence as being the proceedings ‘preserved in [the 
court’s] archives’.81
In addition to permanence, court records were considered incontestable 
as to their contents. Oral records of proceedings in the King’s courts 
were considered incontrovertible and not open to question.82 With the 
development of written records of proceedings, the written form was 
75  The High Court’s own discussion of the ‘the record’ in Kirk in fact begins with a reference to the 
role of the King’s Bench in the 18th century; Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 568.
76  Baldwin & Francis Ltd and Patents Appeal Tribunal [1959] AC 663, 688.
77  Thorne, above n 68.
78  William Searle Holdsworth, A History of English Law (Methuen & Co., 1924) vol 5, 157.
79  Baldwin & Francis Ltd and Patents Appeal Tribunal [1959] AC 663, 688.
80  Lane v Morrison (2009) 239 CLR 230.
81  Ibid 243.
82  Thorne, above n 68.
41
1 . COuRT RECORDS, ARCHIvES AND CITIzENSHIP
similarly incontrovertible. Further proof of the content of the record was 
neither required83 nor accepted:84 a position that has been enshrined in 
the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).85
Taken together, these two principles—an incontrovertible record to 
be held in perpetuity—makes courts’ records more than a procedural 
catalogue. They speak directly to both the status of the record  itself 
and its custodian. For example, on the establishment of the  failed 
Australian Military Court (AMC), the Commonwealth Government 
inserted amendments to the bill making the AMC ‘a  court of record’. 
Arguments to make the AMC a ‘court of record’ had been opposed by 
the Department of Defence on the basis that it was unnecessary and that 
the bill already provided for the new AMC to keep records.86 However, 
submissions on the bill recommended that regardless of whether the bill 
already provided for the powers of a ‘court of record’, the AMC should 
be explicitly created as one in recognition of its powers, its status and 
its authority.87 On the introduction of the amendment, the government 
noted that the amendment ‘further enhance[d] the status of the AMC’.88
Open Justice
While it is one thing to argue that a court’s record of proceedings 
constitutes a permanent archive of proceedings, why should those records 
be available to the public? The origins of ‘the record’ are found in aids 
to the court, rather than the outside world. However, to argue that the 
‘the record’ is a private or an exclusive collection ignores other elements of 
the administration of courts. In particular, the position that the conduct of 
proceedings is transparent and open to all (subject to limited conditions) 
as a fundamental guarantee of the fairness of those proceedings.
83  Ibid; Gaillard Lapsley, ‘The Court, Record and Roll of the County in the Thirteenth Century’ 
(1935) 51 Law Quarterly Review 299, 319.
84  See LexisNexis, Halsbury’s Laws of Australia, (online at 25 January 2019) 195 Evidence, ‘3 Special 
Modes of Proof ’ [195–2310].
85  Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 157 (proof of civil proceedings) and s 178 (proof of criminal 
proceedings).
86  Department of Defence, Answers to Questions Raised to Senate References Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into provisions of the Defence 
Legislation Amendment Bill 2006, 9 October 2006, 6.
87  Len Roberts-Smith, Submission No. P3 to the Senate References Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Provisions of the Defence Legislation 
Amendment Bill 2006, 19 September 2006, [9].
88  Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Defence Legislation Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth), 
[13].
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The commitment to courts operating in public is most immediately 
recognisable in the traditional adage that ‘justice should not only be 
done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done’.89 
The origins of the idea are not clear, either arising out of the practices of 
early courts,90 a corollary of courts being public events91 or ‘more or less 
accidental’ as a necessary part of criminal jury trials.92 However, since at 
least the 17th century,93 it has been accepted and entrenched in English 
law. It is also now seen to be closely tied to the principles of a fair trial, 
judicial impartiality, judicial independence and the maintenance of public 
confidence in the courts.94
As Ernst Willheim outlines in his chapter in this collection, the concept 
of ‘open justice’ is acknowledged in Australia and internationally as 
a fundamental element of the judicial process, consistently acknowledged 
in both precedent and extrajudicially by members of the High Court.
The judicial and academic discussion of open justice has mainly 
constructed the concept around direct, unmediated access to courts in 
person. However, this ‘face-to-face model’ of courts’ relationship with 
the community is inconsistent with current practice, is outdated and 
increasingly problematic. With the advent of more extensive media and 
more universally consistent levels of literacy, it has been argued that the 
traditional model of the public visiting the courts to see justice ‘being 
done’ is outmoded.95
89  This statement comes from R v Sussex Justices; Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, 259.
90  Raybos Australia Pty Ltd & Anor v Jones (1985) 2 NSWLR 47, 51, citing P Wright, ‘The Open 
Court: The Hallmark of Judicial Proceedings’ (1947) 25 Canadian Bar Review 721.
91  Garth Nettheim, ‘The Principle of Open Justice’ (1984–86) 8 University of Tasmania Law Review 
25, 26.
92  Ibid, citing Max Radin, ‘The Right to a Public Trial’ (1931–1932) 6 Temple Law Quarterly 381, 
382. A similar observation is made by Chief Justice Burger in Richmond Newspapers Inc v Virginia, 
448 US 555, 565 (1980), who, in turn, attributes it to William Holdsworth, A History of English Law 
(Little Brown Books, 3rd ed, 1938) vol 10.
93  In Raybos (1985) 2 NSWLR 47, Kirby P identifies references to public trials as early as 1649, 
while Nettheim, above n 91, 27 refers to Sir Edward Coke’s Institutes of the Laws of England published 
in 1642.
94  Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506, 530.
95  Helen Gamble and Richard Mohr, ‘Courts and Communities: Tensions and Accommodations’ 
in Richard Mohr and Sandra Lloyd (eds), Delivering with Diversity (University of Wollongong, 
1996), 7; Patrick Keyzer, ‘What the Courts and the Media Can Do to Improve the Standard of Media 
Reporting of the Work of the Courts’ (1999) 1 University of Technology Sydney Law Review 150, 152.
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Assuming for the moment that the public can attend proceedings, what 
is it that they are likely to hear? As has been discussed by Willheim,96 and 
others,97 legal proceedings in the Federal Court are now largely conducted 
by the exchange of written evidence, materials and submissions, almost 
all of which are unavailable to the public. To the extent that the principle 
of ‘open justice’ is based on the assumption that all, or a large part of, 
the material available to the court would be read aloud in open court, 
it refers to practices that are now largely defunct. Byrne J in McCabe v 
British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited 98 summarised the 
development of civil litigation since the 1980s as:
The ensuing two decades of civil commercial litigation have witnessed the 
progress of this trend in the interests of increased efficiency in the trial 
process. The modern trial judge is confronted with substantial court books, 
often in electronic form, volumes of witness statements, written outlines 
of counsel’s openings and final addresses, chronologies and photocopies 
of cases relied upon, most of which are to be read out of court and which, 
for the most part, are merely alluded to at trial. This serves to make the 
curial and adjudicative process less and less comprehensible to the person 
in the public gallery.99
The emphasis on greater efficiency in litigation has been further reinforced 
in the Federal Court with the introduction of amendments intended 
to ‘bring about a cultural change in the conduct of litigation’.100 Since 
2010, the procedures applying to civil litigation must be consistent with 
an ‘overarching purpose’ of facilitating ‘the just resolution of disputes 
according to law as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible’.101 
Amendments have also been introduced requiring the parties to take 
‘reasonable steps’ to attempt to resolve the dispute before initiating 
proceedings.102
96  Ernst Willheim, ‘Are Our Courts Truly Open?’ (2002) 13 Public Law Review 191.
97  Sharon Rodrick, ‘Open Justice, the Media and Avenues of Access to Documents on the Court 
Record’ (2006) 29(3) UNSW Law Journal 90.
98  McCabe v British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited [2002] VSC 150.
99  Ibid [19].
100  Explanatory Memorandum, Access to Justice (Civil Litigation Reforms) Amendment Bill 2009 
(Cth), 3.
101  Federal Court of Australia Act, s 37M. This includes an obligation on the parties to conduct 
litigation in accordance with the ‘overarching purpose’ (see s 37N). See also Cement Australia Pty 
Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2010) 187 FCR 261 for a discussion of the 
interpretation of the provision.
102  Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth), ss 6 and 7.
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These measures seeking to reduce the cost of litigation, or avoid it 
completely, are valuable and significant in improving access to justice. 
However, allied to these changes is also the active encouragement of the 
parties and the Federal Court to attempt to resolve issues informally or 
through processes that are not available to the public.103 Even for members 
of the public who do seek access to written materials, there is the additional 
burden of cost. Inspection and copying of accessible materials attract 
a  fee,104 while parties, the public and the media must order transcripts 
from an external provider and pay a fee.105
Conclusion: Access and Citizenship
Restrictions on access to courts’ unique store of materials reflect on all 
aspects of Australian citizenship: as a legal term, as a frame for thinking 
about the relationship between the citizen and the state, and as a way 
of encouraging active citizenship. This chapter has explained how our 
thinking about courts’ archives is related to, and influenced by, the 
evolution of citizenship in Australia historically, from federation to 
the growing jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia. Restrictions 
on access to documents impacts on Australian citizenship as well as on 
a general understanding of the rule of law and open justice as modern 
expectations of the justice system.
Maintaining a narrower view of ‘the archive’ perpetuates a system of 
inequality between the citizen and the state that is now out of date. In 
the present context, the state determines what the citizen can see based on 
old ideas about courts, their proceedings and their records. It also restricts 
access based on a practical fiction that the public can, at any time, turn up 
and witness proceedings.
Given the evolving jurisdiction of the Federal Court, and changing ideas 
about restrictions on access based on its function as a court, maintaining 
a traditional view of the Federal Court’s record ignores its role evolving 
in parallel as an archive. The Federal Court’s role as a site for disputation, 
103  See, for example, Federal Court of Australia, Practice Note CM 1: Case Management and the 
Individual Docket System, 1 August 2011; Law Council of Australia and Federal Court of Australia, 
Case Management Handbook (Law Council of Australia, 2014). 
104  Federal Court and Federal Circuit Court Regulation 2012 (Cth), Schedule 1, Part 1, Item 123.
105  Federal Court of Australia, Access to Transcript (n.d.) Federal Court of Australia <www.fedcourt.
gov.au/services/access-to-files-and-transcripts/transcript>.
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negotiation and resolution about rights, particularly those around the 
power of the executive and the role of the state, means that its records 
speak directly to the evolution of Australian society. The different 
perspectives and the process by which the state (in the broadest sense) 
decides what those rights and roles are, in the growing jurisdiction of the 
Federal Court of Australia, ultimately confirms it is part of the evolution 
of Australian citizenship. The citizenry must, therefore, be in a position 
to access materials that inform that national identity, consistent with 








The openness of judicial proceedings is a fundamental constitutional and 
common law principle. It ensures that citizens and the media can come 
in to the courtroom and observe and report on the administration of 
justice. In 2015, the Federal Court won a National Archives of Australia 
award for digital excellence for its implementation of electronic court 
files. In accepting the award, the Principal Registrar and Chief Executive 
of the Federal Court said:
Court records provide a snapshot of Australia’s evolving social and legal 
history. A digital version of them will ensure their long-term preservation 
so future generations can understand the legal questions and concerns of 
the day and the Court’s role in the Australian community.1
The public availability of court records as a means of reinforcing the 
Federal Court’s role arose in discussion in Grollo v Palmer.2 Grollo was 
a challenge to legislation authorising ‘eligible judges’3 to issue warrants for 
1  Warwick Soden, ‘Federal Court Wins National Archives Award’ (Media Release, 4 May 2015).
2  Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348. 
3  A person who is a judge of a court created by the Parliament (Telecommunications (Interception) 
Act 1979 (Cth) s 6D).
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phone tapping on the grounds that the function was incompatible with 
judicial office. The warrants were issued ex parte and in secret. No records 
were kept in the court’s registry. Justice McHugh dissented from other 
members of the High Court on the incompatibility issue and made this 
powerful observation on the importance of open justice in the Federal 
Court:
Open justice is the hallmark of the common law system of justice and 
is an essential characteristic of the exercise of federal judicial power. 
Participation in secret, ex parte, administrative procedures by those who 
hold federal judicial office contravenes the spirit of the requirement that 
justice in the federal courts should be open; it weakens the perception 
that the federal courts are independent of the federal government and 
its agencies. Much of the litigation in the Federal Court is between 
the ordinary citizen and the federal government and its agencies. The 
maintenance of public confidence in the independence and impartiality 
of the Federal Court judges in hearing disputes between the citizen and 
the government and its agencies is contingent upon the public perception 
that the judges of the federal courts are impartial and entirely independent 
of the executive arm of government. That public perception must be 
diminished when the judges of the Federal Court are involved in secret, 
ex parte administrative procedure.4
What both the Principal Registrar and Justice McHugh emphasise is 
the importance of open justice as an essential characteristic of federal 
judicial power.
Openness was identified as an important feature of the common law 
in early classical English writings. Hale, Blackstone and Bentham all 
attached importance to oral evidence, submissions and rulings in open 
court.5 In this respect, the common law is in sharp contrast with the secret 
practices of the ecclesiastical courts, and the investigative and inquisitorial 
processes of the civil law system.
4  Grollo (1995) 184 CLR 348, 379–80.
5  Matthew Hale, The History of the Common Law of England (University of Chicago Press, 3rd ed, 
1971) 163–4; William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England (Strahan & Woodfall, 11th ed, 
1791) vol 3, 372–4; Jeremy Bentham, Draft for the Organisation of Judicial Establishments Compared 
with that of the National Assembly, with a Commentary on the Same, Works of Jeremy Bentham (William 
Tait, 1843) vol 4, 305, 316–7; Ernst Willheim, ‘Are Our Courts Truly Open?’ (2002) 13 Public Law 
Review 191.
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The snapshot to which the Federal Court’s Chief Executive refers is taken 
with a narrow lens, with much of the subject-matter obscured from view. 
The Federal Court, by its practices and rules, appears to be seeking to 
shield some of its most important records from public scrutiny. Far from 
assisting researchers to understand the legal and factual questions raised 
in its proceedings, the Federal Court appears to be seeking to obstruct 
genuine research. The policy considerations that lie behind the Federal 
Court’s practices and rules are unclear. This chapter argues that the 
relevant provisions of the court’s rules may be of uncertain constitutional 
validity.
The chapter also draws a distinction between records of judicial proceedings 
and records relating to the internal administration of the Federal Court. 
In relation to records of court administration, prima facie they should 
be subject to the same sorts of access provisions as the records of the 
executive government.
Openness
Successive decisions in England and Australia have confirmed openness 
as an essential feature of the common law judicial system.6
In Scott v Scott,7 a House of Lords decision, Lord Shaw emphasised 
‘publicity in the administration of justice’ as ‘one of the surest guarantees 
of our liberties’.8 He went on to criticise ‘encroachments by way of judicial 
procedures in such a way as to impair the rights, safety and freedom of 
the citizen and the open administration of the law’.9 Those remarks 
are especially apposite. It is through ‘encroachments by way of judicial 
procedures’ adopted by the Federal Court in the interests of efficiency that 
open administration of the law is impaired. Arguably, the principles so 
eloquently espoused by Justice McHugh are regularly breached.
6  Scott v Scott (1913) AC 417, 476, 478: Dickason v Dickason (1913) 17 CLR 50, 51; Russell v Russell 
(1976) 134 CLR 495, 520 and 532; Grollo (1995) 184 CLR 348, 379–80.
7  Scott (1913) AC 417.
8  Ibid 476.
9  Ibid 478.
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In Dickason v Dickason,10 in a short but succinct judgment, Acting Chief 
Justice Barton wrote, ‘one of the normal attributes of a court is publicity, 
that is, the admission of the public to attend the proceedings’.11
In Russell v Russell,12 the High Court held invalid section 97 of the Family 
Law Act 1975 (Cth) requiring proceedings under that Act to be heard in 
closed court. Referring to the openness rule, Justice Gibbs wrote: ‘[t]his 
rule has the virtue that the proceedings of every court are fully exposed to 
public and professional scrutiny and criticism, without which abuses may 
flourish undetected’.13 He continued:
the public administration of justice tends to maintain confidence in the 
integrity and independence of the courts. The fact that courts of law are 
held openly and not in secret is an essential aspect of their character. 
It distinguishes their activities from those of administrative officials, 
for ‘publicity is the authentic hall-mark of judicial as distinct from 
administrative procedure’.14
In John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court of NSW,15 Chief 
Justice Spigelman said:
It is well established that the principle of open justice is one of the most 
fundamental aspects of the system of justice in Australia. The conduct 
of proceedings in public is an essential quality of an Australian court of 
justice. There is no inherent power of the Court to exclude the public.16
Of course, the openness principle is not absolute. In Hogan v Hinch,17 
a case concerning orders prohibiting publication of names of convicted 
sex offenders, Chief Justice French said:
It has long been accepted at common law that the application of the open 
justice principle may be limited … where it is necessary to secure the proper 
administration of justice. In a proceeding involving a secret technical 
process, a public hearing of evidence of the secret process could ‘cause an 
entire destruction of the whole matter in dispute’. Similar considerations 
10  Dickason (1913) 17 CLR 50.
11  Ibid 51. The other members of the court concurred. 
12  Russell (1976) 134 CLR 495.
13  Ibid 495.
14  Ibid 520, citing McPherson v McPherson [1936] AC 177, 200. 
15  John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court of NSW (2004) 61 NSWLR 344.
16  Ibid [18]. See also James Spigelman, ‘The Principle of Open Justice: A Comparative Perspective’ 
(2006) 29 University of New South Wales Law Journal 147.
17  Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506.
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inform restrictions on the disclosure in open court of evidence in an 
action for injunctive relief against an anticipated breach of confidence. 
In the prosecution of a blackmailer, the name of the blackmailer’s victim, 
called as a prosecution witness, may be suppressed because of the ‘keen 
public interest in getting blackmailers convicted and sentenced’ and the 
difficulties that may be encountered in getting complainants to come 
forward ‘unless they are given this kind of protection’. So too, in particular 
circumstances, may the name of a police informant or the identity of an 
undercover police officer. The categories of case are not closed, although 
they will not lightly be extended.18 
Openness in judicial proceedings is well established in common law 
systems. More recently, it has been incorporated in international human 
rights instruments. Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms establish an entitlement 
to ‘a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law’.19
The importance of openness is not confined to protection of the rights of 
the parties. By exposing the judicial process to public scrutiny, courts are 
publicly accountable. Openness is a prerequisite for public confidence in 
the integrity of the judicial system. Practices to the contrary, sometimes 
adopted in the interests of administrative efficiency, breach the openness 
principle and may well be unconstitutional.
Chief Justice French has referred to public adjudication, or adherence to 
the open court principle, as one of the essential and defining features of 
courts.20 He went on to observe that the defining characteristics of courts 
are of constitutional significance and emphasised the need to maintain 
the distinctiveness of the public function of courts as the third branch 
of government and the special character of public adjudication.
18  Hogan (2011) 243 CLR 506, 531–2. The references in the passage have been omitted.
19  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd session, 183 plen 
mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948), art 10; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976), 
art 14 and 38; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘European 
Convention on Human Rights’ ), opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered 
into force 3 September 1953), art 6. The European Convention on Human Rights omits the word 
‘competent’, included in the ICCPR.
20  Robert French, ‘Essential and Defining Characteristics of Courts in an Age of Institutional Change’ 
(Speech delivered at Supreme and Federal Court Judges Conference, Adelaide, 21 January 2013).
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Openness and Court Records
Most of the principles relating to open justice were developed in the 
context of physical access to the courtroom. In an article provocatively 
titled ‘Are Our Courts Truly Open?’, 21 I explained, with particular 
reference to the High Court and the Federal Court, that in light of 
modern procedures adopted by most superior courts—written pleadings, 
requirements for written submissions to which counsel and judges refer 
but that are not read out in open court, and evidence on affidavit ‘taken as 
read’22 but not in fact read out orally—cases are determined on the basis 
of material not freely available to the public.
For example, the Federal Court’s Central Practice Note explains that written 
submissions are now a ‘useful way of shortening addresses’.23 The ‘usual 
orders’ now made by the Federal Court at the first directions hearing of 
a case often include orders that evidence in chief be by way of affidavit and 
that deponents to affidavits be called for cross-examination only by leave. 
It follows that issues of fact are determined by reference to evidence that 
is not publicly available.
The openness principle is, of course, fundamental to public confidence 
in the judiciary—but it is not so confined. Witnesses are also exposed 
to public scrutiny. Few would dispute that the expectation of public 
scrutiny, including scrutiny by the media, can constitute an important 
deterrent to false evidence. As Blackstone wrote, ‘a witness may frequently 
depose that in private which he will be ashamed to testify in a public and 
solemn tribunal’.24 In consequence of procedures adopted in the interests 
of efficiency, public scrutiny and public understanding of the judicial 
process is inhibited. It is difficult to argue that court processes now fully 
comply with the openness principle.25
21  Willheim, above n 5.
22  That is, admitted into evidence. I do not contend that affidavits that are filed but not admitted 
into evidence should be publicly available.
23  Federal Court of Australia, Central Practice Note: National Court Framework and Case 
Management (CPN–1) 25 October 2016 <http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/law–and–practice/practice–
documents/practice–notes/cpn–1>.
24  Blackstone, above n 5.
25  In the case of the High Court, written submissions are now available on the court’s website.
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When the openness principle was developed, the emphasis was indeed 
on physical access to the courtroom. Nowadays, physical access remains 
important but most of us rely on the media to report what is happening 
in the courts. The ability of the media to provide a proper report of court 
proceedings is, therefore, an important aspect of the principle of open 
justice.26 Where a newspaper reporter is seeking to prepare an article on 
a Federal Court proceeding, if a written submission is read out in full or an 
affidavit is read out in full, the reporter is able to report on them. However, 
where the case is heard on the basis of written submissions and affidavits 
that are, in the contemporary jargon, ‘taken as read’ but not read out in fact 
and not publicly available, can the reporter prepare a meaningful account 
of the case for her or his newspaper? Open justice requires the opportunity 
for the media to publish fair and accurate reports of submissions and of 
evidence. The same considerations apply to researchers and commentators. 
An academic commentator seeking to analyse a case may wish to analyse 
the written submissions by the parties and the evidence as well as the actual 
judgment. Critical scrutiny may well involve analysis of whether, and to 
what extent, a judgment appropriately reflects the submissions and the 
evidence. For example, a researcher with an interest in public administration 
or corporate fraud may have a special interest in the evidence in cases falling 
within the field of interest. It is very much in this context that access to the 
court’s records, to the written submissions and to the affidavits that have 
been ‘taken as read’, but not in fact read out in open court, is crucial. In the 
absence of any specific orders made by the court in relation to sensitive 
documents, those records should be treated as public records open to the 
public to inspect and copy. The same principles that apply to the public’s 
right of access to the physical courtroom should apply to access to the 
court’s records of the proceedings. In the modern world, where few have 
the opportunity to attend the court and most of us rely on media reports 
of court proceedings, access to the court’s records is of greater practical 
importance than physical access to the courtroom itself.
Many Australians learn more about the law through watching American 
television and American films. For example, in the American film Spotlight, 
a Boston Globe reporter walks into a court registry and asks to see a court 
file. When the clerk refuses the request, the reporter runs upstairs, walks 
into the chambers of a judge and is able to obtain access to the court file. 
In the film, the file turns out to include damning evidence that a Cardinal 
had been aware of sexual abuse of a child by a priest.
26  Hogan (2011) 243 CLR 506, 532; John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 465, 476–7.
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In Australia, we cannot storm into a judge’s chambers in the manner that 
appears to be possible in the United States. But can we obtain access to 
court records on matters of public interest? Could an Australian academic 
researcher or investigative reporter obtain access to submissions and 
evidence in Federal Court proceedings? In the broader community, there 
would be a general presumption that, just as judicial proceedings are 
open, so the records of those proceedings will also be open. In particular, 
submissions and evidence27 should be freely available to the public.
The Importance of Public Access
The Federal Court’s Chief Executive correctly identified the importance 
of the court’s records as providing ‘a snapshot of Australia’s evolving 
social and legal history’.28 Records of commercial litigation relating to 
competition policy may include important evidence and submissions 
relating to economic and social conditions. Records of litigation relating 
to Indigenous heritage protection and native title may include significant 
anthropological and other historical material not available elsewhere. 
Records of challenges to government decisions may cast light on public 
administration. Therefore, court records are a rich resource relating to 
Australian society.
Some years ago, I was urged by some Aboriginal leaders to make 
a submission (as a private citizen) to a joint committee of the 
Commonwealth Parliament inquiring into the findings of the Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) that the Native Title 
Amendment Act 1998 (Cth) was inconsistent with Australia’s international 
legal obligations, in particular, the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination.29 One of the joint committee’s key terms 
of reference was whether CERD’s finding was ‘sustainable on the basis 
of informed opinion’.30 ‘Informed opinion’ was, therefore, critical to the 
inquiry by the joint committee.
27  Naturally, only evidence that has been admitted.
28  Soden, above n 1.
29  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for 
signature 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969).
30  The full terms of reference are set out in the Commonwealth 16th Report: CERD and the Native 
Title Amendment Act 1998, Parl Paper No 134/2000 (2000) iv.
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Provisions of the Australian legislation criticised by CERD included 
those validating titles over pastoral leases that had been granted by state 
governments after the date of commencement of the Native Title Act 1993 
(Cth) (‘Native Title Act’) and before the High Court’s subsequent decision 
in Wik Peoples v Queensland,31 where the court held that pastoral leases 
did not necessarily extinguish native title. In light of the Wik decision, 
the validity of pastoral leases granted without compliance with the 
Native Title Act procedures was doubtful, hence the perceived need for 
validation of those leases—the ‘bucketloads of extinguishment’ provision. 
Validation of leases that had been granted without compliance with the 
Native Title Act and consequential extinguishment of native title was 
highly controversial.
What was the state of ‘informed opinion’? How could ‘informed opinion’ 
be established?
In response to criticism of the legislation—criticism that in light of the 
known uncertainty of whether pastoral leases did in fact extinguish native 
title—and that the relevant state governments should have complied 
with the Native Title Act requirements, officials of the Attorney-General’s 
Department submitted that, at the relevant time, the weight of legal 
opinion had supported the view that native title could no longer subsist 
on pastoral lease land.32 On that view, there would have been no need to 
comply with the Native Title Act requirements. 
Were the submissions of the officials soundly based?
Legal submissions made by the Commonwealth in proceedings in the 
Federal Court and the High Court, were, in my view, inconsistent with 
the evidence given by the departmental officers to the joint committee.33 
While the justification for the validation provisions was a matter for 
political judgment, in my view, the committee’s consideration should have 
31  Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1.
32  Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No CERD 24.
33  It was not appropriate for me to disclose to the joint committee that my own legal advice to the 
government had expressed the contrary view that pastoral leases did not necessarily extinguish native 
title. The advice was given at a time when I was a senior officer of the Commonwealth and counsel for 
the Attorney-General in the key Federal Court proceedings raising the question whether pastoral leases 
extinguish native title. I feel able to disclose the substance of my advice now. First, with the passage of 
time, it is now in the ‘open’ period; and second, the relevant Commonwealth Minister has agreed to me 
disclosing that I had advised that pastoral leases did not necessarily extinguish native title.
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proceeded on a factually correct historical record. I sought to obtain for 
the joint committee the legal submissions made by the Commonwealth 
to the Federal Court and the High Court.
In the case of the High Court, there was no difficulty. A summary of 
the argument was reported in the Commonwealth Law Reports.34 Copies 
of the Commonwealth’s submissions were obtained from the High 
Court’s registry upon payment of a modest fee and provided to the joint 
committee.
However, in the case of the Federal Court, the registry refused access, 
relying correctly on what was then Order 46 rule 6 of the Federal Court 
Rules. That rule prevented a person not a party to proceedings from 
inspecting a wide range of court documents, including affidavits and 
written submissions. I had a copy of the submissions made by counsel for 
the Attorney-General in the leading case and was able to provide a copy 
to the committee. I would have preferred to have provided the joint 
committee with a copy of the Commonwealth’s submissions obtained 
from and authenticated by the Federal Court.
When I explained to the joint committee that the copy I was providing was 
from my personal records (as I was Counsel for the Commonwealth in the 
case), authenticity was not called into question. Five members of the joint 
committee rejected the evidence given on behalf of the government that 
the balance of legal opinion was that pastoral leases extinguished native 
title. They cited the Commonwealth’s legal submissions to the High Court 
and the Federal Court. They concluded that these submissions to the High 
Court and the Federal Court demonstrated that the Commonwealth 
did not believe that the question of whether pastoral leases extinguished 
native title was settled.
Access by a private citizen to court records—in this case, access to 
submissions made on behalf of the executive government—was important 
to enable evidence subsequently given by officials of the executive 
government to a joint committee of the Commonwealth Parliament to 
be corrected. It was fortuitous that the citizen had a personal copy of 
the relevant submissions to the Federal Court. In other circumstances, the 
Federal Court rule would have inhibited consideration by a committee 
of the Australian Parliament of an important public issue.
34  North Ganalanja Aboriginal Corporation v State of Queensland (1996) 185 CLR 595, 602.
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Further, as McHugh J pointed out in Grollo v Palmer,35 one of the Federal 
Court’s most important areas of jurisdiction concerns challenges to the 
lawfulness of administrative decisions of the executive government, 
generally by way of proceedings brought under the Administrative Decisions 
(Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (‘Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act’). Access to court records is of particular importance in relation 
to Federal Court proceedings challenging decisions of the executive 
government. The court’s practice, that evidence in chief is introduced by 
way of affidavit, has meant that issues of fact were determined by reference 
to evidence that was not publicly available. Judicial review of executive 
action was clothed in secrecy.
The Federal Court Rules were remade in 2011. Custody and inspection of 
documents is now dealt with in Division 2.4. Rule 2.32 enables a person 
who is not a party to inspect a range of documents in Federal Court 
proceedings. The list covers a number of formal documents such as an 
originating application, an address for service and a pleading. Significantly, 
the list does not include written submissions or affidavits. Rule 22.32(5) 
enables a person to apply to the court for leave to inspect a document that 
the person is not otherwise entitled to inspect.
Does the former O 46 r 6 or Division 2.4 of the current rules give effect 
to the worthy objectives articulated in the media statement by the Federal 
Court’s Chief Executive?
Are those provisions consistent with the constitutional principles 
articulated by Justice McHugh?
Would the former or current rules be open to challenge on the basis that 
they breach the principle of open justice?
Does the opportunity to apply to the Federal Court for leave to inspect 
a document rectify possible constitutional invalidity?
In relation to key Federal Court records, such as submissions and 
affidavits, the rules in effect establish a presumption against access. While 
that presumption can be set aside by the court, the approach should be 
the very reverse: a presumptive right of access, which can be denied on 
appropriate grounds by order of the court.
35  Grollo (1995) 184 CLR 348.
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There would appear to be no published explanation of the court’s rule. 
The purpose of the rule, the policy considerations behind it, the reasons 
for a prima-facie exclusion of submissions and affidavit evidence from 
open access are not known. If the reason relates to cost, this could surely be 
addressed by imposition of an appropriate fee. In any event, in the digital 
age it should be possible to post submissions and affidavits admitted into 
evidence on the court’s website.
The rules inhibit free access to basic details of Federal Court proceedings. 
That constraint on open justice may give rise to constitutional invalidity. 
The inability to freely access submissions and evidence may inhibit public 
understanding of litigation before the court and public debate concerning 
public policy issues arising in Federal Court litigation.
Proceedings under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 
are an obvious example of litigation that may give rise to questions of 
public concern. This Act enables individuals to challenge the lawfulness 
of administrative decisions made by officers of the executive government, 
including Ministers and senior officials. Submissions made on behalf of 
officials and the evidence given by officials may be critical. The public 
must be entitled to know the submissions and the evidence given by 
officials in defence of challenged decisions. Assume it becomes apparent 
during the hearing of a challenge to an administrative decision or from a 
reading of the judgment that serious impropriety is alleged, or is found to 
have taken place, on the part of an officer of the executive government. 
Allegations and findings of executive impropriety are matters of public 
interest and public debate. If, by reason of the court’s rules, the written 
submissions made on behalf of the government defendant, or affidavits 
filed by the government defendant and ‘taken as read’ but not in fact read 
in open court, are not available, the inability to access these documents 
burdens or impairs the implied freedom of communication about the 
affairs of the executive government.
The High Court has recently confirmed that ‘the implied freedom 
(of political communication) is essential to the maintenance of the system 
of representative and responsible government for which the Constitution 
provided’.36 The public interest in fair reporting of court proceedings is 
not in dispute. If the public is not able to access what public officials have 
put to the court, if the media is not able to report on the submissions 
36  Brown v Tasmania [2017] HCA 43, [88].
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made on behalf of the executive and the evidence given by an officer of 
the executive, then the opportunity for political comment on the conduct 
of the executive is seriously impaired.
The first question in the analytical framework for determining whether 
a law contravenes the implied freedom of political communication37 is 
whether the rules burden the implied freedom. This must be answered in 
the affirmative.
It is appropriate to interpose here that the implied freedom of political 
communication is usually seen as a constraint on the exercise of legislative 
and executive power.38 That constraint may or may not apply to the 
exercise of judicial power. While the rule-making function is conferred on 
the court, the court is not exercising judicial power in the strict or narrow 
sense in the exercise of that function.
On the basis that the first arm of the constitutional test is established, 
further questions arise:39 whether the purpose of the law or the burden 
on the implied freedom is justified or legitimate, in the sense that it is 
compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed 
system of representative and responsible government, and whether the 
law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to advance that purpose in 
a manner compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally 
prescribed system of government.
In implied freedom of political cases determined by the High Court, the 
court has been able to identify the purpose of the relevant legislation, and 
to analyse whether the burden is justified. However, in the case of the 
Federal Court’s rules, there is a threshold difficulty. Neither the court itself 
nor the court’s rules identify the purpose of the restriction. There is no 
obvious identifiable legitimate legislative purpose. Therefore, it is difficult 
to discern a case that the restriction is justified, legitimate and reasonably 
appropriate and adapted to advance a legitimate purpose.
37  Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 560; Wotton v Queensland 
(2012) 246 CLR 1; McCloy v NSW [2015] HCA 34. Slightly different frameworks were applied 
in Brown [2017] HCA 43, [90]–[104] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ), [156] (Gaegler J) and [271] 
(Keane J).
38  Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 560; Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506, 554; Unions NSW 
(2013) 252 CLR 530, 554; Tajjour (2104) 254 CLR 508, 558; Brown [2017] HCA 43, [90].
39  Brown [2017] HCA 43, [93], [96], [102], [104], [156] and [318]–[325].
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Cost and administrative convenience would scarcely provide an 
appropriate justification. How can a burden on public access to the 
submissions and evidence put to the court by officers of the executive 
government in litigation challenging the decisions of the executive 
government be compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally 
prescribed system of representative and responsible government? Simply 
put, there is no obvious justification. Where the answer to one or both of 
the further questions is ‘no’, a case for invalidity is made out.
A further question arises whether the opportunity to apply to the court 
for leave to inspect40 cures the apparent invalidity. Why the rule is cast 
in this way, rather than in the form of open access subject to any specific 
orders, is not apparent. Is this an attempt to save the rule from potential 
invalidity? A question arises of whether potential invalidity arises from the 
rules themselves or from the manner of their exercise. I emphasise that 
the invalidity argument relates to impairment of political communication 
about the executive. To establish this argument, it is not necessary to 
establish that the implied freedom extends to communications about the 
judiciary. Of course, if Justice McHugh is, in effect, saying that openness 
is constitutionally entrenched,41 it may not be necessary to rely on these 
additional arguments.
Sensitive Documents
Federal Court archives will obviously include a wide range of sensitive 
documents. Chief Justice French identified a range of circumstances 
where the application of the open justice principle may be limited.42 
Those circumstances related to sensitivity arising in the judicial process. 
The most common circumstances are likely to be in litigation involving 
Indigenous issues such as heritage protection and native title; commercial 
litigation; and litigation involving national security issues. Sensitivity can 
also arise in the internal administration of the court. 
40  Rule 22.32(5).
41  Grollo (1995) 184 CLR 348, 379–80.
42  Hogan (2011) 243 CLR 506.
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Examples from the Administration of Justice
For example, the unreported proceedings in Western Australia v Minister 
for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs43 brought on at short notice 
arose out of a challenge by the State of Western Australia to the validity 
of declarations made by the Commonwealth Minister for Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Affairs under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Heritage (Protection) Act 1984 (Cth) (‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Heritage (Protection) Act’). The Minister’s declarations related to 
a site claimed by the Yawuru people to be a traditional Aboriginal area 
associated with male initiation ceremonies.
In the course of giving discovery, the Minister disclosed a number of 
anthropological reports (referred to in the proceedings as the Sullivan 
Report) and affidavits provided to the Minister on condition that they 
not be reproduced or be seen by women or by uninitiated Aboriginal 
men. Late on Wednesday, 27 July 1994, the state made application to 
the Federal Court for orders requiring the production of the Sullivan 
Report to its counsel and solicitor (who were both women). I was briefed 
on 28 July and flew to Perth that evening. The matter was heard the 
next day. Justice Carr ordered that the Sullivan Report be produced for 
inspection by the state’s counsel and solicitors save that only one of such 
persons should be female. In his reasons, he explained that the interests 
of justice required that at least one of the state’s counsel and solicitor have 
access to the report. By excluding one of them, there should be no real 
prejudice to the applicant’s case and the interests of the Yawuru people 
were protected to the fullest extent possible.
Similar issues arise in a wide variety of cases. In Tickner v Chapman,44 
another challenge to a declaration under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Heritage (Protection) Act, the Aboriginal women claimed gender-
sensitive documents filed with the court related to a women’s birthing site 
and should not be seen by men (these documents were labelled ‘secret 
women’s business’ in the media). In the Broome Crocodile Farm case,45 the 
gender-sensitive material related to a male initiation track.
43  The unreported decision of Carr J, 29 July 1994 cf the later different decision Western Australia, 
Minister of Lands of Western Australia and Another v Minister of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Affairs of the Commonwealth of Australia [1995] FCA 1052.
44  (1995) 57 FCR 451.
45  Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs v State of Western Australia (1996) 67 
FCR 40.
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These issues will undoubtedly also arise in native title cases. 
Evidence in heritage protection and native title cases is a rich resource, 
especially in relation to Indigenous history and culture. Often, it is only 
when a sacred site comes under serious threat that intensive anthropological 
work is undertaken, and stories are recorded. Sometimes those stories are 
culturally sensitive. According to Aboriginal tradition, some stories may 
only be disclosed to elders, or to initiated men, or the stories may be 
gender-sensitive and must only be told to those of a particular gender. 
Obvious questions arise in relation to access to evidence that was given on 
conditions of confidentiality.
Other confidentiality issues can arise in other types of cases, such as those 
identified by Chief Justice French and now especially national security 
issues. In those cases, it is likely that the court will have issued appropriate 
orders during the hearing protecting the confidentiality of records. If, in 
the future, access to court records including submissions and evidence is 
opened up, it may be necessary for the parties in those matters to apply 
to the court for orders that relevant confidentiality orders extend as 
appropriate to the records, following the disposition of the proceedings 
and for the court to adopt appropriate procedures to ensure that relevant 
documents are appropriately identified and protected. 
Examples from Internal Administration
The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) and the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) 
apply to the Federal Court only in relation to matters ‘of an administrative 
nature’,46 an expression that has been held to be ‘incapable of precise 
definition’.47 However, these Acts would not apply to functions that are 
‘truly ancillary to an adjudication by the court’,48 but would apply to, for 
example, employment records, contractors, travel expenses and property 
management.
46  Freedom of Information Act, s 5(1), Privacy Act, s 7(1)(b).
47  Hamblin v Duffy (1981) 34 ALR 333, 338–9; Evans v Friemann (1981) 35 ALR 428, 433.
48  Kotsis v Kotsis (1970) 122 CLR 69, 92.
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Any large organisation will have the occasional administrative problem. 
The court, like any body funded by monies appropriated by the Parliament, 
is accountable for its expenditure. The Chief Justice is formally responsible 
for managing the administrative affairs of the court.49 On a day-to-day 
basis, court administration is handled by the Registrar.50
But what sorts of files should be available to the public?
For example, what if furniture from a retiring Justice’s chambers could not 
be found? Assuming the District Registrar opened a file on this matter, 
should that file be accessible?
What about details of Comcar usage by Justices that may appear 
unnecessarily high? A former Speaker of the Commonwealth Parliament 
found himself in a lot of trouble for using a Comcar to visit a Canberra 
district winery. Assuming the District Registrar opened a file on Comcar 
usage by a judge, should that file be accessible?
What about ‘unusual’ adjournments. An order to adjourn a matter is 
undoubtedly made in the exercise of the judicial function of the court—
but the order may be controversial. Assume that a judge is required to 
sit in a remote but attractive location, for example, a tropical location 
in the middle of winter. Assume also that the judge’s personal staff, 
who travel with him, are family members. The judge sits on a Monday 
morning but after hearing argument for only a few minutes and over 
objections from counsel adjourns to the following Monday. The judge 
and his staff remain in the remote location until the hearing the following 
Monday. Legal representatives make complaints to the Chief Justice and 
to the Attorney-General and court files and departmental files are created. 
The departmental file would be accessible under the normal rules. Should 
the court’s file be accessible?
Other examples relate to spouse travel. Judges have entitlements to spouse 
travel. Assume that a judge is to hear a matter in another registry and the 
matter is scheduled for a lengthy hearing. The judge arranges to take their 
spouse in accordance with standard spouse travel entitlements. It becomes 
apparent that the parties are negotiating and that the parties are likely to 
announce a settlement on the first day of hearing. The judge had been 
looking forward to an extended stay in the other location and the spouse 
49  Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 18A.
50  Ibid s 18B.
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travels with the judge notwithstanding the anticipated settlement. It was 
necessary for the judge to travel. Should the spouse travel have been 
cancelled? Subsequently, the Chief Justice questions the appropriateness 
of the spouse travel and a court file is created.
Should court records relating to travel and accommodation costs incurred 
by a judge and a judge’s spouse and their staff be publicly accessible? 
Would anyone ever want access to these sorts of records? A researcher 
preparing a biography of a judge may wish to access all records relating 
to the judge. A  student of court administration may wish to identify 
difficulties and how they were handled—for example, whether they were 
handled by the Chief Justice or by the Chief Executive, and whether the 
Attorney-General or the Attorney-General’s Department were involved. 
Any relevant records would have been Commonwealth records.
In relation to records in the possession of the Federal Court, the main 
provisions of the Archives Act 1983 (Cth) (‘Archives Act’) would not apply. 
The Archives Act would presumably apply to records of the department 
itself.
Conclusion
The records of the Federal Court constitute a rich resource covering 
enormous fields of public interest, including Australia’s economic and 
financial affairs, public administration and Indigenous issues. Many of 
those records are of great public and historical importance. In the same 
way as justice is administered in open court, so should the records of the 
court be open. Only in special circumstances—for example, where the 
court has made orders restricting access—should access be denied.
Insofar as the Federal Court’s current rules restrict access to legal 
submissions and evidence, the rules should be reviewed.
The preferable approach would be to allow unrestricted access to both 
legal submissions and evidence unless orders have been made restricting 
access. Ideally, legal submissions should be available on the court’s web 
site. Affidavit evidence should also be available after the evidence has been 
admitted.
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Where confidentiality orders are made in the course of hearings, those 
orders should be expressed to extend to the relevant records of the 
proceedings in the court’s archives. Registry procedures should ensure 
that records that are the subject of confidentiality orders are appropriately 
identified and protected.
If, contrary to this suggestion, the court prefers to maintain its current 





When the Carnival is Over: 
The Case for Reform of Access 
to Royal Commission Records
Hollie Kerwin and Maya Narayan1
Introduction
Royal commissions occupy a complex position within the three arms of 
Australian Government. As executive bodies, they may be more amenable 
to characterisation as public record-keeping institutions than Chapter III 
courts, but the royal commission’s central function of receiving evidence, 
often coerced, raises similar questions as to the appropriateness of 
permitting public access to their records.
At the same time, the royal commission is a fundamentally public event. 
Paralleled only by electoral voting and judicial determination, the royal 
commission draws an exceptionally direct line between the citizen and 
government. It casts lines out into public space: inviting—and at times 
compelling—individual witnesses to tell their stories, and recording 
testimony, before speaking back to tell ‘public truths’ and propose legal 
and social change. In this process, royal commissions are heralded as 
1  The views expressed in this chapter are the authors’ and do not in any way reflect those of their 
employers. The authors are grateful to Prue Gregory, Principal Lawyer, Knowmore, Dr Katie Wright, 
La Trobe University, and the National Archives of Australia for their assistance in the preparation of 
this chapter, and to Kerry Ford and Joel Townsend for their generous review of an earlier version of it.
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singularly able to ‘get at the truth’,2 and as a powerful instrument of 
governance that constructs and encourages public endorsement of certain, 
official knowledge, thereby also eliding or silencing other narratives.3 
Despite their public significance, the royal commission remains an under-
researched institution, especially in respect of its function as archive.
In this chapter, we seek to encourage attention to the ‘royal commission 
as archive’. Engagement with the royal commission as archive, we suggest, 
raises risks, opportunities and imperatives for the continued remembrance 
of significant public issues, for critical engagement with the state archive 
and for unpacking the royal commission as an instrument of government. 
We argue that the records of these unique organs of government inquiry 
and public power remain in an unstable legislative and governmental 
compromise.
In response, this chapter proposes a sui generis regime for management 
of and access to the records of these unique organs of government inquiry 
and public power.
The Royal Commission as Government 
Inquiry—A Complex Institutional Identity
Locating Royal Commissions in the Australian 
Constitutional Setting
The royal commission has been described as ‘the most ancient and 
dignified’ organ of government inquiry.4 In many ways similar to a court, 
the royal commission has historically been defined by its power to 
compel individuals to give evidence and its capacity to make findings on 
broad matters of public and private importance, including misconduct, 
corruption, negligence and pressing legal and social issues. However, 
the royal commission is not a judicial entity. Formally an extension of the 
2  Joyce Chia, ‘Inquiring into Inquiries: The Review of the Royal Commissions Act’ (2009) 94 
Reform 49, 49.
3  Jeanine Purdy, ‘Royal Commissions and Omissions’ (1992) 17(1) Alternative Law Journal 32, 
33; see also Hugh McDowall Clokie and J  William Robinson, Royal Commissions of Inquiry: 
The Significance of Investigations in British Politics (1969, Octagon Books), 139–40 and 177; Gillian 
Cowlishaw, ‘Inquiring into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody: The Limits of a Royal Commission’ 
(2007) 7 Journal of Indigenous Policy 28, 31.
4  Clokie and Robinson, above n 3, 24–5.
69
3 . WHEN THE CARNIvAL IS OvER
executive arm of government, the royal commission’s position outside 
Parliament and the judiciary reflects ‘the constitutional struggles which 
have centered around the royal prerogative’ and attempts to restrict royal 
action to certain, defined modes of legal procedure.5
Despite the royal commission’s foundation in British legal history, the 
institution remains relevant, important and a major facet of Australian 
government. At the Commonwealth level, for example, 133 commissions 
have been established under the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) since 
1902.6 These commissions have considered various matters of national 
importance throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, including the sites of 
the seat of the Commonwealth Government (1903); ‘industrial troubles’ 
on Melbourne wharfs (1919–20); the basic wage (1919–20); monetary 
and banking systems (1935–37); Aboriginal land rights (1973–34); and 
drug trafficking (1981–83).7 More recently, the royal commission has 
been employed to investigate alleged corruption, complex crime and 
major institutional failures in the context of the ‘HIH Insurance collapse’ 
(2001–04), the Australian Wheat Board and the United Nations Oil for 
Food program (2005–06), the Home Insulation Program (2013–14), 
child sex abuse (2013–17) and the protection and detention of children 
in the Northern Territory (2016–17).8
Critically, despite the continued currency of the royal commission, there 
is no single or enduring institution known as ‘the royal commission’.9 
Rather, while it is possible to speak of a royal commission as an institution 
of government, individual royal commissions are enlivened by the Crown 
to conduct particular inquiries. Unlike other forms of executive inquiry 
5  Ibid 25.





9  Accepting that there remain rare, permanent, subject-specific royal commissions in British legal 
history. See, for example, the Royal Commission into Historical Manuscripts appointed under royal 
warrant in 1869 and continuing (with amendments to the warrant) as part of the United Kingdom 
National Archives. See further, National Archives, Historical Manuscripts Commission Warrant (n.d.) 
<http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/information-management/legislation/hmc-warrant/>.
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carried out by government departments and law reform bodies, a royal 
commission ceases to exist when its particular inquiry concludes and the 
commission makes its report.10
Contemporary royal commissions continue to be created by the Governor-
General or the Governors of the Australian states by issue of letters patent, 
a mechanism by which the Monarch has historically made commands 
or determined rights. The letters patent compel certain people—
the commissioners—to make inquiries in relation to certain matters 
(the terms of reference). Unsurprisingly, given the royal commission’s 
continued evolution in the age of statutes, each inquiry is now supported 
by detailed legislation in each of the Australian states, territories and at the 
Commonwealth level.11
Complicating the Picture
Despite their technical position within the executive, the royal commission 
does not resemble or neatly reflect the methods of any single arm of 
government.12 As Clokie and Robinson have observed, royal commissions 
are a ‘notable example of the wise combination of fact-finding and 
policy forming in the modern State’.13 In one sense, each commission is 
effectively independent of the executive, given that it is not directed by it 
except as to its composition, timelines and terms of reference (which are, 
of course, not wholly without some effect on their operation).14
10  Leonard Arthur Hallet, Royal Commissions and Boards of Inquiry (Law Book Company, 1982) 1. 
We discuss the implications of the impermanence of a commission in connection with its 
archive, below.
11  Legislation is required to empower royal commissions to compel the production of evidence; 
however, many modern royal commissions statutes go beyond mere provision of such a power: see, 
Royal Commission Act 1902 (Cth); Royal Commissions Act 1923 (NSW); Commissions of Inquiry Act 
1950 (Qld); Royal Commissions Act 1968 (WA); Royal Commissions Act 1916 (SA); Commission of 
Inquiry Act 1995 (Tas); Royal Commissions Act 1991 (ACT); Inquiries Act 2014 (Vic) and Inquiries 
Act 1985 (NT).
12  Clokie and Robinson, above n 3, v, 2; see also Gregory J Inwood and Carolyn M Johns, ‘Why 
Study Commissions of Inquiry’ in Gregory J Inwood and Carolyn M Johns (eds), Commissions 
of Inquiry and Policy Change: A Comparative Analysis (Toronto Press, 2015) 3. 
13  Clokie and Robinson, above n 3, v.
14  For example, as Dibelius has said of the British commissions, ‘the statesman who nominates 
the commission can almost always determine the course that it is going to take, since he will have 
a pretty good knowledge beforehand of the minds of the experts whom he puts on it, while, of course, 
avoiding any appearance of “packing his team”’, cited in Martin Bulmer, ‘Introduction’ in Martin 
Bulmer (ed), Social Research and Royal Commissions (Routledge, 2015) 3.
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Further, royal commissions weave in and out of the space commonly 
occupied by the courts. In conducting their inquiries, royal commissions 
obtain evidence, issue subpoenas for production of documents and 
witnesses, cross-examine witnesses and determine conflicting matters of 
fact using legal method.15 They sit in tribunals and courtrooms, often 
emulating the ceremonies of justice typically seen in those spaces, and are 
frequently presided over by members of the legal profession, including 
sitting judges.16 As the joint judgment of the High Court reflected in the 
Hindmarsh Island case:17
A judge who conducts a Royal Commission may have a close working 
connection with the Executive Government yet will be required to act 
judicially in finding facts and applying the law and will deliver a report 
according to the judge’s own conscience without regard to the wishes or 
advice of the Executive Government except where those wishes or advice 
are given by way of submission for the judge’s independent evaluation.
Similarly, while the findings of royal commissions are not binding, they 
have been elevated in government and academic discourse to the status 
of judicial precedent.18 At the same time, the royal commission has been 
described as the ‘ideal Senate’ or as akin to Question Hour in the British 
Parliament.19
The Australian royal commission is also attended by the complexities 
of intergovernmental interaction and cooperative federalism. Fourteen 
joint commissions, commenced by separate letters patent issued by the 
Commonwealth and Australian states and territories have enabled major 
inquiries to occur in relation to subject matters extending across federal 
15  As Cowlishaw writes in relation to the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, 
for example, ‘the practices of the legal profession naturally dominated the proceedings … Legal 
enquiry operates in terms of certain principles. “The truth” or “the facts” is supposed to emerge from 
the presentation of evidence and questioning of witnesses in an adversarial context’. See further, 
Cowlishaw, above n 3, 32–5.
16  See further, Fiona Wheeler ‘Anomalous Occurrences in Unusual Circumstances? Towards 
a History of Extra‐Judicial Activity by High Court Justices’ (Speech delivered to the High Court of 
Australia Public Lecture Series, Canberra, High Court of Australia, 30 November 2011). 
17  Which considered, among other things, the appointment of a Federal Court judge to conduct an 
inquiry under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth); see Wilson 
v Minister for Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1, 17. See further, Fiona 
Wheeler, ‘The Use of Federal Judges to Discharge Executive Functions: The Justice Matthews Case’ 
(1996) 11 AIAL Forum 1.
18  Hallet, above n 10, 4.
19  Clokie and Robinson, above n 3, 6–7.
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and state spheres of power.20 For example, the Royal Commission into 
Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (RCIADIC), the Royal Commission on 
Human Relationships (Human Relationships RC), the Royal Commission 
into the (organised crime) activities of the Federated Ship Painters and 
Dockers Union (Painters and Dockers RC) and the Royal Commission 
into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (Child Abuse RC) are 
the products of letters patent issued by multiple Australian governments. 
We return to the archives of these important commissions in greater 
detail below.
While the royal commission may reflect a constitutional struggle to 
confine royal action to ‘certain modes of procedure’, this mode, we suggest, 
is multifaceted and spans the gamut of governmental action.
Social and Cultural Functions of Royal Commission 
Inquiries
The inquiries of royal commissions also have a complicated social and 
cultural function and identity. First, modern royal commissions are 
commonly elaborate public events. Their core processes are premised on 
active participation by citizens in political life and democracy, beyond 
obedience of laws (or the burden of sanctions for their breach) and 
electoral voting.
As Bulmer has described, ‘making invitations to submit evidence; 
receiving written evidence; holding public hearings at which oral evidence 
is presented; and making visits of inspection relevant to their subject’ lie 
at the heart of the royal commission’s processes.21 ‘The public’ are invited 
in, often literally by published invitations in newspapers and online. 
The spaces in which they sit are designed for public participation, as 
witnesses of the commission and in the public galleries. In this sense, 
royal commissions are sites for active citizenship22 on issues of civil 
20  Stephen Donaghue, Royal Commissions and Permanent Commission of Inquiry (Butterworths, 
2001) 5.
21  Bulmer, above n 14, 2–3.
22  See further, Kim Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship Law in Context (Lawbook Co, 2002) ch 3; 
Barry Sullivan, ‘FOIA and the First Amendment: Representative Democracy and the People’s Elusive 
“Right to Know” ’ (2012) 72(1) Maryland Law Review 1, 24–6; TJ Cartwright, Royal Commissions 
and Departmental Committees in Britain: A Case-Study in Institutional Adaptiveness and Public 
Participation in Government (Hodder and Stoughton, 1975).
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importance. As Elizabeth Evatt AC recently reflected in relation to the 
Human Relationships RC, in which she, Anne Deveson and Felix Arnott 
were appointed commissioners:
The success of the royal commission was largely due to Anne’s insistence 
that we take the inquiry out to the people. We did this by holding open 
hearings and meetings in many places throughout Australia in an attempt 
to hear the voices of as many Australians as we could. The resulting report 
is enriched by the words of the people who spoke to us.23 
Second, royal commissions have very often established a direct line of 
communication to the public during the life of the inquiry, culminating 
in the publication of their final report. Since at least the early 2000s, most 
royal commissions have created large websites, which, during the period 
of the commission, variously provide access to live and archived streams of 
evidence, transcripts of proceedings, narratives of selected private evidence 
read by actors24 and messages from the relevant commission asking for 
assistance. Previously, evidence of commissions has been broadcast or 
provided daily to media through briefing summaries.25 Hearings have also 
been largely public events, at least until specific reforms enacted for the 
taking of private testimony regarding child sexual abuse. In the British 
historical context, edited serials of the transcripts of each day of evidence 
were published and distributed.26 Further, in the context of the Child 
Abuse RC, a single copy of a book containing ‘Messages to Australia’ 
from a select number of survivors was published and deposited with the 
National Library of Australia when this royal commission concluded in 
December 2017.27
23  Elizabeth Evatt, cited in Wendy McCarthy, ‘Anne Deveson, a warrior for thoughtful, social 
change’, Sydney Morning Herald (online) 13 December 2016 <http://www.smh.com.au/comment/
obituaries/anne-deveson-a-warrior-for-thoughtful-social-change-20161213-gt9wkr.html>.
24  See Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Narratives (n.d.) 
<https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/narratives>.
25  Departmental Committee on the Procedure of Royal Commissions, Report of the Departmental 
Committee on the Procedure of Royal Commissions (The Stationery Office, 1910), [12].
26  See, for example, United Kingdom, Royal Commission on Public Records, Minutes of Evidence 
(House of Commons, 1912–13).
27  Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Message to Australia (n.d.) 
<https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/message-australia>.
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In this way, as sociologist Katie Wright argues, the effects of royal 
commissions may be ‘multi-layered, as much social and cultural as they 
are political and practical’.28 In her view, their inquiries:
throw into sharp relief issues of major social concern: they are symbolic 
of an open and transparent society ‘where the voices of the powerless 
are heard’ and the powerful are held accountable, and importantly, they 
increasingly provide a cathartic function for victims/survivors and indeed 
for societies more broadly.29
In a related way, the capacities of a royal commission to reshape social 
norms are evident. For example, in relation to the Canadian Royal 
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Weir and Habib argue 
that:
Some of the resulting statements defining women’s interests, such as 
those made by Aboriginal women’s organizations, were unprecedented 
anywhere. Hence, the process of participating in the Royal Commission 
also led to the dissemination of new dialogic positions. A state inquiry was 
thus the eliciting condition for the development of knowledge by a social 
movement about changes in scientific knowledge.30
At the same time, the royal commission is a powerful instrument 
of governance and knowledge production. While they may create 
opportunities for a multiplicity of views to be heard or for the 
interrogation of hostile witnesses, through their curated websites, daily 
press summaries, lines of inquiry and reporting, they also produce—from 
a vast mass of information—powerful narratives and official knowledge 
for public consumption and endorsement.31 As Clokie and Robinson 
observed of the broadcasts of evidence made by royal commissions 
through the 1960s in Britain, the royal commission serves the ‘great 
Benthamite principle of government, namely publicity’, including 
drawing the public into government and consolidating public support 
for the legal outcomes of the commission.32 Similarly, the commission 
28  Katie Wright, ‘Childhood, Public Inquiries and Late Modernity’ in B West (ed), Challenging 
Identities, Institutions and Communities, Refereed Conference Proceedings of the Australian Sociological 
Association Conference (University of South Australia, 2014) 5.
29  Ibid 4.
30  Lorna Weir and Jasmin Habib, ‘A Critical Feminist Analysis of the Final Report of the Royal 
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies’ (1997) 52 (Spring) Studies in Political Economy 
137, 148.
31  Charles J Hanser, Guide to Decision: The Royal Commission (Bedminster Press, 1965) ix.
32  Clokie and Robinson, above n 3, 139–40, 177.
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has been described as promoting social control by government;33 as an 
ideological crisis management strategy;34 and as a tool in the resolution of 
public controversy and promotion of public consensus about key issues.35
It must also be accepted that in the process of eliciting and announcing 
public truths, some voices and narratives may not be heard, or indeed may 
be silenced, by royal commissions. Even in the context of the Canadian 
Reproductive Technologies Royal Commission referred to above, some 
forms of knowledge assumed an untouchable position. For example, Weir 
and Habib have illustrated the privileging of ‘biomedical visions’ of the 
body at the expense of understanding or hearing feminist voices in relation 
to the ‘social and cultural changes associated with the government of 
human reproduction’.36 By ‘proceeding from a binary distinction between 
nature and culture’, the commission elided any ‘notion that expertise 
could in any way be constitutive of the body’ and failed to:
heed the warning in a number of feminist briefs to the royal commission, 
particularly those from Quebecois feminists, which broke the 
Commission’s biomedical and legal framing of issues in order to argue 
that the discourse of new reproductive technologies is especially dangerous 
because it assimilates women’s activity in having children with men’s.37
Similar issues have arisen in the context of Australian royal commissions. 
As Purdy has forcefully argued in relation to the RCIADIC’s findings:
practices and rules of law combined to create a space in which legal 
discourse in the form of judgments and reports can be constructed. This 
space is created not only by the determination of who will be able to speak 
and what they will be allowed to say … but also who will be able and 
prepared to speak, and what they will be prepared to say.38 
33  Hanser, above n 31, 160; see also, Geoffrey Lindell, ‘British Tribunals of Inquiry: Legislative and 
Judicial Control of the Inquisitorial Process: Relevance to Australian Royal Commissions’ in Research 
Paper No 5 (Department of the Parliamentary Library, Australia, 15 April 2003) 6.
34  George Gilligan, ‘Royal Commissions of Inquiry’ (2002) 35(3) Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Criminology 289, 289–90.
35  Scott Prasser, ‘Royal Commissions and Public Inquiries: Scope and Uses’ in Patrick Weller (ed), 
Royal Commissions and the Making of Public Policy (MacMillan Education, 1994) 6–8.
36  Weir and Habib, above n 30, 151.
37  Ibid 151.
38  Purdy, above n 3, 33.
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As an employee of the RCIADIC, Cowlishaw, too, has described 
a coalescence of factors that resulted in circumstances where it ‘rarely had 
direct evidence other than from police and prison wardens’.39 As she argues:
neither in the legal process, the scientific discourse of experts, nor in 
the welfare framework of the socially concerned was there much room 
for Aboriginal voices, and certainly a radically different framework 
of discussion could not be accommodated.40
Moreover, Cowlishaw demonstrates how, together, the commission’s 
terms of reference and legal method privileged attention to a dogged but 
largely elusive pursuit of ‘culprits’ for the deaths of the particular people 
in question, at the expense of attention to subtler, more difficult social 
processes contributing to Aboriginal incarceration and deaths in custody. 
In the legal process, she writes, ‘there is little room for recognising that 
a particular kind of account of events is being created, and another 
kind excluded’.41 Rather, for example, while the RCIADIC ‘sought out 
anyone who might be able to give evidence, perused police daybooks and 
worksheets, calculated times and distances, and examined fingerprints as 
in the most careful murder investigation’,42 swearing, for example, was 
erased from accounts of the interaction between police and Aboriginal 
people despite the centrality of abusive swearing to police–Aboriginal 
relations and, potentially, the incarceration of Aboriginal people.43
39  Cowlishaw, above n 3, 30. 
40  Ibid 36. She describes insufficient funding to key Indigenous rights advocacy bodies that had been 
tasked to investigate issues underlying the deaths under inquiry, alienation of Aboriginal people from 
the commission’s processes, a reluctance to give evidence by prisoners based on fear of reprisal and severe 
limitations on the utility of evidence given by prisoners in relation to historical deaths in circumstances 
where they had not been interviewed at the time of death. Amy McQuire argued, further, that the voices 
of Aboriginal women were ‘completely drowned out’. See Amy McQuire, ‘Black Women, And A Tale 
Of Two Commissions’ New Matilda (online) 15 April 2016 < https://newmatilda.com/2016/04/15/a-
tale-of-two-royal-commissions/>. The RCIADIC is not the only Australian royal commission in which 
legal processes have been applied to Aboriginal people’s experiences with the effect of ‘believing’ and 
‘valuing’ certain voices, nor in which the voices of certain Aboriginal people have been absent. See, in 
relation to the Hindmarsh Bridge (South Australian) Royal Commission, Joanna Bourke, ‘Women’s 
Business: Sex, Secrets and the Hindmarsh Island Affair’ (1997) 20(2) UNSW Law Journal 333. See, 
in relation to royal commissions more broadly, Steve Hemming and Daryle Rigney, ‘Decentring the 
New Protectors: Transforming Aboriginal Heritage in South Australia’ in Emma Waterton and Steve 
Watson (eds), Heritage and Community Engagement: Collaboration or Contestation? (Routledge, 2013) 
100–14. Hemming and Rigney write at 104 that ‘Legislation, royal commissions, court cases and other 
legal spaces play an ongoing role in constructing and authenticating histories and stories of Indigenous 
culture. In this context, the colonial archive is both activated and reinvigorated, and new elements and 
interpretations are introduced’.
41  Cowlishaw, above n 3, 33. 
42  Ibid 31.
43  Ibid 34.
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Therefore, royal commissions are undeniably poised in a delicate 
relationship of trust between citizen and government.44 While their letters 
patent compel the commissioners to inquire into certain matters and 
advise the Crown, the royal commission also powerfully recalibrates or 
affirms social norms, rearticulates or further embeds dominant discourses 
and amplifies or placates the anxieties of members of the community. 
As we argue below, the royal commission’s social and cultural identity and 
effects compel attention to the archives of these complex bodies.
Royal Commission as Archive
As a result of their functions—both institutional and sociocultural—royal 
commissions hold vast archives of important historical material. However, 
unlike courts or government departments, once the royal commission 
ends, it ceases to exist. In practice (and at law), then, questions of access, 
care and responsibility in respect of its records leave the ‘commission as 
inquiry’ behind, to be answered, often incompletely, by agencies who 
take, or are left with, responsibility for the commission’s archive.
There remains a dearth of attention to the practical and theoretical issues 
attending royal commission archives. Indeed, when the Australian Law 
Reform Commission considered the arrangements for royal commission 
records in 2007, it noted that it had ‘received limited feedback from 
stakeholders regarding issues of access and use of documents or things 
collected by completed Royal Commissions or other public inquiries’.45
As we illustrate below, access, care and responsibility for these records are, 
often, adrift between multiple legislative regimes, which prejudices their 
public availability and promotion, as well as the integrity of the archive 
itself. However, before doing so, it is necessary to conceive of ‘the royal 
commission as archive’ and to identify the risks, stakes and imperatives for 
civil society, public accountability, transparency and governance posed by 
these volumes of material.
44  Dara M Price and Johanna J Smith, ‘The Trust Continuum in the Information Age’ (2011) 11 
Archival Science 253, 266.
45  Australian Law Reform Commission, Royal Commissions and Official Inquiries, Discussion Paper 
No 75 (2007), [8.47].
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The Royal Commission as Archive?
The documentary record of a royal commission cannot be conceived of 
as mere residue, pressed into obscurity by the primacy of the commission’s 
final report and the fulfilment of its terms of reference. Rather, the royal 
commission’s archive must be treated as a powerful and important product 
of government in its own right. While it may be correct that ‘there seems 
to be little consensus as to what an archive is’,46 in describing the archives 
of the royal commission here, we seek to speak of the totality of material 
held by the institution before its cessation, including the transcripts of 
evidence, commissioner’s notes, documents produced to, or seized by, 
an inquiry, investigative records and the administrative records of the 
commission regarding its own operation.47 In this sense, as we discuss 
below, it is an archive—the ‘official record’ of the commission48—but also 
a body of material, which may have a life of its own after the commission’s 
terms of reference are fulfilled. This is so in three key respects.
Royal Commission Archives as Key to Executing 
its Functions
First, the vast archives of royal commissions are a substantial product of 
the inquiry process. Inasmuch as the inquiry process may have invited or 
coerced individuals and institutions to provide it with information, it is 
the total record of its work, and not necessarily the report, that retains the 
information it has elicited. Clearly, in this way, the archive has ‘obvious 
informational value’49 and is integral to taking action on the basis of that 
information. For example, the Australian Law Reform Commission has 
highlighted the critical importance of royal commission records for law 
enforcement, implementing inquiry recommendations and advising on 
the administration of laws.50 It is an archive in the sense described by 
Ridener as a ‘place for the uncovering of records which are not duplicated 
in any other [single] place’.51 The importance of the archive here is 
46  Spieker Sven, The Big Archive: Art from Bureaucracy (MIT Press, 2008) 4.
47  Developing a conception of the archive in this way has been a central goal of the Court as 
Archive Project, undertaken by the editors of this text. Both authors acknowledge the work of the 
project in foregrounding attention to the archives of institutions in this way.
48  For further discussion of the multiple meanings of ‘the archive’ in connection with legal 
processes, see Katherine Biber and Trish Luker, ‘Evidence and the Archive: Ethics, Aesthetics and 
Emotion’ (2014) 40(1) Australian Feminist Law Journal 1, 5–11.
49  Price and Smith, above n 44. 
50  Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 45, [8.47].
51  John Ridener, From Polders to Postmodernism: A Concise History of Archival Theory (Litwin Books, 
2008) 4. 
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straightforward: it provides for direct action on the information gathered 
by the commission towards the purposes for which it was established. 
Similarly, especially in the case of commissions that have uncovered 
harm to individuals, the particular records of this evidence are vital for 
individuals who may seek to pursue civil or coronial proceedings.
As a body of evidence, too, the records created by the commission may 
arguably represent the key product of a royal commission’s processes. 
As Price and Smith write of Canadian royal commissions (referring here 
to the Indian Specific Claims Commission [ISCC]):
In light of the fact that the ISCC had no real legislative or adjudicative 
power, the records represent the key product of the process, and the most 
important means by which it could exert moral influence in society. 
The raison d’etre of the Inquiry becomes the collection, collation and 
preservation of a permanent, coherent body of evidence.52
Royal Commission Archives as an Accountability 
and Critique Mechanism
Second, prioritising and thinking consciously about the royal commission 
as archive is critical to allowing for critique of the commission’s 
governmental, social and cultural functions. Given the delicate 
relationship of trust between the institution of the commission and the 
public outlined above, its records may form, at the very least, ‘evidence 
that the government has [or has not] carried out its responsibilities to 
society’53 and an ‘audit trail’, which may reveal ‘evidence of negligence, 
malfeasance and missteps’.54 In this sense, the archive is an accountability 
mechanism providing an ‘official record’ against which the technical 
strength and cogency of the commission’s findings and recommendations 
may be assessed.55
52  Price and Smith, above n 44, 270.
53  Ibid 265.
54  Ibid 266.
55  The archive here may arguably provide a continued honouring of the active engagement sought 
by the commission as inquiry between ‘active citizens’ and government. For example, Barry Sullivan 
(citing James Madison) has argued that ‘the right to know’ is a fundamental tenet of a model of 
representative democracy, which expects engagement by citizens with the architecture of government. 
See Sullivan, above n 22, 35.
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Moreover, as cultural theorists, archivists and (now) legal scholars56 
argue, the ability to interrogate the form and context of state archives, 
in addition to its content, provides opportunities for critical engagement 
with the power relations inherent in its production, and of state power. 
As Steedman has written, ‘in its quiet folders and bundles is the neatest 
demonstration of how state power has operated, through ledgers and lists 
and indictments, and through what is missing from them’.57
In this context, we are concerned not just with the content of information 
acquired by the commission, but also with information created by it. This 
includes the records of its own administration, its operational decisions 
and evidence of the way it has curated its public presence and shaped 
its priorities. At a deeper level, it includes the totality of the record and 
what it may implicitly reveal about the commission as an instrument of 
governance; the construction and resolution of the issues under its remit; 
and the things it silences and privileges. In this sense, the archive is the site 
at which to read, for example, ‘what can be said’ before a commission58 
and what cannot, and the ways in which knowledge, semantics and the 
legal method may elevate certain evidence, or diminish or disempower 
others during its operation.59 In addition, as Stoler makes clear, attention 
to the ‘surplus production’ of state archives—the marginalia, edits and 
footnotes, handwritten drafts and the contradiction between official and 
unofficial records—may open up new reflections on the psychic state of 
the empire.60
Importantly, the royal commission as archive is a site for disturbing, 
potentially, the ‘coherence’ of the official record and its intended ‘moral 
influence’ (as referred to by Price and Smith, cited above). It is an 
opportunity to critique the state and the commission, and to see more 
56  See, for example, the emerging literature in relation to ‘law’s archive’ captured in a special issue 
(2014) 40(1) Australian Feminist Law Journal. 
57  Carolyn Steedman, Dust: The Archive and Cultural History (Manchester University Press, 2001) 68.
58  As van Rijswijk writes, for Foucault, the archive is not just ‘that whole mass of texts that belong 
to a single discursive [in this case legal formation]’, but should also be thought of as the ‘law of what 
can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements’; see Honni van Rijswijk, ‘Archiving 
the Northern Territory Intervention in Law and in the Literary Counter-Imaginary’ (2014) 40(1) 
Australian Feminist Law Journal 117, 119.
59  Rebecca Monson, ‘Unsettled Explorations of Law’s Archives: The Allure and Anxiety of Solomon 
Islands’ Court Records’ (2014) 40(1) Australian Feminist Law Journal 35, 39.
60  Ann Laura Stoler, ‘Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance’ (2002) 2 Archival Science 87; 
Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense (Princeton 
University Press, 2009) 41.
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clearly the interaction between those who govern and are governed. It is 
a place to read what is missing (eg, the omission of swearing from the 
accounts of police–state interaction, witnessed by Cowlishaw during the 
RCIADIC) and, potentially,61 to uncover traces of alternative narratives.
Royal Commission Archives as Social, Public Memory
Third, the collected records of royal commissions are undeniably 
significant repositories of public memory. In collecting together previously 
untold life stories, investigations of institutional actions, narratives of 
the interaction between the state and its citizens, corruption, corporate 
failures and other matters of national importance, the records of royal 
commissions provide a ‘vital aspect of the social memory of modern 
societies’.62 In particular, in the minutiae of the documents created during 
an inquiry, the royal commission archive is a record not just of public 
decisions and the formation of public policy, but also of ‘information 
about how public laws and regulations and public institutions affect 
individual citizens in various aspects of their lives’.63 For example, as 
Cowlishaw observed of the public material she viewed during the conduct 
of the RCIADIC (and which is now, as we discuss below, subject to 
a  complex legislative access scheme), ‘the vast array of files reveals the 
levels of monitoring and surveillance, which Aboriginals [sic] have been 
subjected to, and attests to the fact that they have not been authorised to 
produce their own accounts of their experiences’.64
61  Accepting that there are strong critiques of an uncritical approach of ‘going back to the 
archives’ to ‘produce a more correct account’. See further, Victoria Brown ‘Explorations in Feminist 
Historiography: Rhetoric, Affect and “What Really Happened” in Feminism’s Recent Past’ (2014) 
7(2) Subjectivity 210, 212.
62  Inge Bundsgaard, ‘The Question of Access: The Right to Social Memory versus the Right to 
Social Oblivion’ in Francis X Blouin Jr and William G Rosenberg (eds), Archives, Documentation, and 
Institutions of Social Memory (University of Michigan Press, 2006) 114.
63  Blouin Jr and Rosenberg, above n 62, 114.
64  Cowlishaw, above n 3, 33; see also, for example, the use of inquiry transcripts (in this case, 
a parliamentary inquiry, rather than a royal commission) in the ‘Minutes of Evidence Project’, 
which aimed to ‘spark … conversations about history and structural justice through the professional 
performance of transcripts of evidence given before the 1881 Victorian Parliamentary Coranderrk 
Inquiry’. See further, Minutes of Evidence Project, Performance: We Will Show the Country (n.d.) 
<http://www.minutesofevidence.com.au/performance/>. 
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Dislocation, Absence and Complexity in 
Locating and Accessing the Commission 
as Archive
The existing scheme for managing the records of royal commissions 
does not understand these records as a single archival resource and relies 
heavily on ad hoc executive action—be it ministerial direction, ministerial 
approval to ‘special access’ or intergovernmental agreement—to supply 
the content of custody and access arrangements. As we suggest below, this 
dislocated regulatory approach undermines both the integrity of the royal 
commission archive and the capacity of the royal commission to fulfil its 
functions and create meaningful public records.
The legislative difficulty in regulating records of royal commissions 
(whether of single or joint jurisdictional character) is in part a product of 
the unique nature of royal commissions as entities. Although an executive 
entity during the term of an inquiry, a royal commission ceases to exist 
in law once the period provided for in its establishing letters patent 
lapses (without being extended by issue of subsequent or amending 
letters patent). Thus, given absent specific legislative provision, complex 
questions can arise as to the ownership of royal commission records once 
a commission ends.
Joint Commonwealth and State/Territory 
Royal Commissions
The complexities attending access to royal commission records in 
this respect are most acute in the context of joint royal commissions. 
Such commissions are the necessary institutional structure where the 
Commonwealth seeks to inquire into matters that wholly or partly fall 
outside the scope of Commonwealth legislative power.65 They may also 
be the preferred institutional structure—though one strictly unnecessary, 
as a matter of constitutional power—where the governments of more 
than one Australian jurisdiction seek to inquire into a subject matter 
within Commonwealth legislative power, but in which the states have 
some interest. To enable joint royal commissions to coercively obtain 
65  Within the terms of s 51 of the Australian Constitution.
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information and documents across territorial boundaries, the relevant 
inquiring institution is typically conferred with evidence-gathering 
powers under the statutes of each participating jurisdiction.66
In the context of these royal commissions, where material is received and 
produced during the course of an inquiry, records within the archive may 
be of multifaceted jurisdictional character. Is a document produced under 
summons issued in reliance on more than one coercive power (ie, under 
legislation of more than one participating jurisdiction)67 a document of 
the jurisdiction in which it was produced, a document of the jurisdiction 
in which the summons was served or a document of both state and federal 
character? Similarly, is a document produced by a commission sitting 
as a state and federal commission a state, Commonwealth or state and 
Commonwealth document?
The existing legal apparatus to meet such complexity is presently also 
multifaceted and, we argue, unresolved. As we detail below, further 
complexity attends the custody and access to records of joint royal 
commissions, but also commissions commenced by a single government.
Custody, Possession and Use of Commonwealth 
and Joint Commonwealth and State/Territory Royal 
Commission Records
Although each Australian jurisdiction has enacted legislation providing for 
the exercise of coercive powers by joint royal commissions, these legislative 
schemes operate incompletely in their treatment of records produced by 
such inquiries once the relevant inquiry ends. Only the Inquiries Act 2014 
(Vic) makes express provision for the treatment of records of state 
66  Royal Commissions Act 1923 (NSW), s 8; Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950 (Qld), s 5; Royal 
Commissions Act 1917 (SA), s 10; Commissions of Inquiry Act 1995 (Tas), s 22; Inquiries Act 2014 
(Vic), s 17 (read with s 7); Royal Commissions Act 1968 (WA), s 9; read with ss 2 and 7AA of the Royal 
Commissions Act 1902 (Cth).
67  See, for example, Re Winneke; ex Parte Gallagher (1982) 152 CLR 211, concerning a summons 
issued in reliance on the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) and the Evidence Act 1958 (Vic) (which, 
at that time, governed the powers exercisable by state commissions). The question of how documents 
were produced in response to a summons with dual jurisdictional character was not answered by the 
High Court.
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commissions to which that Act applies.68 Other state jurisdictions merely 
treat royal commission records as any other document of an executive 
body, subject to state public archives legislation, but not differentiated in 
their treatment (for custody, possession, use and access purposes).69
This characterisation becomes important when considering the 
application of the archives provisions of the Royal Commissions Act 1902 
(Cth) and the Archives Act 1983 (Cth) (‘Archives Act’). Overlaying the 
idiosyncratic state royal commissions regimes, the Royal Commissions Act 
1902 (Cth) and Archives Act make specific provision, albeit incompletely, 
for the treatment of the records of joint royal commissions.
Section 9(2) of the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) provides for the 
making of regulations for the custody in which some or all of the records 
of a Commonwealth royal commission70 are to be kept. Such regulations 
may also provide for the purposes for which relevant records may and 
must not be used,71 as well as the circumstances in which a custodian72 
of royal commission records must give possession of, or access to, those 
records to other persons or bodies.73
Section 9(3) prescribes the persons and bodies who may be given custody 
of royal commission records by regulations made under s 9(2). All of 
the prescribed custodians are Commonwealth institutions, save for two: 
state Attorneys-General and state law enforcement bodies. That the Act 
provides for state custodians of royal commission records is relevant to 
the discussion below of the access regime prescribed by the Archives Act. 
This is because where regulations are made for the purposes of s 9(2) of 
68  The Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950 (Qld) does empower the commissioner of a relevant inquiry 
to make directions as to the custody of records while a commission is on foot, but is otherwise silent 
on what is to happen once a commission ends: s 19B(2).
69  See, for example, State Records Act 1998 (NSW), s 3(1)(i) (definition of ‘public office’), which 
includes a ‘Royal Commission or Commission of Inquiry’; and s 7(4A), which provides, relevantly, that 
the records of a public office that has ceased to exist, and which was a royal commission or commission 
of inquiry, are to be subject to the control of the Cabinet Office. See also the various record-keeping 
obligations of ‘public offices’, as defined: State Records Act, ss 11–15, 21–25 and 26–36A.
70  See s 1B(1) definition of ‘Royal Commission’.
71  Section 9(2)(b), (e); see also s 9(6), (7).
72  Section 9(3) prescribes the persons and bodies who may be given custody of records by regulations 
made under s 9(2).
73  Section 9(2)(c), (d).
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the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth), the Archives Act has effect as if 
a direction to the same effect were in force under s 22(3) of that Act.74 
In any event, it is worth noting that regulations for the purposes of s 9(2) 
have only been made in the context of two previous commissions.75
The Archives Act extensively prescribes the circumstances in which 
a ‘Commonwealth record’ is to be dealt with and accessed.76 
A ‘Commonwealth record’ is defined as a record that is either the ‘property 
of the Commonwealth or of a Commonwealth institution’ or a record that 
is deemed to be a Commonwealth record by operation of s 22.77 Royal 
commission records fall outside the ordinary definition of ‘Commonwealth 
record’, given that there is no legal entity in possession of relevant records 
once a commission ends. However, s 22(2) of the Archives Act deems records 
kept by a royal commission (defined, relevantly, as a  Commonwealth 
royal commission)78 to be ‘Commonwealth records’ for the purposes of 
the Act and provides that the Commonwealth is entitled to the possession 
of such records once they are no longer required for the purposes of a 
commission.
Section 22(3) requires that deemed Commonwealth records be kept in 
such custody as the relevant responsible Commonwealth Minister directs 
and the National Archives of Australia (NAA) is not entitled to the ‘care’ 
of such records except in accordance with such a direction.79 As the 
Australian Law Reform Commission has observed, the effect of s 22(3) is 
that there is no legal requirement for records of royal commissions to be 
74  Section 9(5).
75  The Royal Commission into Trade Union Governance and Corruption and the Oil-for-Food 
Inquiry: Royal Commissions Regulations 2001 (Cth), regs 8 and 9. A separate regulatory regime was 
enacted to provide for the transfer of certain records of the HIH Royal Commission (which was not 
a joint commission) to the Australian Securities and Investment Commission: HIH Royal Commission 
(Transfer of Records) Act 2003 (Cth); HIH Royal Commission (Transfer of Records) Regulations 2003 
(Cth). 
76  Pt V, divs 3 and 4.
77  Archives Act, s 3(1). The definition excludes certain presently irrelevant material.
78  Being the records kept by a royal commission commenced or completed before or after the 
commencement of Part V of the Archives Act, s 22(1).
79  Section 22(3).
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transferred to the NAA.80 The authors suggest that this lack of obligation to 
transfer royal commission records to the NAA, coupled with the potential 
in the existing legislative context for the records of a royal commission 
to be in the custody or possession of multiple Commonwealth and state 
agencies, undermines the integrity of such records as archival resources. 
This problem is exacerbated by the complex regime governing access to 
the records of joint royal commissions, considered further below.
Access to Royal Commission Records—
Commonwealth and Joint Commonwealth  
and State/Territory
Royal commission records to which the Archives Act applies are subject to 
the ordinary open access periods prescribed by that Act,81 save in the case 
of certain records relating to ‘private sessions’ of the Child Abuse RC.82 
It is important to consider the practical implications of this statement. 
First, the import of this rule is that many of a royal commission’s 
records that were public during the life of the commission (eg, public 
submissions, transcripts of public hearings and other material hosted on 
the commission website, if it is not maintained online) cease to be public 
before the open access period is reached. Except in the case of Cabinet 
notebooks or recordings containing Census information, the open access 
period commences 31 years after the date the document was created. 
Second, in order to be subject to the Archives Act and the open access 
period, a record must be a Commonwealth record: a status that is by no 
means clear in relation to the records of joint royal commissions.
80  Australian Law Reform Commission, Making Inquiries: A New Statutory Framework, Report 
No 111 (2009), [8.47–8.48] (‘Making Inquiries’). Section 27 of the Archives Act prescribes a time frame 
for transfer of certain ‘Commonwealth records’ to the NAA; however, that provision is unlikely to 
apply to royal commission records. Section 27 only applies to a record that is in the custody of a 
Commonwealth institution other than the NAA (s 27(1)(a)) and that has been determined to be part 
of the archival resources of the Commonwealth under s 3C (s 27(1)(b)). It would seem to subvert the 
clear legislative intention of s 22 (namely, that royal commission records be dealt with under a regime 
separate to that applying to ordinary Commonwealth records) if the Director-General could make a 
direction under s 3C that, of its own force, had the effect of bringing royal commission records within 
the operation of s 27 and, thus, circumventing the operation of s 22 (which, critically, provides that 
the responsible Minister is the only decision-maker who can determine that royal commission records 
be transferred to the NAA). In our view, this regime is very likely to engage the principle in Anthony 
Horden & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing and Allied Trades Union of Australia (1932) 47 CLR 1, 
7. In any event, s 27 would not apply to records of joint royal commissions, given that the provision 
only applies to Commonwealth records (that meet the requirements of s 27(a) and (b)).
81  Archives Act, pt V and definition of ‘open access period’ (s 3(1)(c) and (7)).
82  Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth), s 6OM.
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Records that are in the open access period and in the care of the NAA 
or the custody of a Commonwealth institution (and which are not 
otherwise exempt)83 are required to be made publicly available. Any 
non-publication direction given by a royal commission in respect of such 
records (necessarily during the life of a commission) ceases to apply once 
the records enter the open access period.84
Access to royal commission records may be provided under the Freedom of 
Information Act 1982 (Cth), subject to the limitations of that Act; however, 
this may only occur while the relevant record is not in the open access 
period.85 Access may also be provided outside of the open access period 
where ‘special access’ is granted by the responsible Minister, in accordance 
with arrangements approved by the Prime Minister.86 However, ‘special 
access’ may only be granted in respect of royal commission records deemed 
to be Commonwealth records by operation s 22 of the Archives Act.
In the context of joint commissions, a greater impediment to access is 
s 22(6), which provides that the deeming and custody provisions of s 22(2) 
and (3) only apply to joint royal commissions to the extent determined 
by agreement between the Commonwealth and the relevant participating 
state(s). Neither the Archives Act nor the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) 
supply the content to arrangements made by the Commonwealth and the 
states for the purposes of s 22(6) and such arrangements are not required 
to be tabled in Parliament, gazetted or otherwise published publicly. 
Practice also suggests that such arrangements may not be finalised until 
a royal commission is approaching its effluxion date or may not be made 
at all.
Before turning to consider difficulties of access in practice, one further 
point of note is that records of Commonwealth royal commissions that 
are in the custody of a state custodian (ie, a state Attorney-General or 
a  state law enforcement agency) would seem not to be subject to the 
access obligations in the Archives Act and may not be subject to the access 
obligations contained in state public records legislation.87 As  will be 
83  As to which, see ss 29, 33 and 35.
84  Archives Act, s 22(4).
85  Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), ss 12(1) and 13(3).
86  Archives Act, s 56(1).
87  For example, records received by the Attorney-General of Victoria or Victoria Police would seem 
not to meet the definition of ‘public record’ for the purposes of the Public Records Act 1973 (Vic): see 
the s 2(1) definitions of ‘public record’ (para (a)), ‘public officer’ and ‘public office’. 
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suggested later, legislative gaps of this sort would best be addressed by a 
cooperative legislative scheme, supported by referrals of power from the 
states to the Commonwealth.
Record Movements and the Difficulties of Access 
in Practice
Although royal commission records may be transferred to the NAA, 
the existing legislative scheme does not prescribe a time frame for such 
transfer.88 The absence of such a requirement, combined with the existing 
scheme’s reliance on executive action, gives rise to the real possibility that a 
commission may end without clear requirements for record management 
having been in place during the course of its inquiry. In an immediate sense, 
this creates a risk of records being be disposed of or collated ineffectively 
by the commission (and subsequent custodians). In  the longer term, 
failure to have arrangements in place for the treatment of records before 
a relevant inquiry ends leaves those records in an ambiguous legal state, 
productive of accessibility issues for citizens and administrative burden for 
participating governments.
Thus, royal commission records often exist in an indeterminate state 
of partial regulation, formally subject to the Archives Act, but not to 
substantive arrangements of the kinds contemplated by that Act.
Contact with the NAA and with researchers and practitioners attempting 
to engage with the work of royal commissions reveals the practical 
impediments created by such complexities.
Locating the Archive in the Regulatory Penumbra
The NAA estimates that there are over 100 royal commissions affected by 
issues arising from the application of ss 22(3) and (6) of the Archives Act. 
This includes commissions where no direction under s 22(3) was given 
before the commission ended and joint commissions, of which there are 
several, for which there are no arrangements in place for the purposes of 
s 22(6).89 The vast majority of these commissions have long since ended.
88  Australian Law Reform Commission, Making Inquiries, at [8.48]. Please see n 80 for the authors’ 
analysis of the relevant provision of the Archives Act.
89  Interview with the staff of the National Archives of Australia (4 September 2017).
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Because the existing scheme does not proscribe the division of collections 
of royal commission records, when a royal commission ends, its records 
have often been divided and dispersed. In this respect, the report of the 
Australian Law Reform Commission Inquiry into Royal Commissions, 
Making Inquiries: A New Statutory Framework, noted that, as a matter 
of practice, records concerning the administration of royal commissions 
(such as internal correspondence) have been transferred to the Attorney-
General’s Department, while substantive records (such as transcripts, 
evidence and submissions) have been transferred to the Department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet.90 Further, because there is no existing 
legislative mechanism for automatic transfer of records to the NAA and 
the Archives Act does not otherwise specify a time frame within which 
records should be transferred to the NAA,91 the existing scheme creates the 
potential for records to remain indefinitely with a custodial department 
(be it the Attorney-General’s Department or the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet).
In the case of commissions for which no s 22(3) direction is given, or 
no s 22(6) arrangement is agreed, there may be no formal mechanism 
by which the NAA can grant access to such records.92 In the case of 
commissions for which there are no s  22(6) arrangements in place, 
the records of those commissions (at least on one argument) may not 
necessarily be Commonwealth records at all. More broadly, because 
s  22(6) agreements subject certain records to the legislation of one 
jurisdiction,93 unless an agreement is in place, it may be unclear whether 
Commonwealth or state legislation properly governs such records. While 
original records are generally not split across states, in the case of one or 
two joint commissions, the NAA may hold copies of publicly available 
material, while a state holds the original documents.94 Of course, this 
will not necessarily mean that an individual’s access is straightforward 
without a s 22(6) arrangement being in place. It appears, too, that some 
material relating to a royal commission may have been deposited by the 
Commissioner himself (Frank Costigan QC) with his personal papers at 
the State Library of Victoria.95
90  Making Inquiries [8.48]; see n 80 for the authors’ analysis of the relevant provisions of the 
Archives Act.
91  Ibid.
92  Interview with the staff of National Archives of Australia (4 September 2017).
93  Ibid.
94  Ibid.
95  Francis Xavier Costigan, Papers of Francis Costigan (1968–2009), State Library of Victoria 
<http://search.slv.vic.gov.au/MAIN:Everything:SLV_VOYAGER2442558>.
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While the NAA endeavours to facilitate access to material of royal 
commissions affected by ss 22(3) and (6) issues, the NAA has not been 
able to give access to some of these records.96 In the NAA’s view, this is 
a consequence of the inconsistent application of the existing legislative 
scheme.97
Websites recording the work of royal commissions are also not uniformly 
dealt with. Some are preserved and hosted by the Attorney-General’s 
Department for an indeterminate period of time, although they are 
generally not preserved in any permanent sense.98 Material on commission 
websites may or may not be selected by the National Library of Australia 
to go to the PANDORA Archive99 or to the Australian Government 
Web Archive.100 However, difficulties abound around how such material, 
particularly audio and video files, is harvested and may be particularly 
acute in the context of content-heavy websites, such as royal commission 
sites.101 For example, in its Statement of Preservation Intent on Selective Web 
Harvesting, the National Library acknowledges the limits of web archiving, 
including that ‘the way in which the content is collected and displayed 
may mean that there is significant limitation on the presentation of the 
archived artefact as an authentic record of the publisher’s original date’.102
Section 22(3) and the Human Relationships RC
The Human Relationships RC was a joint commission established by 
the Whitlam Government in 1973 to ‘inquire into and report upon the 
family, social, educational, legal and sexual aspects of male and female 
relationships, so far as those matters are relevant to the powers and functions 
of the Australian Parliament and Government, including powers and 
functions in relation to the Territories’, and to give particular emphasis to 
96  Interview with the staff of National Archives of Australia (4 September 2017).
97  Ibid.
98  Making Inquiries, [8.48]. Contrary to the Australian Law Reform Commission’s view, websites 
that it considered ‘safe’ are no longer accessible and have not been re-archived elsewhere.
99  A web archive established by the National Library of Australia, which is now maintained by the 
National Library of Australia and 10 other Australian libraries. At least some records of the Royal 
Commission into HIH Insurance were dealt with in this manner.
100  An initiative of the National Library of Australia, designed to complement the PANDORA 
Archive.
101  National Library of Australia, Statement of Preservation Intent on Selective Web Harvesting 
(1 March 2013) <https://www.nla.gov.au/content/preservation-intent-selective-web-harvesting>; see 
also Paul Koerbin, Report on the Crawl and Harvest of the Whole Australian Web Domain Undertaken 
during June and July 2005 (10 October 2005), National Library of Australia, <http://pandora.nla.gov.
au/documents/domain_harvest_report_public.pdf>.
102  National Library of Australia, above n 101.
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various matters associated with responsible parenting.103 A controversial 
commission, which was ended abruptly following Whitlam’s dismissal, 
the commission’s records were transferred to the NAA without a direction 
under s 22(3) having been made.104 In the absence of a s 22(3) direction, 
the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet remains responsible 
today for determining how access to the records of that commission is 
given.105 The basis for such access would appear to be the ‘special access’ 
mechanism in s 56(1) of the Archives Act, the parameters of which are 
otherwise not prescribed by the Act.
It took sociology researcher Dr Katie Wright over a year to gain access 
to records of the Human Relationships RC. This was eventually granted 
as ‘special access’, although only on the condition that the NAA would 
be required to examine each record before the material could be used 
for research.106 In obtaining this permission, the researcher was advised 
that, although the records of the Human Relationships RC are in the 
open access period and that several records have already been examined 
for public access (as well as made digitally available on the NAA’s website), 
most of the records are yet to be examined for the purposes of determining 
whether access to them can be granted.107
Section 22(6) and the Child Abuse RC
The Child Abuse RC, a joint commission of all Australian jurisdictions, 
concluded its inquiry in December 2017, and is currently the site 
of contestation and ambiguity with respect to its records. Questions of 
access are of particular importance to participants in this inquiry, many 
of whom are survivors of abuse with a direct and profound interest in the 
commission’s work.108 
103  Australia, Royal Commission on Human Relationships, Final Report (1977), Volume 1, xi.




108  The Child Abuse RC’s own final report noted that easily accessible, high-quality records and 
record-keeping practices have particular significance for survivors of child sexual abuse: Child Abuse 
RC, Final Report: Volume 8, Recordkeeping and Information Sharing, 38–40. Justice Coate, writing 
about her role as a Commissioner of the Child Abuse RC, has also directly detailed the significance of 
records generally to care leavers and survivors of abuse. See Jennifer Coate, ‘Perspectives on Records 
and Archives: An Update from the Royal Commission’ (2017) 45(3) Archives and Manuscripts 237.
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Knowmore, which is a specialist community legal centre that was 
established to assist survivors of child sexual abuse to engage with 
the commission’s inquiry, anticipates that issues concerning access to the 
commission’s record will, in two respects, be of immediate practical 
significance for survivors of abuse.109 First, access to commission records 
(particularly transcripts of public hearings) will be important for holding 
institutions accountable for evidence given to the commission; that is, for 
verifying that their conduct in response to allegations of abuse is consistent 
with representations made to the commission about such responses.110 
Second, access to recordings of private sessions111 will be a significant 
tool for avoiding retraumatising survivors when legal representatives take 
instructions for the purposes of preparing civil claims or claims under the 
Commonwealth redress scheme.112 
Despite discussions between the commission, government and 
stakeholders  in the commission’s work that occurred prior to the 
commission ending, uncertainty remains as to whether, and, if so, how, 
survivors will be able to access such material now that the commission 
has ended. For example, it seems likely that the commission’s website will 
remain accessible, although it is unclear whether a systems’ administrator 
will be employed to maintain that material and to ensure that the website’s 
links remain active.113 Moreover, prior to the commission ending, no 
formal arrangements, including for the purposes of s 22(6), had been 
agreed and no provisions had been put in place for the transfer of records 
to the NAA or for access to records more generally.114
109  Interview with Prue Gregory, Principal Lawyer, Knowmore (29 September 2017).
110  Ibid.
111  In this respect, the Child Abuse RC was the first Commonwealth commission to be empowered 
by legislation to receive information from witnesses in private session. Amendments made to the 
Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) by the Royal Commissions Amendment Act 2013 (Cth) made specific 
provision for how information given at a private session is to be held and used: Royal Commissions Act 
1902 (Cth), pt 4, div 2.
112  National Redress Scheme for Institutional Child Sexual Abuse Act 2018 (Cth); see also Royal 
Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Redress and Civil Litigation Report 
(2015), <https://www.dss.gov.au/families-and-children/programs-services/children/commonwealth-
redress-scheme-for-survivors-of-institutional-child-sexual-abuse>.
113  Interview with Prue Gregory, Principal Lawyer, Knowmore (29 September 2017).
114  At the time of writing, the Child Abuse RC’s website states only that inquiries concerning access 
to records should be directed to the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department.
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The Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) itself also creates access 
impediments. Relevantly, that Act prescribes that, for the purposes of 
the Archives Act, records that contain information obtained at a private 
session or that relate to a private session, and which identify a natural 
person who appeared at a private session, enter the open access period 
only 99 years after the relevant record came into existence.115 Knowmore 
already anticipates that it will be important for survivors of abuse to 
have access to private session material well before the end of the 99-year 
closed access period.116 Survivors may have an interest in accessing both 
the recording of a private session in which they gave information to the 
commission and in otherwise knowing what is contained in their private 
session file.117 With respect to the former category of material, in practice, 
no transcripts of private sessions are available.118 Rather, a  survivor or 
their representative has previously been able to seek access to the audio 
recording of a private session by giving several months’ notice to the 
commission.119 Access to such records has been closely supervised by the 
commission and has typically been provided on the condition that no notes 
are made of comments made by commissioners, or commission officers, 
during these sessions.120 However, the last date by which requests could 
be made for access to private session recordings was the end of September 
2017, and it remains unclear where these recordings will be held now 
that the commission has ended.121 With respect to original documents 
given to the commission during a private session, it was anticipated that 
the commission would attempt to return such documents to the relevant 
survivor before its inquiry ended.122 However, if it was unable to do so in 
time, such documents will likely be destroyed.123
115  Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth), s 6OM.
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When the Carnival is Over: The Case 
for Reform
Beyond Institutional Identity as an 
Organising Principle
The Australian Law Reform Commission has noted that the utility of 
royal commissions ‘depends in large part upon the extent to which their 
findings and recommendations are able to be acted upon and the uses 
to which their records may subsequently be put’.124 Gaps in records 
management—such as those created by royal commissions ending without 
s 22(3) directions and/or s 22(6) arrangements in place—thus, inevitably 
undermine the practical value of the work of such commissions.
The regulatory deficiencies identified above are a consequence of  the 
central premise of the existing legislative scheme; namely, that 
the complex institutional identity of royal commissions, particularly joint 
royal commissions, should in some way govern how records are dealt with 
once the relevant inquiry comes to an end. On the one hand, s 22(3) 
reflects a view of the royal commission as an executive entity. It betrays 
an assumption that there may be a department or agency of government 
better placed than the NAA to manage the care and custody of certain 
royal commission records (whether by reason of the nature or provenance 
of the records or the nature of the inquiry during which the records 
were produced). On the other hand, s 22(6) reflects a view of the royal 
commission as jurisdictionally bounded, reserving as it does a capacity 
for states and territories to exert control over the records of their own 
commissions.
These conceptions of the commission—as executive decision-maker with 
immutably jurisdictional character—admit of the potential for multiple 
archival authorities to become responsible for the documentary fruits of 
a commission’s labour. The involvement of multiple archival authorities 
in turn creates risks to the integrity of the archive at multiple stages 
of the archival journey: from appraisal and acquisition to description and 
access. As Cook notes, concepts such as respect des fonds, original order 
and provenance serve to ensure that records are preserved ‘as evidence of 
124  Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 45, [8.4].
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the functional-structural context and actions that caused their creation’.125 
A  dislocated approach to archives management also undermines the 
capacity of the royal commission to provide opportunity for critique of its 
findings and, as we suggested, has broad implications for its functions as 
a body of evidence, a repository of social, public memory and a tangible 
product of a non-binding inquiry. 
Towards Cooperative Centralisation
In light of the complexities discussed above, the authors suggest that 
reform is necessary to facilitate greater public access to the content of the 
archive, and, in turn, greater critical understanding of the silences and 
priorities in its creation. Good archival practice also assists investigative 
processes126 and is central to ensuring that royal commissions are able 
to perform their roles as ‘recognizable and repeatable components of 
a successful and reliable democratic civil society’.127
Pursuit of a general intergovernmental agreement, providing certain 
minimum standards for arrangements between the Commonwealth and 
a  state (or states) for the purposes of s 22(6) of the Archives Act, could 
provide greater certainty around management of archival material and 
set a benchmark for community expectations of  records management 
during, and after, the life of a commission. A general agreement of this 
type might provide for the types of documents that, in all cases, will go 
to the NAA, and for the custody in which those documents will be held 
once a commission ends.
However, relying on non-legislative means to provide for care, custody, 
use and access arrangements would not bind future governments in 
the establishment of new royal commissions. Nor would it address the 
serious legislative deficiencies arising from the interaction of the Royal 
Commissions Act 1902 (Cth), the Archives Act and state commissions 
125  Terry Cook, ‘Evidence, Memory, Identity, and Community: Four shifting archival paradigms’ 
(2013) 13 Archival Science 95, 100.
126  Considering the relevance of archival practice to judicial inquiry, Barrera defines good archival 
practice as including identification of the institutional context in which documents have been 
produced, accurate archival descriptions and use of electronic resources: Giulia Barrera, ‘Of Condors 
and Judges: Archival Musings over a Judicial Investigation’ (2009) 9 Archival Science 203, 212.
127  Price and Smith, above n 44, 266.
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and public records legislation. In the context of joint royal commissions, 
reliance on ad hoc executive action to fill gaps in legislative prescription is 
particularly problematic.
At the best of times, intergovernmental cooperation can be fraught, 
piecemeal and dependent on the political will of the government of the 
day. In the context of commissions concerning issues of public trust or 
government accountability, it might be exceptionally difficult to disabuse 
participating jurisdictions of their possessive tendencies towards documents 
produced in, or by the governments of, each jurisdiction. So much can 
perhaps be inferred from the number of concluded joint commissions for 
which there are still no s 22(6) arrangements in place. Equally, legislative 
reform, particularly cooperative reform—that is, with the participation 
of more than one Australian jurisdiction—would require longer term 
commitment by participating jurisdictions and deeper intergovernmental 
cooperation, often at the highest levels of government.
Acknowledging these challenges, a cooperative scheme, supported 
by referrals of legislative power from the states, for the purposes 
of  s  51(xxxvii) of the Constitution, offers the most effective means of 
achieving archival reform applicable to royal commissions. This might 
involve the Commonwealth Parliament being referred, to the extent 
necessary, the power to legislate with respect to the subject matter of royal 
commission records.128 Although the features of such a scheme are beyond 
the scope of this chapter, it bears repeating that any proposed model for 
archival reform would need to transcend the complex institutional identity 
of the royal commission, rather than accept it as an organising principle.
128  The Commonwealth would already have legislative power with respect to the records of 
Commonwealth royal commissions, but a referral may be necessary to empower the Commonwealth 
to legislate in respect of records of joint commissions that could be characterised as state documents. 
For an example of this approach, see the terms of the referrals supporting the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth): Corporations (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2001 (NSW) s 4; Corporations (Commonwealth 
Powers) Act 2001 (Qld) s 4; Corporations (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2001 (SA) s 4; Corporations 
(Commonwealth Powers) Act 2001 (Tas) s 5; Corporations (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2001 (Vic) s 4; 







A Matter of Records: The Federal 
Court, The National Archives and 
‘The National Estate’ in the 1970s
Ann Genovese
Introduction
Australian scholars of law and history have duties to the places and 
institutions in which we practice our activities, to show adequately the 
conduct of the encounters between laws, and the histories of lives that 
have experienced those laws. This includes being conscious of the diverse 
range of records and sources that are needed to tell these law stories 
(the institutional to the unofficial; film to interview; diary to case law; 
legislation to memoir). It also means being conscious of the diversity of 
styles and genres of writing (reports, chronicle and fragments as much 
as articles, reviews and scholarly monographs) that are required to 
shape those records into narrations and dissertations that make visible 
the traditions and innovations of ‘an Australian jurisprudence’.1 For 
Australian historians of law of the 20th century, the matter of records is 
something we have perhaps experienced in unique ways to our colleagues 
1  This contention underpins much of my current work; see, for example, Ann Genovese, ‘About 
Libraries: A Jurisographer’s Notes on Lives Lived with Law (in London and Sydney)’ (2016) 20 
Law Text Culture 32; Ann Genovese, ‘Introduction: Australian Critical Decisions: Remembering 
the Koowarta and Tasmanian Dam Cases’ in Ann Genovese (ed), Australian Critical Decisions: 
Remembering the Koowarta and Tasmanian Dam Case (Routledge, 2017) 1.
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whose concerns lie primarily in interpreting earlier periods. For a start, 
Australian historians of the 20th  century not only need to work with 
documents that are comparative, but must also undertake the basis of the 
comparison by prioritising the records produced by Australian institutions 
whose formation and arguments are themselves often the subject of 
our attention. This raises some obvious problems. The most pressing is 
how to account for the fraught ways the relationship between records, 
institutions and national histories has been experienced, particularly by 
Indigenous peoples in settler colonies.2 The second is how the complex 
questions of complicity and authority that lie between documents of state 
and the articulation of national visions and nightmares are addressed by 
each generation of scholars. It is worth noting that although experiencing 
a reinvigorated critical turn in the sun for legal theorists and historians 
alike,3 this particular questioning of archives is not a new historiographical 
problem.4 As Hegel famously noted, ‘it is the state that first presents 
a  subject-matter that is not only adapted to the prose of History but 
involves the production of such History in the very progress of its 
own being’.5
In light of these concerns, it is perhaps incumbent on historians of 
Australian law and state of the 20th century, writing their immediate 
past as it edges into frame, to worry overtly about what historiographer 
and theorist Hayden White has called ‘the preconditions of the kind of 
interests in the past which informed historical consciousness and the 
pragmatic basis for the production and preservation of the kind of records 
2  Antoinette Burton (ed), Archive Stories: Facts, Fictions, and the Writing of History (Duke 
University Press, 2005); Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial 
Common sense (Princeton University Press, 2009). 
3  For leading examples across the scholarly and disciplinary spectrum, see Jacques Derrida, 
Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression (University of Chicago Press, 1996); Carolyn Steedman, Dust: 
The Archive and Cultural History (Rutgers University Press, 2002); Matthew S Hull, Government 
of Paper: The Materiality of Bureaucracy in Urban Pakistan (University of California Press, 2012), 
doi.org/10.1525/california/9780520272149.001.0001; Arlette Farge, The Allure of the Archives (Yale 
University Press, 2013); Francis X Blouin Jr and William G Rosenberg, Processing the Past: Contesting 
Authority in History and the Archives (Oxford University Press, 2011); Cornelia Vismann, Files: Law 
and Media Technology (Stanford University Press, 2008). For the particularity for legal administration 
in a different sense, see Bruno la Tour, The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil D’Etat (Polity 
Press, 2010).
4  For a classic historian’s account, see Fritz Stern, ‘Introduction’ and Jules Michelet, ‘History as 
National Epic’ in Fritz Stern (ed), The Varieties of History: from Voltaire to the Present (Meridian Books, 
6th ed, 1960) 1 and 108.
5  Georg Hegel, The Philosophy of History (Dover Publications, 1956), cited in Hayden White, 
‘The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory’ (1984) 23 History and Theory 1, 4.
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that made historical enquiry possible’.6 This includes worrying about 
the changing relationships in the 20th century between administrative 
practices, archival science, historiographical reflexivity and concepts of 
public accountability, and how these underpin our theoretical questions 
and reshape the possibilities of our empirical practices. For those of us 
who are historians of the late 20th century rather than the federation or 
mid-century period, this also includes the specific technical difficulty of 
working in the gloaming: between a distinct administrative paper past 
that is unencumbered by copyright, privacy and living memory (and also 
now often digitised newspaper records or case law or cabinet documents 
free of the 30-year rule); and a present and future where records are 
digitally born.7
I have been worrying about these questions, the records we keep (and 
those we do not) and how I might personally undertake my duties to 
address them, in a range of projects for some time. But I have been 
doing so in deliberate and direct fashion regarding the Court as Archive, 
the subject of this collection and the name of the project I have been 
undertaking with Kim Rubenstein and Trish Luker. A key concern in this 
project has been to consider the nature and responsibilities of courts to 
past records and future histories. Part of our purpose is very practical: to 
think alongside the Federal Court of Australia about how, as an institution 
of law, they might also function as an archival repository, although that 
goes beyond, and potentially complicates, their status as courts of record.8 
The other part of our purpose is to flesh out the implications of what it 
means to recognise that a modern court like the Federal Court (which was 
established in 1976 and commenced its institutional life in 1977) carries 
records of meaning to a diverse public that tell stories of experiences of 
law and people in a particular time, and over time, as well as shape our 
law and our experience of life lived in Australia now. This includes how 
we take responsibility for the relationships between Anglo-Australian law 
and people and Indigenous Australian laws and peoples.9
6  Ibid 3.
7  See, for example, Blouin Jr and Rosenberg, above n 3, 13–33.
8  That superior courts have duties as courts of record is a matter of history and of common and 
constitutional law; see Kirk Group Holdings Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (2010) 
239 CLR 531 and Craig v South Australia (1994) 184 CLR 163. They also have a range of different 
duties to the people and state because of the nature of court record more broadly defined, as noted in 
the Introduction to this volume. 
9  This question has a long history in itself: Henrietta Fourmile, ‘Who Owns the Past? Aborigines as 
Captives of the Archives’ (1989) 13 Aboriginal History 1; Henrietta Fourmile, ‘The Need for an Independent 
National Inquiry into State Collections of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Cultural Heritage’ (1992) 
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In this chapter, I want to add some particularity to our project’s purposes 
in the context of my own body of work and methodological activities. 
As a historian of modern Australian jurisprudence, the practical activity 
of my work involves two things that I aim to join that act as a point of 
orientation and organisation. One, as already noted, is a duty of historians 
to demonstrate, and remind, that history writing is intimately related 
through sources and records to the practices of institutions and institutional 
life—archives broadly conceived—and is always a contested relationship. 
The other is a duty of jurisprudence—to contemplate, and elucidate, 
how people in time and place relate to their law—and this relationship is 
mediated, not always happily, by the procedure and purpose of institutions.
What this means in terms of my own practice, the doing or writing of 
histories of jurisprudence (or jurisography, as I have called it),10 suggests 
a particular relationship with, and responsibility for, records. This is not 
identical in every project, but in the Court as Archive Project has involved 
my taking responsibility for institutional experience that complements and 
underscores the technical questions of archival practice, the problems of 
public law and court administration, and the changing nature of the political 
community that mark what it means to consider the court as archive.
In this chapter, I will endeavour to demonstrate these interrelated 
duties to records in two different forms of historical writing. The first 
is narration: to tell a small slice of the institutional provenance of the 
Federal Court and the National Archives of Australia (NAA). Both were 
established as consciously modern ‘Australian’ institutions at a particular 
moment in time and shared material concern—records—that drew them 
1 Aboriginal Law Bulletin 3; Martin Nakata and Marcia Langton, Australian Indigenous Knowledge 
and Libraries (Australian Academic & Research Libraries for the Australian Library and Information 
Association, 2005); Terri Janke, Our Culture our Future: Report on Australian Indigenous Cultural and 
Intellectual Property Rights (Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, 1998); 
Lynette Russell, ‘Indigenous Records and Archives: Mutual Obligations and Building Trust’ (2006) 34(1) 
Archives and Manuscripts 32; Livia Iacovino and Trust and Technology Project, Exposure Draft Position 
Statement: Human Rights, Indigenous Communities in Australia and the Archives (Monash University, 
2009); Tahu Kukatai and John Taylor, Indigenous Data Sovereignty: Toward an Agenda, CAEPR Research 
Monograph No 38, (ANU Press, 2016), doi.org/ 10.22459/CAEPR38.11.2016; Darren Jorgensen and 
Ian McLean (eds), Indigenous Archives: the Making and Unmaking of Australian Art, (UWA Press, 2017); 
see also UN General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Resolution 
adopted by the General Assembly, 2 October 2007, A/RES/61/295, arts 3, 4, 7 and 8; Charter of Human 
Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 19.
10  Jurisography is a practice and term devised in collaboration with Shaun McVeigh and Peter 
Rush; see Ann Genovese and Shaun McVeigh, ‘Nineteen Eighty Three: A Jurisographic Report on 
Commonwealth v Tasmania’ (2015) 24 Griffith Law Review 68; Ann Genovese, Shaun McVeigh and 
Peter Rush, ‘Lives Lived with Law: An Introduction’ (2016) 20 Law Text Culture 1.
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into association. The other is to offer a commentary on the provenance, 
location and status of the records that should be available to tell that story 
through my own methodological adventures in undertaking the project.
To address the Court as Archive in these ways—as jurisographer, rather 
than theorist or legal policy advisor—I also want to suggest, by way 
of brief conclusion, that the sum of my experience in undertaking the 
project offers a particular view of writing histories: that fragmentation 
in the way the documents are kept itself requires careful documentation; 
and that such fragmentation opens the historiographical conversation 
about the forms and nature of sources and records adequate to represent 
our past for the present.
The National Estate (A Narrative)
How the period of Australian renaissance from the late 1950s to the 
late 1980s has been described and recorded is diverse. Both in style and 
form, as well as the terms of dispute of its political legacies.11 But there 
is consensus in what the 1970s in particular represented, and it is useful 
to consider what those best trained to review and make sense of events in 
the context of politics—historians—wrote of the period, while also living 
through it. Manning Clark, for example, expansively described in his 
Short History that during this period, ‘Australians … liberated themselves 
from the fate of being second rate Europeans’.12 Russell Ward was more 
pointed. Before abruptly ending A Nation for a Continent with a cliff-
hanger (the Dismissal in 1975), he argued that although:
basic cultural and material ties with Britain remained strong, Australia 
adopted a more critical and self-reliant attitude. After the UK’s entry into the 
European Economic Community on 1 January 1973 it was hardly possible 
to do anything else. The words ‘British Subject’ disappeared from Australian 
passports and ‘Advance Australia Fair’ replaced ‘God Save the Queen’.13
11  As examples, see now famous contemporaneous accounts of the times, written across disciplines: 
Donald Horne, The Lucky Country (Penguin Books, 3rd ed, 1971); Manning Clark, A Short History of 
Australia (Penguin Books, 4th ed, 1995); Bernard Smith, The Antipodean Manifesto: Essays in Art and 
History (Oxford University Press, 1976); see also biographies and histories that address the period, 
written from the perspective of our own time: Frank Bongiornio, The Eighties: The Decade that 
Transformed Australia (Black Inc., 2015); Jenny Hocking, Gough Whitlam: The Definitive Biography 
(Miegunyah Press, 2014). 
12  Clark, above n 11, 351.
13  Russell Braddock Ward, A Nation for a Continent: The History of Australia, 1901–1975 
(Heinemann, 1977) 403–4. 
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What interests me in the context of the Court as Archive Project is 
how this orientation away from Britain and towards an articulation 
of an independent and self-confident Australia manifested itself in 
a range of state-generated national projects (from art galleries to the 
Australian Film Institute, childcare to conservation), but had a particular 
institutional focus for the law. On a purely qualitative basis, this resulted 
in a proliferation of law and legal institutions—the artefact of a growing 
and diversifying population with changing desires and requirements—
and a slow encroachment of federal power over states with a concomitant 
development of federal jurisdictions that required more, and more 
responsive, legislation.14 What is a harder-to-pin-down story (but the 
one I want to show) is how the idea of the ‘Australian Nation’ as a law 
story is not only about accounting for Acts, but carries a jurisprudence of 
public relationship, public accountability and, less overtly, public record. 
To  sketch, rather than give a detailed accounts of the establishment of 
the  Federal Court or the NAA in those terms (noting that aspects 
of both the Federal Court and NAA’s establishment histories are already 
written by key participants),15 I want to discuss three reports that link that 
story together: the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate (‘Hope 
Report’);16 the Report into the Development of the National Archives 
(‘Lamb Report’);17 and the Commonwealth Administrative Review 
Committee Report (‘Kerr Report’).18
Although the Kerr Committee was established by the Gorton Government 
in 1968, the commissioning of specialist commissions and inquires, their 
rate and number, was a marked technique of the Whitlam Government 
after 1972. Whitlam expressly noted the development in his 1973 
Robert Garran Lecture ‘The Role of the Australian Public Service’.19 
14  This is clearly evidenced in an example of direct relevance to this essay: Michael Black, 
‘The Federal Court of Australia: The First 30 Years — A Survey on the Occasion of Two Anniversaries’ 
(2007) 31(3) Melbourne University Law Review 1017.
15  Susan Kenny, ‘Federal Courts and Australian National Identity’ (2015) 38(3) Melbourne 
University Law Review 996; Sue McKemmish and Michael Piggott (eds), The Records Continuum: Ian 
Maclean and Australian Archives First Fifty Years (Ancora, 1994); Black, above n 14.
16  Australia, Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate, Report of the National Estate: Report of 
the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1974) 
(‘Hope Report’).
17  W Kaye Lamb, Development of the National Archives (Australian Government Publishing Service, 
1973) (‘Lamb Report’).
18  Commonwealth, Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report 1971, Parl Paper No 
144 (1971) (‘Kerr Report’).
19  EG Whitlam, ‘The Role of the Australian Public Service’, (Speech at the Sir Robert Garran 
Memorial Oration, Canberra, 12 November 1973).
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In this address to (perhaps) unsettled officers of the Commonwealth 
encountering Labor after 23 years of coalition government, Prime Minister 
Whitlam was careful to reassure that Westminster traditions remained an 
unshakeable foundation to responsible government. However, Whitlam 
was also unabashed in opening a conversation about the changing status 
and political demands of the Australian people towards the end of the 
20th century and the need to modernise government policy, law and 
institutional action in response. He stated:
All governments are expected to make changes and deliver benefits with 
a precision and promptitude never before expected or experienced in 
history. When a new government comes in after so long an absence, those 
demands, those pressures are accelerated and intensified.20
Whitlam’s broad theme was ‘greater participation in the affairs of 
Government by concerned people in the community’.21 As he explained, 
‘we want Australian people to know the facts, to know the needs, to know 
the choices before them. This is really at the heart of what has been called 
“open government”’.22 For Whitlam, this involved two broadly defined 
programs. One program was about the accountability to the public of the 
business of government itself. This included proposed legislative schemes 
such as the yet-to-arrive freedom of information legislation ‘to provide 
greater information to the public’ and to ‘clarify the rules relating to access 
to official records and facilitate such access’.23 It also included a related 
national scheme to store those records at a national archive, rather than 
a Commonwealth repository of state documents per se, which was to also 
‘greatly improve the service that the public gets when they want to consult 
some of the more ancient records’.24
The other program was about how these, and other national projects, 
might best be achieved to bring about ‘immediate action’ on ‘a wide 
range of issues’.25 This involved the establishment of ‘no less than 
continuing bodies to assist us achieve our policies’,26 and drawing into 
20  Ibid 1.
21  Ibid 7.
22  Ibid.
23  Ibid.
24  Ibid. It is important to note that there, of course, existed a repository of administrative files and 
records before this time, but these did not yet have the same status as public records as exist in the 
NAA; see Lamb, above n 17; McKemmish and Piggot, above n 15.
25  Whitlam, above n 19, 3.
26  Ibid.
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policy formation a range of experienced Australians from the business, 
law and community sectors, who did not sit within the traditional 
structure of government.27 The importance of these task forces, inquiries, 
committees and commissions; who sat on them; their powers to hear 
and receive submissions and undertake social and factual investigations; 
and the recommendations of their reports, was to provide ‘a key channel 
of communication between Parliament and the people’.28 As Whitlam 
noted, ‘a real contribution is made to public administration and to the 
development of policies [and institutions] acceptable to the community’.29
Of these bodies, it is the aptly named Hope Committee (named after 
its Chair, Justice Robert Hope of the New South Wales Supreme 
Court)30 that offers the underpinning example of how aspirations about 
the government’s relationship with the Australian public was broadly 
conceived and how these bodies were concretely given shape. Although 
the concept of the national estate had United Kingdom (UK) precedents,31 
it was the example of the Kennedy Administration in the United States 
that Whitlam (and other senior Australian Labor Party figures, like Tom 
Uren and Moss Cass) chose to emulate and apply to the Australian 
experience. The aim was to preserve the past for the future by maintaining 
‘intergenerational equity’ and ‘to bequeath our full national estate to our 
heirs’.32 The rhetorical term entered Australian political conversation in 
the 1960s as a way to capture government action and public commitment 
to preservation of the natural and built environments.33 The purpose 
of the Hope Committee, convened in 1973,34 was to recommend ways 
27  Ibid 5.
28  Ibid 7.
29  Ibid.
30  The committee also included Milo Dunphy, Judith Wright, Len Webb, Keith Valance and Judith 
Brine; it, thus, had ‘several prominent conservationists’ in its ranks; see Sharon Veale and Robert 
Freestone, ‘The Things We Wanted to Keep: The Commonwealth and the National Estate 1969–1974’ 
(2012) 24 Historic Environment 12, 16.
31  Ibid 12, citing the work of British architect Clough Williams-Ellis, the Hobhouse Committee 
and the 1949 National Parks and Countryside Act as UK precursors.
32  Ibid 12, citing Whitlam’s open acknowledgment of American President John F Kennedy’s 
influence in adoption of the rhetoric and political commitments.
33  As the Hope Report noted, what they sought to protect and preserve were sites and objects ‘of 
such aesthetic, historical, scientific, social, cultural, ecological or other special value to the nation or 
any part of it, including a region or locality, that they should be conserved, managed and presented 
for the benefit of the community as a whole’; above n 16, 334.
34  One of the Hope Report’s key terms of reference was to determine ‘the role which the Australian 
Government could play in the preservation and enhancement of the National Estate’. Hope’s view 
was that the Commonwealth ‘could and should give a lead to the whole of Australia’; above n 16, 27; 
Veale and Freestone, above n 30, 16.
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‘to conserve and present’ and ‘bring under direct Government control’ 
objects and places of ‘such aesthetic, historical, scientific, social, cultural, 
ecological or other special value to the nation’, and to do so for ‘the 
benefit of the community as a whole’.35 This was, it is important to note, 
a commitment shared by the Coalition Opposition. As Senator Alan 
Missen argued in support of the Australian Heritage Commission Bill in 
1975, the aim of the Hope Inquiry was to show how ‘the Government can 
give a practical lead. People of a later generation will either bemoan the 
fact that we have destroyed things which should have been preserved, or 
they will be grateful to us for those things we have retained’.36
The Hope Report recommended, among other things, establishing a system 
of national parks;37 promoting sites and buildings for World Heritage 
status;38 protecting and taking responsibility for ‘significant Aboriginal 
sites’ (this was ‘not only for the benefit of Aboriginals themselves and of 
the world’s cultural heritage but for the sake of the national conscience’);39 
establishing university research and teaching priorities on ‘conservation 
and protection of built and national environments’;40 and establishing 
a Heritage Commission and National Trust.41 The Hope Report also, 
significantly for my purposes, understood cultural property and its 
institutions (such as museums and libraries) as central components and 
representations of this national estate, and was explicit that the artefacts 
and records these institutions held were essential for government to 
preserve and manage.42 The Hope Report noted expressly that ‘the new 
initiative by the Australian Government in establishing a national archives 
system will help to ensure the preservation of archival resources’.43
35  Hope Report, above n 16, 334.
36  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 5 June 1975, 2361 (Alan Missen). Senator 
Missen also noted (2360): ‘Therefore there is one thing that comes from the Report and the creation 
of this Commission and that is we are recognizing at last the wide range, the very much wider view 
that we have now of the heritage that should be preserved’.
37  Hope Report, above n 16, 337.
38  Ibid 339.
39  Ibid 340 and continues: ‘It is past time that the Australian Government accepted the full 
responsibility laid on it by the people at the 1967 referendum’.
40  Ibid 347.
41  Ibid.
42  Ibid 341–2.
43  Ibid 342. Note, too, Missen’s comments, Parliamentary Debates above n 36, 2362: ‘One of 
the jobs found probably in all other States is the important job of preserving the archives of the 
community. These are often kept in conditions of great danger from fire and decay. If this were to 
happen, part of our history would disappear because we were not farsighted. In that one area in which 
I was doing some work, I believe that the position has not improved greatly. There is obviously a great 
need for the restoration and preservation of this part of our National Estate’.
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The ‘new initiative’ to which the Hope Report referred was the subject of 
a different inquiry on a smaller and more specialised scale. In June 1973, 
the Special Minister of State, Don Willesee, had commissioned W Kaye 
Lamb to ‘visit Australia for six weeks to advise on the development of 
a charter, and necessary legislation, for a National Archives’.44 Lamb was 
the Dominion Archivist—the title of the National Archivist of Canada—
and had been educated in British Columbia and at the London School of 
Economics, completing a PhD with Harold Laski.45 Clearly understood 
in the Commonwealth world as a man capable of building national 
institutions, W Kaye Lamb ‘earned wide recognition for turning the 
Canadian National Archives system into a highly successful institution at 
the service of the Canadian people’.46
During his six weeks in Australia, Lamb visited all established state 
archives and public records offices, including university archives. 47 Lamb’s 
Report, at the conclusion of his tour, unsurprisingly recommended that 
the then Commonwealth Archive Office was capable of being ‘developed 
into a fully-fledged National Archives of Australia’,48 with its own building, 
permanent staffing and its own specialist headquarters in Canberra.49 
The Lamb Report stated that the function of such a national archive was 
‘to assume custody, ownership and control of the records of permanent 
value that will form the permanent official archives of government of 
Australia and to make available for research those that can be released 
for use by the public’.50 This gave the proposed framing of the NAA a 
particular set of responsibilities. For example, Lamb recommended that it 
was the NAA who should, as might be expected, have authority to guide 
and control the final disposition of records. But the NAA should work 
with government departments and agencies cooperatively on which of 
their records should be acquired for permanent preservation,51 and what 
44  Lamb Report, above n 17, 1.
45  William Kaye Lamb, The Canadian Encyclopedia (24 July 2015) <http://www.thecanadian 
encyclopedia.com/en/article/william-kaye-lamb/>.
46  Lamb Report, above n 17, 1. This a worthy topic for another paper: the relationship between 
thinking of the state and the public in the 20th century in terms of different official duties, and the 
transmission of ideas by those who perform those duties, across the Commonwealth.
47  Ibid 1–2.
48  Ibid 1.
49  Ibid 13.
50  Ibid 9. The Report also stated: ‘The heart and centre of any system must be a strong national 
archives … its success as a national institution will depend upon the extent to which its influence 
is felt and its services are provided outside its own walls and outside Canberra’: ibid 29.
51  The Report stated that it was important to make clear to agencies that there is a difference 
between ‘housekeeping’ and ‘operational’ records, the latter being preserved: ibid 7–8.
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restrictions might apply to classes of those documents in terms of public 
access.52 However, the Lamb Report also argued that official government 
records should, by the 1970s, be subject to greater scrutiny by, and 
availability to, the general population. They should not be limited to the 
traditional practices and uses for official depositories that had lasted since 
the 18th century. As Lamb argued:53
The last 25 years have seen a great expansion in the public that wishes to 
make use of public records … [for] modern times and current problems 
… [people] seek access to recent records … [beyond war and politics] to 
multiple disciplines.54
Relevant to the story I am trying to tell, Lamb’s recommendations 
exemplify how the ideas that underlay his terms of reference (and are also 
foundational to the Hope Report, as well as Whitlam’s Garran Address) 
were in sharp tension, if not potential conflict. For example, Lamb 
supported ‘the view that public records are the property of the people, not 
of civil servants nor of whatever administration happens to be in power’, 
and, as such, ‘archives should be one step removed from civil service and 
political control and from restrictions that might result from it’.55 ‘On the 
other hand’, he was careful to delineate, ‘the relationship of Archives 
with the Government is necessarily very close, and to perform its proper 
functions [preserving and curating the records of administration] it must 
work closely with every department and agency of the Government’.56 
In other words, Lamb articulated that it was the government’s duty 
to carefully balance its competing obligations to effective execution of 
executive authority and to its citizenry. To do so, a proposed NAA should 
be an institution that remains within the structure of government, not 
a  public institution with a distinct charter, like the National Library. 
Lamb was clear that if legislation to establish the NAA gave ‘adequate 
authority to perform its functions, I see no reason why this status should 
not be satisfactory both to the Archives and to members of the public who 
wish to make use of its collections’.57
52  The Report stated that ‘no records should be destroyed without the approval of the Archives’: 
ibid 9–10.
53  Blouin Jr and Rosenberg, above n 3, 13–31.
54  Lamb Report, above n 17, 21. On the question of public access, Lamb noted that the current 
Office of Archives was ‘highly unpopular, especially in academic circles. This is due in great part to the 
difficulties experienced by researchers in securing access to public records in the keeping of archives’: 22.
55  Ibid 4.
56  Ibid.
57  Ibid 5.
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Although the Lamb Report was careful about setting out these tensions 
and responsibilities for executive documents, what was not clear was 
how those same precautions might apply to the records of all national 
institutions.58 Courts, for example, were not mentioned at all. Reading the 
Lamb Report in the context of 1974, as opposed to 2018, this omission is 
odd. This is because the expression of the state’s underlying commitments 
to public accountability in the 1970s via open government (in all its 
senses) and its vision of a national estate, was not extant to how a new 
court—a federal court—had already begun to be imagined. Clearly, as 
noted, there is a more expansive history of the Federal Court as a national 
institution yet to be written.59 But the Kerr Report of 1971 is an important 
source through which those commitments, and a jurisprudence of public 
relationship and public accountability in the 1970s, can be made visible.60 
However, the Kerr Report itself has been written about at great length, 
especially by public lawyers. It is rightly, I think, understood by them 
to be the cornerstone of the modernisation of public law in Australia: 
a ‘vision splendid’, as described by Lindsay Curtis, a former President of 
the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Administrative Appeals Tribunal.61 
58  Archives Bill 1979 (Cth), pt V. Debates about the Archives Bill in Parliament took a long 
time because of interlinked concern over freedom of information. These are interlinked narratives. 
In the Lamb Report, for example, it is expressly noted that there are limits to open government, and 
that the NAA should appropriately withhold certain classes of documents (such as those that were 
security classified or in confidence correspondence, and, of course, Cabinet minutes). But it also 
recommended that the 30-year rule on non-disclosure ‘must not be interpreted as meaning that more 
recent records are automatically inaccessible’: ibid 25.
59  There was always a constitutional possibility for a federal court since 1901, but the necessity did 
not really arise until the late 1950s. One of the earliest references to the need for a ‘Federal Supreme 
Court’ was raised in the second reading debate on the Judiciary Bill 1959 (Cth) and Australian 
Capital Territory Supreme Court Bill 1959 (Cth). The objective of the two Bills was to address 
a  lacuna in the existing law that prevented the Commonwealth from being sued in the Supreme 
Courts of the Territories, those matters having to go directly to the High Court. Speaking on the Bills, 
Whitlam made a number of suggestions concerning the appellate structure for Territory Supreme 
Courts and noted that ‘I would go further and express the hope that an appeal from a judge of a 
Supreme Court of a Territory might be heard by the Full Bench of a Federal Supreme Court instead 
of going to directly to the High Court’ (emphasis added); Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 
House of Representatives, 13 May 1959, 2108 (EG Whitlam); see also Kerr Report, above n 18, 
71–5. As one example of parliamentary debates, see Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 
4 June 1975, 2542–54. 
60  However, as John McMillan has described, these changes can be seen as the outcome of the 
‘maturing recognition’ by Parliament of what the committees, led by lawyers and public officers of 
experience, proposed. As he notes, this is despite the fact that the Report ‘attracted meagre publicity 
at the time. Not [sic] did it mirror any groundswell of public discontent, or catalyse a vocal public 
reform movement’; John McMillan, ‘Foreword’ in Robin Creyke and John McMillan (eds), The Kerr 
Vision of Australian Administrative Law at the Twenty-Five Year Mark (Centre for International and 
Public Law, 1998) iii–iv.
61  Lindsay Curtis ‘The Vision Splendid: A Time for Re-Appraisal’ in Creyke and McMillan (eds), 
above n 60, 36.
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The committee was chaired by Sir John Kerr who, in 1968 when it was 
commissioned, was a Judge of the Commonwealth Industrial Court 
and a Deputy President of the Trade Practices Tribunal—offices easily 
misremembered after the events of 1975. Kerr and the other committee 
members62 had vast accumulated experience in public law and public 
administration, and knew how costly, alienating and near impossible it 
was for an ordinary citizen to challenge unlawful government action.63 
The terms of reference for the committee were quite narrow: to investigate 
the need for a new federal court to hear disputes arising from increased 
federal jurisdiction, and to alleviate the demands of the High Court.64 But 
its 1971 recommendations—subsequently developed in the Ellicott and 
Bland Reports—were expanded by its members to do a great deal more.65 
In considering the jurisdiction of such a federal court, the committee also 
developed what we now understand as ‘the New Administrative Law’: 
merits review of government action at specialised tribunals; access to 
judicial review and reasons for decisions via the Administrative Decisions 
(Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (‘Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act’) that removed the ancient requirements of the prerogative 
writs; proposed freedom of information legislation; and a package of 
other institutional measures such as the establishment of an office of 
Commonwealth Ombudsman.66
What I want to draw out, for the purposes of this story, is how the Kerr 
Report and its recommendations were founded on the two principles that 
also shaped the rhetoric and policy of the Hope and Lamb Reports and 
Whitlam’s 1973 Garran address. The first was a desire to formalise and give 
legal form to open government in a postwar world. For example, the Kerr 
Report makes plain that ‘in formulating our proposals we have concluded 
62  The committee’s other members were Anthony Mason (an experienced advocate who, as 
Solicitor-General, had prepared foundational thinking within the executive on a new superior court, 
and subsequently joined the NSW Court of Appeal); Robert Ellicott (in 1968 Solicitor-General, and 
later Attorney-General in the Fraser Government); and, perhaps most importantly, Professor Harry 
Whitmore, Dean of Law of The Australian National University (a pioneer in the development of 
an Australian jurisprudence on review of government action, and a member of the Social Science 
Council); Kerr Report above n 18, i. The Report also notes in this frontspiece: ‘NOTE: Mr Justice 
Mason was appointed a Judge of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 1 May 1969. 
Mr R.J. Ellicott was appointed Solicitor-General on 15 May 1969 and thereafter became a member 
of the committee’.
63  Curtis, above n 61, 45–6.
64  Kerr Report, above n 18, 1–4.
65  Robin Creyke and John McMillan (eds), ‘Administrative Law Assumptions Then and Now’, 
above n 60, 3–9.
66  Kerr Report, above n 18, 112–18.
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that there is an established need for review of administrative decisions. 
We have not thought this to be a matter of real debate’.67 Their point 
was not that governments in the late 1960s and early 1970s68 were any 
worse than their predecessors per se in making lawful decisions. Rather, 
their argument was that older methods of opening those decisions to 
scrutiny had become antiquated. The committee stated that they wanted 
‘merely to point to the changing circumstances affecting the operation 
[of those older methods] in these days of vast expansions in the range 
of regulated activity and the range of services provided’ and concluded 
that ‘the traditional democratic methods in bringing possible injustices to 
notice seem to us to be inadequate’.69
The second foundational principal foundation was that the practice of 
Australian law needed to be understood, by 1971, as federal, or national, 
in ways it had not been before, and that this was perhaps an expression 
of an Australian jurisprudence that had not been institutionalised 
or legislatively recognised before either.70 This included a careful 
consideration of the specificity of Australian constitutional arrangements, 
which did not permit a replication of either British or American models.71 
The Kerr Report noted that:
Our consideration of the matters covered by our terms of reference has 
led us to the view that it is highly desirable to encourage in Australia 
a comprehensive system of administrative law, but one which is essentially 
Australian and which is specially tailored to meet our own needs, 
experiences, and constitutional problems.72
67  Ibid 10.
68  The Kerr Report also addresses French, UK and US responses to the rise of the administrative 
state postwar: ibid 31–75.
69  Ibid 8. 
70  See Black, above n 14, where he makes these points in detail, and expressly.
71  In order to consider the nature of the ‘jurisdiction to be given to proposed Commonwealth 
Superior Court’, the terms of reference for the Kerr Report interlinked viewing comparative 
jurisdictions to see what new legislation had been introduced in administrative law (and why), and if 
and how that would be applicable and useful to the Australian experience shaped by its constitutional 
context. The terms noted that ‘it is the uniform experience of the common law countries, including 
the UK, that the traditional supervision by the courts of the administrative process must be 
supplemented by provision for review on questions of law or on the merits of administrative decisions 
affecting the property and rights of citizens’; Kerr Report, above n 18, 2.
72  Ibid 71.
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This included forming a view not only on matters of jurisdiction, but on 
the role that a federal court ‘should play more generally’,73 of how it might 
undertake its institutional responsibilities in assisting Australian people 
to understand and challenge the decisions taken about them, and what 
correlative duties the state had to be just, fair and open with its citizens.74
The Federal Court began its institutional life in 1977 on the basis of these 
recommendations and visions. Former Chief Justice Michael Black, in his 
memoir of its first 30 years, shows how the Federal Court was responsive to 
new jurisdictions (most significantly, the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act, the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and later, of course, 
the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)) and also new practices, procedures, 
ceremonies and protocols.75 From the desire to innovate technologically to 
promote efficient court services, to the desire to represent itself differently 
from inherited British tradition by revolutionising rules regarding robing, 
wigs and architecture, the Federal Court has developed as a distinctively 
Australian and determinedly modern institution, reinventing the role 
of a  court to meet the circumstances of time, place and the needs of 
a changing public.76
Many of these are innovations that we have had the opportunity to 
uncover in greater material depth in the course of our project. This is 
because our method involves an examination of the Federal Court’s own 
archive of operational practices since its establishment, rather than an 
exploration of the rich litigation materials the court holds. These kinds 
73  Ibid. The idea of a Commonwealth superior court had been the subject of discussion and 
planning in the Attorney-General’s Department since the early 1960s; see, for example, NAA: A5819, 
VOLUME 12/AGENDUM 461.
74  During the second reading speech of the Federal Court of Australia Bill 1976 (Cth), government 
members referred to the need for the existing federal court system, which included separate industrial 
and bankruptcy courts as well as making the High Court the first instance jurisdiction for the review 
of Commonwealth administrative decisions, to be ‘put on a more rational basis’ (Commonwealth, 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 21 October 1976, 2110 (Robert Ellicott)) and the 
significance of the role of the court in introducing ‘streamlined methods’ to address its jurisdiction 
(Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 November 1976, 2536 
(Maurice Neil)).
75  Black, above n 14.
76  The need for change to the federal court structure to meet the demands of increasing population 
and an increasingly diverse jurisdiction was a central argument advanced by then Attorney-General 
Barwick in his initial recommendation to Cabinet for a Commonwealth Superior Court; see NAA: 
A5819, VOLUME 12/AGENDUM 461. As the proposal developed, the increasing diversity of state 
and Commonwealth jurisdiction was also drawn on by public servants working on the proposal to 
recommend that the new court also have an exclusive jurisdiction over some matters to ensure uniformity 
and consistency in the development of the law; see, for example, Memorandum from Mr L Naar to the 
Secretary of the Attorney-General’s Department, 14 July 1967, NAA: A432, 1961/2132 pt 6.
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of records are what the German legal theorist Cornelia Vismann would 
designate as files—bureaucratic documents—as opposed to the records of 
law that are required for courts to perform their juridical and, in common 
law countries, appellate function.77
I would, perhaps, describe these files in a slightly different way: as the 
records of how an institution conducts itself. These records have revealed 
to us how the Federal Court has made decisions about its role and public 
function over time, including how it considered the value and purpose of 
its own archive, and how and where they should be subject to democratic 
methods in bringing institutional court activity to notice. However, 
our problem is that these records are scattered, fragmented, not fully 
accounted for and potentially missing. Many sit alongside the official 
record of the Federal Court and its litigation files and within the custody 
of the Federal Court itself. But there are real and material difficulties 
caused to our project by the fact that although the NAA and the Federal 
Court shared responsibility for records of different kinds, they were 
never directly brought into relation in terms of their public roles. As we 
have seen in the Lamb Report, the NAA was designed to be a national 
enterprise responsive to collecting the public experience of Australian 
government for posterity and for use by future Australians. It is clear from 
the Kerr Report that the Federal Court was designed to be a national 
court responsive to the Australian public and its legal experiences. Yet 
the court records of the Federal Court, from the moment the NAA was 
established in 1983, were neither open for future use nor understood as 
part of Australian cultural property to be protected (in the language of 
the Hope Report) for intergenerational equity. They were excluded from 
the Archives Act 1983 (Cth) (‘Archives Act’). In the context of a prevailing 
culture of the time, it is important to note that this exclusion of court 
records was subject to challenge before it became law.78 When the Archives 
Bill and the Freedom of Information Bill were scrutinised together by 
the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs in 
1978,79 the committee (presciently) reported:
77  Files, in Vismann’s terms, are ‘not the instrument or medium for the arbitration of conflicts but 
a repository of forms of authoritarian and administrative acts that assume concrete shape in files’ And she 
adds provocatively ‘in this way law and files mutually determine each other’: Vismann, above n 3, xiii.
78  Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) Australia’s Federal Record: A Review of Archives Act 
1983 Report No. 85 (1998).
79  Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, Commonwealth, Report on 
the Freedom of Information Bill 1978 and aspects of the Archives Bill 1978 (1979), [33.29] (‘Senate 
Standing Committee Report’).
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The purpose of the Archives Bill is to guarantee that our national history 
can be both preserved and reconstructed. This guarantee must exist with 
respect to the operation of the Head of State, of the Legislature and of the 
Judiciary, much as it exists in relation to the operation of other departments 
… [t]here must come a time when public interest in obtaining access to 
information necessary for the understanding of Australian government and 
history overrides the niceties of constitutional arrangements, and in our 
opinion that time has certainly arrived when an event is thirty years of age.80
But in 1983, such ‘niceties’ remained dominant. The view of Parliament 
then was that special treatment should be afforded to ‘records of those 
arms of the Government which traditionally enjoy a certain degree of 
independence and autonomy’.81 The rationale for the exclusion of Federal 
Court’s records was then founded in both the common law (the traditional 
provenance and authority of courts to be masters of their own rolls and 
the custodian of their own records for the purposes of appellate matters) 
and the Constitution (protection of separation of powers to avoid 
‘interfer[ence] with the independence of the judiciary and the proper 
administration of justice’).82 This left records of a major innovation in 
Australian jurisprudence officially outside of a national archive that was 
designed to preserve the national estate.
A Matter of Records (A Commentary)
My purpose in revisiting the Hope, Lamb and Kerr Reports has been to 
offer a narration about the animating vision of Australian institutions as 
they ‘liberated themselves’ from Britain83 and to contribute to an expanded 
understanding of the administrative mode of setting up such institutions 
80  Ibid [33.23] and [33.26]. This, of course, became the subject of review of records in 1998 by the 
ALRC; see ALRC, above n 78. The ALRC pushed for reform to bring court records within the NAA. 
It also outlined the informal disposal and archiving practices under way in federal courts.
81  Archives Act, pt V excludes courts from operation of the open access provisions; see also Explanatory 
Memorandum, Archives Bill 1979 (Cth) and Senate Standing Committee Report, above n 79.
82  Senate Standing Committee Report, above n 79, [33.21]: ‘The Explanatory Memorandum to 
the Bill explains the exclusion of vice-regal records and the records of parliament and the courts 
on the basis that it would be inappropriate for the regulatory powers of the Archives to be made 
application to the records of those arms of the Government which traditionally enjoy a certain degree 
of independence and autonomy. In part this independence can be viewed on constitutional grounds, 
particularly the separation of the powers of the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. It is also 
felt that, as a practical matter, it should be for bodies like the Parliament and courts to determine what 
is to happen to their own records. For instance, attention is drawn to the difficult questions involved 
in determining what should happen to judges’ notebooks’.
83  Clark, above n 11, 351.
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in the 1970s and 1980s. But it has also been to make plain that the time 
‘when public interest in obtaining access to information necessary for the 
understanding of Australian government and history’84 has clearly arrived.
I want to now discuss the implications of my narrative. In doing so, I want 
to hold against turning ‘the archive’ (and the archival) into normative 
principle by offering a different form of address—a commentary—that 
invites thought on the technicalities of public administration of records 
in terms of how they are experienced. More precisely, I want to describe 
my own activities in undertaking the Court as Archive Project as a set 
of comments about how my official relationship with the administrative 
machinery of archives is also a reflexive part of my training and scholarly 
traditions. I will do this by focusing on the tangle of where the records 
of the Federal Court during the period 1977–90 might be kept (and by 
whom), and the instruments that arrange those institutional relationships. 
By paying attention to these administrative technicalities, I can emphasise 
why court records of the very recent past reveal things about public law 
and life, in the omission and dispersal, that are themselves necessary to 
write into Australian histories of jurisprudence. I can also exemplify how 
maintaining a relationship to records is varied, not always romantic, but 
part of the practice and duties of the conduct of office of the historian and 
the jurisographer.
Provenance
Our archival adventures in the Court as Archive Project began at the 
Principal Registry of the Federal Court in Queens Square in Sydney. 
With the assistance of Lyn Nasir, the court archivist, we were able to take 
advantage of the work the Federal Court has done to digitise the records 
and papers that it possesses on site. We viewed, for example, records of 
committee meetings, as well as management files from 1977, and some 
of the papers of Chief Justices Bowen and Black. These internal papers 
included letters and memos concerning the relationship between the 
Federal Court and the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department 
(AGD). Primarily, this is, of course, because the Federal Court began its 
institutional life administered by AGD. Predating the Federal Court, the 
earliest available records about the idea of establishing a new Chapter III 
court are the provenance and within the jurisdiction of AGD.
84  Senate Standing Committee Report above n 79, [33.23] and [33.26].
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These earlier AGD records date from the early 1960s and include 
opinions about the status of a proposed court authored by Sir Anthony 
Mason as the then Solicitor-General and Sir Garfield Barwick as the 
then Chief Justice of the High Court. They also include terse exchanges 
between existing state supreme courts and the federal government over 
the vexed matter of jurisdiction.85 These records remained within the 
AGD’s physical and legal control until the NAA was itself established in 
1983, at which point the NAA assumed control over the AGD records. 
From 1983 onwards, AGD records were therefore consigned to the NAA, 
under the authority of the general Records Disposal Authority (RDA) for 
government agencies and departments.86 Records relating to the Federal 
Court that were the provenance of the AGD for both these early periods 
of the Federal Court’s history (before 1977 and from 1977 to 1983) are 
noted in the NAA’s database. They are easily identified, although until we 
began our project, most had not yet been declassified and others had not 
yet opened for public use—a point to which I will return.
What was more unexpected was how records of the Federal Court after 1983 
also came to be within the custodianship of the NAA. A central legislative 
and administrative fact that underpins the narrative I have already told 
is that Federal Court records were excluded from the operation of the 
Archives Act.87 Yet our archival investigations indicated that the governance 
relationship between the Federal Court and AGD that was instantiated as 
a matter of practice, if not law, continued after 1983. There is no specific 
RDA to authorise this relationship as a matter of records. The assumption 
from what was available for us to view through public channels is that the 
records about the Federal Court and AGD relationship were still subject to 
general NAA Departmental Disposal of Records Schedules, although the 
agency RDAs for this period are themselves classified AGD documents.88 
85  See, for example, Memorandum from Anthony Mason to First Assistant Secretary (Executive), 
26 July 1966, NAA: A432, 1961/2132 pt 2.
86  A Records Disposal Authority (RDA) is the administrative instrument necessary to organise the 
legal association and conditions of consignment, disposal and transfer of records between agencies.
87  This is in the following footnote and the exclusion is discussed earlier. 
88  For a general overview of the development of the Federal Court’s RDA, see Lyn Nasir, ‘Presentation 
on the Records Authority (Speech delivered to the 9th Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration 
Librarians Conference, Sydney, 21 August 2015). For the historical development of the management 
of AGD and Federal Court records, see NAA: A432/27, 1979/3205; NAA: A432, 1987/016464-01; 
National Archives of Australia, Records Disposal Authority 1234 for the Industrial Relations Court of 
Australia Principal and District Registries (1996); National Archives of Australia, Records Disposal 
Authority for the Federal Court of Australia, Principal and District Registries, Court Records other than 
Bankruptcy No. 1124, 1994; National Archives of Australia, Records Disposal Authority for Bankruptcy 
records, Principal and District Registries, No. 1124, 1994. A Disposal Authority was agreed between 
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What was even more intriguing to us was that some records of the Federal 
Court continued to be sent to the NAA after 1990—the date when the 
Federal Court became self-administering and legally free from AGD 
management or association.89 This state of affairs continued until 2011, 
when a specific RDA was established between the NAA and the Federal 
Court, instigating a more sustained conversation between the agencies 
about what records of courts might be worth preserving (to return to the 
language of the 1970) for the national estate.90
Describing the detail of the negotiations and practical compromises 
of that formalisation of public relationship between the NAA and the 
Federal Court are perhaps the duties that inform different kinds of 
writing in court administration and archival science.91 However, the 
point I want to emphasise here is what a specific Federal Court RDA 
represents for Australian historians of jurisprudence of the 20th century. 
It is an instrument of administration that takes responsibility for records 
and imposes formal and legal consideration of the specific status of court 
records for the first time since both the Federal Court and NAA were 
established. I think that this has allowed a different, and perhaps more 
conscious, conversation about what it is courts do that other institutions 
do not that complicates yet gives shape to the nature of decisions about 
access and protocols that have happened, as well as those yet to come.92
the NAA and National Native Title Tribunal in 2009; see National Archives of Australia, Records 
Authority National Native Title Tribunal, No. 2009/00121658, November 2009. This activity of the 
NAA stands alongside the internal Federal Court initiatives that were occurring concurrently during 
this period, preserving all their own records of litigation through the introduction and innovations 
of e-filing.
89  Warwick Soden, ‘Self Administration in the Federal Court of Australia’(Speech given at the JCA 
Colloquium, Noosa, 10 October 2014); Black, above n 14.
90  National Archives of Australia, Records Authority: Federal Court of Australia, No. 2010/00315821, 
19 October 2011. The 2011 Authority designates all files not determined to be ‘significant’ or not 
native title matters into Part A, which is to be retained permanently by the NAA, and Part B, which 
is to be retained by the NAA for up to 25 years. Part A incorporates court documents that identify 
the issues before the court and the parties; final orders; reasons for decision; High Court orders 
remitting the matter to the Federal Court; and any signed orders disposing of the matter if there was 
no judgment. Part B incorporates the balance of the materials on the file.
91  Livia Iacovino, ‘Rethinking Archival, Ethical and Legal Frameworks for Records of Indigenous 
Australian Communities: A Participant Relationship Model of Rights and Responsibilities’ (2010) 
10 Archival Science 353; Judith Bellis, ‘Public Access to Court Records in Australia: An International 
Comparative Perspective and Some Proposals for Reform’ (2010) 19 Journal of Judicial Administration 
197.
92  Ian Irving, ‘Information Held on Federal Court Native Title Files’ (Speech given at the National 
Native Title Conference, Darwin, 2006). That the Parliament could legislate for the Federal Court to 
be exempt from the NAA—that it had to be sui generis and set apart—seems defensible in the 1970s 
in ways it is not today. In particular, the arrival of the native title jurisdiction in the Federal Court in 
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One aspect of that conversation is a concern of public law jurisprudence. 
On its face, the tangle of administrative control and legal authority over 
records is not simply an exercise of governance, but a practice that reveals 
how the legal exemption of the Federal Court from the NAA in 1983 is 
an executive recognition that, at common law and under the Constitution, 
Commonwealth superior courts have jurisdiction over ‘the court record’, 
which of course has not altered.93 The historical association between courts 
and the executive that is a necessary part of their establishment, I think, 
reinforces the need to write about administrative and constitutional law, 
and about national institutions that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, in 
a way that joins them together.94
Practice
The other aspect of that conversation is of course about the activity of 
writing those histories. This returns me to my own archival experience 
in this project. For example, Federal Court Archivist Lyn Nasir had told 
us that there were many consignments of records that travelled between 
Federal Court and NAA (without a formal RDA) via the agency of 
the AGD between 1977 and 1990. The Federal Court has the record 
1995 made pressing and real what it means, and meant, to be a national court with responsibilities to 
holding an entire class of materials that tell stories of encounters between laws, as well as people, in this 
country. That we can see, perhaps, in 2018, other ways through this knot of who takes responsibility 
for decisions about court records, not only by negotiating an RDA with NAA, but also by establishing 
advisory committees with stakeholders to discuss significant matters (as Lamb suggested in 1974) or 
building relationships in different ways with as yet unimagined institutions that might house only 
native title records, says things we might in fact suggest at the end of the project. It also says a great 
deal about how the relationships between people and institutions have changed since the 1970s.
93  The court record (what the Federal Court, in their RDA, identify as Part A of a file) is, of course, 
what needs to be preserved by courts to review decisions of lower courts; above n 8. This has not 
legally altered since 1983. The point is that the ‘court record’ does not hold (and never has held) the 
same status as ‘records of the court’ (what in the Federal Court’s and NAA’s terms is now identified 
under the RDA as Part B). These are the abundance of materials that disclose the organisation of 
courts as institutions (ie, what we are looking at in the project); materials of litigation and decision-
making not legally mandated as part of ‘court record’ (such as transcript and evidence); and judicial 
papers, bench books and ephemera.
94  The decision to exempt the court in 1983 from NAA, I think, was clearly aimed to quarantine 
Commonwealth courts’ ‘record’ in its legal sense. The fact that this did not occur cleanly as a matter 
of administrative practice, and that the lines have been tangled because of the historical association 
between courts and the executive that is a necessary part of establishment, reinforces the need to write 
about administrative and constitutional law, and national institutions that emerged in the 1970s and 
1980s in a way that joins them together. This is necessary to reveal the very complex ways that courts 
and executive (at the level of agency activity) practise their constitutional roles and, in turn, consider 
the changing shape of their public duties in time and place. The current RDA (now that there is one) 
offers a way to organise and make the context of those relations (and their implications) visible.
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of the consignment batches and file numbers, but there is no record of 
the content in each consignment. The consignments are signified by a 
number or code only, which do not appear on the NAA catalogue. We 
knew nothing about those materials in any practical sense: what was in 
them; what they tell us; where they might be; and whether they had been 
sentenced let alone whether we could view them.
In 2015, we met with officers of the both NAA and the AGD in 
Canberra to try and find out what had happened to the Federal Court 
consignments. We also wanted to ask if certain AGD documents relating 
to the Federal Court that did appear on the NAA catalogue, but were 
at present unclassified or unopened, could have their status reviewed by 
the normal channels to assist with the process. On this latter point, the 
decision-making as to declassification was straightforward, as we expected 
it to be. The files we were asking to examine would, in most cases, have 
been opened by now under the 30-year rule. What is instructive is that 
these files had never been opened simply because no one, until the project, 
had made the request. If this project were being conducted in the US, 
the fact that a recently established federal court and its history had not 
been addressed would be highly unusual. It says something, too, about 
Australian legal historians’ attentive focus on the 18th and 19th centuries 
and the early years of federation.
On the fate of the consigned Federal Court records, on the other hand, 
the story was instructive in a different sense. The lists did not appear on 
the NAA catalogue. The AGD had no knowledge of their lists. Yet we had 
access to a paper file, full of consignment numbers. This is worth imagining: 
the vast repositories in suburban Canberra, filled with containers of 
documents, from various departments, numbered by dispatch, as opposed 
to the delicate and precise numbering of individual items. This is the very 
material space between raw files, data and recoverable records that can be 
accessed in a form capable of carrying stories.
In the end, we asked for permission to view the AGD’s RDAs to the NAA 
for the period we were interested in to see how they reflected the visions 
of Lamb, how they reflected the court disposal authorities after 1990, 
and to see what had been ‘sentenced’. It is, of course, those instruments 
and the opened files that have shaped this very short dissertation on the 
institutional archival practices in Australia in the 1970s and that will help 
us produce more detailed accounts for the future.
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Conclusion: Records and Australian 
Institutional Responsibilities
By way of conclusion, I want to make three points about my narration 
and commentary on the matter of records.
The first is about access. We would note that as academics with particular 
kinds of experience and institutional affiliation, we were supported 
and welcomed by the Federal Court to look at their records of internal 
administration. Our team were also given excellent assistance by the NAA 
and AGD. We are grateful for these opportunities, and the trust shown in 
us, but would acknowledge our archival adventures based in the Federal 
Court are not yet available to everyone. This is another demonstration of 
urgency in determining which records of courts can be viewed, by whom 
and under what conditions and protocols.
The second point is about court records as objects for history writing. 
That files produced by the Federal Court (and also files produced about 
them) are missing, lost, destroyed, in a lacuna or simply waiting in 
a repository speaks sharply to how lawyers, legal historians and scholars 
of the present and the future might address our past and present national 
stories, as a matter of record or a matter of litigation.
The precariousness of this slice of Federal Court paper records also 
reminds us not only that we need to pay close attention to a digital future, 
but also that we need more than the reports and the other documentary 
records I have drawn on in this paper, especially of the immediate past, to 
adequately tell stories of living with law and legal institutions. Indigenous 
people’s experiences of Anglo-Australian encounters in law, particularly 
in native title, show this need clearly. In addition, if we are writing 
stories about the 1970s and 1980s, we have obligations for gathering oral 
histories and memoirs, for we need all kinds ways of thinking about what 
it means to record experience of building institutions, as much as living 
with them, and marking what they mediate or enable.
My third point returns to my opening remarks about the duties involved 
in writing histories of jurisprudence—what Shaun McVeigh and 
I have called the practice of jurisography. The sum of my experience in 
undertaking this particular project as jurisographer, rather than theorist, 
archival scientist or legal policy advisor, has meant paying attention to 
how the matter of court records is not only epistemological—it is not 
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only about how we organise practices of legal knowledge and consider 
law’s relationship to other practices. Court records also shape what we say 
about the national experience in time and place as matters of law. This is 
not just a matter of technology and technique. It also requires a historical 
understanding of how to step back, to think about institutions and their 
sense of duty, as representations of how a nation understands itself.
My own experience in the project of looking at the Federal Court as an 
archival question (as much as seeking to suggest how it might understand 
and arrange itself as an archive) is, then, allegorical. Joining the court 
to the public in and through archives is neither about past nor future, 
but, rather, about contemporary political ordering of the relationships 
between people, their law and their institutions, as a matter of national 
formation. Attention to archives as allegories of this political ordering 
requires our vigilance, our care and our sense of responsibilities as 
historians of public, and Australian, legal experience. By attending to 
our own duties and training, we can hopefully properly understand 
the implications of how and why law has been withdrawn or set apart 
from the national formation projects of the late modern period, as well 
as address what an archive about a court as an institution of law holds 
and represents as a consequence. In these ways, offering protocols about 
archival responsibilities of courts, as well as telling their own institutional 
histories as central to public concerns, contributes to the recording of 




Framing the Archives as Evidence: 
A Study of Correspondence 
Documenting the Place of 
Australia’s Original High Court 
in a New Commonwealth Polity
Susan Priest
History in itself is fascinating, being the story of the human condition 
and the emergence of our species to what we hope is, and will be, a higher 
plane of peace and security, economic equity and respect for fundamental 
rights. History has an important component. That is why a life in law can 
never be far from history.1
When the Court sat at Noon on Saturday 29th April, it was announced 
from the Bench that circumstances had arisen which left us no alternative 
but to postpone the sittings of the Court appointed to be held in 
Melbourne on the following Tuesday (2nd May) … We did not resort to 
this means until the position had become intolerable.2
1  Michael Kirby, ‘Is Legal History Now Ancient History?’ (Speech delivered at Geoffrey Bolton 
Lecture, Government House Perth, 20 October 2008) 42.
2  Statement by S Griffith, 23 May 1905, regarding the court’s decision to adjourn proceedings 
on 2 May 1905, National Library of Australia (NLA): Symon Papers MS 1736/11/865–6.
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Introduction
In early May 1905, after an increasingly acrimonious and lengthy 
disagreement fought out through frequent exchanges of correspondence3 
between the then Leader of the Senate and fourth Federal Attorney-
General of the Reid–McLean Ministry, Josiah Symon, and the Justices 
of the original Australian High Court—Chief Justice Samuel Griffith 
and Justices Edmund Barton and Richard O’Connor—the High Court 
reached a monumental decision. The court decided that proceedings 
scheduled for hearing in Melbourne on 2 May were to be adjourned and 
went ‘on strike’.4
This momentous act has since been regarded as the newly created 
court’s final protest against Attorney-General Symon and his ultimately 
unsuccessful attempts, throughout the course of the previous nine 
months,5 to interfere with the court’s itinerant sitting patterns,6 including 
the curtailing of its travelling expenses, associated accommodation costs 
and the provision of staff to run the court.7 In its immediate aftermath, 
the decision of the bench made newspaper headlines Australia-wide.8
Approximately two months later, in early July 1905, George Houston 
Reid resigned as Australia’s fourth Prime Minister, and Isaac Isaacs 
succeeded Josiah Symon as Australia’s new Attorney-General under Alfred 
3  Additional references to specific written communications relevant to this discourse are identified 
in the footnotes that follow.
4  Letter from J Symon to G Reid, 22 May 1905, NLA: Symon Papers MS 1736/11/591. In this 
letter, it is Symon who refers to the court’s actions as a ‘strike’.
5  Symon sent a telegram to his wife in South Australia informing her of his appointment to the 
Reid–McLean Ministry. See Telegram from J Symon to E Symon, 18 August 1904, NLA: Symon 
Papers MS 1736/11/23. Hence, the timeline of August 1904 until July 1905, as suggested in the title 
of this chapter.
6  Section 12 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) states, ‘Sittings of the High Court shall be held from 
time to time as may be required as the principal seat of the Court and at each place at which there 
is a District Registry’.
7  For a more detailed account of the circumstances of this event, see Susan Priest, ‘Australia’s early 
High Court, the fourth Commonwealth Attorney-General and the “Strike of 1905”’ in Paul Brand and 
Joshua Getzler (eds), Judges and Judging in the History for the Common Law and Civil Law from Antiquity 
to Modern Times (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 292–305; Susan Priest, ‘Archives, The Australian 
High Court, and the “Strike of 1905”’ (2013) 32(2) The University of Queensland Law Journal 253.
8  ‘Melbourne, Another High Court Difficulty’, The Brisbane Courier (Brisbane), 2 May 1905, 7; 
‘Federal High Court Crisis Over Expenses’, The Age (Melbourne), 4 May 1905, 4; ‘The High Court 
Fixing The Judges Expenses’, The Argus (Melbourne), 3 May 1905, 5; ‘Is The High Court On Strike?’ 
The Advertiser (Adelaide), 4 May 1905, 5.
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Deakin’s leadership.9 Isaacs promptly turned his attention to ‘close the 
correspondence on the various subjects which [had] been under discussion 
between the Justices of the High Court and the Attorney-General [Symon] 
during the last few months’.10
Throughout July and August 1905, Attorney-General Isaacs offered what 
the court considered to be ‘a satisfactory and … permanent solution 
[to] the matters in question’.11 As suddenly as the dispute regarding the 
running expenses of the court had begun, the provisions put in place by 
the recently formed Deakin Government brought the disagreement to an 
end.12 The government ensured that the High Court would continue its 
practice of visiting state capitals and that all associated travelling expenses 
would be paid. Lastly, it was also deemed that there would be no changes 
to the personnel required to run the court to ensure that the ‘interests 
of the community would [continue to] be served’.13
On the world stage, it may no longer be unusual for the judiciary to take 
industrial action, particularly over wages and conditions.14 However, to 
this day, the decision made by Chief Justice Samuel Griffith to adjourn 
court proceedings in May 1905 remains unique in the history of the 
Australian High Court.
It was a spirited act by Chief Justice Samuel Griffith on behalf of the 
original High Court in an emerging Commonwealth polity that made 
a  lasting contribution towards permanently shaping the place and role 
of judicial autonomy at the apex of Australia’s judiciary. It also assisted in 
establishing what would become the contemporary day-to-day operations 
of the court itself. These, in an adapted form, remain to this day. As former 
Justice Michael Kirby reminded us in his 2001 reflections on law at the 
century’s end:
9  JA La Nauze, Alfred Deakin: A Biography (Melbourne University Press, 1965) 398. This was Alfred 
Deakin’s second time as Australia’s Prime Minister. See also R Norris, Deakin, Alfred (1856–1919) (1981) 
National Centre of Biography <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/deakin-alfred-5927/text10099>.




14  George Winterton, Judicial Remuneration in Australia (Australian Institute of Judicial 
Administration Incorporated, 1995), 1–2; Uma Sudhir, ‘Telangana Judges On Strike Over 
Appointments Return To Work’, NDTV (online), 6 July 2016 <http://www.ndtv.com/telangana-
news/telangana-judges-on-strike-over-appointments-return-to-work-1428671>.
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Some features of the sittings of the High Court of Australia have remained 
the same. In June, as in Chief Justice Griffith’s days, we return to his 
beloved Brisbane. In August, the Court travels to Adelaide for a week. 
In October, it is Perth. Chief Justice Barwick, a keen yachtsman, always 
attempted to visit Hobart for the Regatta Week in March. Now, the 
Court only travels to Hobart if business permits; and this is comparatively 
rare. On the establishment of the seat of Court in Canberra, Chief Justice 
Barwick attempted to terminate circuits to the outlying cities. This was 
resisted by the then Justices. Although views differ, most consider (as I do) 
that it is important for the Court to maintain the circuits. They provide 
an essential link between the serving Justices and the legal profession and 
litigants in the outlying States.15 
Finally, the key individuals involved in these fractious written exchanges 
had a keen sense of rivalry to protect.16 Each had been involved untiringly, 
but by no means in accord, in the National Convention Debates of 
the 1890s, shaping line by line the Bill that would become Australia’s 
Constitution,17 including the judiciary clauses of Chapter III.18
Therefore, it ought not be too surprising that in his position as the 
Attorney-General, Symon’s intrusion into the running of the High Court 
was done under the belief that ‘control over its non-judicial action … 
and expenditure … [came] … within … the sphere of [his role as] the 
Executive’19—a stance also met with marked resistance by the Chief Justice. 
Samuel Griffith, with equal resolve, believed it was not for the ‘executive 
… to instruct the Judiciary, or to intimate either approval or disapproval 
of their action’20 and, by insisting that the independence of the judiciary 
be protected, ensured that no easy or immediate solution to the conflict 
would be forthcoming. Nonetheless, as the preceding paragraphs have 
already revealed, the triumph of what remains a lasting legacy ultimately 
belonged to the Chief Justice.
15  Michael Kirby, ‘Law at Century’s End—A Millennial View from the High Court of Australia’ 
(2001) 1(1) Macquarie Law Journal 1, 8.
16  WG McMinn, ‘The High Court Imbroglio and the Fall of the Reid–McLean Government’ 
(1978) 64(1) Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society 14, 84–5.
17  Josiah Symon was greatly offended by Samuel Griffith’s criticism of the judiciary clauses drafted 
when he chaired the Judiciary Committee in 1897; see John Williams, The Australian Constitution: 
A Documentary History (Melbourne University Press, 2005) 614–5.
18  Ibid.
19  Letter from J Symon to S Griffith, 31 January 1905, NLA: Symon Papers MS 1736/11/852.
20  Letter from S Griffith to J Symon, 21 January 1905, NLA: Symon Papers MS 1736/11/852.
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However, for the remainder of this chapter, the focus is less on the details 
of this intriguing narrative, and instead, provides a twofold response to 
a question regarding methodology. Namely, how or in what way has 
the  extraordinary story of this jurisprudential narrative been shaped 
by the evidence that remains in existing archival materials?
First, my analysis will provide a brief discussion of the impact made by 
a  series of key preserved court and departmental letters known as the 
‘official correspondence’21 in shaping this curious tale. Then, second, 
a series of observations will be presented to understand something about 
the nature of the sway of an alternative history—as revealed through the 
personal correspondence exchanged between then Parliamentarian Alfred 
Deakin22 and the High Court Justices throughout the dispute. 
From the perspective of the author, as a researcher immersed over long 
periods of time in extensive hybrid collections of manuscripts23 held by 
the National Library of Australia,24 the National Archives of Australia25 
and the State Library of South Australia,26 it is suggested that perhaps the 
question of methodology can be postured more colloquially. In summary, 
throughout the course of this intensive research process, where, in this 
21  Prime Minister George Reid was perhaps the first to describe the correspondence this way. 
See Telegram from G Reid to J Symon, 24 May 1905, NLA: Symon Papers MS 1736/11/595. This 
correspondence later became known as the Correspondence Between Attorneys-General and the Justices 
of the High Court RE Sitting Places and Expenses of the Court, NLA: Symon Papers MS 176/11/849–
68. This Senate publication consists of 89 letters in total, with the first correspondence commencing 
29 July 1904 and the last dated 23 August 1905.
22  Alfred Deakin was the recipient of the personal correspondence from the original High Court 
at a time when he had refused to join the Reid–McLean Government and, in his words, believed 
‘he could assist the Government more by sitting behind it than becoming a member of it’; see 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 29 June 1905, 81 (A McLean, 
Minister for Trade and Customs).
23  The use of the term ‘hybrid’ indicates that the collections are a combination of institutional 
and personal papers. See the earlier work of Paul Dalgleish, ‘The Appraisal of Personal Records of 
Members of Parliament in Theory and Practice’ (1996) 24(1) Archives and Manuscripts 86, 87.
24  The initial use of these archives was for my PhD; Susan Priest, A Commonwealth Attorney-
General and the early High Court, August 1904 – July 1905 (PhD Thesis, Macquarie University, 2011). 
These include the AJ Buchanan Papers, ‘The Prime Ministers of Australia’, 1940, MS 3034, vol 1; 
the H Campbell-Jones Papers, ‘The Cabinet of Captains: The Romance of Australia’s First Federal 
Parliament’, 1935, MS 8905, Folders 1–3; the LF Crisp Papers, 1917–1984, MS 5243; the A Deakin 
Papers, 1804–1973, MS 1540, Series 14, 16; the JA la Nauze Papers, 1888–1984, MS 5248, Folders 
115, 323, 328 and 375. Permission granted by L Cleland to view Folder 323 and the JH Symon 
papers, 1820–1959, MS 1736, Series 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 29. 
25  National Archives of Australia: A6006 1905/8/7.
26  The State Library of South Australia, Private record Group, 249, ‘The Symon Family 1897–1976’.
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instance, most of the federal archival documents appear largely intact and 
readily accessible to the researcher, what can be gleaned from the historical 
evidence as it emerged from ‘reading other people’s mail’27 written more 
than 100 years ago?
The Archives as Evidence I: Official 
Correspondence
The letters extending over a period of twelve months, were many, in some 
cases very long, and at times pointed.28
The use of letters by scholars for research purposes is by no means a ‘new 
pedagogical phenomenon’,29 and their enduring or lasting sociohistorical 
value to the work of historians, legal historians biographers and writers 
alike remains well-documented.30
Further, even though it is readily conceded in the 21st century that the use 
of mobile phones, emails and other types of social media exchanges are 
quicker and may typically be regarded as a ‘new form of letter writing’,31 
written communications, including letters of state, remain of significant 
research value as a ‘remarkable protean form of writing’.32
27  Maryanne Dever, ‘Reading Other People’s Mail’ (1996) 24(1) Archives and Manuscripts 116, 
116–29; see also her earlier lecture Maryanne Dever, ‘Reading Other Peoples Mail’ (Speech delivered 
at the National Library of Australia, 25 October 1995) <https://www.nla.gov.au/maryanne-dever/
reading-other-peoples-mail>.
28  ‘The High Court. Circuits and Travelling Expenses. Interesting Correspondence’, The Argus 
(Melbourne), 25 August 1905, NLA: Symon Papers MS 1736/3/120.
29  R Holmes, ‘The Past Has a Great Future’ (2008) (November) Australian Book Review 26, 27.
30  J Kent, ‘Creating Lives: The Role of the State Library of NSW in the Creative Process of 
Biography’, (2002) (August) LASIE 83, 83–90; Maryanne Dever, ‘A Friendship that is Grown on 
Paper: Reflections on Editing Majorie Bernard’s Letters to Nettie Palmer’ (2005) 19(1) Antipodes 13, 
13–19; John Thompson, ‘Some Australian Letters of Love and Friendship’ (1998) 8(10) National 
Library of Australia News 11, 11–15; Dever (1996), above n 27; Adrian Cunningham, ‘The Mysterious 
Outside Reader’ (1996) 24(1) Archives and Manuscripts 130, 130–44; Miriam Estensen, The Letters of 
George and Elizabeth Bass (Allen & Unwin, 2009); H Anna Suh (ed), Van Gogh’s Letters (Black Dog 
& Leventhal, 2010).
31  Jennifer Moran, ‘Potency of the Pen’ (2008) 18(12) National Library of Australia News 7, 7.
32  Thompson, above n 30, 11–15. As a recent example, see Michela McGuire and Marieke Hardy, 
Signed, Sealed, Delivered: A Collection from Women of Letters (Viking Press, 2016).
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Figure 1: Correspondence between Attorneys-General and the Justices 
of the High Court re sitting places and expenses of the court.
Source: NLA Symon Papers MS 176/11/849 .
Even if letter writing might be regarded as a diminishing art, correspondence 
is a permanent manifestation of writing that permits the reader to 
understand something about the ways in which the quality and character 
of individuals of the past, who were unwilling to converse with each other 
face-to-face, used the privacy of the letter to express themselves.33 John 
Wishart documented these ideas in 1921 when he stated:
Letters … reveal the inner history of great national events of the time in 
which they were written … names to most readers, become real persons 
to those who have read their letters … The little incidents of every-day life 
… give an insight into the thoughts and actions of our forefathers such as 
no amount of description can provide. To read such letters is to enter into 
the life of days gone by, to accompany the writers in their business … to 
look at the world as they knew it through their eyes.34
While such observations readily confirm the merits, for research purposes, 
of examining correspondence for what its close association with both 
their writers and history will reveal to a reader, the same commentaries go 
further in their contribution to the focus of this chapter.
33  Thompson above n 30.
34  John Wishart (ed), Selected English Letters (JM Dent & Sons Ltd, 1921) 11.
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These sources verify that the ‘high-water mark’35 of letter writing 
encompassed specifically the time of the dispute between Attorney-General 
Symon and the original Australian High Court.36 They also reveal that 
the common notion of correctness, or practised conventions, dominated 
letter writing at this time to an extent unknown before or since.37
In a telegram sent from then Prime Minister George Reid to Attorney-
General Symon dated 24 May 1905,38 the Prime Minister suggested that 
Cabinet may have discussed the likelihood of publishing these letters 
with the intent of showing ‘that there were faults on both sides’39 of the 
disagreement. His prediction, in the end, ultimately proved to be correct.
The collection of 89 letters of state that became known as the ‘official 
correspondence’,40 exchanged between the Attorney-General’s Department 
and the Justices of the High Court between the months of July 1904 and 
early August 1905, presented in foolscap typeset,41 appear to conform to 
the practised conventions as business letters of the day required.42
They were frequently answered similarly to the one received and promptly 
answered.43 Each member of the High Court, when writing to Attorney-
General Symon or vice versa, addressed each other as business letters of the 
day required.44 They often used ‘My dear Sir’45 or ‘Sir’46 and ended with 
‘Yours faithfully’,47 ‘I have the honour to be … Your obedient Servant’,48 
or more commonly, ‘We have, &c.’,49 or ‘I have &c.’.50
35  Ibid. This high-water mark is purported to have ended around 1918.
36  Ibid.
37  Ibid.
38  Telegram from G Reid to J Symon, 24 May 1905, NLA: Symon Papers MS 1736/11/595.
39  WG McMinn, George Reid (Melbourne University Press, 1989) 218.
40  Telegram from G Reid to J Symon, 24 May 1905, NLA: Symon Papers MS 1736/11/595.
41  Correspondence Between Attorneys-General and the Justices of the High Court RE Sitting Places and 
Expenses of the Court, NLA: Symon Papers MS 176/11/849–68. 
42  Mrs Erskine (full name unknown), Etiquette in Australia (William Brooks & Co., 1911) 71 
indicates that business letters needed to be answered promptly and in the same form as the one received. 
43  Above n 41. The dates on this correspondence indicate replies to letters received ranged from the 
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To contemporary eyes, such expressions of politeness appear to be at 
odds with the contents of the letters that generally seem to remain aloof, 
uncompromising, acerbic and, at times, lengthy and rather repetitive.
Described by other scholars who examined these letters of state several 
decades ago, the correspondence on Attorney-General Symon’s part, 
according to one, was written with ‘fiendish ingenuity and sinister 
powers’.51 According to others, the letters were ‘marked on both sides by 
suppressed fury, and deadly icy courtesy’,52 being eloquent, but not overly 
elaborate in style and frequently long;53 descriptions perhaps that ought 
not to be too startling.
Contemporaries of Attorney-General Symon, for instance, have suggested 
that he was well-recognised for his ‘lucid and pungent’54 writing style, 
which, at the time of his death in 1934, was paralleled with his eminence,55 
not only for his work as a lawyer but also with his contributions as 
a legislator, a lecturer and an author.56
Similarly, AD Graham, a barrister who claimed to have known Chief 
Justice Samuel Griffith for ‘some years’,57 reflected on Griffith as a writer.58 
He stated that the Chief Justice not only ‘wrote an excellent letter’,59 but 
‘had … a complete knowledge of the etiquette of official correspondence, 
and knew exactly the intricacies of the appropriate addresses and signatures 
of letters passing to and fro in Government departments’.60
However, in seeking alternative ways to interpret the contents of the 
formal correspondence, insights are readily documented that see beyond 
a narrative merely concerning an unseemly and prolonged clash of words.
51  La Nauze, above n 9, 383.
52  Gavin Souter, Lion and Kangaroo; The Initiation of Australia (Text Publishing, 2000) 110.
53  McMinn, above n 16, 14, 29. 
54  JJ Pascoe (ed), History of Adelaide and Vicinity: With a General Sketch of the Province of South 
Australia and Biographies of Representative Men (Hussey and Gillingham, 1901) 374.
55  ‘Death of Sir Josiah Symon’, The Advertiser (Adelaide), 30 March 1934, 7.
56  Ibid.
57  Douglas Graham, The Life of the Right Honourable Sir Samuel Walker Griffith, GCMG PC 
(Powells and Pughs, 1939) 2.
58  Ibid 88–93.
59  Ibid 92.
60  Ibid 93.
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On 25 August 1905, the Melbourne Age 61 suggested that its reading public 
consider, as identified in the introductory paragraphs of this chapter, 
that this unique event in Australian legal history not only be regarded as 
a petty argument between the executive and the judiciary but also as an 
argument involving questions of principle:
The epistolary altercation … of a long and bitter controversy, revolving 
sometimes round petty matters … sometimes round large questions 
of principle. Sir Josiah Symon seems to have irritated the judges and 
the judges … appear to have snubbed the then Attorney-General on 
the slightest provocation. The spectacle presented by the letters is an 
unyielding one … It closes with a letter written by the present Attorney-
General, placing the whole of the matters in dispute on a basis which has 
given satisfaction to the judges, and at the same time scale of economies.62
Moving into the 21st century, in One Hundred Years of the High Court 
of Australia,63 JM Williams clarified the notion of principle further. 
He suggested that any narrative concerning the High Court brings with it 
‘an important reminder’64 that it is not an ‘anonymous institution’,65 but 
is staffed by personnel ‘who bring character, and in some cases drama, to 
the work of the Court’.66 None more so perhaps than the original High 
Court tasked with establishing the ‘Court in the Australian hierarchy … 
[and] winning … the respect of the local profession and judiciary’.67
Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, writing extrajudicially in 2007, also 
underscored the significance of the relationship between personalities and 
principles. He indicated that no matter how strong the personal opinions 
may have been between those involved in Australia’s federal movement, 
it remains necessary to look beyond their robust exchanges and examine 
carefully the context in which these exchanges occurred.68 In part, the 
former Chief Justice observed:
61  ‘High Court Judges’, The Age (Melbourne) 25 August 1905, NLA: Symon Papers MS 1736/3/120; 
see also ‘The High Court. Circuits and Travelling Expenses. Interesting Correspondence’, The Argus 
(Melbourne) 25 August 1905, NLA: Symon Papers MS 1736/3/120 and the ‘High Court Official 
Correspondence. Some Plain Speaking. The Justices’ Views Adopted’, The Advertiser (Adelaide), 
24 August 1905, 5, who cautioned its readers that the correspondence would take two-and-a-half 
hours to read.
62  Ibid.
63  John Williams, One Hundred Years of the High Court of Australia (Menzies Centre for Australian 
Studies, 2003).
64  Ibid 30.
65  Ibid.
66  Ibid.
67  Ibid 31.
68  Murray Gleeson, ‘The Constitutional Decisions of the Founding Fathers’ (2007) 9 University of 
Notre Dame Australia Law Review 1.
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In interpreting a legal instrument, including a Constitution, what finally 
matters is the meaning of what the instrument says. The task is to construe 
the text. The authors of the text employed particular language, and it is 
the effect of that language, [and] not their beliefs about that effect, that 
is legally binding.69
Most recently, acknowledging that the story of the strike has been ‘been told 
a number of times … [and] … in a variety of ways’,70 Justice Stephen Gageler 
described the unfolding tensions as ‘a quarrel which wound its way “through 
a labyrinth of spite and petty vituperation on both sides”, but “originated in 
a noble vision” and which bore on “an important principle”’.71:
Griffith’s triumph and Symon’s ignominy cannot gainsay the mixture of 
pettiness and principle which fuelled the actions and reactions of each. To 
the extent the principle can be separated from the pettiness, their battle 
was about the boundaries of judicial independence and about the balance 
between judicial independence and judicial accountability. And to that 
extent, recalling their battle has some enduring significance.72 
Lastly, if we return to the archives of original letters, Attorney-General 
Josiah Symon writing to Alfred Deakin in June 1905 echoed similar 
views. He was ‘grateful’73 for Deakin’s remarks ‘as to our differences upon 
my purposes in regards to the High Court’74 and, despite all that had 
occurred, hoped that it would have little impact on their collegiality. 
In  anticipation of any future communications between them, he also 
hoped that ‘our jurat intercourse … shall not be affected’.75
Finally, if any types of administrative oversights or errors occurred 
during the compilation of the letters that became known as the official 
correspondence, existing archival evidence on these issues remains silent. 
Attorney-General Symon did leave a legacy in this regard and specifically 
noted on his copy of the published volume of the official correspondence 
that one letter to the court, dated 16 February 1905,76 was missing but 
subsequently located elsewhere.77 
69  Ibid 17.
70  Stephen Gageler, ‘When the High Court Went on Strike’ (2017) 40(3) Melbourne University 
Law Review 1098, 1099. 
71  Ibid 1101, citing DI Wright, ‘Sir Josiah Symon, Federation and the High Court’ (1978) 64 
Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society 73.
72  Ibid 1130.
73  Letter from J Symon to A Deakin, 25 June 1905, NLA: Deakin Papers 1540/16/414.
74  Ibid.
75  Ibid.
76  NLA Symon Papers MS 1736/11/849–68.
77  Letter from J Symon to S Griffith, 16 February 1905, NLA: Symon Papers MS 1736/11/728.
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Even so, as a researcher having full access to official court archives, this 
discovery left an impression that additional archives remain beyond 
reach or are yet to be found. As Maud Bailey lamented in AS Byatt’s 
Possession, ‘you know if you read the collected letters of any writer … 
there is always “something … biographers don’t have access to, the real 
thing, the crucial thing … There are always letters that were destroyed. 
The letters, usually”’.78
The Archives as Evidence II: Personal 
Correspondence, Letters to Alfred Deakin
It is impossible to create a federation without having divisions and 
distributions of powers, without having different organs of government 
possibly in conflict. Therefore from the necessities of federation, and as 
one of the inevitable consequences from which we cannot escape, we find 
ourselves in a new situation of comparative peril and serious responsibility. 
Hence we must necessarily have an Australian court for the determination 
of principles which shall be common to the whole Continent, based upon 
a survey of the requirements of the whole people. If the legislative and 
executive powers of the States, the Commonwealth, and the Imperial 
Governments are to be judicially restrained each to its own sphere we 
have before us a difficult task.79
Alfred Deakin was not a gregarious person … His friendships were few, 
and almost none came from his political life, Barton and O’Connor 
being the exceptions in that they were his personal friends as well as 
political allies.80
78  Catherine Burgass, AS Byatt’s Possession: A Readers Guide (The Continuum International 
Publishing Group Ltd, 2002) 45.
79  NLA Deakin Papers MS 1540/14/1038 9.
80  Al Gabay, ‘Alfred Deakin and his Friends’ in David Headon and John Williams (eds), Makers 
of Miracles The Cast of the Federation Story (Melbourne University Press, 2000) 82. 
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Figure 2: Correspondence from each of the High Court members 
to Alfred Deakin.
Source: NLA Deakin Papers 1840/16/213; 1840/16/281; 1840/16/328 .
The significance of the use of court and departmental letters as archival 
evidence to the researcher cannot be underestimated it would seem. 
However, this historical importance for research purposes is further 
magnified when discussing the place of personal letter writing in 
research; the historical value of those communications ‘passed on … 
in a confidential relationship’.81
In a series of incomplete letters that remain as part of the Deakin papers,82 
a brief but manifestly personal understanding is revealed into how each of 
the judges felt about the nature of their formal frequent written exchanges 
with Attorney-General Symon. They provide a reader with an immediate 
and compelling alternate history that can lend both originality and depth 
of historical analysis to the story of the judicial strike of 1905.
The original three Justices of the High Court turned to Alfred Deakin as 
their ‘trusted friend, the legislative father of the court and the only man 
who might be able to protect them by private representations, since Prime 
81  Telegram from G Reid to J Symon, 24 May 1905, NLA: Symon Papers MS 1736/11/595.
82  NLA Deakin Papers MS 1540/16/187, 213–23, 237–52, 272, 281, 303–5, 328–35, 345–7, 
356, 378–9, 385–91, 404–5, 411–14. 
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Minister Reid seemed unwilling or unable to intervene between them 
and the formidably venomous Symon’.83 This collection of letters, most 
frequently penned to Alfred Deakin by Justice Richard O’Connor, are 
incomplete because none of Deakin’s original written replies are part of the 
Deakin collection. Nonetheless, the letters that do remain reveal the High 
Court bench from a different perspective; an original Federal Judiciary 
appalled by the personal attack of the Attorney-General and frustrated by 
his fierce resistance to achieve a lasting and mutually agreeable outcome 
to the drawn-out circumstances of the controversy.
In contrast to the official typeset correspondence, these letters are, for 
the main, all handwritten, extremely difficult to read and, at times, are 
illegible. They were exchanged during January, February, March and, 
more regularly, June 1905. Unlike the formal correspondence, the tone 
in each of the letters appears gracious and forthcoming, and they were 
written between individuals with complete trust and confidence in each 
other.84
In stark contrast to the formalities required with official correspondence, 
Alfred Deakin is addressed as ‘Dear A. D.’,85 ‘Dear Deakin’86 or ‘My Dear 
Alfred’,87 and the letters frequently conclude with ‘yours as ever’88 or ‘yours 
always’.89
Through these exchanges, the congenial relationship that existed 
exclusively between each of the Justices is also confirmed. In one instance, 
the Chief Justice and Justice Barton had written separate notes to Deakin 
on the same page,90 and, in another, Justice Barton puts pen to paper 
in the full knowledge that copies of Attorney-General Symon’s letters 
had already been sent from Justice O’Connor a few days earlier.91 Alfred 
Deakin was privy to the original High Court’s deeply personal attitudes 
towards the nature of the dispute from its outset.
83  JA La Nauze, above n 9, 383.
84  Al Gabay, above n 80, describes Barton and O’Connor as being Deakin’s ‘personal friends’ and 
‘political allies’.
85  Letter from E Barton to A Deakin, 16 February 1905, NLA Deakin Papers MS 1540/16/187.
86  Letter from E Barton to A Deakin, 26 February 1905, NLA: Deakin Papers MS 1540/16/245.
87  Letter from R O’Connor to A Deakin, 12 June 1905, NLA: Deakin Papers MS 1540/16/335.
88  Letter from R O’Connor to A Deakin, 21 June 1905, NLA: Deakin Papers MS 1540/16/389. 
89  Letter from E Barton to A Deakin, 21 June 1905, NLA: Deakin Papers MS 1540/16/385.
90  Letter from S Griffith to A Deakin and letter from E Barton to A Deakin, 16 February 1905, 
NLA: Deakin Papers MS 1540/16/187.
91  Letter from E Barton to A Deakin, 21 June 1905, NLA: Deakin Papers MS 1540/16/385. 
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On 11 January 1905,92 Justice Edmund Barton sent Alfred Deakin copies 
of two letters the court had received from the Attorney-General dated 23 
December 1904, and the Chief Justice’s response of 27 December 1904, 
respectively.93 He also enclosed a copy of the court’s draft response to 
Symon94 and identified the early proposals the Attorney-General had put 
forward to the court to address ways of curtailing its expenditure. These, 
in Justice Barton’s words, were threefold: ‘the practical abandonment of 
sittings of the High Court in the State capitals other than Melbourne’;95 
that travelling expenses would be computed from Melbourne only; and 
that the judges would be paid a fixed daily rate of three guineas.96 However, 
the main reason for writing at this stage was to ensure that Deakin was 
informed of ‘everything so far’.97
A month later, Justice Barton wrote again. By 16 February 1905, he had 
already referred to the Attorney-General’s letters in earlier correspondence 
as being peculiarly ‘insulting in tone’,98 but by 26 February, Attorney-
General Symon’s letters contained ‘screeds on the subject of the abolition 
of the system of holding court in the District Registries’.99 In addition, 
before the court was able to write a ‘joint letter’100 in response to the latest 
communication from the Attorney-General, Symon was writing to them 
again in a manner that was ‘more extraordinary and more insulting than 
anything that had gone before’.101 Barton once again enclosed copies of 
the letters to give Deakin a ‘complete grasp of the matter’,102 but on this 
occasion, his correspondence concluded with an individual request for 
assistance. ‘If you find what seems to you as a solution please let me have 
it always … yours sincerely Edmund Barton’.103
92  Letter from E Barton to A Deakin, 11 January 1905, NLA: Deakin Papers MS 1540/16/ 213.
93  NLA Symon Papers MS 1736/11/850–1 are the original references for Symon’s letters.




98  Letter from E Barton to A Deakin, 16 February 1905, NLA: Deakin Papers MS 1540/16/187. 
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Deakin’s response to the circumstances, according to JA La Nauze, was 
one of disbelief. The Attorney-General’s letters had ‘shocked’104 him 
and left him ‘humiliated’.105 He thought that Symon had an ‘immense 
advantage’106 over the High Court because he treated the judges as 
they were ‘constitutionally supposed to be’107 treated ‘while all the time 
[Symon] is throwing mud like a larrikin at you and exercising the petty 
tyranny that his position allows’.108 He encouraged the Justices to destroy 
the correspondence for both ‘the sake of the Commonwealth and the 
High Court’.109
Other revelations from the judges throughout the next four months 
followed. Chief Justice Griffith sent copies of Symon’s latest letters to the 
bench to Deakin in a brief note on 18 March 1905, enclosing them for 
Deakin’s ‘delight or sorrow’.110
A large gap in the archival materials exists until Justice O’Connor again 
wrote to Deakin in early June.111 By that time, the court’s decision to 
adjourn proceedings and go on strike had already taken place, and 
their reasons for doing so had already been made public. Nevertheless, 
Justice Richard O’Connor thought that a solution to the dispute was still 
possible.112
Aware that Prime Minister ‘Reid ha[d] now left the matter to Symon’113 
to resolve, Justice O’Connor expressed his regret that the correspondence 
could not be withdrawn as it was ‘too late’.114 He went on and rightly 
predicted that ‘Parliament will probably demand to see’ it.115
Days later, O’Connor made a rather startling revelation. Despite the 
misconception Attorney-General Symon might have had in thinking 
he would ‘eventually induce us [the court] to give up opposing him’,116 






110  Letter from S Griffith to A Deakin, 18 March 1905, NLA: Deakin Papers MS 1540/16/281. 





116  Letter from R O’Connor to A Deakin, 12 June 1905, NLA: Deakin Papers MS 1540/16/335.
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O’Connor wrote about the urgency and necessity of discussing and settling 
the matter with the Attorney-General, especially if ‘Symon himself became 
a member of the Court’.117 However, such an appointment occurring 
sometime in the future, given the manner in which the Attorney-General 
had behaved towards the judges, was deemed ‘unlikely’118 to occur. 
On 19 June, renewed written attacks from Attorney-General Symon 
were interpreted by Justice O’Connor as the ‘absolute freehand’119 the 
Attorney-General had been given by Prime Minister Reid ‘to wreck as far 
as he can the High Court establishment as you [Deakin] and we designed 
it should be when we first took office’.120 Then, on the following page, 
O’Connor confirmed, as Symon had threatened that he would do in 
his 26 April 1905 letter, that ‘the official telephones were disconnected 
[in their Sydney chambers except one] today’.121
Still the optimist, Justice O’Connor’s letter concluded on a positive note, 
looking towards an opportunity for a change to the current and untenable 
circumstances:
We are all curious to hear what you have to say at Ballarat—when I say 
‘we’ I do not mean the High Court, but all Federalists and indeed all them 
who wish to see Parliament lift out of the slough … into which Reid has 
dropped it.
I am sure you will do what you think best in the interest of the 
Commonwealth apart from any other considerations.122
On 21 June 1905, Edmund Barton wrote his last letter about the crisis 
to Alfred Deakin.123 He revealed, perhaps in the most intimate terms, the 
impact the dispute was having upon him. In his view, it had now become 
‘impossible to do one’s work efficiently’124 because of the disturbing 
nature of the contents of Symon’s latest letters to the court both dated 
9 June 1905.125
117  Ibid.
118  La Nauze, above n 9, 416.
119  Letter from R O’Connor to A Deakin, 19 June 1905, NLA: Deakin Papers MS 1540/16/378.
120  Ibid.
121  Ibid; J Symon to S Griffith, 26 April 1905, NLA: Symon Papers MS 1736/11/858 is where 
the  Attorney-General initially indicated he would change the existing arrangements with regard 
to the payment for telephone usage.
122  Letter from R O’Connor to A Deakin, 19 June 1905, NLA: Deakin Papers MS 1540/16/378.
123  Letter from E Barton to A Deakin, 21 June 1905, NLA: Deakin Papers MS 1540/16/385.
124  Ibid.
125  See NLA: Symon Papers MS 1736/11/860 and 861 for copies of these letters to the court.
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According to Barton, the Attorney-General in these two communications 
had now surmised:
his determination to pack our tipstaffs off at a few days notice and turn 
them adrift upon the world. Shocked as I had been at the … venom of the 
war, it was natural to fear that he would resort to such a cruelty to these 
innocent officers for the mere purpose of satisfying his hatred of us.126 
Then, he finished his letter by adding:
One feels all this bitterly. We are in every way degraded and humiliated 
by this unspeakable scoundrel: and if Australia offers the Judges of her 
one and only national Court to be treated thus she will deserve as she 
has not yet done the scoffs and jibes of the English speaking world. My 
wife wishes me to resign rather than submit to any further indignity but 
at least I shall wait to see whether Parliament adopts or condones, the 
outrage we have suffered, of which every day brings a new one in the 
shape of an insulting letter.127
Fortunately, for the Griffith Court, the original High Court bench would 
remain a united one. In addition, Justice Richard O’Connor had been 
right in his June 1905 prediction to Deakin.128
The controversy between the High Court and Attorney-General Symon 
would only be resolved by an ‘appeal to Symon’s successor’,129 and it was. 
The decisions reached by the new government, as documented at the 
beginning of this chapter, brought the dispute to an end.
The Archives as Evidence III: Concluding 
Notes on Methodology
Then there are emanations from the documents themselves, which the 
historian sometimes exposes to the light for the first time since they were 
preserved.130
[T]he greatest strength of a position depends on its facts, its greatest 
weakness arises from its epithets.131
126  Letter from E Barton to A Deakin, 21 June 1905, NLA: Deakin Papers MS 1540/16/385.
127  Ibid.
128  Letter from R O’Connor to A Deakin, 12 June 1905, NLA: Deakin Papers MS 1540/16/335.
129  Ibid.
130  Tom Griffith, The Art of Time Travel (Black Inc., 2016) 11.
131  Telegram from G Reid to J Symon, 24 May 1905, NLA: Symon Papers MS 1736/11/595, 597.
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The notion of missing primary sources from manuscripts and records, 
such as the letters documenting Alfred Deakin’s personal replies to the 
Justices of the High Court, has been described generally in secondary 
sources as a  concept referred to as the ‘fissured archive’.132 As the 
expression denotes, it refers to materials that survive as evidence in archival 
materials but ultimately remain as a part of what may have originally been 
their total.133
This is a useful choice of words because not only does it highlight the 
limitations on tasks a researcher can achieve when key documents are 
missing, but, as a consequence, the information when ultimately 
presented, as highly relevant and compelling as it may be for research 
purposes, has the potential to be often fragmented and rather disjointed. 
Again, to use a similar colloquial expression cited above, the experience of 
this as a researcher and writer is one of never playing with a ‘full hand’.134
Instead, having to accept that in the private correspondence between 
Alfred Deakin and the High Court, they could only reveal discrete 
snippets or instances from the parties about the information they wished 
to convey, it made subsequent interpretations and reinterpretations for 
writing purposes an extremely difficult undertaking for the researcher. 
Particularly when trying to fill in the gaps with words that could only be 
representations and unable to guarantee a full comprehension or even an 
‘impartial review’135 of all the details enclosed in the correspondence. 
This dilemma is perhaps especially relevant in 2018, where, in the age of 
disclosure, our sense regarding the privacy of individuals and the extent to 
which they will be exposed ‘has been systematically eroded over the years 
by the public’s right to know’.136 Further, it was Prime Minister George 
Reid who predicted that under such circumstances personal motives 
had the potential to be ‘unfairly decried’,137 which remains a relevant 
observation even today.
132  Dever (1996), above n 27, 119.
133  Ibid.
134  Ibid.
135  HG Turner, The First Decade of the Australian Commonwealth: A Chronicle of Contemporary 
Politics 1901–1910 (Mason, Firth and McCutcheon, 1911) vii.
136  Dever (1996), above n 27, 117.
137  Turner, above n 135, vii.
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Therefore, as acknowledged by writers before me who have studied other 
kinds of early letters written by Australian public figures,138 there is little 
reason to doubt that both types of correspondence referred to throughout 
this chapter have presented a valuable ‘tangent to reflect a key moment 
in Australian legal history’ for research and writing purposes.139 However, 
these observations, it is suggested, offer much more.
The contents of the archival materials, including private correspondence, 
have been powerful reminders of personal histories as well—supplements 
to a specific time in Australia’s legal history by providing information, 
opinions and attitudes that can have a dramatic and intensely personal 
impact on how a very public set of circumstances in existing formal letters 
of state are interpreted.
In short, as this chapter sets out to demonstrate, histories have ultimately 
been shaped by numerous tensions, as much by what is known as what 
is not known. The ‘absences and the subtle silences’,140 which structured 
my reading from the archives remain and serve in the end to act as but 
a representative of the whole to depict a narrative as comprehensively and 
as systematically as those resources will allow.
As Marianne Dever wrote in 1996, in the end, reading the archival 
materials—in this instance, both the formal and personal correspondence 
pertaining to the strike of 1905—was, from time to time, a little like:
being the proverbial eavesdropper on a telephone call, inferring from 
the overheard fragments of information those portions of conversation 
to which one is not privy. I read between the lines. But this partial and 
disconnected dialogue leaves me unable to clarify so many details … I can 
picture but not pin down.141
Finally, it was demonstrated, particularly from the list of the early 
references included in the preceding pages, that a broad interest in letter 
writing by researchers ‘with its own unique qualities of style and personal 
expression’142 continues against all the odds to make a regular appearance 
on the publication list of books.
138  Thompson, above n 30, 11.
139  Ibid.
140  Ibid 12.
141  Dever (1996), above n 27, 126.
142  Thompson, above n 30, 11. 
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In writing his much-acclaimed biography of Alfred Deakin, JA La Nauze 
revealed what has already been stated in the previous section of this chapter. 
Alfred Deakin wished under no circumstances for the correspondence 
between the High Court and then Attorney-General to ever be made 
public.143 However, in the same publication, La Nauze expressed his view 
that, if a study of the dispute were ever to be undertaken, it would provide 
the substance for a ‘fascinating study in character’.144 Indeed, it has. Even 
so, the unease about the controversy and shame Alfred Deakin expressed 
about the realisation that the written exchanges might be made public can 
be put to rest.
The original Justices took a resolute position of principle. Under the 
leadership of Chief Justice Samuel Griffith, they established the foundations 
of the High Court as they thought it should and would continue: to attain 
‘high standards of integrity, learning, ability and industry’.145 
For the former Attorney-General, Josiah Symon, the High Court affair, as 
it had for all individuals involved, seemed to have taken an enormous toll. 
In a public and rather emotive demonstration of this, Symon made an 
important distinction between the contributions he had made to the dual 
parliamentary roles he had held in the Reid–McLean Ministry. When he 
resigned his position as Leader of the Senate on Wednesday, 5 July 1905, 
he made it known to the Chamber that:
In relinquishing this position which I have been proud to hold, and whose 
duties I have been proud to discharge—I do not mean the official position 
of Attorney-General, but the position of leader of this great and august 
assembly—I part company from all my honourable friends here, certainly 
on my part, with what will always be a constraint of feeling of personal 
regard, and I am sure that it will be reciprocated by the goodwill of all my 
friends. I move—That the Senate at its rising adjourn.146
143  La Nauze, above n 9, 384.
144  Ibid 382.
145  Harry Gibbs, ‘Griffith, Samuel Walker’ in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper and George Williams 
(eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (Oxford University Press, 2001) 311. 
146  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 5 July 1905, 134 (JH Symon).
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In short, when combined and used as evidence, both official and personal 
letters both disclose and confirm that behind the historical narrative of 
strong or robust opinions of the Federation Fathers,147 a constitutional 
battle testing the parameters of the separation of powers doctrine to 
maintain the well-ordered dignity of the High Court was far greater.
The resolute personality of Australia’s founding Chief Justice of the 
High Court, Samuel Griffith, displayed a determination to establish 
the independence of the court from its beginning, including its sitting 
patterns and the staff required to ensure its operation at the apex of the 
judiciary in an emerging Commonwealth polity.
However, the final words regarding methodology belong to Charles 
Darwin. In a completely different context in his writing in the Descent of 
Man, he stated that ‘we are not here concerned with hopes and fears, only 
with truth as far as our reason allows us to discover it’.148
147  Gleeson, above n 68, 17.
148  Charles Darwin, cited in Inga Clendinnen, ‘The History Question. Who Owns the Past?’ (2006) 
23 Quarterly Essay 1, 68.
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Accessing the Archives of the 




In 1945–51, Australian Military Courts convened 300 trials of Japanese 
accused of committing various war crimes during World War II, which 
sat at Morotai, Wewak, Labuan, Darwin, Rabaul, Singapore, Hong Kong 
and Manus Island. The military courts were creatures of statute under 
the War Crimes Act 1945 (Cth) and akin to field general courts-martial.1 
As such, they were exercising executive, not judicial, power. Significantly, 
the military courts had no duty to produce written reasons for decisions.2 
It is the lack of written decisions that elevates the trial proceedings—tens 
of thousands of pages of forms, transcripts and exhibits that were created 
during the trials—to a position of unusual importance as legal records. 
Moreover, there was some recognition at the time that the proceedings 
had worth beyond legal records; they formed a body of historical records 
relating to the war in their own right and merit and with national, if 
1  See Michael Paes, ‘The Australian Military Courts under the War Crimes Act 1945—Structure 
and Approach’ in Georgina Fitzpatrick, Timothy McCormack and Narrelle Morris (eds), Australia’s 
War Crimes Trials 1945–51 (Brill Nijhoff, 2016) 103–33, doi.org/10.1163/9789004292055_005.
2  Even in judicial proceedings, the requirement to give reasons is regarded as a ‘normal but not 
universal incident’ of the process: Public Service Board (NSW) v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656, 667.
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not international, significance. The proceedings contain thousands of 
accounts of war crimes perpetrators, victims and witnesses, as well as 
firsthand accounts of military service, movements, battles, capture by 
the enemy and, inevitably, atrocities. In seeking to gain copies of the 
proceedings, the Australian War Memorial asserted in 1946, for example, 
that they would be of ‘great value to the official historians, and later 
to other historians and students of the Second World War’.3 However, 
the Department of the Army, which had been responsible for the trials, 
simply treated the proceedings as it did those of courts-martial. The 
proceedings were regarded as classified and confidential Commonwealth 
legal-administrative records that were shuffled between government 
departments and eventually archived but were closed to public access for 
the next quarter of a century.
Australia’s tight control of its trial proceedings in the postwar period 
was not unusual for government records in this period. This was due to 
both the absence of an independent archive and the tendency to regard 
archiving as an economically effective means for the storage and disposal 
of records, rather than as the creation of a valuable national repository 
to preserve and make information accessible. However, given the 
obvious personal and international character of the trial proceedings and 
associated war crimes records, the closure raises questions about access to 
information for those prosecuted and their country. Australia provided 
only a ‘bare minimum’4 of information to Japan about the trials, mostly 
concerning the identities of the convicted and their sentences. Thus, the 
Japanese Government made several diplomatic requests to Australia in the 
1950s and 1960s for access to or copies of the trial proceedings and other 
war crimes records. Other Allied nations were receiving similar Japanese 
requests for their war crimes records. The consequent Allied consultation 
was fairly rudimentary but demonstrated that a consensus approach to 
the requests was thought necessary.
These processes revealed that, in the decades after the war, Allied nations 
were generally opposed to making their war crimes records available, 
although some countries were slightly more permissive than others. 
In Australia, the issue of granting Japanese access to records was typically 
3  AW Bazley, Acting Director, Australian War Memorial to the Secretary, Department of External 
Affairs (Ext Aff), 28 August 1946, National Archives of Australia (NAA): MP742/1, 336/1/1000.
4  As characterised by Yuma Totani, Justice in Asia and the Pacific Region, 1945–1952: Allied War 
Crimes Prosecutions (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 186, doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316104118.
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regarded as one of ‘policy and practicability, rather than of law’.5 There 
was no legal requirement to provide the trial proceedings even to those 
who had been prosecuted, let alone to Japan. Thus, citing policy and 
practicability, the Departments of External Affairs and the Army refused 
to release the records for decades. The policy reasons for access refusal 
usually turned on what was seen as Australia’s right and obligation to 
control the dissemination of sensitive ‘national’ information that Japan 
might use to criticise the trials. Moreover, the estimated expenses in time 
and money to make copies of these records was used to argue that their 
provision was impracticable. Little consideration in this decision-making 
process was given to those who may have had a valid interest in access to 
the records or to the light that the records may have shed on a key part of 
wartime history. The closure of the records simply ensured that Australia 
maintained an exclusive grip on knowledge of that history.
Drawing on government correspondence, this chapter examines the 
postwar views and control of Australia’s archives of war crimes records 
in response to the Japanese requests for access. This story will be told 
through short vignettes that describe the shifting relationships between 
Australia and Japan, as much as those between the institutions of the 
Australian Government and their conceptualisation and approach to 
the value and materiality of war records. This story demonstrates how 
records that documented the prosecution and punishment of people from 
another nation during legal processes that were open to the public to 
watch (prima facie court records) can, nonetheless, be classified afterwards 
as confidential national records (not court records) of such significant 
international political consequence that they had to be zealously protected 
for decades. Although Prime Minister John Gorton announced the 
accelerated release of general World War II records in 1971,6 it took until 
1975 for the trial proceedings to be opened to the public. In an interesting 
turn of fate, it was the Commonwealth’s legal executive—the Attorney-
General’s Department—that finally recognised the importance to history 
of allowing public access to the records, an importance that overrode any 
supposed protective requirements, such as confidentiality. The ‘past’, stated 
5  See handwritten note to Mr Horne, 28 May 1965, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15A.
6  Access to Commonwealth Archives − Statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. John Gorton (30 December 
1970) Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet <http://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/
files/original/00002342.pdf>.
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Attorney-General Keppel Enderby QC, ‘should be everyone’s property’.7 
Yet, the lengthy delay in making the records accessible meant that, in the 
interim, most individuals involved in the trials had died, taking with them 
what could have been invaluable personal accounts and permanently 
impacting on our understanding of the trials and the histories that can 
be told of them. In hampering research for so long, protectionism had, in 
this case, an indelible effect on knowledge. 
The First Japanese Request for Access 
in 1955
Japan’s first request to the Department of External Affairs for records 
relating to Japanese war criminals and their trials arrived in 1955, four 
years after the final trial on Manus Island. A Japanese Embassy official 
asked in person for information about the whereabouts of the records and 
what authority was in charge of them; whether there were extra copies of 
these records; and whether Australia would consent to Japan obtaining 
these copies. Given that the official also enquired about the estimated cost 
of reproducing the records, it was perhaps contemplated that Japan would 
pay an appropriate fee.8
As the Army had convened the trials, External Affairs forwarded 
the  Japanese request to the Department of the Army for its view.9 The 
Secretary of the Department of the Army was surprised that a ‘request of 
such magnitude’ had been made orally. He advised that it seemed ‘almost 
certain that the information is wanted for propaganda purposes as no 
other possible reason can be visualised’. He observed that ‘[p]ublication 
of distorted versions of particular trials, extracts therefrom taken out of 
context, or half truths’ might assist the various nationalist organisations 
that had since sprung up in Japan, which sought, for example, to ‘restore 
the lost honour of the Imperial armed forces’ and to ‘correct the cruel 
injustices done to their dignity and memory’. He pointed out that there 
was nothing in the War Crimes Act or its regulations that provided for 
copies of the proceedings to be made available and nor were there extra 
7  Attorney-General (Att Gen) press release, ‘Access to Historical Records’, 2 June 1975, NAA: 
A1838, 3103/10/13/12 PART 16A.
8  Secretary, Ext Aff to the Secretary, Department of the Army (hereafter Army), 8 July 1955, 
NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 13.
9  Ibid.
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copies. He estimated that it would cost £13,000 and ‘20 typist years’ 
to retype about 75,000 pages of records or £38,500 and ‘185 machine 
days’ to do photostatic reproductions and his departmental staffing was 
insufficient to undertake such a ‘tremendous’ task. For all these reasons, he 
recommended that no records should be made available to the Japanese.10
External Affairs considered the Army’s response and canvassed a number 
of high-level departmental officials. James Plimsoll, then Assistant 
Secretary, for instance, recommended that Japan should be told that it 
was not possible to provide any records and that no information should 
be provided at all, apart from the Army’s estimated cost of reproduction.11 
In due course, the Japanese Embassy was told that that none of the 
information requested could be made available. The Embassy apparently 
made ‘no comment’ on the refusal.12
After Australia’s refusal was communicated to Japan, External Affairs 
informed its diplomatic representatives in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, France and the Philippines about the request 
and the refusal. The representatives were asked to ascertain whether Japan 
had made similar requests to those nations; if so, what that government’s 
response had been; and if there were any ‘views’ as to what was ‘behind’ 
the request. The Australian Embassy in Tokyo was similarly asked to ‘shed 
any light’ on what had prompted the request.13 The Embassy responded 
that ‘[n]othing specific’ had suggested itself as the ‘immediate cause’ of 
the request, but that it seemed ‘likely’ that the records were sought to 
give ‘further support for appeals for clemency’.14 Most of the other Allied 
Powers had, in fact, received Japanese requests for access to, or copies of, 
their records of war crimes trials. The cautionary responses were fairly 
similar in each case, demonstrating scepticism of the Japanese motives. 
As a result, the requests were met usually with outright refusals or with 
limited access being offered with such stringent conditions and/or high 
costs to be met by Japan that such offers were not taken up. The United 
States, for example, had received a Japanese request for records, but the 
10  AD McKnight, Secretary, Army to the Secretary, Ext Aff, attaching Appendix A and B, 21 July 
1955, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 13.
11  Handwritten note signed and dated 27 July 1955, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 13.
12  Secretary, Ext Aff to the Secretary, Army, 12 September 1955, 1, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 
PART 13.
13  TW Eckersley for the Secretary, Ext Aff, to Washington, London, The Hague, Paris, Manila and 
Tokyo, 1 August 1955, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 13.
14  RWL Austin, Second Secretary, Australian Embassy, Tokyo to the Secretary, Ext Aff, 2 September 
1955, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 13.
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State Department could ‘only guess’ what the reason for it might be, 
as none had been provided.15 State Department officials suggested to the 
Australian Embassy that the Japanese ‘might wish to use parts of the … 
records to support requests for the release of prisoners’ or, alternatively, 
that the Japanese ‘simply’ wanted ‘all records concerning important 
matters in which its nationals have been or may be concerned’.16 One of 
these officials, legal expert George Hagan, referred to:
the common Japanese feeling that the war criminal trials constituted 
a kind of national disgrace and the Japanese desire to ‘expunge them’, as 
it were, from the record: possession of the official documents might help 
them in some way for this purpose.17 
The State Department told the Australian Embassy in early 1956 that the 
Japanese Embassy was going to be informed that the records were ‘not 
available’, since they were still being used by the US Clemency and Parole 
Board relating to war criminals. Moreover, ‘[s]ome form of words will be 
found’ to ‘discourage the Japanese from renewing their application’, even 
after the war criminals had been all released.18 As External Affairs later 
characterised the overall outcome of the Japanese requests to the Allied 
Powers, ‘[i]n effect, the Japanese got no change from anybody’.19
The Second Japanese Request for 
Access in 1959
The second, quite similar, Japanese request for copies of Australian records 
arrived in August 1959. The Japanese Embassy advised that the Ministry 
of Justice was ‘engaged in collecting’ all postwar trial records.20 Indeed, the 
Ministry had established a Judiciary and Legislation Investigation Bureau 
(shihō hōsei chōsabu) in May 1958, tasked with the project to collect as many 
15  JR Rowland, First Secretary, Australian Embassy, Washington DC to the Secretary, Ext Aff, 
29 August 1955, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 13.
16  Ibid.
17  Ibid. 
18  JR Rowland, First Secretary, Australian Embassy, Washington DC to the Secretary, Ext Aff, 
25 January 1956, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 14A.
19  Ext Aff File Note, ‘Japanese War Criminals, Records’, 7 September 1959, NAA: A1838, 
3103/10/13/2 PART 15A.
20  Embassy of Japan, Note Verbale, no. 109, 25 August 1959, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 
PART 15A.
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Allied trial records as possible.21 One External Affairs analyst was initially 
minded to reject the request outright, as Japan had provided ‘even fewer 
reasons for the request now than they did in 1955, when we rejected it’ 
and that the reasons for the rejection remained valid.22 The analyst posited 
that the request was based on the fact that ‘there is, in Japan, pressure 
to “correct” the verdicts of Allied Military Tribunals’.23 The analyst also 
suggested that if none of the above was sufficient to explain a rejection, 
Japan could be told that it was based on ‘the need to protect individuals 
who had supplied information about war crimes’.24 The Legal and Treaty 
Division of External Affairs also advised that there was ‘no obligation 
in law’ to comply with the request and, in fact, no specific legislative 
provision under which the records could be provided.25 However, this 
did not prevent the handing over of copies to Japan, if this was the policy 
decision that was made.26 The Department of the Army agreed that the 
objections raised in 1955 remained ‘sufficient’ to refuse the request and, if 
any further reason was required, it was the ongoing Allied opposition to 
providing access. The Army suggested that the Japanese Embassy simply 
‘be informed that it is not the practice of Australia to pass documents of 
this nature to a foreign Government or to provide copies of them’.27
This time, External Affairs began international consultation while 
consideration was ongoing.28 The United States advised that another 
Japanese request had arrived in mid-1959, for the stated reason that Japan 
wanted the records ‘for the purpose of historical record’. However, a State 
Department official suggested to an Australian official that if Japan gained 
the records, it ‘might in the future attempt to cast doubt on the trials’ and 
that ‘this was the real motivation’ in seeking them. The State Department 
intended to ‘stall the Japanese request indefinitely by long drawn-out 
consultation’ with other government agencies. The only ‘difficulty’ was 
21  Totani, above n 4, 188.




25  AH Body, Ext Aff File Note, ‘Japanese War Criminals’ Records’, 15 September 1959, NAA: 
A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15A.
26  Ibid.
27  B White for the Secretary, Army to the Secretary, Ext Aff, 3 March 1960, NAA: A1838, 
3103/10/13/2 PART 15A.
28  HA Dunn for the Secretary, Ext Aff to the Australian Embassy—Washington, the Hague, Paris, 
Tokyo and the Australian High Commission, London, 5 July 1960, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 
PART 15A.
THE COuRT AS ARCHIvE
152
that ‘some’ proceedings had already been reproduced for university 
libraries. Therefore, the State Department expected that it might have to 
permit Japan to have copies of those trials, although it was likely that access 
would be refused to investigation files.29 Of the other Allied countries, the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France had also received Japanese 
requests but were generally not cooperative. Nevertheless, France had 
provided to Japan a list of the numbers and dates of the judgments of 34 
Japanese war criminals and advised that it would provide copies only of 
judgments if Japan paid the expense of doing so.30
After receiving the international responses, External Affairs continued to 
debate the matter. One official suggested that it would ‘close the matter 
out to refuse the Japanese request’, which he favoured.31 Another official 
felt ‘strongly that we should not yield an inch on the subject of war 
criminals’, given that ‘Japan’s record in this field was disgusting’ and that 
it would be ‘abhorrent to the Australian people if it became known that 
we even discussed this subject with the Japanese’. Moreover, this official 
suggested that Japan be told that ‘we would not welcome any further 
approaches on this subject’.32 Another official agreed with this latter view, 
pointing out in particular that ‘we have already done a lot of yielding’ on 
war criminal issues.33
The Australian Embassy in Tokyo was warned in advance that the Japanese 
request would be refused and was advised that the grounds for the refusal 
included Australia’s ‘feeling that we have gone far enough in meeting 
other Japanese requests on such matters as remission of sentences of war 
criminals’.34 On 19 December 1960, Assistant Secretary DW McNicol 
advised Mr Yoshida, the Counsellor at the Japanese Embassy, that:
29  Australian Embassy, Washington, to the Minister and Ext Aff, 1 August and 3 August 1960, 
both in NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15A.
30  GJ Price, Second Secretary, Australian Embassy, Paris to the Secretary, Ext Aff, 23 September 
1960, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15A.
31  Handwritten note for Mr McNicol, 24 November 1960, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 
PART 15A.
32  Ext Aff File Note for Mr Heydon, 25 November 1960, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15A.
33  Ibid. 
34  DW McNicol, Assistant Secretary, Ext Aff to the Australian Embassy, Tokyo, 2 December 1960, 
NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15A.
153
6 . ACCESSING THE ARCHIvES OF AuSTRALIAN WAR CRIMES TRIALS AFTER WORLD WAR II
The Department wishes to inform the Embassy that it is not the practice 
of the Australian Government to make available information relating to 
documents of this nature and it is therefore unable to meet the Embassy’s 
request.35 
McNicol told Yoshida that it was in Japan’s interests that memories of war 
crimes—which had ‘deeply shocked and angered the Australian people’—
be ‘erased’ and that the ‘chances that time would diminish the memories 
would be improved if one was not reminded of these crimes’.36 McNicol 
added, on a personal level, that it would be ‘preferable’ if the Japanese 
Ministry concerned was ‘persuaded not to raise the subject of war crimes 
again’.37 Yoshida said that he was ‘grateful’ for the reply and ‘understood’.38
After Australia’s refusal, the United States surprised Australia in May 
1961 with the information that it proposed to tell Japan that copies of its 
trial records—not its investigation records, which remained classified—
could be made available at Japan’s expense. The reasoning behind this 
abrupt change in position was that, as the Japanese had participated in 
the trials, they could be ‘assumed to have their own rudimentary records’ 
of them. In addition, records had already been partially made available in 
the United States. The State Department had also concluded that request 
arose from ‘Japanese Bibliophile-type psychology and their passion for 
completeness’. While the State Department continued to ‘bear in mind’ 
the possibility that Japan might want the records to ‘enable’ the casting of 
doubt on the trials and to ‘attempt to rewrite history’, Japan was already 
in a position to do this. Therefore, Australia, the United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands were invited to give their views to determine whether 
an ‘agreed policy could be worked out’, so as to ‘avoid’ Japan using the 
United States’ position to ‘bring pressure to bear on the others’.39
External Affairs forwarded the United States’ proposal to the Army, which 
repeated its opinion that Japan should be refused access.40 The Australian 
Embassy in Washington was advised in December 1960 that Australia was 
35  Ext Aff Record of Conversation with Mr Yoshida by Mr DW McNicol, ‘Japanese Request for 




39  Australian Embassy, Washington to Ext Aff, 3 May 1961, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 
15A.
40  B White, Secretary, Army to the Secretary, Ext Aff, 26 May 1961, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 
PART 15A.
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adhering to its refusal and hoped that the United States would ‘not act 
unilaterally’, given that there were ‘advantages’ to ‘maintaining a united 
front on this issue’.41 External Affairs in London passed along the comment 
that the United States’ proposal had led a senior Foreign Office official 
to refer ‘unkindly to the “double-crossing” attitude of the Americans’.42 
External Affairs later assumed that it was continued Australian and United 
Kingdom opposition that led the United States to reconsider its plan to 
provide its trial records to Japan.43 Instead, the United States released 
a  policy directive on war crimes records in March 1963, which stated 
the details of the trial records that could be made available to American 
citizens upon application; however, the trial records were not available to 
Japan or Japanese citizens. Moreover, apart from official purposes, war 
crimes investigation records were ‘closed to all persons’.44
The Third Japanese Request for 
Access in 1965
That the Japanese had not been discouraged by lengthy delays in responding 
to the requests for war crimes records and the repeated firm refusals 
to provide the records, as well as the advice to desist from requesting 
them, was made clear in April 1965, when another request arrived via 
the Japanese Embassy. The request came with strong reassurances about 
the purposes for which Japan wanted the copies and the conditions it was 
willing to abide by to receive them. The Ministry of Justice explained that 
it was collecting ‘all available material concerning war trials’ to facilitate 
research on the factors such as the social system that ‘contributed to 
war crimes’, the ‘legal aspects of the prosecutions’ and the ‘procedural 
rules’, which it was convinced would ‘contribute to the development of 
international law and to the prevention of war’. The Ministry reassured 
Australia that it had ‘no intention of repudiating the war trials themselves’ 
41  Ext Aff to the Australian Embassy, Washington, repeated to London and The Hague, 29 May 
1961, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15A.
42  H Marshall for Senior External Affairs Representative, London to the Secretary, Ext Aff, 9 June 
1961, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15A.
43  Ext Aff File Note by AJ Melhuish for Mr Horne, ‘Japanese War Crimes’, 13 May 1965, NAA: 
A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15A.
44  Detailed in RN Birch, Counsellor, Australian Embassy, Washington to the Secretary, Ext Aff, 17 
September 1965, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15A.
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and advised that any copies would be held at the Ministry and ‘made 
available only to those scholars who can make good use of them for 
a purely academic purpose’.45
An initial External Affairs analysis of the Japanese request concluded 
that the ‘reasons advanced by the Japanese’ were ‘not very compelling’.46 
Therefore, it was suggested that the request be refused with the same terse 
statement that had been given five years earlier.47 However, the usual 
consultation with the Department of the Army revealed that while the 
Army maintained its opinion that the records should not be provided, 
it conceded that it was ‘now twenty years since the war’ and that it would 
be ‘increasingly difficult to sustain this attitude as time goes on’.48 Change 
also appeared to be in the air at External Affairs: Malcolm Booker, a senior 
official and former ambassador, suggested in October 1965 that the 
department should take ‘a fresh look at our negative attitude’ and ‘ease up 
a bit’. In his view, Australia’s approach had become ‘anachronistic’ and, he 
alleged, out of step with that of the United States, which was ‘prepared 
to make open to the study of all persons [sic] trial records, transcripts, 
documents and other evidence presented in court’.49 Unfortunately, this 
was a clear misreading of the United States’ policy. While the United 
States had by then allowed Japan access to its records of the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), its own trial records remained 
closed as per the 1963 directive. Despite the inaccurate premise, Booker’s 
suggestion to reconsider Australia’s approach was adopted. 
A draft briefing memorandum was prepared for the Minister for External 
Affairs Paul Hasluck, which provided the background of the 1955, 1959 
and 1965 requests and advised that as ‘twenty years have now passed since 
the end of the war it is considered that a completely negative attitude 
to the Japanese request is anachronistic and that we might modify our 
attitude’.50 The draft memorandum conceded, accurately, that the United 
States had only made publicly available the records of the IMTFE, 
45  Embassy of Japan, Note Verbale, no 51, 25 April 1965, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15A.
46  Ext Aff File Note by AJ Melhuish for Mr Horne, ‘Japanese War Crimes’, 13 May 1965, NAA: 
A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15A.
47  Ext Aff File Note for Mr Booker, ‘Japanese War Crimes’, 7 October 1965 attaching draft note 
verbale addressed to the Embassy of Japan, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15A.
48  B White, Secretary, Army for the Secretary, Ext Aff, 18 August 1965, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 
PART 15A.
49  Ext Aff File Note by LE Phillips for Mr Piper, ‘Japanese War Crimes’, 14 October 1965, NAA: 
A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15A.
50  Draft for the Minister, ‘Japanese War Crimes’, nd, 3, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15A.
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but argued that that there was ‘no real argument against enlarging the 
permission’ to include national records. It recommended to the Minister 
that Japan be granted access to Australia’s records.51
Before Hasluck was given the briefing memorandum, External Affairs 
sought further information from the United States. This time, the 
State Department was slightly more revealing about the reasons for its 
historical reluctance to release the records. The State Department told 
the Australian Embassy that all the records had been ‘bundled together 
in Army warehouses’ and that the ‘initial U.S. reluctance to release’ the 
records arose from the ‘physical problem of sorting the material’.52 Then, 
around 1956, the ‘records were handed over to the archivists’ and it was 
‘feared’ that ‘some of the material inadvertently found its way into the 
hands of research scholars’.53 This fear had prompted a discussion about 
access restrictions and had led to the decision that the records should not 
be released to Japan unless the other Allied nations were similarly prepared 
to acquiesce, which they were not. This was the policy still being observed 
in 1965. However, the State Department was now tending to ‘discount 
any possibility that the Japanese are attempting to “whitewash” criminals 
at this point of history’. Rather, the State Department assumed that ‘some 
obscure [Japanese] historical section has discovered gaps in its files and 
succeeded in having its request processed by the Foreign Ministry’.54
Australia’s decision on Japan’s request was still being considered in early 
1966 when it was proposed that, subject to widespread agreement, copies of 
the trial decisions should be offered to Japan.55 Acting Legal Advisor Patrick 
Brazil recommended that as George Dickinson—who had been the defence 
advisory officer at the Manus Island trials in 1950–51—had praised in print 
the ‘ability and fairness’ of President Kenneth Townley, who presided over 
the Manus Island trials,56 it might be worth considering that:
51  Ibid.
52  RN Birch, Counsellor, Australian Embassy, Washington to the Secretary, Ext Aff, 10 December 
1965, 1, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15A.
53  Ibid.
54  Ibid.
55  Ext Aff File Note by HW Bullock for Mr Booker, ‘Japanese War Crimes’, 8 February 1966, 
NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15B.
56  George Dickinson, ‘Manus Island Trials’ (1952) 38 Journal of the Royal Australian Historical 
Society 67; George Dickinson, ‘Japanese War Trials’ (1952) 24 The Australian Quarterly 69.
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if judgments are to be made available, they should be limited, at this stage 
at least, to the judgments given in the Manus Island trials. This course 
would have the advantage of limiting the work involved in sorting out 
the records and would also mean that we could reasonably be confident 
as to the quality of the jurisprudence that we were putting before the eyes 
of our Japanese friends.57
Thus, External Affairs suggested to the Army that departmental officers 
examine the Manus Island decisions to determine whether their ‘contents 
would cause difficulties if made available to the Japanese authorities’.58 
However, what this process revealed was that External Affairs was 
completely unaware of the fact that the trials had no written decisions that 
could be provided. Even the Army, which had run the trials, now appeared 
unaware of this crucial fact, as it did not correct External Affair’s impression 
but simply said that the decision was ‘properly’ one for External Affairs.59 
Thus, External Affairs remained under the impression throughout the 
remainder of 1966 that the Army was busily engaged in reviewing the 
(non-existent) decisions from the Manus Island trials. Booker was told 
in August 1966, for example, that despite several reminders to the Army, 
External Affairs was ‘waiting for Army to examine the judgments [sic]’.60
External Affairs must have finally realised its misapprehension about 
the existence of written decisions, as a review of the trial proceedings 
commenced. Lyndel Prott of the Legal and Treaties Branch observed in 
her April 1967 report that the trials were ‘generally satisfactory’ and did 
not cause ‘any substantial miscarriage of justice’. However, she pointed 
out that:
since war crimes trials are a controversial issue in general, they provide 
material for a troublemaker to use against the country which conducted 
them … Almost all of the trials of ‘B’ and ‘C’ class criminals have elements 
appearing on the face of the records which would provide a hostile reader 
with anti-Australian ammunition.61
57  Ext Aff File Note by P Brazil, Acting Legal Officer, ‘Japanese War Crimes Trials’, 11 March 1966, 
2, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15B.
58  AH Borthwick, Acting Assistant Secretary, Ext Aff to the Secretary, Army, 17 March 1966, 
NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15B.
59  B  White, Secretary, Army to the Secretary, Department of Defence, copied to the Ext Aff, 
22 March 1966, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15B.
60  Ext Aff File Note by AH Borthwick for Mr Booker, ‘Japanese War Crimes’, 23 August 1966, 
NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15B.
61  Lyndel V Prott, ‘Release of Records of Japanese War Crimes Trials’, 5 April 1967, 1, 2, 5, NAA: 
A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15B.
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Prott concluded that Australia should ‘be wary of providing adverse 
propaganda against ourselves’, but pointed out that a refusal to grant 
access to the trials ‘might imply that we have something to hide’.62 
Afterwards, Prott studied reports on the American, British, Dutch, 
French and Chinese war crimes trials and observed that ‘at least some’ 
of our trials could ‘raise no more criticism than that which has already 
been thoroughly discussed’ and that any impact could be ‘diminished’ by 
the fact that criticism could be levelled widely. In any event, she thought 
that it was possible to select certain trials for provision to Japan that were 
defensible against criticism.63
By this stage, a clearer division had appeared within External Affairs as to 
whether the Japanese request should be granted. The department’s East 
Asia Branch, for instance, felt that Australia’s agreement would further 
relations with Japan, but the Legal and Treaties Branch was opposed. 
Two draft briefing memoranda that presented lists of ‘considerations’ for 
and against the release of Australia’s trial records, noticeably so in that 
specific order, were prepared. The considerations against release in the 
first draft were:
(i) hostile consideration of these records by the Japanese could lead to 
criticism of the trials and create unpleasant propaganda if made public;
(ii) a future government may attempt to repudiate these trials (although 
the present government says it has no intention of doing so);
(iii) their study would draw attention to provisions of the War Crimes 
Act which would be better left in their present happy state of neglect; 
(iv) once the records were transferred we would have no further control 
over their use or future disposal by the Japanese;
(v) the release of certain cases or of certain parts of proceedings only may 
incite the Japanese to further demands;
(vi) in the absence of judgments the trial records of little value for research 
[sic].64
The considerations promoting release generally revolved around being 
‘obliging’ to the Japanese Government, with whom relations were ‘likely 
to become of increasing importance’, or avoiding the suggestion that 
62  Ibid 1, 11.
63  Ext Aff File Note by Lyndel V Prott, ‘Release of Records of Japanese War Crimes Trials’, 14 June 
1967, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15B.
64  Draft for the Acting Minister, ‘Japan—War Trial Records’, nd, 1–2, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 
PART 15B.
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Australia had something to hide or distrusted Japan or its motives.65 
The second draft memorandum was more vehemently against releasing 
the records. It pointed out that as redeeming Japan’s reputation was 
presumably part of the overall goal, ‘critical attention’ would necessarily 
be focused on ‘debatable aspects’ of the trials.66
External Affairs consulted again with the Australian Embassy in Tokyo. 
Counsellor RJ Percival responded that he thought that the undertakings 
provided by Ministry of Justice about how the records would be used 
should not be taken seriously. He pointed out:
If at some future date the Japanese authorities wish to repudiate any or 
all of the war crimes trials, question any particular sentences, criticise the 
conduct of the trials, or take any similar action, we can be fairly sure that 
they will not let any previous undertakings of this sort stand in their way.67
He conceded that, at this point, he saw ‘little gain’ for the Japanese 
Government in doing so. On the other side, Percival pointed out that it 
would not help Australia’s relations with Japan to be ‘the only government 
to hold out on this matter’ or for Japan to become aware that, ‘but for 
our opposition’, other Allied nations would have provided their records. 
He also thought that refusing the request would suggest that Australia had 
something to hide and that this would be ‘evidence that a strong element 
of distrust and antipathy remains in Australia’s attitude towards Japan’. 
In his opinion, Japan would ‘keep at us for the release of these records 
until such time as we agree to their transfer’. Therefore, he suggested that 
Australia release its records, provided the other Allied nations also agreed 
to do so.68
After further consultation with the other Allied Powers, another draft 
briefing memorandum was prepared for the Minister for External Affairs 
in July 1968. The Minister was asked to approve the records’ release upon 
the release by the United States of its records.69 When consulted, the Army 
now indicated that there was ‘no reason’ why the Australian records could 
65  Ibid 2. 
66  GA Jockel for the Acting Minister, ‘Japan—War Trial Records’, nd, 1, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 
PART 15B.
67  RJ Percival, Counsellor, Australian Embassy, Washington to the Secretary, Ext Aff, 26 June 
1967, 1, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15B.
68  Ibid 2.
69  MR Booker, ‘Japan—Release of Australian War Trial Records’, 12 July 1968, NAA: A1838, 
3103/10/13/2 PART 15B.
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not be ‘perused’ by Japan, apart from those of two particular trials, which 
it identified. In those two trials, the Judge-Advocate General (JAG) had 
advised not to confirm the findings but his advice had been disregarded.70 
However, the Army pointed out that the JAG’s reports were ‘never 
included’ when transcripts of courts-martial were made available, as they 
were regarded as ‘confidential and privileged’.71 The Attorney-General’s 
Department then agreed in principle to release the trial proceedings to 
Japan, subject to the JAG’s reports being withheld.72
Thus, External Affairs recommended to the Minister that, subject to the 
concurrence of the Minister of Defence, the trial proceedings (apart from 
the JAG’s reports) be approved for release in parallel with the release of 
the United States records.73 In response, Hasluck raised a crucial issue 
of parity: should Australia release the records to Japan ‘for the use of 
scholars’, as Japan had proposed, without ‘facing up’ to the issue of 
releasing them to Australian scholars?74 Booker advised Hasluck that the 
records had been withheld from Australian scholars on the ‘grounds that 
information they might derive from them could come into the hands of 
the Japanese to whom the records have been barred’. Booker’s reasoning 
might have been constructed on the spot, as External Affairs had told the 
State Department only the previous year that there was ‘no record of any 
interest ever being expressed by scholars’ in the Australian trial records.75 
This lack is not really surprising, as scholars would have been unlikely to 
have directed requests for access to External Affairs, given that the records 
had been created by the Army and, once archived in the Commonwealth 
Archives Office, were controlled by the Attorney-General’s Department. 
Certainly, political scientist and historian David Sissons, who had served 
as an interpreter at the Rabaul trials, had been seeking access to various 
war crimes records since the early 1950s but his queries were directed, for 
70  For these two trials, see NAA: A471, 80757 and 81068.
71  B White, Secretary, Army to the Secretary, Ext Aff, 25 July 1968, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 
PART 15B.
72  Secretary, Att Gen to the Secretary, Ext Aff, 15 August 1968, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 
PART 15B.
73  MR Booker, ‘Japan—Release of Australian War Trial Records’, 12 July 1968, 4 September 1968, 
NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15B.
74  MR Booker, ‘Japan—Release of Australian War Trial Records’, 5 September 1968 with marginalia 
on 4, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15B.
75  Ext Aff to the Australian Embassy, Washington, 11 April 1967, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 
PART 15B.
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example, to the Australian War Memorial.76 Regardless of past reasoning, 
Booker then suggested to Hasluck that if the records were released to 
Japanese scholars, they should ‘also be made available to bona fide 
Australian scholars’.77 In support, he pointed out that if Japanese scholars 
‘distorted or otherwise misused the records, their interpretations would be 
open to comparison with the judgments of Australian scholars’.78 Hasluck 
eventually approved the recommendation to release the records, subject to 
the proviso that the release go no further, as ‘we have to keep in step with 
the Allies as much as we can and not get ahead of them’.79
Although Australia had finally, after three years, made a decision on 
the Japanese request, the process of consultation continued without 
any communication of that decision to Japan. Various concurrences to 
releasing the records were still required, including those of the United States 
and the United Kingdom. In the interim, there were other practicalities 
to address, including whether a ministerial or other committee had to 
approve the release, given that it was a ‘sort of archives policy matter’.80 
Whether all the records were in existence and accessible, how to offer 
Japan access and the costs of doing so also had to be ascertained. It was 
also suggested that the Returned Services League and the Australian 
War Memorial be ‘sound[ed] out’ on the release in case of ‘any political 
backlash from old soldiers’.81
All of this background process was presumably underway when the issue 
of access to the trial records was finally publicised in mid-1969. Jack 
Sue, a former member of Z Special Force on Borneo, asked the Army for 
access to the trials that dealt with the Sandakan-Ranau ‘death’ marches to 
complete his book.82 Making the Australian Government appear as if it 
was being churlish to a veteran, a Canberra Times story alleged that Sue 
had been given ‘unqualified refusals’ to access the files for 17 years, which 
76  Letter from David Sissons to the Director, War Memorial, 27 December 1954, AWM: 
AWM315, 449/009/142.
77  Underlining in the original: Ext Aff File Note by MR Booker for the Minister, ‘Japan—Release 
of Australian War Crimes Records’, 25 November 1968, 1, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15B.
78  Ibid, 2.
79  Additional copy of draft submission for the Minister by MR Booker, ‘Japan—Release of Australian 
War Trial Records’, 5 September 1968, with marginalia dated 26 November 1968 on 4, NAA: A1838, 
3103/10/13/2 PART 15B.
80  Ext Aff File Note for Mr Borthwick, 2 January 1969, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15B.
81  Ibid.
82  Jack W Sue to the Minister of the Army, 3 June 1969, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15B.
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had delayed publication of his book since 1952.83 At this point, External 
Affairs had not yet determined how to decide whether any applicant for 
access was a bona fide scholar, but it advised that it had no objection to 
Sue perusing the records, provided that ‘no reference’ was made in the 
book to ‘the records as such or to the fact that he has been given access to 
them’. This condition was imposed because no international concurrence 
to the release of records had yet been received.84
Amply displaying the problem with consultative and consensus decision-
making involving multiple stakeholders, and the apparent imperative 
for Australian policy to neither get ahead nor behind other nations, any 
momentum on releasing the records then appeared to grind to a halt. 
Australia never received any official indication from the United Kingdom 
of whether it would agree to release the records. As a memorandum 
in 1975 pointed out, External Affairs had last heard from the United 
Kingdom on the issue in September 1969.85 As a result, no decision had 
been apparently communicated to Japan on its 1965 request and nor 
had any further requests from Japan been presented when, in 1975, the 
issue finally became moot.
Opening the Trials
The decision to finally release the Australian trial proceedings to public 
access in 1975 appears to have been prompted not by Japan—which, 
sensibly, might have given up asking by then—but by Australian scholars 
such as Sissons pressing the Attorney-General’s Department for access. 
Fortunately, at least as far as the Attorney-General’s Department was 
concerned, some transition had taken place in how the records were 
viewed. In announcing his decision to lift the access restrictions, Attorney-
General Keppel Enderby QC pointed out, in fact, that he did not regard 
the trial proceedings as ‘government records’, as the ‘conduct of these 
trials did not form a part of the normal administration’ of government.86 
83  ‘Borneo Story Still a Secret’, Canberra Times (Canberra), 19 June 1969, 3. In fact, the book was not 
published for decades after this: Jack Wong Sue, Blood over Borneo (WA Skindivers Publications, c2001).
84  AH Borthwick for the Secretary, Ext Aff to the Secretary, Army, 15 July 1969, NAA: A1838, 
3103/10/13/2 PART 15B.
85  WM Bush for the Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary, Att Gen, 22 May 
1975, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/2 PART 15B.
86  Att Gen press release, above n 7.
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This  meant that the standard 30-year closed period then in force for 
archives—which would run until the early 1980s—did not apply. More 
crucially, Enderby remarked:
The Australian Government recognises the need of this and future 
generations of Australians to question and understand this country’s past 
… For too long Australian scholars have been hampered in their attempts 
to interpret Australia’s history. Restrictions like this one no longer serve a 
useful purpose. They should be replaced by a policy based on open access 
wherever practicable. The past should be everyone’s property.87
Given the general trend in the early 1970s to appreciate the value of 
government records to national history, and that other World War II–era 
records had been opened in 1971, the decision to make the trial proceedings 
accessible was probably not surprising. However, this decision may never 
have been made if the Attorney-General’s Department had not acted 
without consultation with the Department of Foreign Affairs, as it now 
was. Presented with a fait accompli, Foreign Affairs complained about this 
‘unwelcome surprise’, especially as it came on the eve of a ministerial visit 
to Japan.88 Foreign Affairs alleged that there were ‘political considerations 
which, even after the passage of many years, remain[ed] strong’ and 
argued that the United Kingdom should have been consulted as a matter 
of ‘courtesy’.89 This reads as oddly deferential to the United Kingdom, 
given that there was no mention of consultation with the United States, 
which had earlier been of equal importance on this issue. Fortunately for 
scholars and the public, international consultation did not further delay 
the release of the records. Yet, clearly miffed at the Attorney-General’s 
trespass on what it considered its patch of responsibility, Foreign Affairs 
sought an undertaking that, in the future, its concurrence should be 
sought before the Attorney-General’s Department released ‘historical 
records affecting other countries’.90
It took close to a quarter of a century after the end of the Australian 
trials in 1951 for the Australian Government to finally make the trial 
proceedings publicly accessible. In the interim, most Australian trial 
participants had died, taking with them their invaluable personal accounts. 
87  Ibid.
88  Department of Foreign Affairs to Tokyo, 6 June 1975, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/12 PART 16A.
89  JR Rowland to the Secretary, Att Gen, 6 June 1975; and Ext Aff File Note by W M Bush, ‘Japanese 
War Criminals—Release of Records’, 2 June 1975, both in NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/12 PART 16A.
90  JR Rowland to the Secretary, Att Gen, 6 June 1975, NAA: A1838, 3103/10/13/12 PART 16A.
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Yet, even if Australia had granted any one of the Japanese requests for 
access to the trial proceedings in the 1950s and 1960s, any records that 
Australia provided to Japan would have been restricted from public access 
in Japan for another quarter century. It was not until 1999 that the Allied 
war crimes trials records gathered by the Ministry of Justice’s Judiciary 
and Legislation Investigation Bureau were transferred to the National 
Archives of Japan, Tokyo, and made (mostly) accessible to the public.91 
Fortunately for researchers, Japanese participants in the trials have left 
considerably more personal accounts in writing of their experiences at the 
Australian trials.
Today, the Australian trial proceedings are digitised in full at the National 
Archives of Australia,92 as are many other war crimes files. Fortunately, 
somewhere along the way Australia discarded the imperative not to get 
ahead of other Allied nations: Australia is, in fact, the only Allied nation 
thus far to disclose all its World War II war crimes trial proceedings 
online. Any researcher in the world can now access the trial proceedings, 
and efforts to make public comprehensive finding aids to the investigation 
and trial records are ongoing. While Australia has by its promotion of 
digitisation perhaps partially remedied the restrictions it placed for 
decades on historical research into the trials, the impact of the delay and 
particularly the loss of valuable firsthand accounts of the trials can never 
be overcome.
91  Totani, above n 4, 188.









A Conversation with Warwick 
Soden (Principal Registrar and 
Chief Executive Officer, Federal 
Court of Australia)
Interviewed by Kim Rubenstein and Ann Genovese1
On 28 January 2016, Kim Rubenstein and Ann Genovese interviewed 
Warwick Soden for the Court as Archive Project, at the Principal Registry 
in Sydney. Mr Soden is the Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Court 
of Australia, a position he has held since 1994. In the full interview, we 
discuss the status and management of court records over time, as well as 
Warwick’s experiences in undertaking his duties in Court Administration, 
over the period of his career.
The Federal Court archivist, Lyn Nasir, was also present.
1  Please cite as Warwick Soden and Lyn Nasir, interview Kim Rubenstein and Ann Genovese 
in Ann Genovese, Trish Luker and Kim Rubenstein (eds), The Court as Archive (ANU Press, 2019).
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Included below is a selection from the interview concentrating on aspects 
relevant to this collection. Further publications from the interview are 
planned, given that the interview with Warwick Soden is a rare example 
of an oral history undertaken with a key administrative office holder of 
the Federal Court.2
The interview was conducted on the eve of the court’s 40th anniversary 
as a national institution and should be read as capturing the respective 
participants’ thinking at that time. Indeed, some of the issues discussed 
have since progressed, but its essence and content maintain its value on 
a number of levels relevant to this research.
Kim Rubenstein (KR): Warwick, we would like to start by asking you 
when you joined the Federal Court, and what you had been doing before, 
to understand the relationship between your expertise and coming to 
the court.
Warwick Soden (WS): Well, for about eight years prior to coming to this 
court, I was the Chief Executive and Principal Registrar of the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales. Now, that is a long time ago.
KR: Yes, when was that?
WS: I went to the Supreme Court of New South Wales in 1987—early 
30s at that time. I thought I was old at that time!
[Laughter]
In 1972, I think I was about 18 and a half, 19, I started working in the 
courts in New South Wales—primarily what were then called the Courts 
of Petty Sessions—and did my law degree part-time.
Ann Genovese (AG): At the University of New South Wales?
WS: No. I ended up doing it remotely, through Macquarie Law School 
because I was in the country and I needed to do all my study externally. 
It took me about four or five years to do it.
2  The Federal Court has undertaken oral histories with former Federal Court judges and Federal 
Court judges have also been interviewed as part of the ARC Linkage Project, The Trailblazing 
Women and the Law Project (ARC Linkage LP120200367). See Australian National University and 
University of Melbourne, ‘The Trailblazing Women and the Law Project’ (30 November 2016) The 
Trailblazing Women and the Law Project <http://www.tbwl.esrc.unimelb.edu.au>.
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AG: Would it be fair to say that, for you, the commitments and demands 
of the job were supplemented by your degree, rather than the other way 
around? Because for many people, they’re doing the degree to get the job, 
and you’ve already …
WS: I was working in the courts, and in that whole scheme, they had 
what were called in those days, exam barriers. So as you progressed 
through university, you were able to be promoted because of your partial 
legal qualifications, as long as you had some managerial acumen. Which, 
luckily, I did. So I was fortunate in being quite young, finishing my law, 
and there weren’t other people who had done their law in the system 
who were competing for a job. So I ended up being in some quite senior 
positions in the New South Wales court system prior to going into the 
Supreme Court. I was what was called, I think, the Registrar or the Clerk 
of the court, or whatever it was called in those days for Wollongong. 
So that included being … the Coroner for the City of Wollongong. So I 
did all the coronial enquiries from things like deaths in the steel works 
and mine collapses and all that sort of stuff.
AG: And this is when you were still very young.
WS: I was early 30s. At that time, there were a lot of industrial accidents 
occurring and the Supreme Court had an industrial accident jurisdiction 
with juries. That’s all gone now. So I spent some time in the Supreme 
Court, learning Supreme Court practice and procedure with people 
there, and set up the Supreme Court registry in Wollongong. So I got 
involved in some of the policies and procedures in delay reduction and 
case management, and ended up being asked to be in the Supreme Court 
[in Sydney]. For a while, acting, and then was appointed.
AG: What year was that?
WS: That was ’88: ’87 to ’88 from memory. So one of the things that 
was important, as an issue for me in the Supreme Court, was not only 
the delay and reduction initiatives, and all the case management work 
that we did, but there was also a whole lot of records work that was being 
done, for example, a whole lot of microfilming of old probate records. 
One of the things I found amazing at that time was the indexes to the 
probates—big index books—were in a complete state of disrepair and 
just rotting away.
AG: Where were they all housed?
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WS: In the dungeon of this building [No. 1 Queen’s Square, Sydney]. 
I went and got one, which was just a sample, and it was almost unusable. 
It went back to the days of things like the will of James Ruse, you know, 
which is from the time of the early settlers, and these things were just 
going to be destroyed. So I had copies done that were preservable and 
all that sort of thing. So I don’t think that was the start of my interest in 
records or archives but it was an issue at that stage. It was a no-brainer 
to me at the time that some things must be preserved that weren’t being 
preserved. That led to a lot of issues about court records, what comprises 
the court records, et cetera. Although I was in the Supreme Court for, 
I think, eight years, most of the time with Murray Gleeson subsequently 
as Chief Justice, the focus of my work then was case management and 
delay reduction. We did turn it around substantially to be much better 
than it had been. So I didn’t focus as much as I could have on records 
issues. But we did touch upon, even in those early days, the issue of what 
comprised the court record.
I can remember it was Gleeson who made it indelibly clear in my mind 
that the court record doesn’t comprise anything more than—this is the 
official court record of a superior court—who sued what for whom and 
what was the result?
AG: So where were all the records kept?
WS: Most of it was here. There were some offsite archives. But I’m not 
sure what was offsite and what was here. I know probate was here. I think 
most of the probate work was here, or probate records were here.
AG: So the relationship between courts and departments or administering 
agencies is really fascinating to us. As we were saying before this interview 
started, our archival searches at NAA [National Archives of Australia] 
show that in the early years of the Federal Court, the court was trying 
to manoeuvre or navigate its relationship with Attorney-General’s 
Department, when that’s in Canberra and you’re setting up state-based 
registries, it was quite a distinct theme or narrative.
WS: Well, can I say, by 1994 at the time when self-administration 
was under consideration, there was quite a large movement in [the] 
Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration by a number of judges 
and others on the subject of the governance of courts. The Australian 
got involved. There were seminars and conferences on the subject of the 
governance of courts because a lot of courts were having problems with 
resource allocation and being able to control what they did, because they 
were part of the Department of Justice or a Department of Attorney-
General. Many of them still are.
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In the federal area, I could see that that debate had progressed from the 
courts being administered by the Federal Attorney-General’s Department 
to the sensible conclusion that the court should be given the responsibility 
for managing themselves and making the decisions about how to manage 
their operations, rather than be remotely administered by a department 
who had no real control over what needed to be done. So that happened 
with the Federal Court, the Family Court, and the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal, on the model of the High Court. I think, subsequently, that was 
thought to be quite a successful change.
I have recently written a paper3 about this, and the people who talk 
about that in that paper, the people who proposed it, said after a number 
of years, they thought the whole system was much more efficient. The 
courts were operating more effectively. Federally, that took away a lot of 
the previous tension that had existed between the judges and the people 
working in courts, and the Attorney-General’s Department in relation to 
how the courts were administered.
KR: So can you tell us a little bit about that vision when you first arrived 
at the Federal Court?
WS: Very importantly, independence came with responsibility and 
accountability. So organisational responsibility was holistic. So everything 
we did as an organisation, put aside the fact that we were a court, needed 
to be done in organisational terms in the best possible way. Innovative 
leading. World leading. We had a saying within the court that we wanted 
to be and to be seen as a world-leading superior court. Which drove some 
of the strategies. That’s one of the reasons why things like managing court 
records and managing the record and related issues was an important issue. 
It was part of the holistic approach to management of the organisation. 
So one of the things I focused on was managing organisational issues of 
the court. Not as a court, but as an organisation.
AG: I mean that’s a massive shift for many, not just judges, but in the legal 
profession, to come to terms with. To think about courts organisationally, 
rather than only institutionally. You have been talking about the Federal 
Court being a national court, but also about how the court is perceived 
by the public and how the public can use it. Did you want, for the record, 
to describe some of those other innovations?
3  Warwick Soden, ‘Self-Administration in the Federal Court of Australia’ (Speech delivered at the 
JCA Colloquium, Noosa Heads, 10 October 2014).
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WS: Yes, and this is all really important background as to why we are 
now in the position we are, in a records sense. It’s almost a consequential 
offshoot of what we’ve done in the past. Wishing to be perceived as, 
and to be, a world-leading superior court meant that there were many 
strategies that needed to be undertaken. That included all of the practice 
and procedure reforms; it included the buildings; but included important 
things like focusing on courteousness and politeness; cost reduction; 
time reduction; and also really important things like an appearance of 
modernity, rather than an appearance of being a colonial relic.
AG: There are major innovations that you’ve overseen too in terms of 
the individual docket system and e-filing and other things, which, again, 
most people in the general public wouldn’t be aware of, but [which] are 
hugely innovative in terms of how people can access courts quickly.
WS: Yes, well, the reason that we now have a Records Disposal Authority 
and an electronic court file goes back to a whole lot of the related 
issues about being a modern, accountable, responsible institution, 
which happens to be a court. So if we’re going to move to the modern 
environment and we’re going to work in an environment that the business 
community expects us to work in, the clients of the practitioners, we 
had to take decisions that I persuaded the judges to take, about making 
assumptions about what it meant to move from the paper to the electronic 
environment. Because, importantly, the business-to-business interactions 
would be electronic and the legal profession would be expected by 
business to work in that environment. They would then expect us to work 
in that environment. So we would be perceived as being antiquated and 
out-of-date if we did not plan to do the same thing. So we developed what 
was called an e-services strategy. We needed to say we can do electronic 
filing, we can do electronic hearings, we can do things in the courtroom 
without paper. We were very careful, and I emphasised this, we needed to 
be careful that what we did electronically was what should be done, not 
what was done in the paper context. We did a fair bit of work on that, all 
of those types of initiatives as a court and as an organisation improving 
its performance ultimately led to in the e-services strategy, which was the 
creation of electronic work file, and all of the things that went with that. 
It was the creation of the electronic court file that drove the requirement 
to make a decision about what comprised the court record and what wasn’t 
part of the court record. For the purpose of Lyn Nasir, getting a records 
authority for the digital record to be accepted by National Archives. You 
couldn’t get the judges to focus on the record unless it was in the context 
of …
KR: The modern court.
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WS: Exactly. 
KR: That’s very important. As a way back into how the court conceived 
of itself as managing an archive, there is actually an earlier question which 
comes back to your views around when you came in to be a manager 
of an organisation. That is, of course, a court is different to any other 
organisation in that it is constitutionally placed and has constitutional 
frameworks within which it operates.
WS: Yes, but one of the things that is misunderstood often is the 
constitutional position of the court in terms of judicial independence. 
Judicial independence is about judges. Not about the institution of 
the court. The best way of highlighting that fact is there was no issue 
of judicial independence when the courts were administered by the 
executive. Do you know what I mean?
KR: Yes.
WS: The transfer of responsibility to the court wasn’t for judicial 
independence. It was for organisational performance reasons. So there’s 
no such thing in the law as institutional independence of the court. 
There’s only judicial independence of the person making decisions under 
Chapter III.
KR: So the follow-up question then to you, Warwick, is why do you 
think the court was excluded from the Archives Act?4 Because if you follow 
that train of thought, the court should not have been excluded from the 
Archives Act, should it?
WS: I think the only reason that comes to my mind is the court of record 
issue that we touched on before: a superior court being a court of record. 
Now that’s got nothing to do with judicial independence or … the 
independence of institution. Superior courts of record.
AG: It is a common law question.
WS: And if it’s a superior court of record. All Supreme Courts, Federal 
Courts, are courts of record. There’s common law requirements on 
what the record of that court should be. Nothing to do with judicial 
independence.
4  Archives Act 1983 (Cth).
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KR: No, but it is interesting, I think. It’s really interesting because, 
theoretically, it could have been clearer. The National Archives could have 
been clearer about the things that were not subject to the Archives Act, as 
opposed to the entire court not being subject.
WS: Yes, look, I don’t know what was considered at that time. But 
you know, there are issues in relation to the perception of judicial 
independence that sometimes blur decisions about what it is and what it 
isn’t; it’s certainly not about prerequisites of office.
KR: No, but by virtue of the fact that the court was exempt, we’re 
interested to know how the court saw itself in terms of its management 
of its archive.
WS: The court, being exempt, didn’t change its common law requirement 
to be a court of record.
AG: No, not at all. But that’s the fascinating conundrum, I suppose.
WS: It is muddied, yes, and I think maybe that’s behind the reason why 
the court was excluded from the Archives Act. But I’d like to say that we 
take our historical archival responsibility seriously. Even though there’s no 
statutory requirement to do so.
KR: That’s what we’re interested in: how that evolved. So part of it is the 
modern story that you’re telling us. That, by wanting to be the sort of 
court that it is, that’s the obvious consequence; that you want to be in 
the spirit of the Archives Act. But what else, I guess organisationally, lead 
to that?
WS: Well, I think it comes from two sources. One is that the sense of 
having an archival responsibility comes from the tradition of being a 
court of record, if I could describe it that way, which goes back to colonial 
times. There is archival relevance in the court of record information. 
That’s one issue. On the other side of the coin is the, I think, accepted 
responsibility from Michael Black, other Chief Justices. And those of us 
in present charge of maintaining the historical record of the institution, 
which is an important institution for the country, dealing with some of 
the most important cases affecting civil society and the commerce of the 
institution—commerce of the country, which would be important for 
the future and for the history of the country. One of the things I’d never 
looked at closely here, and we didn’t do it in the Supreme Court, was do a 
survey of who was asking for what and for what purpose. But I know that 
in the Supreme Court, before you had any electronic information, you 
maintained manual indexes of plaintiff–defendant or applicant. I think 
many organisations, law firms, financial institutions did due-diligence 
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work in relation to whether there was anything in the indexes in respect 
of someone being sued for what. Now, all that can be done electronically 
these days.
KR: So that probably takes us nicely back to, if you can, charting for us 
the relationship between the court and National Archives. Given that it 
wasn’t a strictly …
WS: Harmonious.
KR: … formal one.
[Laughter]
KR: How that evolved, really, to the extent you know from the start and 
then how it changed.
WS: Well, I had nothing to do with them really.
Lyn Nasir (LN): Well I suppose when I came in, the …
KR: When did you start then?
LN: I started in late 2007.
WS: There was a person before you.
LN: There were several before me, but getting a records authority had 
been going on for many years. I think we stopped with our other records 
authorities the year 2000. The National Archive said, ‘we’re not taking 
anything from you anymore; you’ve got to revise that and come up with 
something new’. It was called DIRKS [Designing and Implementing 
Recordkeeping Systems]. There was apparently lots of interviews with the 
Deputy Registrar at the time and …
AG: Can I just pause there? So DIRKS, just so we can clarify, is not just 
for the court. Looking at the materials we’ve been looking at, the National 
Archives itself was having a recalibration of its relationship with …
LN: All agencies.
AG: … and how they define what an agency is and, therefore, also what 
they keep and select, and to rethink those sentencing of records questions. 
So I suppose what’s really interesting to us is that we know that in 1994, 
there was a record disposal authority with NAA?
LN: Yes, there were several. We sent everything then. All our court files 
went to National Archives.
THE COuRT AS ARCHIvE
176
WS: Everything went there and they kept the lot.
KR: So there was no decision-making at all? It was just everything went?
LN: Yes, all paper went. We still sent everything. They considered 
everything from the court as significant at that point.
AG: So that period between 1976 and 1994, it’s very hard to ascertain 
what happened.
WS: They were getting miles and miles of storage cost.
LN: They couldn’t take a thing anymore so that was it. Economics 
probably drove a lot of that.
WS: I know I gave it a fleeting thought in the early days and was just very 
relaxed that everything was going off to National Archives and being kept. 
I didn’t have to worry.
LN: Everything was retrieved from there too. We’d get files back. They’d 
go back and forth, back and forth. It was all working pretty well. You 
know what? We would have been under the Attorney-General’s disposal 
authorities.
WS: At that stage.
LN: That’s why our Records Disposal Authorities are dated a bit late. 
They’re in the early ’90s I’m pretty sure. Yes.
WS: I would have thought the Attorney-General’s Department at the 
time would have said, ‘off to archives’.
LN: They wouldn’t have been able to send it without some authority. 
So there would have been something somewhere like a class number or 
whatever. You can’t send them anything unless they know all that. A lot of 
them are handwritten. I’ve scanned them. They’re handwritten files that 
we’ve sent off. Sometimes, they don’t even match up with this versus that. 
How useful is this, I mean research-wise?
AG: Hugely. Because that’s the story. That becomes the question, I think.
KR: They’re part of the things that I think will be part of a protocol 
as to what would be important for future researchers. In a way, this is 
amplifying this function between a court of record and a …
WS: And an archive.
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KR: … that houses documents that are of national significance. In a way, 
it’s the beautiful distinction you’re making between the judges, as 
independent and as judges, and the court as an institution in a modern 
democratic Australia. I mean the way you’ve articulated that is so helpful 
for showing how this plays out in terms of the nature of history in 
a modern postcolonial society.
AG: And I think we’re now at a point, because of the innovations and 
the commitment of you and others in this court, and how this court has 
imagined itself into being, that the record and file have become electronic, 
so it’s a whole other question about how you store metadata and access 
the metadata.
WS: There was a confluence of records authority requirements, and 
an electronic record. It came together. That was what I would describe 
as a  break point in defining the court record, and focusing on the 
requirement to identify important files for archive purposes, separately 
from the courtroom—what can be classified as ‘significant files’. I must 
say, I didn’t focus on that path when I came here. I was only focusing …
AG: You’re building a court, right? It’s a different thing.
WS: [Laughs].
KR: I’m going to put that in at terms of your vision. Your vision was 
forward looking.
WS: It was. It was. It was. It was.
KR: Which, therefore, in and of itself means that archives are not within 
your frame, and I don’t mean that in a judgmental sense.
WS: No, I can say I did not think of the future archive requirements 
at that time because everything was being kept.
LN: Yes, that’s true and it was being taken care of then.
WS: It was not an issue that needed to be managed and it was not a cost 
issue for them.
AG: So to return to this question of significance, which is really an internal 
issue for the court, a response to DIRKS it’s …
WS: Developing.
LN: Yes, and that’s in the records authority. We have to define what we 
think is significant. We still haven’t defined it completely.
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WS: It’s not finished.
LN: Yes. The conversation that went around that was National Archives 
coming back to us and saying, ‘We can’t take everything’. And we’re coming 
back to them and saying, ‘But you should take something. We feel that 
there are some cases that we have here that really should be sent’. They’re 
coming back to us and saying, ‘Yes, we agree with that. We’ve got to put 
a percentage on it. We can’t give you …’. That’s where the 10 per cent of 
files came in. They were negotiations really with Imelda Payne, Director 
of Information Services at the time, and myself, just trying to flesh that 
out. Also, with Warwick’s backing, and the Deputy Registrar at the time 
saying ‘well, we do need to send—we know we have to send—something. 
We feel it should be on a public record in a national research area, which 
is the National Archives, that these significant files are kept. Even though 
you don’t want everything, you should have some’.
WS: Significant could be a number of different things. I’ve expressed 
some views. There are some variations. Significant files, to me, ought to be 
a representation of what the workload was, not just the important cases. 
So when we were thinking about the 10 per cent, should that be a random 
collection of 10 per cent of the files of a year? Should it be a request for an 
identification of the significant cases from the judges and then a top-up to 
make the 10 per cent by a random collection of everything else? So that’s 
out there for consideration at the moment.
I think what is significant to me is much more than just the big and 
important cases. Because cases that have commenced, been worked up, 
case managed and settled don’t have the big judgment, don’t have the big 
hearing.
AG: No, they don’t.
KR: Then what about the court’s own internal administration? How do 
you conceive of that in your archival decision-making?
WS: We don’t. [Laughs].
KR: I mean it’s again, back to you, that distinction. You are an organisation.
LN: Well, no, we keep the judge’s minutes. They will all be going there; 
significant. But as you say, that’s probably out of the administration 
because that’s the judicial side of things. Our rules and practices, yes, 
they’re kept.
WS: Practice committee papers and real committee papers, yes.
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LN: They’re kept but they’re kept with us. We have the obligation to 
keep that. Nothing goes off to National Archives. The only thing going to 
National Archives are our significant cases and our native title files. That’s 
all they’ve been taking out.
KR: I mean but this is really pre-empting a later output of the project, 
which I haven’t made, but I think the focus of our research is highlighting 
the significance of the court as an institution. As an organisation. 
It’s almost your job in a way and the way you conceived it is that that’s 
a significant part of this institution that arguably is significant for the 
archive for further down the track.
WS: It should be actually. It should be.
AG: Well, it’s extraordinary to us that we were the first people who 
have ever asked and got access in National Archives to looking at those 
documents that discuss the setting up of this court.
LN: We’re not that old yet really. [Laughs].
AG: It’s kind of part of broader projects for us about what it means to take 
your own Australian innovations in jurisprudence seriously.
WS: Most of the other courts—most, I think it’s fair to say, you’ve probably 
already experienced this—but most of the other courts of Australia that 
are still connected in institutional terms with the executive aspire to be 
like us.
KR: That’s right. I guess their records would be done through the Justice …
WS: Department of Justice.
KR: Yes, and the requirements of those departments. 
AG: That’s right.
KR: They would, you would hope, have approached looking at their own 
management as part of the archive. Because I think for our project, the 
outcome is to think of the court beyond the cases that it hears. Sure, it’s 
set up for the cases that it hears and those become significant, but it’s the 
organisation as well.
LN: It’s a lot of other things as well.
WS: It’s the institution, in all aspects.
KR: Exactly, that is significant and significant to the development 
of Australian identity.
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LN: These days, we are really trying to maintain the electronic side 
of  administration up to speed too. What we’re trying to do is keep 
everything electronic. It’s hard because a lot of it is emails now.
AG: I mean it’s a question facing people [who are] thinking not just in 
terms of courts and histories and legal history projects but all sorts of 
historical things, like just writing biographies in the future where you 
can’t read anyone’s letters. Because it’s now electronic.
We were talking about what is significant. Back to the significance 
problem. So I was just saying to Lyn: I had a look at the current Records 
Disposal Authority just in preparation, again, for coming today. When 
you’re reading that, you’re thinking, ‘well that’s perfectly sensible’.
KR: Yes, for this record, let’s read out what constitutes part A and part B 
of the court file according to the Records Disposal Authority.
WS: Well, part A is the words that define what is essentially the court 
record. The document that commences the proceeding that identifies the 
parties and the cause of actions, together with the orders made at the 
end of the proceedings, comprises the court record. But to be clear about 
that, you’ve got to add things like amended pleadings, et cetera, et cetera. 
Because there might be a change to the parties. But importantly, what the 
court record doesn’t include—the official court record—is the reasons for 
the decision …
AG: Unless they’re published.
WS: Yeah, but a lot of reasons aren’t published. Or the transcript, the 
description of the parties; who sued what for whom, and the orders made 
and variations in appeals and first in matters, et cetera, et cetera. In order 
to get that, sometimes you might have to have a look at interlocutory 
decisions in relation to either adding or deleting parties. So the case that’s 
commenced may not be the case that has all the parties at the end.
AG: So I’m gathering no judge would have had any dispute with part A 
at all?
WS: No. No.
KR: Because that’s the law.
AG: So part B: what was the nature of the debates about what was going 
to be in part B?
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WS: No, there were discussions at the meetings about whether or not 
reasons for judgments or transcripts should be included. Because I can 
remember one of the judges saying, ‘But the High Court has a transcript 
in all its cases, why shouldn’t we?’. Well, the answer to that is because we 
don’t need to in many of the cases.
AG: But that’s also interesting because the High Court can’t be appealed 
from. So the notion of what is on their record has completely different 
significance.
WS: The judges could see the sense of having an electronic court file 
system that automatically categorised part A and part B.
AG: About part B, was there any debate? The conceptual thinking about 
what to preserve, what might be of future value? This is the Apple and 
Samsung issue.
WS: I can tell you: no, there wasn’t. The reason was this: once they were 
satisfied that part A was defined and it was going to be kept, everything 
else was part B.
KR: So you keep everything.
AG: Or nothing.
LN: Well we only have to keep part A forever.
WS: Part A was the record. Part B was everything else, and in the context 
of significant files being kept, that was going to be A and B.
AG: Right. So back to the circular question about significant files and 
how to decide …
KR: … what was significant.
WS: They really left … They’ve left that to us.
KR: The process is still an evolving one, you think?
WS: We’re still having discussions about what it ought to be.
LN: We’re starting prepared cases to go now. There’s two massive ones in 
the ACT [Australian Capital Territory] that we know are going to be and 
so we’re preparing them to go. But what we’ve got to do is have an access 
policy, which we’re still working on as well.
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KR: So this is where I hope our work can be practically significant too, 
because there are quite interesting process questions about how those 
decisions are made. In the sense of, I mean even our discussion today, 
at the moment, you’re only thinking about the cases that are significant 
as opposed to the other documentation that exists in the Federal Court 
that should be, perhaps, in our view, be reflected upon to be identified as 
significant.
WS: That’s fair comment. 
KR: I was saying a bit earlier to Lyn, when I first got involved and 
interested in archives from being a legal academic, it was in the context 
of not courts but the Department of Immigration and which documents 
it kept from my work on citizenship. Being amazed at things that were 
about to be sent and destroyed that were of real national significance. 
I have a memory, and I need to follow this up, that committees were 
established where there were historians. Or people not from the actual 
organisation who were involved in that process of making decisions about 
significance. 
One thing I’m just literally throwing up, that’s coming to my mind in this 
discussion, is whether the Federal Court, in its thinking about making 
those decisions about significance, should be thinking about external 
people who could be on the committee to assist in that process.
WS: I think we should think about it.
AG: Well, I think that’s how … I mean just about the part A and 
part B. Because all lawyers will understand that but the historiographical 
problems of thinking about how we interpret what we save, keep and 
curate and then how you access it and what you might think is of value 
and what kinds of stories or histories are able to be told. Most lawyers find 
that very difficult to understand. Now, Chief Justice Allsop, I’ve had one 
conversation with him about this project, when we asked for permission 
to come and work, and he gets it implicitly. He gave me an example 
from his own experience about how he had thought about that. So, as an 
institution, the fact that …
KR: You’re doing all this stuff.
WS: It’s important. It’s important. It’s important, yeah.
AG: The access question is a really difficult one that sort of exercised us 
a fair bit because, and again this goes to the native title question, because 
clearly how to modernise and become a national court occurred at the 
same time as the introduction of the native title jurisdiction.
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LN: Ian Irving [Former Native Title Registrar of the Federal Court of 
Australia] was working on that and we’ve got a MoU [Memorandum 
of Understanding] ready drafted. It’s a draft. It’s going to the judges. The 
native title judges. It is ready for final sign off. Because we are wanting to 
send away native title files and National Archives, in their wisdom, and 
it’s from a practical thing, and they’re saying, ‘Well, why should we accept 
all of them if they’re not going to be accessible? We’re not a storage area 
anymore’.
AG: See, this is fascinating.
LN: We are here for significant files to be placed with us so people can 
access. So if you’re not going to give an access policy, thank you very 
much, we don’t want your files. We know we’ve got to take them but 
they’re putting the onus back on us.
WS: That’s fair enough. I think that’s fair enough.
LN: We’re nearly there because Ian has got something pretty good. 
The only thing that’s not worked out is the expert reports, but anyway.
AG: It was really interesting before to me and I think this is a really 
exemplary thing about this court, is when you were thinking about what 
native title meant when it arrived jurisdictionally. To be able to think 
okay, this is a majorly ground-shifting political and historical moment in 
the history of this country. Like post-Mabo, everything is different.
WS: It is. It is.
AG: Everything is different. In how we think about what institutions do, 
who accesses, all of that has to be fundamentally different. The fact that 
this court both could have the foresight and imagination to say ‘we need to 
think of practice guidelines that include things that don’t ordinarily look 
like law but are law’ and, at the same time, going ‘we’ve got to treat these 
matters exactly the same as we treat all other matters, with efficiency’. 
That, I suppose, is a really important thing to consider. If we think about 
how native title matters are to be archived and access[ed], that gives an 
indication, I think, of how everything else should be.
LN: We’ve actually spelled a lot of that out. All [those] diaries and sound 
recordings, we’ve actually …
WS: It’s true. I mean you’ve got to apply both sensible practices to that 
issue.
AG: Yeah, because the nature of what it is to be a court fundamentally 
incorporates all of that. 
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WS: Yes.
AG: That’s, I think, a really important thing to consider—how to think 
about access for native titles matters and native title materials, which 
are diverse and this complexity of not everything can be electronically 
managed.
LN: Well that’s it. You want to do that in the electronic world, it’s going 
to be difficult, isn’t it?
WS: Yes, I know, and there has to be some sort of sensible consideration 
given because these things that are presently thought to be quite sensitive 
are not going to be sensitive in 50 years’, 100 years’, 200 years’ time. 
They’re going to be critically important.
AG: Yeah, so and I suppose the debates for Indigenous communities 
about ownership and repatriation and having some of those conversations 
with colleagues, researchers, who work in that area, but you’ve got to 
understand the responsibility to hold material because it’s a superior court 
of record and what it means to preserve things and who and how that is 
accessed.
KR: It’s not dissimilar to concepts that go with things like cabinet 
documents that are closed for particular periods of time because of the 
sensitivities …
WS: Yes, true. True.
KR: … where there is a need for closure because of other interests and 
how you work out what that period will be in light of the interests that 
are involved.
WS: Yes, I think there’s some common sense being applied to that. But 
the judges are going to have to be satisfied that there’s something in place 
to protect some sensitivities of litigation in the present time.
KR: But also what would be interesting, coming back to that external 
advisor, how much the Indigenous communities are consulted on those 
sorts of questions.
LN: Well Ian is definitely talking to them about expert reports.
WS: Yes, they have. They have been.
LN: I think any confidential order that’s been put now … Because we’re 
sending a file with a page on the front that will summarise what can and 
can’t be accessed in that file. They’re going to be putting the details of 
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any confidentiality orders so that National Archives still have the right 
to come back and ask about that. But it seems—I wanted to clarify that 
with them—but it seems like they’re asking National Archives to do that. 
They’re giving them contact details so that if they feel … they can contact 
the Indigenous body direct. 
AG: But, I mean, it’s the community, not the individual that sort of is the 
point. Those things are going to be ongoing relationships. So, I suppose 
it’s an interesting difficulty … what are obligations of courts … to 
multiple publics [different groups, and communities]? I mean I have used 
collections [of different community organisations] at Mitchell [Library] 
and other places, some of which [are restricted and require permission 
from the group], some … that I can copy. [Court records, however,] 
are not of the nature of those kinds of records. I think the difficulty 
[for courts in making access rules] is going to be about who the parties are 
… a problem that has beleaguered the native title jurisdiction. It is going 
to be those same kinds of issues, in terms of consultation about who can 
then access materials.
LN: Isn’t there a move too, Warwick, for the judges now to put a limit 
on orders? You know there’s going to be a time when they can be lifted.
WS: Yes.
[Over speaking]
LN: Because at the moment, there’s no end date. That’s the difficulty with 
anything like this: no end date. So I think there was a move to see if she 
could put something in place. Okay, we’ll put this on but there is an end 
date or a review date or something, so it doesn’t go on forever.
KR: Yes, like a sunset clause.
LN: Yes, and that’s our problem. Because these things have got to be 
around forever.
AG: Because also, just for non–native title matters as well, when does 
a file become closed? You know, to make the decision about when things 
are sent. I mean, you say you’re preparing things now to send. So the 
idea that this … clearly you can’t be sending significant matters until 
they’ve been …
KR: Concluded.
LN: Well, these are about 2003, these ones we’re looking at now. So that’s 
quite a …
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AG: Yes, so the lag itself obviously is part of the protocol that you have 
to …
LN: Well, hopefully there won’t be that real lag later. We will probably get 
all of those. Those big ones like that, we’ll identify them. But then we’re 
looking at significant files like 12, 24 months after the event really, aren’t 
we? We’re flagging them.
WS: Yeah, we’re not going to do it until the prospect of the appeal period 
having been passed. Because on the list of documents, I mean, if you’re 
just looking at our file, parties and orders, there might subsequently be 
a Full Court, a High Court appeal that reverses the decision.
AG: Exactly.
WS: That’s noted on the original file. So you want the benefit of all that 
on the original file.
AG: Can I just come back to this thing about selection by number. You 
know, by … because obviously, this is something that a colleague of 
mine who works very closely as a 19th historian with Supreme Courts, in 
particular in Victoria, said they did a similar thing. But they didn’t even 
think about what they were keeping. They just went, ‘we’re just going to 
keep …’. They just literally looked at what was there.
WS: No, I wasn’t prepared to let that happen.
AG: I think you need to have that kind of sweep. Because we don’t know. 
We want to know, you know, you’re looking at social histories of who the 
parties are. What the legal issue is has become sort of …
KR: Who had access to the courts? What’s in the nature of the submissions? 
Who were the lawyers? How do we think about those?
LN: We always had that in mind that we would be looking at a selection 
of the cases we look at every year. So there’s a cross-section of … We deal 
with migration—they mightn’t be significant migration—but we 
deal with migration so we want a sample of all the things that we do. 
So that was always a category that we were going to look at.
AG: That’s back to the idea of the history of this organisation, also lets 
you see that.
LN: Yes. Exactly. That’s important.
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WS: I think the history of the organisation is going to be in a lot of the 
documents and records we have in the administration files. The committee 
meetings, I mean; you would have seen that. 
LN: We’ve got a scanning project going on at the moment with just doing 
that. All the background papers to the judge’s meetings, which are where 
all the work happens.
WS: The introduction of the electronic court file and the fact that we’ll 
be able to keep, in the future, the record electronically and transfer 
significant files electronically is the solution to the future cost problems 
of keeping records.
As discussed in the introduction to this extract, the various issues raised 
in this interview are of continuing relevance to the court and involve 
ongoing projects. This interview was conducted on the eve of the court’s 
40th anniversary as a national institution and captures the respective 
participants’ thinking at that time. At the time of publication, the court 
had not finalised its significant court file policy, although progress has 
been made in developing a policy on accessing native title files, which 





A Conversation with Louise 
Anderson and Ian Irving 
(Former Native Title Registrars, 
Federal Court of Australia)
Interviewed by Ann Genovese and Kim Rubenstein1
On 27 February 2017, Kim Rubenstein and Ann Genovese interviewed 
Louise Anderson and Ian Irving for the Court as Archive Project. Louise 
and Ian are former Registrars of the Federal Court of Australia. Louise was 
the first Native Title Registrar appointed in 1998 and Ian was appointed 
a Registrar in 2003 and became the second Native Title Registrar in 2005. 
At the time of the interview, both worked at the Victorian Supreme Court, 
Louise as the Chief Executive Officer and Ian as a Judicial Registrar. 
In 2019, Louise Anderson returned to the Federal Court in the role of 
National Director, Court and Tribunal Services.
In the interview, we discuss, among other topics, what it meant for the 
Federal Court of Australia to accrue the native title jurisdiction in 1996 
and what changes that occasioned for the Federal Court’s practices, 
procedures and records management. We also discuss what the arrival of 
1  Please cite as Louise Anderson and Ian Irving, interview Ann Genovese and Kim Rubenstein 
in Ann Genovese, Trish Luker and Kim Rubenstein (eds), The Court as Archive (ANU Press, 2019).
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the jurisdiction meant for the relationships between the court, Indigenous 
litigants and other parties; there are also aspects of this discussion that 
highlight key issues around active citizenship as a form of participation.
We interviewed Louise and Ian together to capture their significant 
collaborations and their different institutional and professional experiences. 
The full interview is not included below, but further publications are 
planned around other aspects of their interview.
Alongside the interview with Warwick Soden, the following extract from 
this interview offers another rare example of an oral history undertaken 
with key administrative office holders of the Federal Court conducted 
around the time of its 40th anniversary as a national institution.
In the same spirit as the interview with Warwick Soden, this interview 
represents a point in time. Some of the issues discussed will have 
progressed, but they are a timely record of significant aspects of this 
project’s research interest.
Kim Rubenstein (KR): There’s an interesting backdrop to our 
conversation today. We’re sitting in the Victorian Supreme Court, Louise 
as the CEO and Ian a Judicial Officer, but we’re taking you back to your 
Federal Court life.
Louise Anderson (LA): So in terms of taking this back, the Federal 
Court just had its 40th anniversary and, well, in fact, it was created in 
1976 by statute. Both Ian and I were invited to the official anniversary 
event, which was great. It was great that the Chief Justice had invited 
Professor Mick Dodson to address the court as part of the anniversary 
celebrations. That motivated me to attend. I’m so pleased I did. Why 
I mention it now is that submissions were made at the event and almost 
all mentioned a native title jurisdiction, mediation and case management 
and digital innovation. These initiatives/innovations were things that we 
were passionate about and drove very hard. So that was incredibly exciting 
when you think of the time, the life of the Federal Court and, really, well, 
1994 was a significant part of the court’s history.2
Ann Genovese (AG): In looking at internal documents, of its own 
administration, and what you have just commented on regarding the 
anniversary is confirmation, adding context and flesh to what we know 
from the documents: that your stewardship, alongside former Federal 
Court of Australia Chief Justice Michael Black, marks a central moment 
2  The time of the commencement of the Federal Court’s native title jurisdiction.
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for the court. If you go back, looking at the files and arguments about 
the establishment of the court in the first place, a key issue was: what is 
a modern Australian jurisdiction going to look like?
LA: That’s right.
AG: How that’s realised? It doesn’t really, in my view, come of age until 
after Mabo3 and the arrival of the native title jurisdiction.
LA: It’s really interesting, because I felt that so strongly when I was there 
on the 40th anniversary, and I felt that strongly, that I was sort of growing 
up, as it were, in the Federal Court. Chief Justice Allsop spoke passionately 
about the native title jurisdiction. For the Federal Court, notwithstanding 
being in the rarefied air of a commercial jurisdiction, you’ve got to hang 
on to something that makes you relevant to the community of which 
you’re a critical part.
KR: The heart of it.
AG: So that’s exactly what I would observe, that after Mabo, the whole 
game changes. Australian law—what does [Chief Justice] Brennan say?: 
‘The law of Australia is Australian law’. So institutions have got to start 
being responsive and responsible in different kinds of ways.
KR: It’s interesting. From my perspective, the sort of migration jurisdiction 
is the other point of analysis too there, because of that key workload. 
It also asks of the court: who is the community? And that in law we define 
ourselves by who we are not: the ‘aliens’ head of power. That all plays out 
so amazingly here too.
LA: Yeah, very true. Very true.
KR: Louise, you made a lovely statement that you grew up in the Federal 
Court. Can you both tell us, well, one by one, how you came to the 
Federal Court? 
LA: Sure. I did law as a graduate after my first degree and then I moved 
to Sydney and I was admitted to practice a year before the High Court 
delivered Mabo. So, for me, having come from a very political activist 
background and worked in …
AG: In Tassie, for the record.
[Laughter]
3  Mabo v Queensland (No 2) 175 CLR 1.
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KR: In terms of Tasmania Dams case.4
LA: Yeah. That was my first experience of consensus decision-making, 
learning about it with Bob Brown.
KR: Were you at UTas [University of Tasmania] for your law degree?
LA: No. I started … I did one year at UTas for an Arts degree and then 
I got a small scholarship on the understanding that I would come back 
and continue in political science because that was my passion, but I didn’t. 
I became a ‘mainlander’. Yes. Then I worked in the union movement 
actually and then went to Sydney and worked in community legal centres. 
Ian and I, in fact, had a crossover. We both worked at the Inner City Legal 
Centre. Just by chance, really, which has been my career, a bit by chance. 
I then fell into a role as an Associate at the AAT [Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal] when Justice Deirdre O’Connor was the President in Sydney. 
Anyway, from there, I realised how much I liked working in tribunals and 
courts. Then the NNTT [National Native Title Tribunal] was established, 
so that was 1 January 1994. I worked on and off in the community legal 
centres for a number of years. Then a position came up at the NNTT as 
a senior case manager. So I went for that really with passion about what 
native title could be. That was when Justice French was the President 
and I was one of the first 50 employees. So that was a very exciting time. 
Michael Black had decided that post-Brandy,5 and with the increase in the 
jurisdiction in the Federal Court, there needed to be a native title specialist 
role within the court. Now, again, what was interesting was that it was at 
a time when the NNTT really were still very, very, very challenged by 
the notion that their decisions could not be enforced and the belief was 
that the court would rubber stamp the agreements. However, the court 
was never going to be a rubber stamp, because courts don’t operate in 
that way. I was in Sydney and it was a Melbourne position, but the twins 
were quite young. There was family in Melbourne, so I applied. It was 
a very intense time. I first started working in the old High Court, which 
is now part of the Supreme Court, which was the Federal Court in 1998. 
I remember my first meeting with Chief Justice Black was in a stairwell. 
He said, ‘So how are you going to resolve all these cases in three years?’. 
I was quite surprised and said, ‘I’m not. We need to have a conversation’. 
That’s what happens when you’re kind of young and …
AG: You just say it.
LA: Yes. Rather than now, I’d probably be far more nuanced. So …
4  Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1.
5  Brandy v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245.
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AG: But I take it he didn’t respond negatively to that?
LA: No. He said, ‘Well give me a plan’.
Ian Irving (II): He was throwing out a challenge.
LA: At the same time, the court’s expectation for prompt disposition 
remained paramount, and a three-year target for all cases had been set. 
This started a really interesting journey in itself and a lot hangs on that, 
because the court under [Principal Registrar] Warwick [Soden] and the 
Chief Justice’s leadership was absolutely and understandably focused on 
efficiency and effectiveness. In doing that, disposition targets and dockets 
were central to it. So to have a jurisdiction [like native title] that didn’t 
necessarily fit within the docket system [introduced to the Federal Court 
in 1997], that was clearly going to challenge the ordinary notion of case 
management and disposition targets. There was a real opportunity for 
shaping that, but the three-year disposition target for all cases remained 
something I think that was a reputational risk for us. Although, on 
reflection, Warwick Soden’s focus on the target did focus attention on 
what target was reasonable; a question that played out for many, many 
years. So we had to hear strongly from others. So what we went to do was 
organise. For example, I went and spoke at conferences and was really 
the spokesperson for what in my view was a fairly untenable position; to 
set that target so early on [in] the court’s journey with the [native title] 
jurisdiction.
KR: Can I just clarify, who had set the three-year disposition target in the 
first place?
LA: The court had set up a native title coordination committee, which—
primarily at that point—comprised judges who had land rights experience 
from the [Land Rights] Commission, so Justices Olney, Gray, Merkel, 
Beaumont, O’Loughlin … with leadership from Justice Toohey—
notwithstanding he was on the High Court … What we did very quickly 
was put in place specialist native title judges. And [Justice] French was 
also a member notwithstanding being the President of the NNTT. So to 
meet the disposition target [in native title], I think, was around saying 
to government: ‘what resources do we need to drive [these native title 
cases]?’. So it was quite strategic on that part. What we organised very 
early on, so—well, it didn’t culminate until 2001—was a series of user 
groups. It drove both a different level of community engagement that 
wasn’t there in the Federal Court before. It drove a different level of 
public information that wasn’t there in the Federal Court before. Also, 
specialist rules and procedures and a very different way of doing business, 
THE COuRT AS ARCHIvE
194
notwithstanding it was still a superior court of record. Each of these things 
required significant submissions from me, presentations to our judiciary, 
really cross-examination in a way that just made me grow up very quickly.
KR: Your advocacy skills must have really been honed in that period.
LA: They did. I really learned how to get a message across in the most, 
I hope, effective way. Even the user group narrative had to be well-
argued and presented, because the Federal Court wasn’t in the position of 
saying to the people who had come before it, other than through formal 
engagement with the Bar: ‘what are we doing well and where could we 
do better?’. So that was my message. The two things we’ve got to be 
saying out aloud and actually open to hearing are enormous. I mean, Ian 
certainly worked and followed that through …
II: I was originally on the other side of that.
AG: So that seems like a convenient moment to …
KR: A nice segue …
AG: … and Ian enters the picture!
II: But I didn’t enter the picture until 2005 at the Federal Court, but from 
2001 through to 2005, I’d been at the Kimberley Land Council. I was 
at UNSW [University of New South Wales]. I did a science–law degree, 
genetics and immunology. I was going to be a research scientist. Started 
doing operations on rats and all of the rest. Realised pretty quickly I didn’t 
want to be a research scientist. Finished my law degree. Thought, what 
am I going to do? Travelled around for a while. Tried my hand at a few 
things …
[Laughter]
II: Ended up somehow after that at community legal centres, so doing 
volunteer work at Marrickville Legal Centre, getting a job a Marrickville 
Legal Centre, eventually working at Inner City Legal Centre. I think 
[Louise] you had just left there …
LA: I was on the Board. I’d just left.
II: Then I worked at Legal Aid. I had a really good friend who had recently 
got a job in Alice Springs. Thought: ‘I want to get out of Sydney. What am 
I going to do?’. A job came up in Broome at the KLC [Kimberley Land 
Council] and I thought, ‘well, what the hell. I’ll give it a go’. Had a mad 
interview by video from Glebe to Broome. 
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AG: So had you been to Broome before?
II: I had been luckily once before. Anyway, it was amazing. But, so that 
was 2001, and I think in 2001, in some senses, I was on the other side 
of [the user groups Louise was organising]. So the KLC for better or for 
worse had, at one stage, five matters that were all in litigation at the same 
time. They had hardly any lawyers. The lawyers that they had had no real 
litigation experience. I’d at least worked at Legal Aid, so I knew how …
AG: To run a file …
II: Yes, run a file and broadly how courts worked, but also that experience 
of working there and being kind of trapped in this litigation process meant 
that I was going to user group meetings with a sense of ‘hang on a second, 
there’s almost too much litigation pressure’. But we were also passionate 
about getting outcomes in a way that’s not only through litigation.
LA:  It was a very clear intention and explicit that native title was around 
an intersection of two laws and customs, so we wanted the Federal Court’s 
presence to be, and the structure, to be there. But we also needed to find 
a way to properly listen and hear on a more equal footing. That was a real 
challenge.
AG: Can we come back to that? Because that’s hugely significant …
LA: Well, I—to return to my arrival at the Federal Court in 1998—in my 
first three weeks, I was in the old High Court building in Little Bourke 
Street in Melbourne, on a chair that fell apart and a desk that was wonky! 
The first thing was to write some native title procedural rules. 
AG: In the first three weeks!
LA:  So I rang Graeme Neate [at the NNTT] and asked for his advice. 
I rang others—judges and legal practitioners, academics. But the 
conversation about ‘what are rules?’ can be difficult if you’re not immersed 
in it. So then I started to think about, well, what were they, the court 
rules? Now, my—for my sins …
II: You can’t subvert the rules without knowing what they are.
LA: Yeah. I love rules! So when we tried to work out how to rewrite 
the rules, Justice French was very helpful. People gave me the Northern 
Territory land rights regime, all of that. Then we started to think about—
and [Chief Justice] Michael Black was great on this, because there was 
great concern from within the Federal Court about including music, 
language, art and dance as evidence. That was something that I felt really 
passionate about.
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II: And statements of cultural and customary concerns.
LA: Yes that’s exactly right. If you’re working within a predominately oral 
culture and you don’t have the written record, how are you going to get 
it across there?
AG: I want to come back to that, it is very important. But Ian, to return to 
your arrival at the Federal Court; so obviously if you’re at the KLC, legally 
that’s a very specific set of experiences.
II: So I arrived there from Sydney. I had always lived in Sydney. So then 
I was transplanted to Broome. As soon as I got there, we had the AGM 
[Annual General Meeting]. It was at a pastoral station outside of 
Kununurra, so it was just boiling hot. So we get back to the office in 
Broome, which is where all the lawyers were, and I asked, ‘where are the 
files?’. Well, they kind of didn’t really have a proper filing system. No sense 
of when you have a conversation, write it down, make a file note, put it 
on a file, make sure the file has a date when it has to come back to you. 
Like, to try and get people to understand why that was important was 
kind of …
AG: When you say people here, we’re talking [about] the other lawyers?
II: Other lawyers. There were only really two other lawyers at that stage: 
Julie [Melbourne] and Kristy [Guest]. Julie had been at the KLC since 
the ’80s, and the KLC had been really a community kind of political 
organisation.
AG: I think that is really important, because how practitioners, not just 
judges working on claims, but practitioners working with communities 
learn particular skillsets, which are unbelievably important, but they’re 
not litigation focused.
II: Yes. Really skilled at actually working with groups—mediation skills. 
But litigation is very different. By the time I got there, Julie was in 
Kununurra, so she didn’t have any time for me, because she was busy at 
the hearings …
LA: With Rubibi 6 and Miriuwung Gajerrong 7 looming.
II: Miriuwung Gajerrong had just been remitted by the High Court.
AG: Wow.
6  Rubibi Community v State of Western Australia & Ors (Unreported, National Native Title 
Tribunal, 7 November 2001).
7  Attorney-General of the Northern Territory v Ward (Unreported, National Native Title Tribunal, 
9 December 2003).
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II: We were saying to Justice Merkel, ‘Please don’t put Rubibi into 
litigation. Please don’t put Rubibi into litigation’. But he did. Then Bardi 
Jawi 8 somehow …
AG: So this extraordinary. These are major matters. And there are three 
of you?
II: There were three of us, but we quickly brought on more people. 
So, hence, going to the Federal Court user group and just saying …
LA: I remember. You made a submission. It was in 2001. We had, 
I remember, the first and only, I think, national user group. I had the Full 
Court there. It was in Adelaide.
AG: So having you two in the interview together is perfect, because how 
you are coming to know each other happens at the same time as the 
jurisdiction you’re imagining, from the ground up. You need all these 
different experiences. So Louise, how did you argue for the user group in 
the first place?
LA: I wrote a lot, because it’s still submission-based. You had to write 
things and we’d put things up to the Native Title Practice Committee. 
We needed to find a managerial approach within the Federal Court. It is 
important to remember that we had the docket system from 1997; the 
principle of a single judge in control of a case as soon as it’s filed. So 
the native title jurisdiction got caught up in that. I mean, I think the 
docket system is an extraordinary success and it works as a core principle 
of accountability and transparency in a court system. But you’ve also got 
this notion that ran counter to the complexity of native title. So there 
was so many things that were at odds with each other, but you’re trying 
to make this work. Anyway, what we identified was the risk. We could 
have had 50 individual judges with native title matters and neither the 
‘system’—because it was by now being seen as a ‘system’ …
II: The court couldn’t afford that.
LA: No. Well, that was part of the driver: one, just financially; two, 
credibility; and three, managing the workload. So we needed to get 
education streams running: one, how’s the Native Title Act9 to work?; and 
two, what are the Indigenous perspectives running under, in and around 
the Act. There’s sense, for the court, for the first time, that there was 
criticism of it. That it wasn’t loved by this jurisdiction and the stakeholders. 
8  Sampi on behalf of the Bardi and Jawi People v State of Western Australia (No. 2) (Unreported, 
National Native Title Tribunal, 30 November 2005).
9  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth).
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So we had a number of pressures, and we needed to engage at every stream 
of government through that point, with the Wik Task Force, with the rep 
bodies, with ATSIC [Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission] 
as it was then.
AG: Were all of these in your consultative framework?
LA: Yes, then also internally supporting our judiciary to understand 
that we needed a different managerial structure for native title. So we 
improvised with the docket system and we created these judges called 
provisional docket judges. Those judges were the managerial judges. They 
were not intended to hear matters. They were to be case management 
judges and then we aligned very quickly the idea of specialist Registrars to 
support all that. That took me a long time to get up. So just in terms of 
the user groups, we get through to 2001, and we’ve now got conversations 
at local level. A lot of internal professional development. In fact, Noel 
Pearson was really excellent in that, because he gave a lot of his time and 
came to a number of our internal training [sessions] as it were with the 
judiciary and spoke in a way that crossed the divide.
AG: Well, he is a lawyer.
LA: He’s an advocate. Beautiful advocacy. Compelling. So, by 2001, in 
Adelaide, we had the first national user group, which was to deal with the 
three-year disposition target, amongst other things.
AG: So, how many people?
LA: One hundred.
II: At the court, was it?
AG: There was no Federal Court building in Adelaide then.
II: But you know what, it’s interesting that you talk about they ‘all came 
in’ and they—such strong engagement and leadership—and I reckon 
there’s something about that. It’s obvious in a way. Aboriginal people and 
their interaction with institutions and law. So it’s not about coming from 
a place of ‘I’ve got rights; I’m going to assert them’. It’s ‘how am I going 
to negotiate in this?’.
AG: Exactly.
II: ‘How am I going to engage with this in a way that I’m going to come 
out with an outcome I like, for my law, not depending upon my rights?’ 
So that coming in together is really deliberate.
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LA: Very deliberate.
II: I think that was important for my clients’ approach to native title. 
I think, in the Kimberley, they had been using the Heritage Act10 as their 
way of actually getting outcomes. Then suddenly native title comes along 
and it was really uncertain, but they thought, ‘Well, what the hell? We’ll 
sign on. We’ll become a rep body. We’ll do it, because that was another 
opportunity. Let’s see what happens’.
AG: That’s important to note: instead of saying ‘Here’s Australian law 
and Aboriginal people have been completely done over [by it]’—which 
removes Indigenous people from their own law story. You are reminding 
us that at every single point is an encounter of laws and what you, as 
the lawyer, bring to the meeting, how you take instruction and how the 
meeting is ceremonially staged at every single level is important 
LA: That’s right. The ceremonial staging was critical. I think. And 
I absolutely agree with your point, Ian, that there wasn’t anything on either 
side accidental about this. Native title was supposed to be a mediated 
outcome through the tribunal, but there was such opposition from 
government to local Aboriginal land councils that had just created their 
own governance in that space. So there was heritage interaction already, 
and native title was this overlay. In principle, in theory, sensational, but 
then you go …
KR: How do you fit it all together?
LA: Yes, from a governance perspective. So Indigenous leadership was 
very, very cogent, particularly for saying to the court, ‘You’ve got it wrong 
in applying a disposition target’. So we shifted from there. But in shifting, 
the court couldn’t move too far. We still needed to look at outcomes and 
that’s something, as Ian said, both he and I were very passionate about; 
that you couldn’t have these matters languishing for so long; and the court 
must look at all sides and bring that sort of perspective. So the user groups 
were, sort of, looking from the outside in.
II: That’s huge.
LA: They were extraordinary and they shifted the court’s engagement. 
The court really then … Many of its jurisdictions adopted that approach.
AG: Had that happened before?
10  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth).
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LA: No. It had only happened with the Bar Association and the Law 
Council of Australia. Well, these national user groups … there were 
hundreds of people in that room. I mean, it was like a conference.
AG: So I’m just imagining how hard you worked.
LA: Yes. We had everyone with speaking notes and we had everyone 
structured and everyone knew what was going to be said and what was 
going to be the response. So these were very orchestrated events. The local 
user groups were a bit different and that’s where Ian and I met. I mean, Ian 
and I had sort of known of each other from Inner City and just around 
the traps, but it was [at] the WA user group. I remember. For me, one of 
the things was, as an officer of the court, I was invisible a lot of the time. 
Whilst I was quite comfortable with that, now and then you’d sort of go, 
‘Oh, hang on a minute. Is this where I actually want to position myself?’ 
because it was so much back-room wheeling and dealing to get things 
sorted, and I remember being in that meeting and, Ian, you went, ‘Louise 
Anderson’. I looked around I thought, ‘Who’s that?’.
[Laughter]
Then you made a very compelling presentation to Justice French and you 
basically said, ‘We have five trials on, we can’t do it’.
AG: God, Ian. Five.
II: Yeah. We had Miriuwung Gajerrong. We had Neowarra.11 We had 
Karajarri,12 the remainder of Karajarri. We had Rubibi. And we had Bardi 
Jawi.
AG: That’s huge. How many solicitors at the time?
II: At that stage, we probably had four.
AG: Ian.
KR: Wow.
II: We had brought in … so we were just buying in barristers, really, to 
try cases and financially, what happened was that FaCSIA [Family and 
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs] turned around and said 
to KLC, ‘Well, you can’t manage your money. So we’re putting in an 
administrator’. So we were just caught between what felt like a broader 
conversation between the court and the bureaucracy about native title 
11  Neowarra v Western Australia [2004] FCA 1092.
12  Nangkiriny on behalf of the Karajarri People v The State of Western Australia (Unreported, National 
Native Title Tribunal, 12 February 2002).
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funding models. We were just stuck in the middle, saying, ‘We’re trying to 
get out of this, but we can’t get out of it and now we’re closing all of these 
regional offices and laying off a quarter of the staff’, which was awful. 
Yeah. As well as …
KR: Running the cases.
II: … just trying to keep on top of it. Yes. So you had an organisation, 
which had started as a community organisation, where suddenly it’s like, 
‘Wait a minute. We’re getting rid of the local officers, which are the main 
connection with the community and becoming a law firm’.
AG: So on that point—which, I think, is another important point about 
native title practice—if you’re losing the local office, and, obviously, the 
on-the-ground work you’re doing with your clients is so fraught to get 
consensus or agreement that fits into the form for native title litigation, 
that must have been hugely problematic.
II: It was, because you had all of these groups who needed to be together 
to form the Kimberley Land Council. But we had to say to claimants, 
‘We don’t have any time or resources to actually do any of your future act 
work. We are for the next X number of years—well, really we do—yeah, 
stuck with this. We’re going to effectively work for these five groups in 
the litigation and that’s it’. So the others are just, like, ‘Well, what am 
I doing here?’.
AG: So that’s a huge amount of political negotiation going on.
LA: With your community.
II: Yes. And even considering who claimants might be. But that was 
fascinating. As someone who had kind of come from Legal Aid and 
working with individual clients, to go to groups and group dynamics and 
that was a whole level of complexity, which wasn’t the same; exhausting, 
but so exciting.
AG: But this is the thing. To think as lawyers across the board, to have 
that sense that the client is not a corporation in a traditional sense, even 
though under the [Native Title] Act, you are a corporation in different 
kinds of ways, but a group who have not only different relationships 
to law, but different relationships to each other, to fit as a litigant for 
everyone would have been difficult.
KR: It’s just such interesting democratic flow-on in terms of thinking 
originally as participatory democracy in terms of user groups to then 
the ways in which a Western liberal system conceives the individual as 
separate from and whereas this is so connected. It’s very interesting.
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LA: That’s right.
AG: So I want to return to that national user group in 2001. So there you 
went, ‘Louise Anderson’, and then gave a compelling submission. What 
did you say?
II: From what I can remember, French J asked a question. I can’t remember 
exactly what the question was. But the sense was, ‘If we did this, would it 
make a difference?’.
LA: Which was a small thing, but we had taken forever to say we can’t run 
native title matters all at the one time. So really it was just a prioritisation 
process.
II: Yes, but our priorities at KLC were just kind of keeping our heads 
above water and trying to hang on to some staff. So we were saying, ‘Just 
back off for a minute and let us get through this thing’.
[Laughter]
LA: It was important in the Federal Court to always be thinking in that 
broader sense of ‘What’s the point of engagement?’. It’s not just at an 
individual. It’s not just at a claim. We needed to think more broadly about 
what’s the role of the court. How can the court, as such a critical institution 
in the Western legal democratic principles, engage with legal practice and 
principles that actually run almost counter to the way that the court sees 
itself? So it’s … While the user groups were the sort of theatre, but what 
had gone behind it was so much engagement around decision-making, 
the management of knowledge within Indigenous communities. So the 
orders that started to come out around gender-restricted evidence, what 
was interesting in terms of the practice of the court, in my observations, 
were judges who in the main would have been making orders per case 
in isolation of others now needed to be quite collective in their thinking 
around that. 
So—and I remember Justice Branson—there was quite a big engagement 
at one of our judicial conferences around the making of those orders 
around restricting gender evidence. Not only the mechanics of it, but 
also the conceptual thinking around it in the way that knowledge is. So 
they had to learn so much about the demarcation of knowledge, and 
that knowledge in our Western legal democratic institutions should be 
as open as possible. We’ve got to be as transparent as we can. Then we 
ran up against how that actually can offend the principles you’re trying 
to recognise.
So that’s in itself a very, a really critical, acknowledgement that native title 
was alive and law and custom was alive, if there was debate and …
203
8 . A CONvERSATION WITH LOuISE ANDERSON AND IAN IRvING
II: So while you’re doing all of that internally with the court, the KLC 
and, I suppose, the legal team that’s involved is working at it from the 
other side by bringing Pat Dodson into court as an Indigenous person 
who has that gravitas within a broader kind of audience to actually try to 
educate the court from an Indigenous perspective.
LA:  That was a brilliant move, because the Pat Dodson transcript was just 
used and used and used.
KR: When you say his transcript of …
II: His evidence, yeah.
LA: It was an extraordinary piece of advocacy, wasn’t it? It wasn’t in 
respect of Karajarri. It was in respect of the neighbouring claim, wasn’t 
it, around …
II: Well, he’s Yawuru, so he’s Rubibi. So he did get brought in to …
LA: To speak, yes. Well, Ian you were part of orchestrating that as the 
lawyer. But what worked for us at the court was it spoke volumes of all of 
what we were trying to ask the judiciary to understand internally around 
a vibrant dynamic law and custom working on the ground in a native 
title community, if we can use those terms, and had so many rules of 
disclosure within Indigenous law. It was such an articulate piece to be 
able to say, ‘This is how it works in practice’. We referred to it a lot. 
I mean, what I was doing during that time, after the rules, my second 
piece of work was putting together a bench book. We launched that at a 
judges’ conference, I think, again in 2001; we did the front of it in, not 
Federal Court colours, but Indigenous and land rights colours. The bench 
book broke down the life of a case, which has always been my thing. 
Beginning to end. Each part of it: What was the nature of the orders? 
What secondary source material? What are the critical issues you need to 
think about at this juncture? What are going to be the pressures at play? 
We did it online and in hard copy.
AG: A manual, a training manual. So, Ian, you joined the court in 2005. 
What was your official role when you joined?
KR: Or can you tell us the transition of the move, what happened?
II: So I was in the Kimberley until about 2005. Decided I wanted to come 
back to a city.
LA: Well, just before then, Chief Justice Black’s—one of his Associates, 
[Kristy Dunn] was at a juncture. I said, ‘There’s a great media role going 
at the Kimberley Land Council. You’d be excellent’.
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II: Okay. So Kristy came to work at the KLC. She was fantastic and I said, 
‘Come and work in the legal unit’. So she came to work as one of the 
lawyers, which was fantastic. She worked on Rubibi a lot. In fact, I’m 
sure she would have looked at various papers and things that I wanted 
to talk to at user groups, so she was a really good insight into the other 
side in terms of what’s happening at the court. Anyway, Justice North 
was up in the Kimberley. He must have been doing the Karajarri Part A 
determination maybe and, through Kristy Dunn, we ended up having 
dinner. Just felt like a real connection there. But he had been so—I don’t 
know what he was like before Karajarri—but he had been so, kind of, 
open to the experience …
LA: Yes, brilliant.
II: … to the extent where the claimants used to call him Mudjanunja or 
something, like Boss North. Like, ‘he’s our judge’. They felt such a level 
of connection, such a respect for someone who was going to listen to 
them, who was going to hear what they had to say, they … But they also 
recognised that he was a law boss as well, so …
AG: So the procedure—so I’m just thinking back to the institutional—we 
are sort of slowly moving to the actual nub of the archive question in 
doing this, because obviously Ian took particular responsibility for that 
question around that time. But before we do so, I want to ask about how 
institutions become transformed, a theme of this conversation. Obviously, 
the Federal Court, on one level, thinks of itself as always being responsive 
and transforming itself. But from my observation, and keeping in mind 
protocols in and outside the court, it would seem your influence and 
role, both of you, in speaking with judges in chambers, or at user groups, 
helped to change jurisprudence, not just rules. I mean, it’s under-sung. So 
it is important to acknowledge it here. But from the outside perspective 
looking in, the key things are not just transforming the culture of the 
court, how you think with outsiders, who comes to court and what 
happens, but writing the rules—the on-country hearing question.
LA: So the on-country hearings … I mean, whilst we inherited some 
of that from the land rights regime and the Land Commissioner, the 
majority of our judges were very opposed to it. They were opposed to it 
because land rights was an administrative procedure …
AG: Absolutely.
LA: … with a judge exercising quite a different power and authority than 
the Federal Court. The Federal Court had never contemplated operating 
outside of its own premises within states and territories. We drove that. 
There were many conversations. It was advocacy coming in predominately 
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from either our internal professional development opportunities or 
externally through land councils and others. So, for me, there were 
three things running. One was I knew instinctively, I suppose, that once 
you get judges on country, you’re going to get a whole other quality of 
decision-making, because there has to be, at some point, a sense of the 
meeting of those … an intersection of those laws and that needed to 
be palpable and experienced on that very sensory level, not just through 
reading, so there’s that. The second thing that we sort of were able to argue 
strongly was oral tradition versus written submissions. You’ve already 
got a … you’re going to deliver a significant disadvantage to people if 
you’re trying to determine whether their law and custom is sufficiently 
robust or intact, and at a certain point you were requiring all to be done, 
mediated, through advocates on a written submission basis. So that was 
good because judges could understand that there was a fairness principle 
running in it, and there was a quality of the evidence. You were going to 
get your best evidence by being on country. So we had those messages 
coming in from all places. The other piece of it was I had to negotiate, and 
we did very well with this, was to get the funding for it.
[Laughter]
II: Have you seen the manual? It’s so comprehensive in terms of every 
possible risk including shark bite, mosquitos, flat tyres … Each region 
had its own set of risks.
LA: I mean, when you look at risk assessment, we had to do everything. 
We had to have protocols. My brother was in CASA [Civil Aviation Safety 
Authority] at the time, so he was helpful on twin-engine planes and the 
nature of the plane and what time we would invest into pilots! I had this 
scarce precious resource: a judge. Then you also had the cultural manual. 
But it was to give judges comfort that we were not doing this without very 
significant consideration of what we were asking them to do. So you had the 
bench book running, you had the rules, you had the OH&S [occupational 
health and safety] manual and our checklists and then the kind of cultural 
protocols. So basically, we did research. Some of it we got from the tribunal 
but, in the main, we generated things ourselves, around cultural norms, 
outside of native title, and how it was going to be put in the case—how to 
interact, what to expect. So there’d be things like, ‘What was the temperature 
like?’, ‘What are things?’, What’s the colonial history?’, ‘What are you … ?’ 
‘How do you want to address things?’; that …
AG: But it worked.
LA: Yes. So they were read. Yes. Then we had to [get] a portable coat of 
arms, you know?
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II: That’s right.
LA: [Laughs]. We don’t go anywhere without a coat of arms. I had no 
idea. I’m, like, ‘What? I have to have a coat of arms?’.
AG: Because you’re a court. And when you speak to Indigenous people 
on country …
LA: Yes.
AG: … you’re coming here as law, you’ve got to be …
LA: Be, I know, law. You’ve got to come robed. It was all of that and it 
was …
II: … getting permission to go on pastoral stations …
LA: That was huge. God, that took me a long time to negotiate.
AG: If we could turn, Ian, to your role. In 2006, you wrote a really 
significant briefing paper on access to native title records.
II: It came about because the … it was for a rep body conference. It was 
because, from memory, Louise said, ‘Can you address this?’. It was 
actually … I thought it was Indigenous rep bodies. Rep bodies being 
concerned that their connection reports, their expert reports, were going 
to be made available to absolutely anyone who asked for them. That’s how 
it came about.
LA: It did come about a bit before. It was actually native title lawyer 
Andrew Chalk and someone else saying, ‘You’ve got this incredible body 
of material. We want it to be available. And we want it to be available for 
best practice. But we know that there’s a whole lot of …’.
AG: … problems …
LA: That ran parallel with some consideration we’d had internally, because 
dealing with some of the anthropologists and the rep bodies and dealing 
with Ron [Levy] actually in the Northern Land Council. Ron was really 
instrumental in that. 
II: So that’s how that came about; so it was actually asking, ‘Well, let’s 
just start at the beginning and look at what is actually accessible and not 
accessible, and what happens to records once they’re in the court and all 
the rest of it’; ‘How do we deal with archives?’, et cetera.
AG: Because the Federal Court hadn’t really been worried about it in those 
terms before you undertook the briefing paper, from our investigations.
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KR: In the sense of when you were coming in to the court was there 
anyone that you thought, ‘Oh, I’ll go and speak to so-and-so’ because, 
of course, a court with records would have to have think about records.
II: Within the court?
KR: Yes.
II: No. It was talking to you, Louise, I think. That was it.
LA: And I was talking to Justice Mansfield and that was it. [Laughs].
KR: I mean, this is what our project is about in the sense of how much 
had the court thought about managing its own records before.
LA: No, it hadn’t. Hardly at all. It was native title that really pushed that.
AG: That paper was 10 years ago now, but the actual movement of the 
native title materials between institutions goes on. Obviously the politics 
of what repatriation looks like, and the replication of things that are 
evidence or submissions or not, which you covered in the paper, goes 
on. That’s not over. But the Record Disposal Authority that sends native 
title matters to the National Archives when every single other thing at the 
Federal Court is still exempt—can you offer any comment on how that 
happened? 
LA: So there were a few things pressing. I mean, one was just the physical 
… the space that we needed. So we had the Miriuwung Gajerrong 
Room in Perth. We had the Yorta Yorta room in Melbourne, you know? 
We had the …
II: … sending things offsite, and then the places offsite saying, ‘We’re not 
taking them’ and they’re wanting to send it back and … 
LA: Yes. So we had a real pressure around just the cost of storage. Then we 
had the cultural kind of questions around what’s our responsibility with 
this material? Are there ways that we could make it available to others to 
both benefit from as a researcher, but also the nature of what we’ve got, 
particularly in those expert reports. I mean, they were …
AG: Extraordinary.
LA: … extraordinary. You don’t want them lost in the bottom of an archive 
box in the basement of a Federal Court—not that we had basements—
but the concept of being lost. Yes. So we started some discussion. In fact, 
we had a couple of archivists, but none of them had engaged with this. 
So that work came with Grace [Koch] and Toni [Bauman] from AIATIS 
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[Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies]. Toni 
and I worked very closely on how we could … First of all, it was AIATIS 
who wanted to be the holders of it and then there was just some concern 
about that, because from our judges, well, AIATIS is for Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islanders. Whilst that might be appropriate, it doesn’t send 
the message that if these documents are going to be available …
KR: Information.
LA: Yes. Exactly. So that’s when we started the discussion with the National 
Archives and then there was a lot of concern around just the protocols and 
things—I mean, I don’t know how many papers I had to write on Judge’s 
Orders in Perpetuity, and what was the enforcement principle, and if 
a judge died and what the protocol archives would have? It sounds simple.
KR: All that work that you did. It’s important too.
II: Whereas I came at it from the other angle, which was having done 
Rubibi and been in the KLC. So there was a big debate within the KLC 
about, well, what happens to all of our knowledge and our material? There 
was a library that was in Derby. Was everyone going to send all their stuff 
to Derby for it to be in library? Was that going to last? Come to the court 
…
LA: Because you were closing Derby office, I remember.
II: … by this stage the Yawuru had won Rubibi, so they wanted to be 
independent of the KLC. They were saying, ‘Well, we’ve asked the KLC 
for the the copies of our stuff. They won’t give it to us. Can we get it from 
the court?’. So then you had …
LA: … Indigenous people coming here to access their own materials.
KR: That is so interesting, isn’t it, in terms of ownership?
II: And also that thing about, you know … but that Indigenous people 
actually trying to mine the archive for the purposes of their cases and 
coming up with nothing or pretty well nothing, or not much, or really 
having to see and read in a lot to the archive and the silences within the 
archive to say, ‘Wow, there’s something so rich here that actually represents 
Indigenous people speaking the way that they want to talk to an extent, to 
the way that they want to talk and its importance’.
AG: The court record does something that other records do not?
II: Yeah, absolutely. Yeah.
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KR: Were there key people at the National Archives at the time who you 
…
LA: The archivist. Grace and Toni would know from AIATIS.
II: Well, Grace kept on saying, ‘Have you done anything more about 
that archive policy and the issue?’. You’d be, like, ‘Oh, God. Got to get 
back onto that and trying to talk’. A lot of it was actually trying to get 
the judges to actually agree, well, what are we going to keep? If we’re 
going to keep it, there’s no point in keeping it unless we’ve got an access 
arrangement. What are our rules around access going to be?
AG: So now there are kind of different historiographical conventions 
going on about those discussions; what is part B of the record …
KR: I think, probably, it takes time because there is an interpretive element 
that the judges then feel they’re responsible for. What is the record for the 
purposes of judicial review as opposed to archival practices?
AG: That’s the part A – part B demarcation.13
LA: Yes, it is.
KR: And part B revolves around what is the significance to the nation?
II: Yeah. So there’s one thing about the record that determines let’s keep 
it, which is great. It’s kept, but then, it’s then what? The management of 
it, accessibility arrangements … The only other thing that I just wanted 
to say really quickly, even whilst we’re grappling the actual record: there’s 
a whole other series of documents and materials that courts have, which 
is far harder to work out.
AG: The file.
II: Yes.
AG: Exactly, because the record is not the file.
II: Or if we choose to save in native title matters: the correspondence; 
those digital diaries; the tapes of the transcript; so people singing; people’s 
actual voices; those gifts that the court gets given—which, to me, is 
like, you know, well, what is the significance of those gifts? How do we 
understand them? Should we have them as a collection? All of those 
things. But they are not part of the physical …
13  See Warwick Soden and Lyn Nasir, interview by Kim Rubenstein and Ann Genovese; Chapter 7 
in this volume.
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AG: … file. So if you’re talking about what should happen with a file. 
You’ve got a set of kind of understood procedures and practices and 
processes around trying to decide what should happen with those, and 
how to access those things, but you’ve got these other things, objects, 
songs that, in some ways, that should free the courts up, as in how to 
curate them. The point is now I think, because of the negotiations that 
you’ve all done, they are safe, right? They’re with the National Archives? 
Or the court? In any event, native title remains unlike other important 
matters, in which the materials are definitely not ‘safe’. So …
LA: Yeah, but I think that it’s absolutely important to keep that alive 
really and we should probably have some conversations reminding people, 
and I think … that it is so important. I mean, generationally you need 
to move on and there needs to be an uplift of other capability. But going 
back, I suppose, to where I started, at the anniversary celebration, I just 
felt like the court was at risk of forgetting itself a bit. The statements 
at a  senior level are still about passion and the importance. I mean, 
CJ  Allsop, in the 40-year anniversary, was talking again about the 
incredible importance of the native title … the intersection between … 
this is about the development of a nation.
II: Well, he’s an historian.
AG: Exactly.
LA: But to me, what that said was, well, is the Federal Court now seeing 
itself as an administrative vehicle no more in a way? It seems that it has 
fallen back from how critical courts are to do this. Now, whilst that might 
be relevant and appropriate now, in those early days, it wasn’t. We were 
much more instrumental in making and breaking the system. I’m just not 
sure if all of those questions are going to remain alive. For example, the 
2006 to 2007 amendments to the Native Title Act, the 2009 amendments 
and now, of course, the most current coming out of the Noongar claim 
issues, and we were instrumental in driving or reacting to or trying to 
inform those amendments. There’s so much documentation around all of 
that. Some of it, whether it’s ever appropriate to see the light of day … 
That is a whole other administrative record sitting in the Federal Court 
that’s now …
KR: Yeah. It’s, well, this is the active citizenship and the legislative 
citizenship experience.
LA: Yeah, exactly. Yes.
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As discussed in the introduction to this collection, and to this chapter, the 
various issues raised in the interview are of continuing relevance to the 
court and to Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars and communities. 
As Louise Anderson notes in the extract, native title represented the 
recognition of an intersection of two laws by Anglo-Australian law, and 
it was after the arrival of the native title jurisdiction in 1994 that the 
Federal Court addressed its public role and responsibilities in new ways. 
For the purposes of the Court as Archive Project, this included the fact 
that it became more broadly involved in the content and management of 
its records and stories, which we think it is important to emphasise. 
This interview, as noted, is the first of its kind in Australia to record the 
work of Native Title Registrars in the early years of a new jurisdiction. 
We  hope it forms the basis for our further work on the encounters 
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Since the establishment of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (‘Native Title 
Act’), Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have lodged close to 
1,800 native title claimant applications; 360 of these have since been 
determined, 40 by trial. Many claims were ultimately withdrawn; however, 
266 remain on foot.1 A further 41 compensation applications have been 
filed. As a result of these many legal proceedings, the Federal Court of 
Australia and the National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT) are now in 
possession of an enormous number of records that contain information 
about many thousands of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander persons, 
both living and deceased.2
1  As at 5 June 2017, 1,806 claimant applications had been filed since 1993. National Native Title 
Tribunal (NNTT), Search Native Title Applications, Registration Decisions and Determinations (5 June 
2017) National Native Title Tribunal <http://www.nntt.gov.au/searchRegApps/NativeTitleClaims/
Pages/default.aspx>.
2  The NNTT and Federal Court are not alone in possessing such information; over the years, 
state governments and respondent parties have accumulated similar collections of native title records. 
The collections of state governments are likely far larger, as during mediations towards consent 
determinations, they are provided with copies of evidence such as connection reports and genealogies 
that are ultimately never submitted to the Federal Court or NNTT.
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Native title records are exceptional in both scale and scope and are as 
unique as the property rights they evidence. As legal records, they are 
an account of the administration of justice, but they also have broader 
historical and cultural importance. Collectively, they tell the story of 
the implementation of one the most significant political interventions 
in colonial relations since 1788, when Arthur Phillip planted a British 
flag on the land of the Eora Nation at the place now known as Sydney 
Cove. Perhaps more importantly, they contain extensive documentation 
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ families, histories and 
cultural practices in relation to land, tendered as proof of asserted rights 
and interests, and constitute a unique body of research that is not available 
elsewhere.
Indeed, the onerous evidentiary requirements of the Native Title Act have 
resulted in, albeit unintentionally, one of the most substantial government-
sponsored research efforts ever undertaken with Indigenous Australians. 
At the outset, applicants are required to submit genealogical, cultural and 
historical information that demonstrates their traditional connections to 
land;3 as proceedings progress to mediation or litigation, more detailed 
evidence is required to persuade both the Federal Court and respondent 
parties of the veracity of their claims.
How should native title records be managed into the future? Who should 
be able to access them, and for what purposes? Developing appropriate 
policies for the management and archiving of native title records is 
a necessary but onerous responsibility for the Federal Court and NNTT. 
Part of the challenge lies in the fact that such protocols must address two 
key imperatives that are not always compatible: the need to ensure public 
3  Evidence is required to demonstrate that native title exists, as defined by s 223 of the Native Title 
Act, which states that: 
The expression native title or native title rights and interests means the communal, group 
or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders in relation 
to land or waters, where: 
(a) the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged, 
and the traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait 
Islanders; and
(b) the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and customs, 
have a connection with the land or waters; and 
(c) the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia.
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confidence in the administration of justice and the need to respect the 
concerns of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in relation to 
personal or culturally sensitive information.4
Using the example of a series of research reports produced by the 
NNTT between 1995 and 2012, this chapter explores some of the 
intersecting legal and ethical interests that complicate the possibility of 
making native title records publicly available through either archives or 
publication. Rather than applying a strictly legal reading of what is or is 
not permissible, I advocate for a risk-based approach that prioritises the 
impacts of information management policies on Indigenous Australians 
and their relationships with others. Identification of attendant risks 
requires, I  argue, meaningful consultation with relevant Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples and their informed consent for any 
mitigation strategies.
But is this practically achievable given the potential cost of undertaking 
consultation and the limited and ever-diminishing resources available to 
the Federal Court and the NNTT? An alternative approach proposed 
here is to ensure that native title records held by the Federal Court, the 
NNTT and the National Archives of Australia (NAA) are at the very least 
readily discoverable. Facilitating public discoverability as the first step in 
developing comprehensive management protocols will reduce the legal 
and cultural risks associated with unfettered public access while ensuring 
that native title records can always be found if and when they are wanted.
Weighing Up the ‘Public’ Interest
Any decision to make native title records publicly available requires 
consideration of a broader public interest. At first glance, the cultural, 
educational and historical significance of native title records implies 
a  public interest that should be supported with public access. Yet the 
highly personal nature of much of the information these records contain, 
and the circumstances under which they were obtained, raise some very 
good reasons as to why their availability should, in fact, be limited.
4  Ian Irving, ‘The Challenges of Managing Documents Related to Native Title Hearings’ in Pamela 
Faye McGrath, Ludger Dinkler and Alexandra Andriolo (eds), Managing Information in Native Title 
(MINT) (Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, 2015) 53.
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The ‘public interest’ is not a clearly defined legal concept, but, rather, 
is treated by the law as ‘flexible enough to respond to the facts and 
circumstances of any particular case’.5 When used in a statute, as it is in 
the Native Title Act, the term ‘public interest’ derives its content from 
‘the subject matter and the scope and purpose’ of the legislation in which 
it appears.6 Among the possible public interest matters that may be 
relevant in the context of native title, ensuring the proper administration 
of government and the promotion of open justice are among the most 
compelling.7 However, the public interest must also be considered in 
relation to the subject, scope and purpose of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) 
(‘Privacy Act’).
Further, there is a need for both privacy and the public interest to be 
considered against the cultural and customary concerns of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples. Ultimately, it falls on the Native Title 
Registrar to decide on this balance. 
Under the Native Title Act, the Native Title Registrar may keep other 
records and information as he or she considers appropriate, and make 
those records available to the public.8 The Native Title Registrar must not 
make information available to the public if he/she considers that it would 
not be in the public interest to do so. And when considering the public 
interest, the Native Title Registrar must take into account ‘the cultural 
and customary concerns’ of Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples.9 The term ‘cultural and customary concerns’ is undefined in the 
Native Title Act and can reasonably be interpreted as potentially including 
concerns about the management of personal or culturally sensitive 
information.
This raises a critical question about the extent to which the interests of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander persons and peoples are usually 
accommodated within consideration of a broader ‘public’ interest. 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander persons are undoubtedly members 
5  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22, cited in Australian Law Reform Commission, Serious 
Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, Discussion Paper 80 (2014) 116 <https://www.alrc.gov.au/
publications/serious-invasions-privacy-dp-80>. 
6  Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506, [31], cited in Australian Law Reform Commission, above 
n 5. 
7  For a list of common values, freedoms and matters of public interest, see Australian Law Reform 
Commission, above n 5, 30.
8  Native Title Act ss 98A (1) and (2).
9  Native Title Act s 98A.
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of the public, but as a social category, they are a ‘persistent minority’.10 
Persistent minorities rarely have their way in processes of democratic 
decision-making, which has profound consequences for their ability to 
‘make the larger world in which they live a home for themselves’.11 In the 
words of Noel Pearson, it is the structural problem of the 3  per  cent 
‘mouse’  of Indigenous Australia contending with the 97 per cent 
‘elephant’ of the rest of the population: ‘The 3 percent can never really 
get the 97 percent elephant to behave in a way that treats the mouse with 
dignity as citizens’.12
It appears that the Native Title Act is in fact structured towards addressing 
this demographic disadvantage. The obligation for the Registrar to 
consider the cultural and customary concerns of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander people as a matter of public interest is clearly aimed at 
supporting Indigenous Australians to have a greater say over the fate of 
information about themselves, their families and their land. It follows that 
the assumption at the heart of this intention—namely that Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples are a segment of the Australian public whose 
interests, in this context, are to be given priority—should be a central 
consideration in the development of protocols for the management of 
native title records into the future.
But what does this look like in practice? Drawing on the lessons learned 
from developing management protocols for the NNTT research reports, 
I am advocating for a process that puts the opinions and perspectives of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples at the centre of any analysis 
of the risks and benefits associated with creating public access to native 
title records. The discussion that follows does not reflect current NNTT 
or court policy in relation to managing and creating access to native title 
records.13 Rather, it offers a particular perspective on the issues that is 
grounded in my many years of research and policy experience in this area.
10  Thomas Christiano, ‘Democratic Equality and the Problem of Persistent Minorities’ (1994) 
23(3) Philosophical Papers 169.
11  Jeff Spinner-Halev, Enduring Injustice (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 133.
12  Noel Pearson, ‘Keynote Address: An Agenda for Indigenous Empowerment’ (Speech delivered 
at the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists Annual Congress, Brisbane, 6 May 
2015) 9 <http://capeyorkpartnership.org.au/news/an-agenda-for-indigenous-empowerment/>.
13  A small number of the research reports are subject to directions from a Tribunal Member 
restricting their disclosure made under s 94L or s 136GD of the Native Title Act. This special category 
of report requires a unique management regime and is not dealt with in any detail here.
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The NNTT Research Reports
Among the many thousands of native title records held by the NNTT 
is a  small but significant collection of 280 research reports that were 
produced by NNTT researchers (employees of the Australian Public 
Service) during the period between 1995 and 2012. These research reports 
were generally commissioned for one of two statutory purposes: to assist 
parties in relation to native title proceedings under s 78 of the Native Title 
Act ; and to assist the NNTT with the mediation of applications under 
s 108(2) of the Native Title Act.
The research reports are substantial documents that bring together, often 
for the first time, copies of publicly available historical and ethnographic 
(‘ethno-historical’) sources about particular Aboriginal or Torres Strait 
Islander groups in relation to particular areas. The ethno-historical items 
they include were authored by many different kinds of people—explorers, 
anthropologists, linguists, pastoralists and the like—the vast majority of 
whom were non-Indigenous. Typically, the sources range from extracts of 
early maps of ‘tribal’ or ‘language’ boundaries, journals and field notes, 
mission and government records, books, newspaper articles and academic 
papers to published oral histories of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
individuals and families.
For each research report, the ethno-historical materials are accompanied 
by a summary chapter written by NNTT researchers. These provide 
background information about the authors of the ethno-historical 
materials and the circumstances in which they collected their data. 
Some of the summary chapters include focused discussion about specific 
matters of contention—for example, the location of a boundary between 
two groups or the identity of a local ancestor.14
The amount of information contained in the research reports is substantial. 
To give a typical example, a research report prepared in 2001 relates to 
three different native title groups and includes items spanning a time 
period of 102 years. Specifically, it contains:
14  Each summary chapter also typically includes a list of sources viewed but not cited and 
a bibliography. Some of these bibliographies have already been published by the NNTT as standalone 
documents and are currently available on the NNTT website (although the summary chapters 
themselves are not); see National Native Title Tribunal, Publications (2016) National Native Title 
Tribunal <http://www.nntt.gov.au/News-and-Publications/Pages/Forms-and-Publications.aspx>.
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• a summary chapter of 52 pages
• 32 ethno-historical map appendices
• three maps showing relevant native title claims
• 33 ethno-historical document appendices, ranging between one and 
30 pages in length.
This particular report also names 90 different Aboriginal persons, some 
of whom are still living, and includes numerous statements about the 
location of traditional territorial boundaries, sites of ritual significance 
and commentaries on the practice of culture and custom (including 
references to gender-restricted ceremonies). The unpublished ethno-
historical sources included in the report came from five different archives 
located in four different Australian cities and previously published ones 
were obtained from a number of different libraries and secondhand 
booksellers.
With the hard work of locating, scanning and aggregating all this material 
already done, each research report provides immediate access to a research 
literature that, even though already publicly available, was previously out 
of reach to anyone without the necessary time, money and expertise to 
search for it themselves. In this sense, the potential value of the research 
reports to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and their researchers, 
lawyers and advocates, as well as respondents to their claims, cannot be 
understated. They are also of potential value to academics and members 
of the public who, for other reasons, are interested in understanding the 
indigenous social and cultural landscapes of particular areas.
That said, the research reports are not without their flaws. The ethno-
historical materials they contain are not comprehensive and vary 
considerably in scope and quality. There are some national sources, such 
as Norman Tindale’s Aboriginal Tribes of Australia and David Horton’s 
Encyclopaedia of Aboriginal Australia, that are prominently featured in 
almost every research report, while other significant but less well-known 
and accessible materials are overlooked.15
15  A number of research reports include transparency maps showing the location of the underlying 
native title claim in relation to both Tindale and Horton’s accounts of group boundaries; Norman 
Tindale, Aboriginal Tribes of Australia: Their Terrain, Environmental Controls, Distribution, Limits and 
Proper Names (University of California Press, 1974); David Horton (ed), Encyclopaedia of Aboriginal 
Australia (Aboriginal Studies Press, 1994).
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Further, the analysis contained in the summary chapters does not take 
into account the perspectives of contemporary native title claimants. This 
was a deliberate decision on the part of the NNTT, aimed at ensuring 
that the objective neutrality of the NNTT was preserved and that the 
reports did not stray into the territory of providing expert opinion. 
As a consequence, the sources are presented without critical assessment of 
their reliability or the weight they should be given when considering any 
underlying native title rights.
The NNTT was alert to these shortcomings at the time they were drafted 
and acknowledged them with disclaimers that nicely highlight some of 
the attendant risks and benefits associated with their possible publication. 
Among other things, the disclaimers note that the research reports were 
prepared within short time frames, are not comprehensive, and that 
the inclusion of particular ethno-historical items does not constitute an 
endorsement of those items by the NNTT. Where the research reports 
contain names of deceased Aboriginal people or culturally sensitive 
information, warning statements are also included.
Despite these limitations, the research reports were, and remain, a valuable 
if sometimes problematic resource for claimants and respondent parties 
alike. The preparatory research undertaken for native title claims during the 
early years of the Native Title Act was extraordinary and involved intensive 
documentary discovery. Scores of researchers and traditional owners were 
simultaneously tasked with the job of locating and reviewing thousands 
of potentially relevant records. The demand on libraries, archives and 
museums was so intense that the Commonwealth Government funded 
the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies 
(AIATSIS) to establish a Native Title Access Unit to deal with the surge 
in requests from native title groups and respondent parties for searches of 
their collection.16
The NNTT research reports were of great assistance in this effort, saving 
everyone involved considerable time and money. Despite their variable 
reliability, they were useful for examining the factual basis of applications, 
preparing documentation for registration testing and negotiating 
boundaries between overlapping claims. A crucial starting point for 
native title applicants, they also provided reassurance to non-Indigenous 
16  Copies of many of the ethno-historical materials included in the NNTT research reports were 
provided by the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies (AIATSIS).
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respondent parties sceptical of the very fact of prior occupation (‘yes, there 
is evidence that Aboriginal people actually lived here’). In light of this 
utility, the research reports were usually distributed widely to everyone 
involved in a matter—anthropologists, claim lawyers, respondents and 
state government officials alike.
They were especially valuable to researchers located in remote areas during 
the early years of native title when digital technologies had yet to become 
commonplace. When I worked as a researcher in the Tom Price office of 
the Pilbara Native Title Service in the early 2000s, Google was barely two 
years old, broadband internet was in its infancy and our unreliable dial-up 
connection was torturously slow. All the archives I needed to access for 
the claims I was researching were located many thousands of kilometres 
away in Perth, Adelaide and Canberra, and the native title representative 
body I worked for could only afford to employ a single historian, who 
undertook background research for more than 30 different claims. In these 
circumstances, the NNTT research reports were a godsend, providing my 
colleagues and me with access to crucial pieces of evidence that would 
otherwise have been beyond our reach.
However, these reports undoubtedly mean the most to those Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples whose histories are contained in their 
pages. For many groups, the research reports were the first time that 
a survey of ethno-historical sources about their people had been undertaken, 
and/or the first time they had access to these sources themselves. Far from 
being neutral documents, the collective knowledge they contain about 
country, culture, kin and the impact of colonial settlement affords them 
a degree of emotional and political power that resonates well beyond their 
original purpose. Their contents have the potential to confirm or deeply 
disturb an individual’s fundamental sense of self and where they belong in 
the world, generating joy, grief, shame, anger and argument in turn and 
altering both an individual and shared sense of social reality. Disclaimers 
mean little in such circumstances. Rather, sensitive and respectful attention 
is required in the development of any plans for the future management of 
these valuable assets.
THE COuRT AS ARCHIvE
222
Managing Valuable Native Title Records
It is now 25 years since the first NNTT research report was produced, and 
there is a pressing need to have them archived. This requires consideration 
of, among other things, the level of public access allowed once they are 
lodged with the NAA. For many reasons, this will not be a straightforward 
undertaking.
The research reports remain sought-after assets, even though the NNTT 
has not produced a research report since 2012 and many of the older 
research reports are now effectively redundant because native title has 
been settled in the areas they discuss. They continue to be used by parties 
involved in native title proceedings, and every year the NNTT receives 
a number of requests for copies of existing reports from members of native 
title groups, their legal representatives, respondent parties and the Federal 
Court. Requests also occasionally arrive from other interested Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander persons and members of the public. Once 
archived, such requests will also be received by NAA.
There are some significant differences in the obligations of the NNTT 
and the Federal Court in relation to archiving of legal records, despite 
an overlap in the records they hold (both hold some of the same kind of 
records, as well as records relating to the same proceedings).17 The NNTT 
and the Federal Court operate under different NAA record authorities 
and are dealt with differently under the Privacy Act. Consequently, each 
organisation must develop its own approach to archiving and accessing 
native title records, and responsibility for developing management policies 
for the NNTT’s research reports lies with NNTT alone.18
The NNTT’s policy for managing access to the research reports has been 
revised a number of times over the course of the last two decades. At times, 
the research reports have been made widely available, including on the 
NNTT website, with little control over their distribution.19 At other 
17  Prior to legislative amendments to the Native Title Act in 2012, the NNTT was responsible for 
case management of native title claims and, therefore, both organisations are in possession of case 
management files. Similarly, as it currently stands, the NNTT undertakes registration testing for 
native title applications for which the Federal Court provides case management, leading to a situation 
where both organisations are in possession of records relevant to a particular matter.
18  Federal Court of Australia, Annual Report 2014–15 (Federal Court of Australia, 2016) 21, 60 
<http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/digital-law-library/annual-reports>.
19  Copies of some of the research reports are held in the AIATSIS collection.
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times, a very cautious approach has been taken, and their distribution 
has been carefully controlled and monitored. The current NNTT policy 
deals with requests for access on a case-by-case basis, but, in principle, 
aims to provide native title groups and their representatives with all 
relevant information held by the NNTT. Facilitating access requests from 
members of the public is complicated by the absence of a direct interest.
Developing appropriate access protocols is an issue that NNTT continues 
to wrestle with. When I was appointed NNTT Research Director in 
2015, I was given responsibility for reviewing the access policy for the 
research reports and developing a plan for their longer term management. 
Pre-armed with firsthand experience of their great utility and value as 
tools for native title researchers, I embraced the task with enthusiasm and 
immediately started exploring the possibility of making them more readily 
available, perhaps through open-access online publication. It seemed to 
me that such useful documents should be made more widely available and 
that this could be done in a way that encouraged self-service and reduced 
the administrative burden of the NNTT.
After 12 months of scoping the possibilities, delving into countless 
layers of legal, cultural and ethical complexity, I was prepared to admit 
that my initial enthusiasm for an ‘open access’ approach to publishing 
the NNTT research reports may have been pre-emptive. I had come to 
appreciate that, even though copies of most of the research reports are 
already in circulation and contain information that is already publicly 
available, increasing public access to these unique knowledge assets is not 
without risk. These risks are for the most part borne by Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people alone. Moreover, it has become increasingly 
clear that the attendant risks will not be effectively mitigated or resolved 
by simply applying a strict interpretation of what is legally permissible. 
A  different approach is required that more fully considers the possible 
social impacts of the research reports within their home communities.
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Assessing the Risks and Benefits 
of Creating Public Access
While most of the information contained in the research reports is freely 
available elsewhere, this fact alone does not diminish the potential risks 
associated with allowing public access to them, and the task of developing 
appropriate policies for their ongoing management has proven to be 
complex.
There is a degree of ambiguity in the Native Title Act that may be interpreted 
as providing for, or at least not preventing, public access to the research 
reports. As previously noted, the Registrar alone is empowered to make 
decisions about the provision of native title information to the public, and, 
when doing so, must take into consideration matters of public interest.
Given the historical and educational value of the research reports, there 
would seem to be a clear public benefit to making them available. However, 
the Native Title Act does not confer any specific educational purpose on 
the NNTT or Native Title Registrar, and the original purpose for which 
research reports were prepared was not educational. Nevertheless, the 
Native Title Act does not necessarily preclude publication of the research 
reports for educative or research purposes, and ss 78(1)b and 78 (2)(a) 
provide for the Native Title Registrar to provide assistance, including 
research assistance, to any person at any stage of a proceeding in matters 
relating to that proceeding.
But do the potential benefits of providing public access to these records 
for educational reasons justify the potential risks such access poses 
to Indigenous Australians? One way of approaching this question, 
I  suggest, is to engage in a process of risk analysis aimed at identifying 
how the publication of native title records will impact on Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples and persons, their communities and their 
relationships with other Australians. The explicit intention of such an 
analysis should be to inform the development of policies that not only 
minimise risk but also empower and strengthen key relationships to fully 
realise the conciliatory intent of the Native Title Act.20
20  The preamble of the Native Title Act makes it clear that the intention of the legislation is to 
‘rectify the consequences of past injustices’ and ‘ensure that Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait 
Islanders receive the full recognition and status within the Australian nation to which history, their 
prior rights and interests, and their rich and diverse culture, fully entitle them to aspire’ and to ‘further 
advance the process of reconciliation among all Australians’.
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Risk management in government is a highly specialised area that is 
guided by its own set of rules and requires expertise in its own right.21 
The approach that I present here does not represent the current policy 
and practice of the NNTT or the Federal Court, nor is it a definitive 
assessment of all the attendant risks, their likelihood and/or their potential 
consequences. Rather, it sets out some basic principles of risk assessment 
that might be usefully brought to bear on the development of policies for 
the management of native title records.
A common approach to assessing risk involves applying a framework 
that identifies the possible consequences of a particular course of 
action, articulates the likelihood and severity level of risk for particular 
stakeholders, and develops strategies to mitigate those risks. Risk 
oversight and management are a key part of the corporate governance 
of both the Federal Court and NNTT. Both institutions are committed 
to an organisational culture that supports the identification, analysis, 
assessment, treatment, monitoring and review of all strategic, professional, 
reputational, personnel, political and operational risks. These include not 
only risks to the institutions themselves, but also to their stakeholders.22
Needless to say, when it comes to native title matters, it is Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples who are the primary stakeholders, and the 
strategic, reputational and political risks they face should be paramount 
in any consideration of the impacts of creating public access to native 
title records. This requires consideration not only of impacts internal to 
Indigenous families and communities, but also risks posed to Indigenous 
people’s relationships with others. In the context of native title, those 
relationships are between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander individuals 
(as represented by their prescribed bodies corporate) and the rest of the 
world, with the NNTT and the Federal Court (as representatives of 
government) playing a central role in the mediation of that relationship.
To put it another way, the failure of relationships between native title 
holders and the NNTT or the Federal Court will have ramifications for 
the broader relationship between Indigenous Australians and government, 
and, as such, any actions that potentially undermine this relationship 
warrant thoughtful consideration.
21  The Federal Court and NNTT are guided in their approach to risk management by the Australian/
New Zealand Risk Management Standard (AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009) and the Commonwealth Risk 
Management Policy 2014. Federal Court of Australia, 2016–2020 Corporate Plan (Federal Court 
of Australia, 2016) 39 <http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/about/corporate-information/corporate-plan>.
22  Ibid. 
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Even though they are just a fragment of the entire collection of native 
title records held by the Federal Court and the NNTT, assessing the risks 
associated with creating public access to the NNTT research reports is no 
small task. The risk profile of each research report will vary because each 
is unique in purpose, scope and methodology and deals with a distinct 
group or groups of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples with their 
own unique laws and customs. And although much of the information 
they contain is already available elsewhere, and many of the native title 
proceedings they relate to have been finalised, the multidimensional 
nature of the information they contain means that there are potentially 
many legal and cultural issues to be considered. For the purposes of this 
paper, I focus on four: copyright, personal information, culturally sensitive 
information and out-of-date or inaccurate information.
Copyright
Copyright is perhaps one of the more straightforward issues to be 
considered in relation to making native title records publicly available. 
Nevertheless, for reasons explained below, copyright is a potential 
impediment to publication (ie, reproduction as opposed to access) and 
has a significant impact on the ability of the NNTT to reproduce the 
research reports in their entirety in a public forum.
As previously noted, the summary chapter of each research report is an 
original piece of work that is copyrighted to either the NNTT or the 
Commonwealth of Australia, and which the NNTT, therefore, has the 
right to publish. However, each of the appendices has its own unique 
provenance and copyright remains with the original copyright holder 
(except where they are out of copyright). The NNTT has never sought 
permission to use these materials for any purpose other than for their 
original purpose—namely, to assist with native title claim applications or 
mediations—and therefore, cannot republish them without first obtaining 
the permission of the copyright holder.23
23  The NNTT operates under the Federal Court’s GovCopy licence. The GovCopy licence is for 
organisations that are not part of, or have not been authorised by, the Crown but are characterised 
as administrative bodies that are funded by taxpayers. Organisations with a GovCopy licence may 
use up to 10 per cent of copyright material. This includes reproductions and communications, 
including internal emailing and uploading of copyright material to intranets. For more information, 
see: Copyright Agency, Your Organisation and Copyright (2015) CopyrightAgency <http://copyright.
com.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/CopyrightAgency_GovCopy_FactSheet.pdf>. 
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With the total number of appendices in the thousands, it is simply not 
feasible for the NNTT to seek permission to republish ethno-historical 
sources from all copyright holders. However, this does not preclude the 
possibility of making them publicly available through an archive, or 
publishing the summary chapters as standalone documents (as the copyright 
for these is held by the NNTT). Although the utility of the  summary 
chapters would be somewhat constrained if they were published without 
copies of the ethno-historical items to which they refer, for some language 
groups they remain the only summaries of ethno-historical materials ever 
prepared and are potentially of value in their own right.
Personal and Sensitive Information
One of the more complex issues that arises when considering the 
consequences of creating public access to the research reports, and 
native title records generally, relates to the management of personal 
privacy. ‘Personal information’ as it is defined in the Privacy Act refers to 
information or opinion about an individual that enables that individual 
to  be identified. ‘Sensitive information’ is a category of personal 
information that includes information or opinion about, among other 
things, an individual’s racial or ethnic origin, political opinions and 
religious and philosophical beliefs.24 The Australian Privacy Principles 
apply to this kind of information, regardless of whether the individual 
concerned is alive or deceased.
The research reports are replete with information that is of a personal 
nature. In some cases, they contain photographs of named individuals, 
living and deceased, and opinion about their racial origins. Others include 
lists of individuals named in ethno-historical sources, some of whom are 
still living, alongside facts about language and tribal affiliation. Needless 
to say, such information is related to the race, ethnicity, political attitudes, 
and religious and philosophical beliefs of those identified and falls under 
the category of sensitive information.
24  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Australian Privacy Principles (January 2014) 
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner <https://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy-law/privacy-
act/australian-privacy-principles>.
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As is the case with copyright, there are differences in the privacy obligations 
of the Federal Court and the NNTT in relation to the records they hold. 
The Privacy Act does not apply to documents and other materials relating 
to court proceedings; these are dealt with under the Federal Court of 
Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and the rules made by Judges of the Federal 
Court. However, unlike the Federal Court, the NNTT and the Native 
Title Registrar are bound by the Privacy Act and the Australian Privacy 
Principles in relation to the collection, use, disclosure, management and 
access of personal information.25
The court has considered privacy issues specifically in relation to the 
NNTT research reports. They determined that, while it is clear that the 
NNTT may provide research reports to persons outside of the NNTT 
to assist with a native title application compatible with the Privacy 
Act, making research reports available to the general public involves 
a secondary purpose that may invoke the Privacy Principles. In light of 
this, the Federal Court’s current Privacy Policy states that:
The disclosure of [the NNTT research reports], in whole or in part, 
may be subject to the Privacy Act and/or specific directions made by the 
NNTT under section 94L or the former section 136F of the Native Title 
Act.26 (emphasis added)
Given this legal uncertainty, one of the options open to the NNTT is to 
seek a public interest determination from the Information Commissioner 
in relation to the publication of the research reports.27 This would provide 
clarity on the matter and, if publication were deemed to be compatible 
with the Australian Privacy Principles, would enable the NNTT to 
proceed with publication of the research reports indemnified against the 
risk of legal action over the publication of personally sensitive information.
25  Federal Court of Australia, Privacy Policy (31 March 2014) Federal Court of Australia <http://
www.fedcourt.gov.au/>.
26  Ibid.
27  ‘A public interest determination (PID) may provide that an act or practice of an APP entity 
that could otherwise breach an Australian Privacy Principle (APP), or a registered APP code that 
binds that entity, shall not be regarded as having done so (s 72(2)). An APP entity undertaking that 
act or practice will not be taken to have contravened s 15 of the Privacy Act (or s 26A if an APP 
code)’: Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Privacy Public Interest Determination 
Guide (June 2014) Office of the Australian Information Commissioner <https://www.oaic.gov.au/
agencies-and-organisations/guides/privacy-pid-guide>. 
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However, such indemnity does not mitigate the risks for those Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander persons whose personal information is published. 
It is precisely in such a situation—where the legality of a particular course 
of action is unclear or ambiguous and does not adequately accommodate 
the risks of key stakeholders—that it is useful to shift the focus onto the 
relationships underpinning the proposed transaction, and the potential 
risks that any particular course of action poses to those relationships. The 
failure of the NNTT and the Federal Court to appropriately acknowledge 
and mitigate such risks may in fact undermine the level of trust 
between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and government 
(as represented in this instance by the NNTT and the Federal Court), and 
is a political risk in its own right.
Despite the fact that most ethno-historical sources used in the research 
reports are already publicly available, the potential for the personal 
information they contain to damage an individual’s or group’s reputations 
and relationships is very real. This risk is intensified by the fact that the 
research reports increase the ease with which such information can be 
discovered. Consider, for example, the potential impact of a single snippet 
from an ethno-historical source that identifies a particular ancestor as 
belonging to language group X, despite the fact that their descendants 
actively identify that person as belonging to language group Y. It won’t 
matter whether the reliability of that particular ‘fact’ has been debated in 
court and found wanting; out of context and in the absence of detailed 
analysis of its veracity, that ‘fact’ has the potential to damage the status 
and standing of an entire family, both within their community and more 
broadly within the Australian society.
Not all native title records containing information of a personal and 
sensitive nature will carry such risks, and it may be the case that in 
some instances creating public access to the research reports would be 
welcome and celebrated by the Indigenous persons and native title groups 
concerned. But while there are certain kinds of information that are more 
likely to be of concern than others, there are no fixed criteria by which 
the likelihood of risk or consent can be predicted by a third party. The 
only way to identify the likelihood and severity of the substantive risks 
associated with exposing sensitive personal information for any particular 
matter is to consult the individuals directly involved; given the amount of 
personal and sensitive information contained in the research reports, this 
will be a time-consuming and expensive undertaking.
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Culturally Sensitive Information
As with information of a personally sensitive nature, the task of identifying 
and mitigating risks associated with exposure of culturally sensitive 
information is a complex proposition. Bureaucrats employed by the 
Federal Court and the NNTT are generally not well placed to understand 
and assess the attendant risks and, as with personally sensitive information, 
consultation with relevant Indigenous parties will be required.
The types of culturally sensitive information that are commonly 
problematic in the public domain are relatively well-known and include, 
for example, the names or images of deceased individuals; references to 
male initiation practices; out-of-date terminology; and information that 
identifies the location of sacred sites. However, the great diversity of 
cultural practices and historical experiences among the many hundreds 
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander groups around Australia makes it 
is impossible to predict the potential for any particular details to breach 
local cultural protocols.
The hurt individuals and families may experience as a result of the 
publication of culturally sensitive information is very real. Individuals’ 
relationships with cultural information are profound, as are the possible 
consequences of failing to control its’ distribution appropriately. Breaches 
of traditional law and custom in relation to cultural information may 
result in pain, anxiety, illness and, potentially, death, and the people 
deemed responsible for a breach may be punished by their community. 
The loss of information and authority in relation to both culture and 
country, in turn, undermines an individual’s cultural status and impedes 
their ability to reproduce their traditions and, therefore, themselves in 
very fundamental ways.28
The significance of the impacts of exposure and loss of cultural 
information is underscored by a recent Federal Court decision in the 
Timber Creek native title compensation case. In 2016, the Ngaliwurru 
and Nungali peoples were awarded a solatium of $1.3 million for hurt 
arising from damage caused over the loss of their native title rights in 
an area of approximately 79 hectares in and around the town of Timber 
28  Benedict Scambary and Gareth Lewis, ‘Sacred bodies and ore bodies: Conflicting commodification 
of landscape by Indigenous peoples and miners in Australia’s Northern Territory’ in Pamela F McGrath 
(ed), The Right to Protect Sites: Indigenous Heritage Management in the Era of Native Title (AIATSIS 
Research Publications, 2016) 224.
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Creek. Crucial in consideration of the solatium were multiple dimensions 
of social effect—namely, ‘loss of amenities’, ‘pain and suffering’ and 
‘reputational damage’. Central to the judge’s decision was the hurt caused 
by a loss of cultural reputation among members of neighbouring groups 
and ‘the sense of failed responsibility for the obligation … to have cared 
for … that land’.29
The consequences of exposing cultural information to the public can 
only be identified and assessed by people who are familiar with it and 
can contextualise its social effect. The only way to be certain that the 
publication of native title records containing cultural information will 
not have undue negative consequences is to seek advice directly from the 
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander people concerned. Consultation not 
only guards against potential hurt or pain, but it also puts control over 
cultural evidence back in the hands of the people to whom it belongs, 
reinforcing respectful relationships between Indigenous peoples and 
government and delivering on the basic intent of the Native Title Act. 
Inaccurate, Incomplete or Out-of-Date Information
The final significant issue associated with creating public access to the 
NNTT research reports is that they can present a partial or inaccurate 
impression of the native title rights of a particular group if they contain 
out-of-date, incorrect or misleading information. The misunderstandings 
such information may perpetuate can have a significant impact on 
relationships and reputations, and can generate argument and conflict 
among and between individuals and groups.
The NNTT research reports were prepared for a very specific task—
namely, to provide information to assist with the mediation and 
resolution of native title claims. They were designed to be used and 
considered alongside other forms of evidence—namely, the testimony 
of contemporary claimants. They were not written with a general public 
readership in mind, and as noted above are limited in scope and variable 
in quality. The inclusion of ethno-historical sources in the NNTT research 
reports is no endorsement of their reliability, and the most accurate and 
persuasive historical records for a native title claim will not necessarily 
have been included. Rather than a fulsome account, each research report 
29  Griffiths v Northern Territory of Australia (No 3) [2016] 900 FCA 318.
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offers only a glimpse of the reality of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
connections to country as understood through only a fraction of the total 
body of relevant evidence.30 Additionally, as soon as there is any change 
to the status of the underlying claim, the research reports are effectively 
out-of-date and are unlikely to reflect the facts of native title as the Federal 
Court has subsequently determined them to be.
All of this makes for a knowledge asset that, despite its inherent value, 
is nevertheless highly problematic and open to misinterpretation. The 
possibility for NNTT research reports and other native title records to 
contribute to social conflict is often raised during public forums and 
private discussions about the management of native title information.31 
As an Aboriginal colleague who has been closely involved in her own 
family’s native title claim explained: 
I have seen traditional owners have different views on research materials 
and in most cases have seen conflicts created due to the lack of proper 
understanding of the research material [in circumstances where] 
traditional owners and community doubt the reliability of the primary 
and secondary sources.
All that [the research reports] provide is a snapshot analogy of cultural 
and historical bibliographic research that was done on their traditional 
country and I believe it gives a very marginal understanding of the 
authenticity of the research.32
30  This broader body of evidence would usually include oral testimony of claimants; genealogies; 
contemporary maps of boundaries and sites of significance; and difficult-to-obtain but more in-depth 
ethno-historical materials, such as anthropological field notes held in international archives. The 
Federal Court and NNTT do not hold copies of all the evidence that may have been submitted in 
relation to native title applications resolved by consent determination. However, state governments 
will hold copies of this material. Given the large number of native title claims to date that have 
been resolved through mediation rather than litigation, the collections of native title records held by 
state governments will be much larger than those held by the Federal Court and NNTT. They too, 
presumably, are struggling with the challenge of how to manage them.
31  For example, see proceedings of a workshop on native title information management hosted by 
AIATSIS in 2015; McGrath et al, above n 4.
32  Email to author, 10 February 2016. The source wishes to remain anonymous.
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It is difficult to assess the likelihood of public access to the NNTT research 
reports or other native title records creating or aggravating social conflict.33 
In each instance, the possibility will be context-dependent and will be 
influenced to a great extent by the circumstances of those concerned at 
any given moment in time. Even if the likelihood of social conflict is low, 
the potential severity of its consequences warrants careful consideration 
as to whether the educational benefits that potentially flow from creating 
public access ultimately outweigh the associated risks.
That the contents of research reports may be unreliable, incomplete or 
misleading raises a compelling argument that on that basis alone they 
should not be made publicly available. That their publication may also 
contribute to social conflict and damage to the reputations of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples and their relationships with others tips 
the scales even further in that direction.
Nevertheless, it should not be presumed that native title groups will always 
want to prevent the publication of NNTT research reports. The same 
colleague who raised concerns about their potential to generate arguments 
also expressed a belief that they should be made publicly available in some 
form so that traditional owners can use them to help locate, review and 
understand historical information relevant to their people and country.34 
The issue is, then, one of consent.
Informed Consent and the Need 
for Meaningful Consultation
On the face of it, the risks associated with creating public access to 
the NNTT research reports are likely much reduced because most of the 
information they contain is already in the public domain. However, this 
assumption fails to consider the circumstances in which that information 
was initially collected, and, in particular, whether free, prior informed 
consent for recording and distribution was provided by the original 
informants.
33  For further discussion of the generative role of native title research in social change and 
conflict, see Simon Correy, ‘The Reconstitution of Aboriginal Sociality through the Identification of 
Traditional Owners in New South Wales’ (2006) 17(3) The Australian Journal of Anthropology 336; 
Eve Vincent, Against Native Title: Conflict and Creativity in Outback Australia (Aboriginal Studies 
Press, 2017).
34  Correy, above n 33; Vincent, above n 33.
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Since the introduction of the Native Title Act in 1993, many thousands 
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have willingly shared 
information of a personal or culturally sensitive nature with third parties 
to progress their native title claims. However, the NNTT research reports 
also include cultural and personal information that was not collected with 
the consent of named individuals or groups. While this may not be an 
issue when using this information for a native title claim, it becomes one 
when it is to be made available for public use.
Determining the existence of prior consent requires examination of 
the expectations of the informants at the time that the information 
was originally collected. Establishing consent in circumstances where 
everyone involved in the original exchange—researchers and informants 
alike—may have long since passed away is especially difficult. Even when 
information has been more recently gathered and from a consenting 
individual for the express purpose of providing evidence for a native 
title claim, agreement to use that information for a secondary purpose—
namely public education—cannot be assumed.
The impossibility of establishing consent does not negate the need for 
consultation with relevant persons or groups. Rather, circumstances where 
consent is either absent or ambiguous call for more, not less, consultation 
about the risks of making sensitive information publicly available. For 
although it may seem that any damage would already have been done 
as a result of someone else publishing the material, the repetition of 
that injustice may still impact directly on Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples.
What does a meaningful and effective consultation look like in the context 
of native title? In 2010, the then Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Social Justice Commissioner, Mick Gooda, suggested that at a minimum 
it requires that:
• consultation processes should be products of consensus
• consultations should be in the nature of negotiations
• consultations need to begin early and should, where necessary, 
be ongoing
• Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples must have access to 
financial, technical and other assistance
• Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples must not be pressured 
into making a decision
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• adequate time frames should be built into consultation processes
• consultation processes should be coordinated across government 
departments
• consultation processes need to reach the affected communities
• consultation processes need to respect Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander representative and decision-making structures
• governments must provide all relevant information and do so in an 
accessible way.35
Designing and implementing processes that pay heed to the above criteria 
and are agreed to by all parties will be neither straightforward nor quick. 
Key informants may have passed away or be difficult to locate, and other 
native title groups may hold divergent views about publishing ethno-
historical sources relevant to both. Similarly, descendants of a particular 
named individual may hold different opinions about how best to manage 
personal information about a shared ancestor. Like native title claims 
themselves, the process of figuring out the fate of the many thousands of 
records they have produced is likely to be a long and expensive one.
Discoverability: A Possible Way Forward
In the context of limited resources available for consultation and risk 
mitigation, how should the NNTT and the Federal Court proceed with 
the challenge of managing the research reports into the future?
One course of action would be to simply deposit them, along with all 
other native title records, with the NAA under the strictest possible access 
conditions. The disadvantage of this approach is that it limits the potential 
educational and historical value of native title records by making it very 
difficult for members of the public—Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
alike—to locate and access them. Of greatest concern is that traditional 
owners and prescribed bodies corporate who do not hold their own 
copies of these materials may have difficulty accessing them, as will other 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander persons who, for whatever reason, 
are not actively involved in their relevant native title group.
35  Australian Human Rights Commission, Native Title Report 2010 (Australian Human Rights 
Commission, 2011) 60.
THE COuRT AS ARCHIvE
236
One way to preserve the broader educative and historical value of native 
title records while minimising the risks associated with their exposure 
is to make them publicly discoverable, but not publicly accessible. 
By ‘discoverable’, I mean that information about what records exist and 
the conditions under which they may be accessed can be easily and readily 
found by anyone who is looking for them. This approach would ensure 
that until such time that meaningful consultation with individuals and 
groups can occur, circulation of the records themselves is limited but 
knowledge of their existence is not lost.
To this end, the NNTT has recently investigated the feasibility of creating 
an online map-based search tool that would enable users to generate 
bibliographies of native title research assets, including the research 
reports and the ethno-historical items they contain. Copies of the assets 
themselves would not be provided unless the consent of the native title 
group, identifiable persons and copyright holders has been obtained.
Online technologies and reliable standardised metadata will be crucial to 
the success of this strategy. Much of the contextual information currently 
contained in the research reports—namely, background information 
about the identity and qualifications of authors and the circumstances in 
which they collected their data—could readily be included in the metadata 
for each record, without risk of exposing personal or culturally sensitive 
information. This would assist the reader with assessing the reliability and 
relevance of particular documents without having to view the originals.
The ambition to create discoverability does, nevertheless, raise a critical 
question about the extent to which the act of collating and publishing 
metadata about native title records is in and of itself an act that requires 
consultation with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. The 
risks are certainly much reduced; however, any consequences will still 
be experienced almost exclusively by Indigenous Australians alone, 
suggesting some form of consultation—perhaps with prescribed bodies 
corporate and/or native title representative bodies—may be warranted 
before proceeding with this strategy.
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Conclusion
All of the issues discussed above in relation to the management of NNTT 
research reports are relevant to the development of management policies 
for other types of native title records held by the NNTT and the Federal 
Court—for example, court transcripts, genealogies, preservation evidence 
and connection reports. Because these documents were created exclusively 
for native title proceedings and contain original historical, cultural and 
personal information unavailable elsewhere, these particular records are 
potentially of far greater value than the research reports. The potential 
benefits of making them publicly available will be greater, but then so 
too will the associated risks, and these risks will be disproportionately 
experienced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.
In the development of policies to identify and mitigate these risks, the 
possible impacts of any particular course of action on the relationships and 
levels of trust between Indigenous Australians and government should not 
be forgotten. For when these relationships fail, it is invariably Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander people who suffer. The recent report Overcoming 
Indigenous Disadvantge: Key Indicators 2016 noted that ‘stronger 
relationships between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians 
and non-Indigenous Australians build and sustain mutual respect, while 
mutual respect contributes to stronger relationships—[it is] a virtuous 
circle’.36 The report further noted that participation in decision-making 
was a key element of self-determination, which, in turn, is a critical part 
of governance. Effective governance, leadership and recognition of culture 
are essential to the social and economic development of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Australians and have the potential to influence 
virtually all other indicators of wellbeing.37
If we recognise that a fundamental intention of the Native Title Act is 
to provide for the advancement and protection of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples, and to progress the process of reconciliation among 
all Australians, then it is incumbent on those of us who are responsible for 
developing policy to put those interests and relationships at the centre of 
all decisions about the fate of native title records.
36  Productivity Commission, Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage: Key Indicators 2016 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2016) 7 <http://www.pc.gov.au/research/ongoing/overcoming-indigenous 
-disadvantage/ 2016#thereport>.
37  Ibid 25–6.
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A robust approach to developing policy to assess and mitigate risks 
associated with creating public access to native title records is one that 
prioritises the interests of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. 
It is one that recognises that what is legally possible is not necessarily 
the most appropriate way forward, and, instead, invests in consultation 
towards achieving informed consent. However, where the resources are 
not available to facilitate this level of engagement, providing for public 
discoverability of native title records is a viable alternative that will ensure 
the inherent value of these precious knowledge assets is preserved until 
issues of public access can be resolved.
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Archiving Revolution: Historical 




The Court as Archive Project is unique in its consideration of the records 
of Australian superior courts in centring the fundamental value of court 
records as more than simply a collection of process, but as a social and 
cultural archive. As the editors discuss in the introduction to this volume, 
historical court records have assumed an increasing significance as 
a primary source for researchers across a range of disciplines. Engagement 
with the substance of court records has opened opportunities to develop 
more diverse and more complete narratives of individuals’ relationships 
with one another and with the state.
As an inheritor of English legal tradition, Australian courts share 
features with other former colonial possessions, including the practice 
and traditions of adversarial, common law courts of record. Therefore, 
international experience provides a valuable source on which to draw in 
the development of retention and maintenance practices.
As part of the process of drawing together those experiences for the Court 
as Archive Project, the experience of United States courts—particularly 
those of its oldest colonies—has become increasingly relevant.
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Figure 1: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Boston, 
Massachusetts.
Source: Author’s photograph .
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Massachusetts is one of the oldest colonies in North America, having 
been claimed by British adventurers in 1602, armed with letters patent 
from Queen Elizabeth I.1 Massachusetts is also the landing site of the 
Mayflower, carrying the Pilgrims to the new world,2 and the site of the 
‘shot heard around the world’3—the confrontation between British 
soldiers and colonial militia at Concord in Middlesex County—that 
heralded the War of Independence.
The lengthy history of Massachusetts courts and their establishment as 
courts of record means that their records of proceedings contain a wealth 
of information about the development and growth of the colony as part of 
a nascent United States. Hidden among the records of the Massachusetts 
courts are proceedings that include the names of a number of the United 
States’ ‘founding fathers’, including John Hancock, Paul Revere, Samuel 
Adams and President John Adams; the biographical value of this collection, 
it has been argued, is ‘difficult to exaggerate’.4
Although Massachusetts courts are much older than the Federal Court of 
Australia, they have confronted similar issues regarding records retention 
and the vexed question of what constitutes a ‘significant’ record that 
requires permanent retention. However, through a process of determining 
historical context, sampling and inspection, Massachusetts found that 
a definition of ‘significance’ was largely unnecessary.
‘Significance’: Context and ‘Fat Files’
Two inspections conducted in the 1970s assessed the significance of 
Massachusetts courts records as one of several potential sources of historical 
and cultural information. Those inspections found that pre-1859 court 
forms contained important biographical information about the parties that, 
as a result of changes to the forms, was omitted after 1859. For records after 
1859, the historical and cultural value of the record to researchers could be 
preserved by retaining only a small, random sample and an oversample of 
1  John Stetson Barry, The History of Massachusetts: The Colonial Period (Phillips, Sampson & Co., 
1855) 10. Interestingly, there was also a competing claim to Massachusetts by the Dutch East India 
Company under a Charter from William of Orange.
2  Ibid 80–1.
3  Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘Concord Hymn’ in Edward Waldo Emerson (ed), The Complete Works 
of Ralph Waldo Emerson (Houghton Mifflin, 1904) 159.
4  Robert Brink, ‘Deferred Maintenance of Court Records’ (1980) 73 Law Library Journal 997, 
1001.
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any file larger than two inches in thickness or which had been the subject 
of an appeal. As a result of a large-scale sampling and inspection process, 
a determination of the ‘significance’ of a record did not require the physical 
inspection of every file, but a high degree of confidence could be taken that 
the larger the file, the more ‘significant’ the record was likely to be.
Despite now being more than 40 years old, the same process of random 
sampling and an additional oversampling of large files remains in place 
in Massachusetts today.5 The practice is the subject of little complaint or 
comment. On occasion, researchers find that a record important to their 
research has been destroyed. However, the court’s experience has been that 
the instances are rare and, when the practice is explained to researchers, 
it is accepted.6
This chapter provides an overview of the origins of the Superior Court’s 
approach, adopted as a result of the Colonial Courts Record Project and, 
subsequently, the Superior Courts Record Project. It also draws together 
some of the lessons and concepts from both projects as a means of providing 
an analysis of how a project of this size came into being, and how it reached 
what many might consider an unusual approach to determining the question 
of ‘significance’. In doing so, it suggests that Massachusetts courts’ approach 
to the development and implementation of records retention practices may 
be valuable in approaching similar superior courts’ collections in Australia.
Massachusetts Court Records: History 
in an Unbroken Line
The origins of the justice system in Massachusetts are almost as old as 
the colony itself. The Research Guide to the Massachusetts Courts and their 
Records goes as far as to argue that the justice system ‘traces its history in an 
unbroken line’ to 1630.7 Until 1639, records of judicial proceedings were 
5  Supreme Court Judicial Rules (10 February 1995), r 1.11; see also Executive Office Trial Court, 
Guide: Trial Court Record Retention Schedule (n.d.) Mass.gov <https://www.mass.gov/guides/trial-
court-record-retention-schedule>.
6  Interview with Bruce Shaw, Director, Massachusetts Superior Judicial Court, Archives and 
Records Preservation (Boston, Massachusetts, 5 July 2017).
7  Catherine Menand, A Research Guide to the Massachusetts Courts and their Records (Supreme 
Judicial Court Archives and Records Preservation, 1987) 7.
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‘irregularly kept’.8 However, in arguably one of the very earliest directions 
on the maintenance of judicial records in the colonies, the Massachusetts 
General Court directed that all evidence was to be kept ‘to posterity’.9 
All courts, including a superior court to exercise the same powers of the 
Courts of Common Pleas in England, were subsequently re-established 
as ‘courts of record’ in 1691 when William III appointed a governor to 
the colony.10
The significance of ‘courts of record’ is discussed elsewhere in this 
volume.11 However, the designation of Massachusetts courts as courts of 
record brings with it two important signifiers—one affecting the status of 
the court and the other affecting the status of its record. 
First, and according to English practice at the time, Massachusetts 
courts transformed from being informal or ad hoc tribunals to adopting 
a permanent existence and developing a transparent and consistent body 
of law.12 Second, and more importantly, in the context of courts as archives, 
the establishment of a perpetual record meant that the record’s contents 
became immutable and incontrovertible. As early as the 13th century, the 
oral history of proceedings in the King’s courts in England were considered 
to be authoritative and above question. With the advent of a written 
record, the same character was attached to those records. The court record 
was not required to be further proved or supported by reference to oral 
evidence.13
Despite the political upheaval of the War of Independence, and the 
successive realignments of colonial boundaries to both amalgamate14 and 
then separate the colonies and, subsequently, states,15 Massachusetts courts 
8  Emory Washburn, Sketches of the Judicial History of Massachusetts (Charles C Little and James 
Brown, 1840) 89.
9  Ibid.
10  Ibid. Interestingly, the Governor was styled as a ‘president’ with a deputy president and elected 
assistants to provide advice, similar to an executive council.
11  See Chapter 1, this volume.
12  Enid Campbell, ‘Inferior and Superior Courts of Record’ (1997) 6 Journal of Judicial 
Administration 249.
13  SE Thorne, ‘Courts of Record and Sir Edward Coke’ (1937) 2(1) The University of Toronto Law 
Journal 24; Gaillard Lapsley, ‘The Court, Record and Roll of the County in the Thirteenth Century’ 
(1935) 51 Law Quarterly Review 299.
14  Alan Taylor, American Colonies (Viking, 1st ed, 2001) 277.
15  For a detailed account of the waxing and waning of Massachusetts’ boundaries with the 
surrounding states, see Franklin Van Zandt, Boundaries of the United States and the Several States 
(United States Department of the Interior, 1966) 95.
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have remained in a similar tiered structure.16 The current Massachusetts 
General Law establishes a Supreme Judicial Court, an Appeals Court, 
a Trial Court (consisting of a series of specialist jurisdictions), a Superior 
Court and District Courts.17 The establishment of each tier under  the 
General Law places the administration of the court largely under 
the supervision of the court itself.
Record Retention in Massachusetts
By the mid-1970s, there were approximately 2.7 million court files stored 
in locations all over Massachusetts. No preservation or conservation work 
had been done on the materials, and there was no designated central 
repository. Clearly, the Massachusetts courts’ extensive history contributed 
to the volume of the materials. At the same time, that history also meant 
that the records constituted an invaluable archive of economic, social and 
political disputes stretching back more than 200 years.
As a result of a substantial records inventory, assessment and sampling 
exercise, supervised by a board comprised of judges, historians and other 
scholars, the Massachusetts Superior Judicial Court18 adopted a unique 
approach to the management of its records. Rather than developing 
a definition of ‘significance’ as a means of determining which files should 
be retained, the project found that the thickness of the file and whether it 
had been taken on appeal were the only consistent indicators of historical 
significance. Only those files that were greater than two inches in thickness, 
or were appealed, were recommended for permanent retention.
16  Menand, above n 7, 21.
17  Massachusetts General Law (MGL) ch 211, 211A, 211B, 212 and 218.
18  Michael Hindus, Theodore Hammett and Barbara Hobson, The Files of the Massachusetts Superior 
Court, 1859–1959: An Analysis and a Plan for Action (GK Hall and Company, 1979) (the ‘Hindus 
Report’).
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Origins of Massachusetts’ Records 
Management
The origins of efforts to adopt a structured approach to the management of 
court records in the United States can arguably be found at the intersection 
of two significant events during the 1970s: Chief Justice Burger’s ‘deferred 
maintenance’ address and the consequent creation of the National Center 
for State Courts; and the bicentenary of the United States.
Deferred Maintenance
In 1971, President Richard Nixon and Chief Justice Burger of the 
United States Supreme Court spoke at the first National Conference 
of the Judiciary. The American Bar Association Journal acknowledged 
that the occasion was a rare one to have brought the head of the executive 
and the judiciary to the same conference platform.19 Both the President 
and  the Chief Justice addressed delays in the justice system and the 
need for reform to improve public confidence.20 However, while the 
President’s remarks were addressed to procedural reform, the Chief Justice 
adopted a different approach. Acknowledging that delays in litigation 
were something on which even Roscoe Pound had expressed concern,21 
he also drew attention to the ageing administrative practices of courts, 
particularly in the context of their records administration. Commenting 
specifically on the increasing complexity of litigation, Chief Justice Burger 
noted that:
In terms of methods, machinery and equipment, the flow of papers … 
most courts have changed very little fundamentally in a hundred years or 
more. I know of no comprehensive surveys, but spot checks have shown 
that the ancient ledger type of record books, sixteen or eighteen inches 
wide, twenty-four or twenty-six inches high, and four inches thick are still 
used in a very large number of courts. These cumbersome books, hazardous 
to handle, still call for longhand entries concerning cases. I mention this 
only as one symptom of our tendency to cling to old ways.22
19  ‘Williamsburg Cradles Another Revolution—This One in the Administration of Justice’, (1971) 
57 American Bar Association Journal 421.
20  Richard Nixon, ‘Reforming the Administration of Justice’ (1971) 57 American Bar Association 
Journal 421; Warren Burger, ‘Deferred Maintenance’ (1971) 57 American Bar Association Journal 425.
21  Burger, above n 20.
22  Ibid 427.
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As a means of addressing the diverse methods of administration 
consistently, Burger proposed the development of a National Center 
for State Courts as a ‘national clearinghouse or center to serve all the 
states and to co-operate with all the agencies seeking to improve justice 
at every level’.23
The National Center for State Courts (NCSC) that Burger had proposed 
commenced operation less than 12 months later.24 Among its earliest 
projects was a survey of records management practices in state courts 
nationally.25 The survey found that a large number of courts held records 
more than 100 years old, but that ‘many states [had] allowed these records 
to be relegated to attics, basements, and closets with little selectivity 
and virtually no management’.26 Importantly, the NCSC survey was 
subsequently submitted as a successful proposal for seed funding to 
undertake records management activities in courts to the National 
Historical Publications and Records Commission—the significance of 
which is discussed further below.27
Bicentennial Fever
The push for a better approach to the management of courts’ historical 
records, in particular, was assisted by a significant historical milestone. The 
bicentenary of the United States in 1976 brought with it an enthusiasm 
for historical information, just as the Canadian centenary had done 
nine years earlier.28 Planning began some 10 years before and, based on 
recommendations of the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission, 
the United States Congress established a national coordinating body—the 
American Revolution Bicentennial Administration29—and a number of 
institutions were gripped by ‘bicentennial fever’.30
23  Ibid.
24  Warren Burger, ‘The State of the Federal Judicary—1971’ (1971) 57 American Bar Association 
Journal 855, 856.
25  National Center for State Courts, Court Records Retention Survey and Guidelines Project Proposal 
627, cited in Brink, above n 4, 998.
26  Ibid 998; see also Robert C. Harrall, ‘Court Records Management: “The Mitten” Revisted’ 
(1976) 2(1) Justice System Journal 77.
27  Brink, above n 4.
28  Gabrielle Blais and David Enns, ‘From Paper to People Archives: Public Programming in the 
Management of Archives’ 31 Archivaria 101, 102.
29  Act of 12 November 1973, Pub Law No 73−179, 87 Stat 697 (1973).
30  Richard Baker, ‘Reflections on the Modern History of Congressional History’ in Glenn Gray, 
Rebecca Johnson Melvin and Karen Paul (eds), An American Political Archives Reader (Scarecrow 
Press, 2009) 6.
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To mark the bicentenary, the American Association of Law Libraries 
(AALL) held its national conference in Boston with a focus on the legal 
history of the American Revolution and the management of historical 
records.31 A number of speakers at that conference drew attention to the 
absence of a collected history of colonial administration as well as the value 
of the historical records that many institutions and private collections 
held.32 However, they also emphasised the difficulty of building a complete 
picture of America’s legal history, referring to the sources being contained 
in an ‘immense and scattered mass’33 and being ‘diffuse’.34 David Flaherty, 
who had published work on a history of Massachusetts as told through 
court records, noted that there was a significant inconsistency in the way 
in which court clerks had marked or catalogued court records across time, 
making it difficult for the historian to determine not only the content 
of the record but whether a particular record even existed.35 He also 
noted that he had, in effect, had to travel to every colonial county seat to 
determine what records were available.36
In addition to the difficulty of locating material, concerns were also 
expressed about the manner in which valuable records were being kept. 
Records were being stored in basements and decommissioned cells in 
environments that did not suit long-term preservation. Speakers at the 
AALL conference also emphasised the need for a ‘carefully planned and 
rigidly supervised program of housekeeping’37 to ensure that materials did 
not continue to be lost as a result of age.
31  Amercian Association of Law Libraries, ‘Association News’ (1975) 7(1) Newsletter 1, 2.
32  Kinvin Wroth, ‘Documents of the Colonial Conflict: Part I—Sources for the Legal History of 
the American Revolution’ (1976) 69 Law Librarians Journal 277; Gerard Warden, ‘Commentary 
on Sources for the Legal History of the American Revolution: Part II—Documents of the Colonial 
Conflict’ (1976) 69 Law Library Journal 292.
33  Wroth, above n 32.
34  Morton Horwitz, ‘Documents of Constititional Development’ (1976) 69 Law Library Journal 
295, 296.
35  David Flaherty, ‘The Use of Early American Court Records in Historical Research’ (1976) 69 
Law Library Journal 342.
36  Ibid 344; see also Michael Hindus, ‘Designing Projects for Maximum Impact: Saving the Early 
Court Records in Massachusetts’ (1979) 42(3) The American Archivist 307.
37  George Cunha, ‘Preservation and Conservation of Legal Materials’ (1976) 69 Law Library 
Journal 300.
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Figure 2: An example of court records held by Massachusetts courts—
Writ of Summons dated 1775.
Source: Author’s photograph .
A New Wave of Users
While the concerns of scholars and court staff about the scattered and 
imperilled historical records of Massachusetts courts are cited as the 
principal origin of the development of Massachusetts court record 
practices,38 part of those concerns also related to the interests of a new 
and growing body of users. A lack of administrative structure is clearly 
a cause for concern, but it was not the objective in itself. Many of the 
concerns expressed by scholars related to their inability to find materials 
to support their research. Among court staff, it related to the inability to 
help researchers by finding the material for which they were searching.
The concerns of the materials’ users rather than their keepers also reflected 
a new movement in archival and library management occurring at the 
same time, prompted, at least in part, by a renewed interest in history. 
The bicentenary introduced a new ‘wave’ of users to archives—genealogists 
38  The Hindus Report, above n 18; Brink, above n 4.
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spurred on not only by the bicentenary, but also by the broadcast of 
historical miniseries like Roots a year later39—and coincided with more 
popular awareness in North America of the availability of historical 
information.40 Attempts were made to provide a more ‘user-friendly’ 
approach to archival records and to move away from the understanding of 
archives as the domain of the expert archivist, as had been the subject 
of debate among North American archivists during the 1970s and 1980s.41 
However, the impetus given to the public’s interest in historical material 
by the bicentenary prompted a renewal of the debate.42
The National Historical Publications and 
Records Commission
Important for the development of a number of projects during the 
bicentenary was also the expansion in 1974 of the National Historical 
Publications Commission (NHPRC), which had been established in 1934, 
to now include records.43 The expansion allowed the National Archives and 
Records Authority (the equivalent of the National Archives of Australia) 
to make funds available to state and private archival collections for their 
preservation—some of which was made available to Massachusetts courts.
Sampling and ‘Significance’
The current records management practice was not the first attempt to 
introduce a method of structured record-keeping to the court’s historical 
records. In 1976, the Colonial Courts Records Project commenced under 
the supervision of a judicial committee appointed by then Chief Justice 
Edward Hennessy to undertake a survey and inventory of the courts’ 
records to be conducted by lawyer and legal historian Michael Hindus.
39  Heather MacNeil and Terry Eastwood, Currents of Archival Thinking (ABC-CLIO, 2nd ed, 2017) 
229.
40  Ibid.
41  See, for example, Mary Pugh, ‘The Illusion of Omniscience: Subject Access and the Reference 
Archivist’ (1982) 45(1) American Archivist 33; Bruce Dearstyne, ‘What Is the Use of Archives? 
A Challenge for the Profession’ (1987) 50(1) American Archivist 76; Francis X Blouin Jr and William 
Wallach, A Decade of Sponsored Research: The Research Fellowship Program for Study of Modern Archives 
(University of Michigan, 1994) 17.
42  Edward Weldon, ‘Lest We Forget: Setting Priorities for the Preservation and Use of Historical 
Records’ (1977) 40(3) The American Archivist 295, 295; Howard Applegate, Richard Brown and Elsie 
Freigovel, ‘Wider Use of Historical Records’ (1977) 40(3) The American Archivist 331.
43  44 USC § 25 (1974).
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The principal objective of the Colonial Courts Record Project was to 
locate,  identify and microfilm the hundreds of thousands of scattered 
records for Suffolk County, within which Boston lies.44 The project 
was supported by a grant from the NHPRC and eventually produced 
a survey of the records published in 1977: The Records of the Massachusetts 
Superior Court and its Predecessors: An Inventory and Guide.45 Chief Justice 
Hennessy considered the project to be his most significant contribution 
as Chief Justice.46
The judicial committee responsible for the Colonial Courts Record 
Project recommended permanent retention of all pre-1859 files for two 
key reasons. The survey had identified some 40,000 cubic feet of records 
stored in various locations across the state. However, only 5,000 cubic feet 
contained pre-1859 materials.47 The survey suggested that the change in 
volume was due to changes in the administrative practice of courts and 
the legal profession. The advent of printed forms, rather than bespoke 
process, meant that the rate at which material could be produced had 
increased.48 It also suggested that the increase in volume, particularly in 
the early 20th century, appeared to relate to motor vehicle torts—a cause 
of action previously unknown.49 Storage requirements for pre-1859 files 
were, therefore, significantly less onerous.
Second, from about 1859 onwards, the practice of Massachusetts courts 
changed so that court records contained substantially less sociological and 
biographical data. Pre-1859 materials commonly contained addresses, 
gender, occupational and other data that made them a valuable and 
unique source. Post-1859, that data was omitted but was also available 
from a range of other sources.50
The Colonial Courts Record Project and the survey provide some important 
direction and advice about the scoping of any form of management 
strategy. First, the records need to be seen in a much broader context 
44  Interview with Bruce Shaw, Director, Massachusetts Superior Judicial Court, Archives and 
Records Preservation (Boston, Massachusetts, 5 July 2017).
45  Michael Hindus, Superior Court of Massachusetts and Judicial Records Committee of 
Massachusetts, The Records of the Massachusetts Superior Court and its Precedessors: An Inventory and 
Guide (Archives Division Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, 1978).
46  Interview with Bruce Shaw, Director, Massachusetts Superior Judicial Court, Archives and 
Records Preservation (Boston, Massachusetts, 5 July 2017).
47  Hindus, above n 45.
48  Hindus Report, above n 18.
49  Ibid.
50  Ibid 7.
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than simply a collection of process; it is a social archive. Approaching the 
initial assessment of the records process from the perspective of the value 
of the records from different perspectives rather than an inward-looking 
assessment of importance to the court or legal history is fundamentally 
important.
Supporting this assessment is a sound understanding of the content 
of the records not in isolation but in connection with other archives. 
The 1977 survey identified the content of pre-c1859 records as unique 
in telling a much wider story about the colony and state as a whole. 
From the perspective of the Australian Federal Court, it is arguable that 
the management of native title court records, their uniqueness having 
been explored in other chapters in this volume, and acknowledged in the 
Federal Court’s existing Disposal Authority, fall within the same category.
A Proposal for Sampling
While the judicial committee responsible for the 1977 survey had 
recommended a clear approach to pre-1859 records, it made no 
recommendations about the much larger collection of post-1859 
materials. However, rather than leaving the matter, the committee chose 
to undertake a further project to determine what to do with the more 
recent records.
The Superior Courts Records Project began in 1977, still under the 
supervision of the judicial committee but now to be conducted by a larger 
team including Michael Hindus, lawyer and historian Theodore Hammett 
and historian and sociologist Barbara Hobson. The project’s objective 
was to attempt to find a way to rationalise the large body of post-1859 
files in a cost-effective manner that would not devalue the collection for 
researchers. Very early on, the committee agreed to a process of ‘selective 
retention’,51 but which files to retain and which to keep was a sensitive 
question.52
What is important about this observation of ‘sensitivity’ is that one of the 
underlying concerns of the committee and the court was the level of risk 
that both were prepared to accept: by destroying a certain proportion of 
51  The Hindus Report notes that ‘this is, of course, a euphemism. We use this term to refer to the 
destruction of files’: ibid 5.
52  Ibid.
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files, historically significant material would be lost. That is, the committee 
and the court had made the initial, fundamental decision that everything 
could not be kept and that material would clearly have to be destroyed. 
Therefore, the project’s objective was to find a point of compromise. How 
much historical material were the committee and the court prepared to 
lose in the interests of managing such a massive collection before the risk 
and rate of loss became unacceptable?
Hindus and his co-authors proposed a method of selective retention 
based on a sampling methodology: a random sample was proposed to be 
taken from the collected body of files with the balance to be destroyed. 
Underpinning this approach was the concept that by selecting an 
appropriate sample, conclusions could be drawn about the population as 
a whole.53
A random sample was selected from two counties—Suffolk and 
Hampshire—based on a randomly generated set of file numbers. The 
choice of counties was deliberate: Suffolk being predominately urban 
(it includes Boston and other major urban centres) and Hampshire being 
predominately rural.54 The sample was split again across civil and criminal 
matters as being substantively different classes of matters with different 
characteristics.55
A randomly generated set of numbers was chosen instead of a set number 
series from each period or a sample from specific jurisdictions to avoid 
distorting the sample. For example, Hindus notes that if a predetermined 
number range were used, it would skew the sample towards a particular 
period.56 File numbers tend to be assigned in all courts in numerical order 
so to set a range would, consequently, predetermine a period in time.
The sampling methodology also took into account the volume of matters 
and historical interest. Once the number of post-1859 matters was 
identified, a total sample size was selected that would provide a statistically 
significant result. However, a sliding scale of the proportion of matters 
within years was also identified. Hindus notes that this was done for 
two reasons: older matters were considered by the committee to be of 
greater value and, because the total number of matters commenced in the 
53  Ibid 42.
54  Ibid 45.
55  Ibid.
56  Ibid 13, 42.
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Massachusetts Superior Court increased over time, a smaller proportion 
could be taken while producing a similar number of physical files as for 
earlier years.57
This approach, as an alternative to the physical of every file, has some 
clear advantages. It is clearly more time- and cost-effective. However, 
Hindus acknowledges that it may not be appropriate for all matters or 
all jurisdictions. For example, Hindus notes that while undertaking the 
project, the committee was also approached for advice on sampling with 
respect to probation files. Ultimately, sampling was not recommended 
based on the absence of important identifying information, which would 
allow a sample to be taken as representative of a set, the unique nature 
of the records and their sensitivity.58
Therefore, the application of a sampling methodology as a starting point 
for determining an approach to selective retention is not entirely random. 
As Hindus explains, the nature and size of the collection need to be 
considered and understood at the very start. Factors such as geographical, 
temporal and jurisdictional spread need to be taken into account in 
determining the overall size of the sample, and this cannot be done 
without adequate identifying data. Within that spread, factors such as the 
increase in total filings or filings of a particular type need to be identified 
and taken into account in setting the parameters of the sample. 
However, once those parameters are determined, then the method of 
selecting the sample needs to be as random and objective as possible. 
For example, Hindus and his team used a random number generator to 
determine file numbers within the predetermined objectives. The advantage 
here is to avoid skewing the nature of the sample. In such a sensitive context 
as the preservation of records in which members of the committee may 
have an interest, it also avoids skewing in favour of individual members’ 
interests that, ultimately, might not be representative of, or shared by, 
researchers 10, 20 or 50 years later.
57  Ibid 13.
58  Ibid 14.
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Testing the Sample: Historical Significance Within 
the Sample
As acknowledged earlier in this chapter, the process of selective retention 
requires an assessment of, and compromise on, the risk of the ‘wrong’ 
records being destroyed. As a means of testing the sampling process and 
providing a sense of what Hindus refers to as ‘comfort’ to the committee 
responsible for supervising the project, the project took the additional step 
of developing a methodology to determine how many records contained 
information of real historical interest.
Eighty-two different variables were established as a means of identifying 
the characteristics and historical significance of each file. The codes, 
signifying important legal, social, historical and cultural factors, were 
determined by a committee composed of nine scholars prominent in 
the fields of legal history, social history, criminology, law, demography, 
minority history and statistics.
For example, in relation to civil files, codes were assigned to the basic 
information of jurisdiction, the identity of the plaintiffs and the 
defendants (grouped by social or economic interest) and the cause of 
action. Additional codes were assigned to reflect the procedures on the 
file (eg, claim, counterclaim and appeal) and, very simply, its size. A third 
set of codes was then applied to identify historical elements of interest 
(eg, if the matter dealt with issues of ethnicity, race, labour or family).59
The process also allowed for an overall rating of historical interest based 
on  a simple low-to-high scale. The variables upon which this ranking 
could be based were not listed to remain flexible, but might include 
variables such as social context, detailed descriptions of social practices or 
the political context within which a matter was occurring.
Hindus and his co-authors acknowledge that, while the process of 
settling on a list of codes and assigning them to files was as robust as it 
could be made, it cannot be argued that a different group of scholars, 
or even different scholars, may have agreed on the same variables.60 This 
is a weakness in the process. However, the broadly representative nature 
of the committee, looking outside just the judges and court staff, and, 
59  Ibid Appendix B.19.
60  Ibid 59.
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thereby, reflecting a much broader range of perspectives, arguably makes 
the list of codes more defensible. The importance of the contents of the 
file was not being determined from a purely legal or administrative 
perspective, but, at the same time, those elements were not ignored.
While the initial sample identified was up to 6,000 files, time constraints 
and the amount of material on some files meant that, ultimately, a sample 
of 3,500 files was inspected—1,422 criminal files and 1,968 civil files—
and the variables present in the files identified.
Once the files were coded for characteristics and significance, the project 
was then able to produce data on the extent to which the sample, and, 
therefore, the complete collection of files, held material of historical value. 
Surprisingly, the sampling process revealed two key findings:
• Only 6.8 per cent of sampled civil files and 8.1 per cent of criminal 
files were of historical interest, and the majority (4.6 per cent and 
6.6 per cent, respectively) were ranked of ‘low’ historical interest.61
• Out of the 82 different variables, the study found that the size of the 
file (literally thickness), whether the matter had been taken on appeal 
to a superior court and (in the case of civil matters) whether the matter 
was one in equity were the only consistent indicators of historical 
interest.62
Implementing Hindus: Summary and Lessons
As discussed earlier, the results of the Superior Courts Record Project 
and the recommendations of the Hindus Report were consequently 
adopted as records retention policy in Massachusetts and continue to be 
applied today. 
However, the Hindus Report was also written with the intention 
of providing a set of principles or practices for courts to follow in 
emulating the records management practices of the Superior Court of 
Massachusetts.63 While the methodology is summarised in this chapter, 
there are some broader lessons and concepts that also need to be taken 
into account.
61  Ibid 62, 66.
62  Ibid 62, 64, 71.
63  Michael Hindus, Theodore Hammett and Barbara Hobson, ‘Preface’ in ibid.
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The Importance of Timing
The management of historical court records, both in Massachusetts and 
across the United States, was not something on which the courts or 
the NCSC had haphazardly or accidentally focused in the early 1970s. 
As Chief Justice Burger and the AALL had highlighted, courts’ records 
were generally in a parlous state by the early 1970s and management had 
remained fundamentally unchanged ‘for a hundred years or more’.64
Records and records management was therefore hardly a new issue or 
problem. However, what appears to provide the motivation for it to be 
addressed is increasing community awareness of the value of the courts’ 
records, driven by external events coupled with an acknowledgement 
by courts of the value of their records to the community as a whole. 
Massachusetts was able to take advantage of Chief Justice Burger’s call for 
the establishment of a National Center for State Courts and additional 
resourcing from the NHPRC to give impetus to its own efforts.
In the context of the records of Australian superior courts, it is difficult to 
identify an event or events that might provide the same level of national 
focus and motivation as the country’s bicentenary. However, given the 
nature of the Federal Court’s collection of materials in particular, events 
such as the 30th anniversary of the Mabo decision65 or the introduction of 
the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) might provide the basis for a renewed focus 
by the community and by the government on the value of those materials.
Nevertheless, there is an important and perhaps perennial issue bound 
up within the issue of timing, which is also worth noting.
Content and Purpose of the Records
The development of a records management policy for Massachusetts 
courts was not something that was compelled or forced by the bicentenary 
or the clamour of researchers. Just as with Australian Commonwealth 
courts, Massachusetts courts are constitutionally separate from the other 
arms of government, and any decision to change its practices was required 
to be made by the courts themselves. What is critical to understanding 
how comprehensive the process becomes is the overall commitment by 
the courts to that process.
64  Burger, above n 20.
65  Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1.
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As noted above, while the initial Colonial Courts Records Project was 
prompted in part by an acknowledgement that administrative practices 
needed to change simply as a matter of efficiency, it also acknowledged the 
value of court records to the community as a whole. That is, the project, 
survey and Hindus Report all acknowledged that the records were more 
than merely records of process, but were also invaluable historical, social 
and cultural records that might form part of a larger narrative about the 
colony, state and, ultimately, the nation. For example, the former Director 
of Archives and Record Preservation at the Massachusetts Superior 
Court, Bruce Shaw, notes the purpose of court records retention is not 
‘warehousing dead and static paper’, but the retention of materials that 
‘are living historical documents’.66
This acknowledgement is also evident in some of the decisions made about 
permanent retention. For example, the decision to preserve pre-1859 
records was in part made on the basis that as biographical (and not process) 
records, they formed an invaluable part of a wider narrative, whereas other 
elements of a resource ‘community’ took up the same story after 1859.
It is also evident in the decision that the project and the Hindus Report be 
overseen by a committee drawn from a diverse array of interests. It is not 
only the diversity of interests that is important. It is also that the process 
of drafting rules about the records to be retained was overseen rather than 
conducted by that committee. This is an important distinction. To have 
the same committee review samples or attempt to develop a definition of 
‘significance’ rather than to review the outcomes of the sampling process 
avoids compromise or confusion in decision-making and drafting.
In the context of the Australian Federal Court’s records, there is a need 
to acknowledge that its records have more significance than simply 
a record of process. As is discussed elsewhere in this volume, the records 
have the same historical, social and cultural value, and the same integral 
role as a part of a larger narrative, as the records of Massachusetts courts. 
However, that acknowledgement must also come with an understanding 
that to determine how to approach the management of that resource, 
lawyers and judges represent only one perspective.
66  Interview with Bruce Shaw, Director, Massachusetts Superior Judicial Court, Archives and 
Records Preservation (Boston, Massachusetts, 5 July 2017).
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Significance and Sampling
One of the most challenging aspects of the Hindus Report and 
the implementation of Massachusetts record management practice is the 
seemingly simplistic manner in which the issue of ‘significance’ was 
ultimately determined. Without context, the practice of random and 
oversampling based on physical size of files can appear to be only a few 
steps above simply tossing files down a set of stairs and keeping those 
closest to the top.
However, as has been summarised in this chapter and is discussed at length 
in the Hindus Report, the manner in which the practice was developed 
was based on an understanding of the nature of the records being surveyed 
and objective testing of the proposed method against a substantial section 
of the existing files. Put another way, the random sampling of files was not 
a practice arrived at randomly.
As noted much earlier in this chapter, the practice is, and has been, 
the subject of little complaint and even less discussion. It was also one 
developed by taking into account the nature of the records themselves. 
Hindus and his co-authors acknowledge that the same methodology may 
not be appropriate for every set of records. This is very similar to the 
decision taken, for example, by the Federal Court of Australia to keep 
every native title court file but to keep only a smaller proportion of other 
matters.67
However, there is a further interesting sidenote to the Hindus Report 
that reinforces the extent to which a similar process might apply. In an 
Appendix to the Hindus Report entitled ‘Historical Interest and the Front 
Page’, Hindus and his co-authors discuss steps taken to address concerns 
that had been expressed by the committee overseeing the project that the 
sampling process would lead to the destruction of matters of ‘unusual 
interest’.68
As a means of assessing the extent to which matters that might have 
been the subject of significant community or media interest, the Hindus 
Report reviewed front pages of the Boston Globe for 1933 and traced 
matters mentioned through the Superior Court’s files. What the process 
identified was that the focus of media attention was predominately on 
67  Records Authority No 2010/00315821, Federal Court of Australia (FCA), 19 October 2011.
68  Hindus Report, above n 18, 185.
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criminal matters, which was not representative of the bulk of the court’s 
overwhelmingly civil work. Second, and perhaps importantly for public 
organisations with limited resources, the process of historical media 
review and tracing was found to be time-consuming and labour-intensive, 
particularly in the case of matters that might have a number of related 
proceedings.69
Ultimately, there are no recommendations made about retention practices 
and ‘unusual interest’. That is not to suggest that a court considering 
a  similar approach might not find a need to address media interest. 
One of the issues identified in the Hindus Report, though, is the demand 
of a historical media review. However, in relation to current or prospective 
records, the same issues would not be applicable. A current or prospective 
matter might be marked for permanent retention as a result of ongoing 
media discussion.
What the Hindus Report does warn against is the potentially distortive 
effect of relying on media attention as an indicator of significance. One 
of the key concerns of the Hindus Report was to ensure that the sample 
taken was truly representative of the work of the relevant court. As a 
result, a larger sample of civil matters compared to criminal matters was 
taken, as well as a smaller proportion of modern proceedings, given the 
similarity of their content. The case file numbers selected for any one year 
were also randomly generated to avoid taking a sample that reflected any 
one part of a legal year than another.
The distortive effect of media attention is something that needs to be 
considered in the context of the work of each court to which a similar 
methodology might be applied. The Federal Court of Australia, for example, 
has a diverse jurisdiction. To the extent that media interest was to be taken 
into account in a determination of significance, it would be necessary 
to review that criterion in terms of the effect that it has on the sample 
collected for any particular year. In a year in which there is a large degree 
of media focus placed on television broadcast rights70 or the enforcement 
of intellectual property rights against ‘torrent’ downloading websites,71 care 
needs to be taken to ensure that it does not produce a sample of matters that 
are not representative of the work of the court as a whole.
69  Ibid 186.
70  Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2007] FCA 1062.
71  See, for example, the extensive litigation leading up to Dallas Buyers Club LLC v iiNet Limited 
(No 5) [2015] FCA 1437.
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Washing Records: Record Preservation versus 
Record Retention
What is not apparent from the work discussed in this chapter and 
the implementation of the Hindus Report’s recommendations is the 
substantial commitment that Massachusetts was required to make not 
only to the proper identification of records, but also to the process of their 
physical preservation.
Although discussed as early as the 1970s, the poor physical state of court 
records was as much of a concern to researchers as the poor identification of 
their location.72 The former Director of Archives and Records Preservation 
at the Superior Judicial Court noted that from the start of the Colonial 
Courts Record Project, it was necessary not only to identify where records 
were kept but also to begin a process of repairing and preserving those 
records.73 Consequently, Archives and Record Preservation has a large 
document-preservation facility in the Superior Judicial Court Building.
Figure 3: Document preservation facility, Superior Judicial Court.
Source: Author’s photograph .
72  See, for example, Brink, above n 4; Harrall, above n 26; Wroth, above n 32.
73  Interview with Bruce Shaw, Director, Massachusetts Superior Judicial Court, Archives and 
Records Preservation (Boston, Massachusetts, 5 July 2017).
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Archives and Records Preservation has continued to work on the 
painstaking process of preservation since the 1970s, and continues on 
that work today. By virtue of the sheer volume of materials, the process of 
recovering and repairing records means that the end of the process may 
still be some years away.
The effort required in the case of Massachusetts records is principally the 
result of almost 200 years of inattention—a problem that the Federal 
Court of Australia does not face. However, what the experience of 
Massachusetts does highlight is that the practice of records retention, and 
their acknowledgement as a valuable source, does not stop at the point 
of selecting records but incorporates everything required to maintain 
that record permanently. The National Archives of Australia has the 
necessary expertise and facilities to ensure that that occurs. However, 
while a decision on ‘significance’ by the Federal Court is outstanding, and 
records remain in its possession, there is a need to ensure that appropriate 
steps are taken to ensure those records’ physical integrity before additional 
remedial measures are required. 
Conclusion
As examples of English colonial legal systems, the United States and 
Australia share a common heritage. They are steeped in the concept 
of superior courts’ records providing a perpetual and incontrovertible 
record of their contents. Both legal systems also share aspects of 
a common experience in developing awareness of the wider significance 
of those records as a social and cultural resource. Although the origins of 
Massachusetts courts and the Federal Court are separated by almost 
300 years, that same common experience is nevertheless evident.
As this chapter has endeavoured to summarise, because of internal and 
external pressures, Massachusetts courts were compelled to find a way 
of balancing the value of their collected records with the administrative 
and financial cost of simply retaining everything. The practice adopted 
of random sampling and oversampling based on the physical size of a file 
might, on first look, appear to be haphazard and potentially dangerous 
in terms of the potential loss of important historical material. However, 
what this chapter has attempted to make apparent is that the current 
practice developed based on an understanding of Massachusetts courts’ 
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role as part of a larger narrative of the nation’s history—both in terms 
of those records that might not be found elsewhere and those records in 
which information might be duplicated.
It would also be incorrect to assume that the practice equates significance 
to size—it does not. Through a careful survey and sampling process, 
Massachusetts has been able to identify that, in that particular jurisdiction, 
file size provides a clear and consistent indication of the potential 
significance of that record into the future.
What this chapter does not suggest is that another court, seeking to apply 
Massachusetts’ experience, adopt file size as an indicator of significance. 
What is instead required is a careful sampling and survey of records to 
determine what indicators might provide the same level of confidence 




Sentencing Acts: Appraisal 




In archival theory and practice, sentencing is the process of identifying 
and classifying information, potentially resulting in its destruction. It is 
a surprising homonym to judicial pronouncement of criminal punishment, 
despite the emotive association with censorship and book burning. 
In archival science, as in law, sentencing is the result of evaluative judgment. 
In the case of archival science, these judgments about historical and social 
value, institutional accountability and resourcing have a powerful impact 
on social memory because they determine which ‘creators, functions, and 
activities in society will be represented in archives’.1
In the practice of archival appraisal, records are sentenced in accordance 
with a disposal authority—a documented appraisal framework for 
decisions about preservation or disposal of records. However, disposal 
does not necessarily mean that the records are destroyed; it may mean that 
they are transferred to another institution or even to a national archive to 
1  Terry Cook, ‘Documenting Society and Institutions: The Influence of Helen Willa Samuels’ in 
Terry Cook (ed), Controlling the Past: Documenting Society and Institutions—Essays in Honor of Helen 
Willa Samuels (Society of American Archivists, 2011) 2.
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be retained. Particularly from the mid-20th century, the proliferation of 
documentation resulting from bureaucratisation and rapid technological 
developments has meant that ‘choices had to be made about what to 
maintain’.2 It is now generally acknowledged that not all records can, or 
should, be preserved and that resources should not be wasted on keeping 
records longer than necessary.
In Australia, federal government agencies cannot dispose of records without 
authorisation from the National Archives of Australia (NAA).3 This is 
also the case in Canada, where permission for destruction of Canadian 
government records must be obtained from Library and Archives Canada 
(LAC).4 However, in both jurisdictions, courts are subject to archives 
legislation only to a limited extent,5 resulting in uncertainty about 
responsibilities and rights in relation to court records. In the absence of 
obligations under archives legislation, courts have drawn on a range of 
frameworks to make decisions about preservation and disposal, including 
legal principles and obligations, information management requirements, 
administrative needs and constraints, and jurisdictional obligations. 
However, attempting to reconcile these (sometimes competing) 
obligations has resulted in incoherent and inconsistent decisions about 
preservation and disposal of records. In some instances, it has also resulted 
in contentious public debates, legal conflict and litigation.
This chapter considers the role of courts as archives through an examination 
of approaches to appraisal and disposal of court records. Drawing on 
fieldwork conducted in Canada and Australia, I will demonstrate how 
superior courts of record in these jurisdictions have attempted to address 
their legal and institutional responsibilities, to varying points of resolution. 
I begin by identifying a number of disputes over the preservation and 
destruction of records from legal inquiries and court processes, drawing 
2  Sue McKemmish, Barbara Reed and Michael Piggott, ‘The Archives’ in Sue McKemmish, 
Michael Piggott, Barbara Reed and Frank Upward (eds), Archives: Recordkeeping in Society (Centre for 
Information Studies, Charles Sturt University, 2005) 175.
3  Archives Act 1983 (Cth) (‘Archives Act’). Section 6(1) of the Act gives the NAA power to authorise 
the disposal or destruction of Commonwealth records; s 24 gives agencies responsibility for destruction, 
transfer or alteration of Commonwealth records, subject to the authorisation of the NAA.
4  Library and Archives Canada Act, SC 2004, c 11, s 12(1) (‘Library and Archives of Canada Act’).
5  In Australia, the Archives Act s 19(1) specifies that the legislative provisions concerning 
Commonwealth records, including disposal and destruction, do not apply to records in the possession 
of a court or court registry, unless Regulations so provide. In Canada, the Library and Archives of 
Canada Act applies only to government institutions, as defined in the Access to Information Act, RSC 
1985, c A-1, Schedule 1. No courts are covered by this legislation.
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on examples from the Australian and Canadian contexts. These disputes 
highlight the importance of some of the questions posed by the Court 
as Archive Project; questions that courts in both jurisdictions have been 
attempting to grapple with over recent years. What responsibilities do 
courts have, as institutions of legal authority and record, to preserve, 
curate, store and provide access to records of their adjudication? What 
principles should guide and determine appraisal decisions about what to 
keep and what to dispose of? How should courts balance the (sometimes 
competing) obligations to the principle of open justice and litigants’ right 
to privacy and confidentiality? Are some court records so significant as 
to be preserved in perpetuity and, if so, what principles should guide the 
selection of these records? 
I have chosen to highlight disputes over the destruction of records 
concerning Indigenous and First Nations, Inuit and Métis peoples. These 
records, and disputes about them, bring into stark relief some of the 
competing public, institutional, political and ethical demands faced by 
courts and other legal bodies concerning their responsibilities as archives. 
Rather than seeing these disputes as exceptions to general principles and 
challenges, in the Court as Archive Project, we regard them as paradigmatic 
examples that can assist courts to develop appropriate institutional 
archival policies and practices. As Australian archivist Michael Piggott 
argues, more attention to archival histories, such as histories of acquisition 
and destruction of records, could help explain current community views 
of the past and benefit current social debate, especially in relation to 
Indigenous records.6 
In Australia, from the early 1990s, the development of native title 
jurisprudence, as well as other areas for Indigenous claims, including 
litigation concerning the legality of genocide, cultural heritage claims 
and compensation by members of the Stolen Generations, resulted in the 
production of an extensive body of evidentiary and litigation materials for 
the purposes of legal action. Under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), for 
example, claimants must provide evidence that they possess communal, 
group or individual rights and interests in relation to land or waters under 
traditional laws and customs. This is an onerous burden of proof, requiring 
that claimants demonstrate an ongoing connection to the land in question, 
dating back to the assertion of colonial sovereignty. In addition to witness 
6  Michael Piggott, Archives and Societal Provenance: Australian Essays (Chandos Publishing, 2012) 
238, doi.org/10.1533/9781780633787.
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statements, it may include genealogies, anthropological, historical and 
linguistic reports, maps, photographs, artworks and other material. The 
Federal Court has been conscious of the historical value of the records 
produced for the purposes of litigation and its responsibilities for them 
as a court of record with obligations to the national interest. However, 
for many years, it did not have a suitable archival appraisal framework on 
which to base decisions about what to preserve and what to destroy. This 
points to the significant interrelationship between the development of 
the Federal Court’s approach to its record-keeping obligations alongside 
developments in its native title jurisdiction.7
Where Australian and Canadian courts of record have attempted to 
resolve questions about record-keeping responsibilities, they have drawn 
primarily upon legal principles and obligations, including the need to 
preserve records of judicial decisions for the purposes of precedent; the 
civil law principle of ‘open justice’; the rights of individual litigants to 
privacy; the maintenance of legal professional privilege; and the need 
to protect certain groups, such as children. Further, as for all public 
institutions, decisions by courts about record-keeping have been driven 
by rapid changes and developments in technology, as well as increasing 
constraints on financial resources and storage space. As a result of these 
imperatives, and despite the lack of legislative coverage, superior courts of 
record in both Canada and Australia have engaged in negotiations with 
national archives institutions, the NAA and LAC, seeking arrangements 
for custodianship of case file records, once the case is closed.
Legal principles and obligations are necessary and important requirements 
for courts’ approaches to decisions about appraisal and disposal of records. 
However, federal supreme courts of record should also consider their 
archival responsibilities in terms of the deeper public law issues underlying 
their institutional role. Courts can benefit from approaches reflected in 
contemporary archival theory, where it is recognised that appraisal choices 
are political and ethical because they ‘shape the future of our jurisdiction’s 
documentary heritage’.8 Drawing on such a framework will assist courts 
in developing their archival responsibilities beyond consideration of the 
need to preserve legal records of individual disputes, but rather as records 
that are of public interest and importance because they reflect societal 
7  See Chapter 7, this volume.
8  Terry Cook, ‘Macroappraisal in Theory and Practice: Origins, Characteristics, and Implementation 
in Canada, 1950–2000’ (2005) 5 Archival Science 101, 103.
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dynamics and public issues. As Canadian archivist Terry Cook explains, 
‘archivists should focus on the mechanisms or loci in society where 
the citizen interacts with the state to produce the clearest evidence of 
societal dynamics and public issues, and thus of societal values’.9 This is a 
valuable framework for informing the development of archival principles 
for federal superior courts of record because of their important role in 
adjudicating claims and disputes of a democratic society, and as a legal 
archive of national value.
The aim of the Court as Archive Project has been to clarify the institutional 
purposes and civic responsibilities of Australian supreme courts of record 
through their archival role. In particular, we have focused on the unique 
role of the Federal Court of Australia as a site for production of significant 
national archives. We have also ventured to develop principles to inform 
the administration of the court’s records, as a responsive civic institution 
in 21st-century Australia. The chapter concludes with an account of 
the development of the Federal Court’s records authority that sets out 
the current framework for the management and disposal of its case file 
records. I focus, in particular, on the rationale for the definition of what 
constitutes a ‘court record’ and the identification of a ‘significant’ case. 
This history importantly reveals the extent to which the negotiations 
between the Federal Court and the NAA have provided the defining 
context for the meaning of the ‘court record’ in Australian superior courts 
of record. It demonstrates the importance that histories of archives theory 
and practice play in defining legal and court practices.10
Gaps in the Records
Appraisal has been described as the ‘critical archival act’, the archivist’s ‘first 
responsibility’,11 but also as ‘the most vexed issue in archival practice in the 
early twenty-first century’.12 Perhaps, as Sue McKemmish, Barbara Reed 
and Michael Piggott suggest, because appraisal has not always been part 
of archival practice, ‘pragmatic and practice-based approaches became the 
core guides’.13 However, it is now well-recognised among archival thinkers 
9  Ibid 125–6.
10  The interview with Warwick Soden, CEO, Federal Court of Australia, in Chapter 7 of this 
volume, provides an account of this history from the Federal Court’s perspective.
11  Cook, above n 1, 2.
12  McKemmish, Reed and Piggott, above n 2, 175.
13  Ibid.
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that appraisal, like other areas of archival work, involves decisions about 
far more than the availability of storage space and financial resources. 
Archival appraisal results in the creation of archives as institutions and, 
for this reason, decisions about what to keep and what to destroy requires 
sensitivity to the ‘political, social, philosophical and ethical nature of 
appraisal’. Indeed, Terry Cook goes so far as to suggest that, as a society, 
‘we are what we do not keep, what we consciously exclude, marginalize, 
ignore, destroy’.14
The truth of this aphorism is clearly demonstrated in settler colonial 
polities, such as Australia and Canada, when contentions over the 
reliability and interpretation of state-produced archival records have 
come into sharp relief, notably as a result of legal avenues and processes of 
reconciliation with Indigenous peoples. For example, in Australia, research 
conducted during the 1990s for the National Inquiry into the Removal 
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families 
revealed destruction, under authorised procedures, of a range of records, 
including adoption and fostering case files across state jurisdictions.15 
The inquiry received a number of submissions concerning the difficulties 
Indigenous people experience in gaining access to archival records held 
by the various record-keeping agencies.16 Some stated that ‘government 
agencies had destroyed or lost particular classes of records relating to 
adoption, foster care or personal information, either through deliberate 
culling or through fires in the buildings that housed the records’.17 There 
was also an unexplained gap in Aborigines Welfare Board files for an entire 
decade: 1938–48.18 Further, as the inquiry pointed out, records made 
and held by non-government organisations, including churches that ran 
children’s homes and orphanages, are neither required to retain records 
nor to provide access to these records under Freedom of Information 
legislation.19 As a result of these revelations, the inquiry made a number of 
recommendations in relation to changes to archival records management 
14  Terry Cook, ‘“We Are What We Keep; We Keep What We Are”: Archival Appraisal Past, Present 
and Future’ (2011) 32(2) Journal of the Society of Archivists 173, 174.
15  Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Bringing Them Home: Report of the 
National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families 
(1997), 325–6.
16  Ibid 348.
17  Sonia Smallacombe, ‘Accessing Personal and Family Records: Contesting the Gatekeepers’ 
[1998] Indigenous Law Bulletin 2.
18  Above n 15, 325–6.
19  Above n 15, 333–4.
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practice, including a moratorium on destruction of records relating to 
Indigenous individuals, families or communities held by government or 
non-government agencies.20
This was not the only time recommendations have been made in relation 
to record-keeping after legal inquiries. Kim Eberhard points out that in at 
least eight key inquiries into various aspects of the welfare of children 
conducted in Australia since 1989, recommendations were made in 
relation to record-keeping, even when the terms of reference did not 
mention these matters. She argues that commissioners conducting these 
inquiries have been ‘confronted with the centrality of records to their 
inquiries, and that a lack of records has been the most critical factor 
leading to recommendations concerning record-keeping in both public 
and private sectors’.21
In Canada, there have also been controversies surrounding the 
destruction of government and legal records. During the late 1980s, 
a furore emerged in the context of the Royal Commission of Inquiry to 
investigate the charge that Canada was a haven for Nazi war criminals.22 
The National Archives of Canada was called to give evidence about 
its records management policy and processes, and many government 
officials were surprised to learn that not all immigration and security case 
records were retained in perpetuity.23 Terry Cook, one of the archivists 
from the Canadian National Archives involved in the appraisal decisions 
resulting in the destruction of the records, has written extensively about 
the impact, personally and professionally, of the revelations that valuable 
historical records concerning human rights violations had been destroyed. 
He argues that this marked the beginning of a new approach to appraisal 
and disposal at NAC with national and international impact.24
20  Above n 15, Recommendation 21: Destruction of Records Prohibited, 347.
21  Kim Eberhard, ‘Unresolved Issues: Recordkeeping Recommendations arising from Australian 
Commissions of Inquiry into the Welfare of Children in Out-of-Home Care’ (2015) 43(1) Archives 
and Manuscripts 4, 6.
22  Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals in Canada, Report and Findings (Privy Council 
Office, Canada, 1986).
23  Terry Cook, ‘“A Monumental Blunder”: The Destruction of Records on Nazi War Criminals in 
Canada’ in Richard J Cox and David A Wallace (eds), Archives and the Public Good: Accountability and 
Records in Modern Society (Quorum Books, 2002).
24  Ibid 62.
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More recently in Canada, disputes have arisen about responsibility for 
contemporaneous records of testimonial and documentary evidence 
produced in proceedings under the Indian Residential Schools Settlement 
Agreement.25 This agreement provided for two avenues of reparations, one 
of which was for previous students who wished to pursue compensation 
claims for serious assault and sexual assault. The Chief Adjudicator of the 
Independent Assessment Process (IAP), Dan Shapiro, sought an order 
for destruction of the documents at the end of the process to protect 
the privacy of the survivors and perpetrators.26 However, the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission sought an order that the documents be 
archived at LAC on the basis that the narratives produced for the hearings 
are an irreplaceable historical record of the Indian Residential School 
experience.27 The court granted the Chief Adjudicator’s request that the IAP 
documents be destroyed after a 15-year holding period by the Canadian 
Government. However, it also made an order that with the consent of the 
claimant, and subject to redaction of identifying personal information 
about alleged perpetrators or affected parties, the records may be archived 
at the National Centre for Truth and Reconciliation.28 On  appeal, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal upheld this decision and a further appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) was dismissed.29 In a unanimous Full 
Court decision, the court rejected the argument that the documents were 
subject to federal access, privacy and archives legislation.30
These disputes clearly demonstrate, sometimes in poignant ways, the 
competing legal, ethical and political demands and expectations associated 
with decisions about preservation and destruction of legal records. The 
obligations of courts and other legal entities to maintain records of 
proceedings may come into direct conflict with the right of individual 
25  The Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement was agreed to on 8  May 2006. It is 
a multiple court–approved settlement resulting from approximately 150 individual and class actions 
taken by former students of Indian residential schools: <www.residentialschoolsettlement.ca/IRS%20
Settlement%20Agreement-%20ENGLISH.pdf>.
26  Fontaine v Canada (Attorney General) 2014 ONSC 4585. The application by the Chief 
Investigator was supported by the Assembly of First Nations, the Twenty-Four Catholic Entities, the 
Nine Catholic Entities, the Sisters of St Joseph and Independent Counsel.
27  The application by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was supported by the Canadian 
Government and the National Centre for Truth and Reconciliation.
28  The National Centre for Truth and Reconciliation, based at the University of Manitoba, 
was established ‘to preserve the memory of Canada’s Residential School system and legacy’ as the 
permanent home for all statements, documents and other materials gathered by the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Canada: <http://nctr.ca/map.php/>.
29  Fontaine v Canada (Attorney General) 2016 ONCA 241.
30  Canada (Attorney General) v Fontaine [2017] 2 SCR 205.
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litigants to privacy or the need to respect Indigenous control of cultural 
knowledge. At the same time, the record of the court’s proceedings 
produced by the court is of significant national archival value, as it records 
the claims and disputes of a democratic society. They are rich records 
of public interest and importance about the relationship between the 
individual and the state that are not readily accessible elsewhere.
Further, these disputes highlight the unique characteristics of records 
produced by courts in the course of litigation, which may include 
transcripts of oral testimony, expert witness reports, evidentiary materials, 
photographs, affidavits and other court records. As Cornelia Vismann 
argues, files are the foundation of legal activity, but they ‘remain below 
the perception threshold of the law’.31 Records presented in litigation may 
have been sourced from established state- or privately owned archives, 
or they may have been created specifically for the litigation on the basis 
of new research or investigations. These records may subsequently be 
incorporated into or associated with new records, being records of 
disputes between parties. As records of court processes, they are generally 
subject to the legal principle of open justice. However, this is not always 
the case, as some proceedings are held in closed courts or are subject to 
confidentiality requirements. The specific characteristics of court and 
legal records suggest the need for an approach to archival appraisal that 
recognises their value not only as records of proceedings of claims and 
disputes, but also as archives documenting changes in understandings of 
political demands, and democratic expressions about rights and values.
Archival Appraisal
In Australia and Canada, archives legislation provides the legal framework 
for preservation and disposal of government records through the 
establishment of national archives institutions.32 In both jurisdictions, 
the legislation was introduced as part of the administrative law packages 
31  Cornelia Vismann, Files: Law and Media Technology (Stanford University Press, 2008) 11.
32  In Australia, the Archives Act 1983 (Cth) (‘Archives Act’), established the NAA to ‘ensure the 
conservation and preservation of the existing and future archival resources of the Commonwealth’ 
(s 5(2)(a)). In Canada, the National Archives of Canada Act, RSC 1985 (3rd supp), c 1 (‘National 
Archives of Canada Act’) established the National Archives of Canada ‘to conserve private and public 
records of national significance’ and ‘to be the permanent repository of records of government 
institutions and of ministerial records’ (s 4(1)). The National Archives of Canada Act was repealed by 
the Library and Archives of Canada Act, which established the LAC.
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in the 1970s, including Freedom of Information legislation that was 
intended to provide improved access to government information. 
However, based on the principle of the separation of powers between the 
executive and the judiciary, the records of courts are specifically exempt 
from the operation of archives legislation.33 Nevertheless, faced with 
exponentially increasing case loads and decreasing availability of archival 
storage space, superior courts of record in each jurisdiction have engaged 
in negotiations with national archives for transfer and custodianship of 
court archives, including case file records.34
Under the Australian Archives Act, the NAA has power to authorise the 
disposal or destruction of Commonwealth records,35 giving government 
departments and agencies responsibility for destruction, transfer or 
alteration of Commonwealth records, subject to its authorisation.36 The 
Archives Regulations 1984 (Cth) provide the framework for appraisal and 
disposal of records, including the requirements for consent to destruction 
from both the NAA and the Commonwealth institution.37 In Canada, 
archival appraisal is conducted by the national archives institution, 
LAC, in consultation with federal government agencies. The consent of 
the National Archivist must be obtained for destruction and disposal 
of records.38
In an article that considered disposal practices under the Australian Archives 
Act from an administrative law perspective written some 20 years ago, 
Kim Rubenstein argued that the legal framework for records destruction 
is sparse. While the NAA has the responsibility for determining the 
practices and procedure appropriate for disposal, the Act does not provide 
clear direction because it does not contain an objects clause that sets out 
33  Archives Act s 19. In Canada, the Library and Archives of Canada Act does not cover federal 
courts. In Australian states and territories, New South Wales alone specifically excludes court and 
tribunal records from obligations under the State Records Act 1998 (NSW) ss 9(1)(c) and (2), 26(1)(c), 
49(1)(c) and (2). In most Canadian provinces, records legislation includes provisions for archiving 
of court records. For example, the Saskatchewan Archives and Public Records Act, SS 2015, c A-26.11 
provides for management of Court of Appeal records, including administrative records. However, in 
some jurisdictions, provisions specify a long period for court retention prior to transfer.
34  See Chapter 4, this volume.
35  Archives Act s 6(1).
36  Archives Act s 24.
37  Archives Regulations 1984 (Cth) regs 3–7.
38  National Archives of Canada Act s 3; Library and Archives Canada Act s 12(1).
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fundamental principles to guide the decision-makers in what is worthy of 
disposal. She suggested that there was not enough guidance in the Act and 
that there was a lack of accountability.39
Since this time, responsibility for government record-keeping practices 
in Australia has devolved even further to the agency level, through the 
extensive use of records retention and disposal authorities (RDAs).40 
The  NAA has tasked itself with responsibility for the selection and 
preservation for retention of the most important information identified as 
being of permanent (or continuing) value due to its national significance 
or public interest. All other records are the responsibility of the agency 
that created or controls the information, although decisions about what 
to retain, and for how long, are made through the development and 
implementation of RDAs. These allow government authorities to make 
decisions about preservation, destruction or transferral of records at the 
department or agency level, in accordance with frameworks established 
by the agency in consultation with the NAA. Some RDAs are general 
and apply to areas such as administrative functions across agencies, 
others are agency-specific. The framework outlined by the NAA for 
records management stresses the need to reduce business risk, increase 
accountability and improve operational efficiencies. It identifies the 
context of limited financial resources and storage space as rationales for 
records destruction.41
Despite lack of legislative requirement, RDAs have been established by 
courts and tribunals with federal jurisdiction, including the Federal Court 
of Australia, to cover specific areas of operation. For example, disposal 
of the administrative files is authorised by a general Administrative 
Functions Disposal Authority, applying to all federal government activity 
and covering an extensive range of records of administrative practices.42 
Under the authority, government departments and agencies are permitted 
to dispose of certain ‘low-value and short-term information’ considered 
39  Kim Rubenstein, ‘Erring on the Side of Destruction? Administrative Law Principles and 
Disposal Practices under the Archives Act 1983 (Cth)’ (1997) 4 Australian Journal of Administrative 
Law 78, 82.
40  Archives Act s 24.
41  National Archives of Australia, Records Authorities (2018) <www.naa.gov.au/information-manage 
ment/ records-authorities>.
42  National Archives of Australia, Administrative Functions Disposal Authority (AFDA), (Revised 
March 2010) (2018) <www.naa.gov.au/Images/AFDA2010-7Feb2013-revision_tcm16-44429.PDF>.
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part of normal administrative practice, including draft notes, temporary 
materials and such.43 It is only once an RDA is established that sentencing 
can occur, performed by the agency itself, but authorised by the NAA.
Notwithstanding the proliferation of RDAs, archival appraisal is 
ultimately  an interpretative act. The decision as to whether a record 
is appraised as worthy of retention and preservation is a process that results 
in only some records being attributed status as archives. As Canadian 
archivist Tom Nesmith argues: 
The destruction or exclusion of non-archival records ‘re-creates’ the 
surviving records by repositioning them in the archives vis-à-vis related 
records, or by removing aspects of their context of interpretation. The 
records elevated to the status of archives then become the focus of the 
meaning-making or interpretive process, which in turn makes and 
remakes them.44
In this way, archival practices of appraisal shape records and selectively 
establish relationships among records that did not necessarily exist before 
archivists created them and, thus, foster some interpretive possibilities 
and diminishing others.
Similarly, the framework drawn upon to establish principles and 
approaches to appraisal and sentencing have been subject to change and 
have themselves been influenced by theoretical developments in archival 
theory, history and other disciplines. For most of the 20th century, archival 
appraisal based its decision-making on what to keep and what to destroy 
‘primarily on assessing actual or anticipated research uses of records, 
particularly for writing academic history’.45 However, ‘value through 
use’ is now recognised as an inadequate basis for archival appraisal. 
Fundamental changes in understandings of history and historiography 
that developed during the late 20th century have contested the historical 
authority attributed to archivally based history, identifying the way it 
reflects the history of hegemonic, rather than the marginalised, oppressed 
and subaltern.46 There has also been a significant expansion of conceptual 
43  National Archives of Australia, Normal Administrative Practice (2018) <www.naa.gov.au/
information-management/managing-information-and-records/disposal/NAP/ index.aspx>.
44  Tom Nesmith, ‘Seeing Archives: Postmodernism and the Changing Intellectual Place of Archives’ 
(2002) 65 The American Archivist 24, 34.
45  Cook, above n 23, 59.
46  Francis X Blouin Jr and William G Rosenberg, Processing the Past: Contesting Authority in History 
and the Archives (Oxford University Press, 2012).
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understandings of ‘the archive’ and increased use of archival sources by 
disciplines outside academic history, including law.47 In settler colonial 
contexts such as Canada and Australia, this has notably included the 
use of archival sources as historical evidence in legal actions in relation 
to land rights, treaty rights, cultural heritage and compensation for loss 
in relation to stolen children and wages. Importantly, the court case file 
records of these actions themselves provide valuable accounts of the claims 
and disputes that reflect the changing nature of society. 
Appraisal at Courts of Record
Developments in archival theory recognise the outdated notion 
that archivists simply and invisibly process records for future use. 
As Tom Nesmith points out, within postmodern understandings of 
communication, archivists are co-creators and shapers of knowledge in 
records, and ‘thus help form society’s memory’.48 Records are not inert 
but are continually evolving. He argues that archives-making is a type 
of authoring or creating:
Some of what makes a record meaningful is inscribed in it by those who 
literally made it, but most of what makes a record intelligible lies outside 
its physical borders in its context of interpretation. Archivists, who do 
much to shape this context, therefore share in authoring the record.49
The increased sophistication of theoretical approaches to archival appraisal 
has had a significant impact on records retention policies internationally. 
New conceptual and methodological approaches to archival appraisal, 
such as ‘macroappraisal’, attempt to reflect ‘a broader spectrum of human 
experience in society and to mirror more closely therefore society’s own 
values, rather than more narrowly the values of powerful records creators 
or those derived from anticipating use patterns’.50 Macroappraisal has been 
adopted in Canada as the official appraisal strategy at LAC and has been 
very influential at the NAA, employed as a ‘functions-based’ approach, 
in conjunction with individual agencies. It is a top-down approach that 
47  See contributions to ‘Evidence and the Archive: Ethics, Aesthetics, and Emotion’ (2014) 40(1) 
Australian Feminist Law Journal 1.
48  Nesmith, above n 44, 31.
49  Ibid 32.
50  Cook, above n 23, 62.
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requires assessment of the value of records not at the level of the individual 
document or file, but, rather, at the level of the organisation, department 
or government.
While superior courts of record in Australia and Canada have been 
included in the ambit of application of RDAs for general records, they 
have encountered obstacles and delays in developing and obtaining 
agreements for authorities in relation to case file records. The overriding 
principle of the separation of powers, the absence of imprimatur under 
archives legislation, competing demands for financial and space resources, 
as well as the unique characteristics of court records are all factors that 
have contributed to these challenges. In particular, when engaged in the 
process of developing frameworks for archival appraisal through records 
RDAs, superior courts of record in Canada and Australia have been 
confronted with a question that goes to the heart of their identity and 
ultimately defines their record-keeping responsibilities—namely ‘What 
is a court record?’. In the following section, I will explain how superior 
courts of record in Canada and Australia have engaged with archival 
appraisal, with particular attention to the question of what constitutes a 
court record.
What is a Court Record?
During 2015, I conducted fieldwork for the Court as Archive Project 
in Canada, with attention to developments in records management at 
the key federal courts of record, the Supreme Court of Canada and the 
Federal Court of Canada, as well as the federal archival institution, LAC. 
Supreme Court of Canada51
The SCC is the highest court in Canada’s federal court system, 
adjudicating approximately 80 cases per year; it deals only with appeals, 
and no evidentiary material is presented. As the court with final judicial 
authority in the nation, its decisions establish legal precedent. For this 
51  The information contained in this section is based on communication with David Rajotte and 
Michael MacDonald, archivists from Library and Archives Canada on 9 September 2015; Etienne 
Perras, Manager, Library and Information Management Branch, Supreme Court of Canada on 
9 September 2015; and Barbara Kincaid, General Counsel and Director-General, Court Operations 
Sector, Supreme Court of Canada on 3 November 2015, and her subsequent participation, via Skype, 
in the Court as Archive Symposium, The Australian National University, 17 February 2016.
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reason, since its establishment in 1875, the court’s policy in relation to 
record-keeping of case files has been to ‘keep everything’.52 Until 2009, 
case file documents were maintained in paper form and stored in the 
court’s records centre. Starting in the 1980s, the court began producing 
microfilm of case files, progressively establishing a comprehensive record 
dating back to 1875. In 2009, the court introduced electronic document 
management and records management and, since this time, has made 
available to the public live and archived webcasts of its hearings.
In 1977, the court signed an agreement with LAC to transfer case file 
records for preservation once the court file was closed. One copy of the 
microfilm is maintained at the court registry and the original files, together 
with a second microfilm copy, are transferred to LAC. This transfer 
arrangement occurs every two to three years, but it does not include 
cases from the most immediate past years. In 1991, a transfer agreement 
between the SCC and LAC was signed, which meant that all publicly filed 
documents contained on the case files from 1875–1945 were transferred 
to LAC for care and custody, although the court continued to own the 
material. LAC provides unlimited public access to all Supreme Court files 
unless the material has been identified by the court as restricted. Public 
access is available at LAC via the online catalogue and includes the video 
recordings of hearings.53
In 2003, the court began negotiating a comprehensive agreement with 
LAC for permanent transfer of records deemed to be of enduring value. 
Barbara Kincaid, General Counsel, SCC, explained that the protracted 
negotiations to develop the court’s retention policy raised for the court 
important questions about how to define the court record: questions that, 
as a court of record, it was imperative the court resolve because the answer 
to this question determines what records the court is required to preserve 
permanently. For example, in attempting to balance the open court 
principle with individual rights to privacy and security, is it acceptable 
for the court to place limits on public access to court records, media and 
parties to the proceedings where there are statutory publication bans, 
sealing orders or statutory restrictions on access to case files? In keeping 
with its vision of making its collection accessible to the Canadian public, 
52  Interview with Barbara Kincaid, General Counsel and Director-General, Court Operations 
Sector, Supreme Court of Canada (Ottawa, 3 November 2015).
53  Email from Barbara Kincaid, General Counsel and Director-General, Court Operations Sector, 
Supreme Court of Canada, to Trich Luker, 3 November 2015.
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LAC would like to digitise the microfilm collection. However, what 
happens to sensitive information in older case files? What is the risk given 
that personal identifiers and other sensitive information may be contained 
in closed case files? Further, how does the court distinguish between 
judicial information, such as records of judicial deliberations, and public 
information—namely, what is on the official court record?54
In 2017, a comprehensive agreement between the SCC and LAC was 
finalised. It provides the terms for the provision of perpetual care and public 
access to SCC ‘information resources of enduring value’ (IREV). Under 
the agreement, 50 years following closure of the case file, the Supreme 
Court will donate to LAC records identified as case-related operational 
documents that are IREV. This includes the court records filed by litigants 
or produced by or on behalf of the court; specifically, applications for 
leave to appeals, appeals and reference documents identified as case files, 
docket information, judgments, statistical reports concerning the variety 
of cases heard before the court, and audio, video or web recordings of 
hearings.55 Under the agreement, the SCC is responsible for identifying 
records that, as a result of a legal obligation, court order or administrative 
classification, result in limits on accessibility or dissemination. LAC must 
consult with SCC before providing access to restricted information. 
Different conditions apply to collegial judicial documents, including 
correspondence, memorandums and notes created by a justice, chambers’ 
personnel, law clerks or legal counsel of the SCC in relation to judicial 
proceedings before the court. Once operational use has ceased, these will 
be transferred to LAC. However, they will remain closed for 50 years 
after the case file for the proceeding is closed (with the SCC maintaining 
control), after which time they become open to the public.56
The agreement took 15 years to be negotiated. It appears to provide 
a comprehensive arrangement for archival appraisal of the case file and 
administrative records of the SCC, as well as arrangements for public 
access to these documents. In navigating the question of what is meant 
by the ‘court record’, the SCC has taken a broad ambit by including all 
54  Barbara Kincaid, ‘Administration of Legal Records: Institutional Experiences’ (Speech delivered 
at the Court as Archive Symposium, The Australian National University, 17 February 2016).
55  Agreement between the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada and Library and 
Archives of Canada, Appendix B, on file with author.
56  The agreement also provides for the donation of the Supreme Court of Canada’s administrative 
records, including registrar and senior management documents, services to justices, legal services and 
communications, once operational use has ceased. 
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of the court’s case file records. This is enhanced further by the inclusion 
of collegial documents, providing access to a rich source of judicial 
deliberations that illuminate how and why these decisions were made. 
However, the court has taken a cautious approach to issues of privacy and 
confidentiality by imposing a 50-year embargo on the collegial files.57
Federal Court of Canada58
The Federal Court of Canada was established in 1971, with a separate 
appeal division, the Federal Court of Appeal, established in 2003. It is 
a superior court of record with civil and criminal jurisdiction to hear 
and decide legal disputes arising in the federal domain, including claims 
against the Canadian Government, civil actions in federally regulated 
areas and challenges to the decisions of federal tribunals. As the national 
trial court, it has a very large volume of cases, with approximately 
3,000–4,000 proceedings heard in court per year.59 The magnitude of 
the court’s caseload means that it faces significant challenges in relation 
to document management strategies. This is demonstrated by the court’s 
failure, to date, to reach an agreement in relation to archival appraisal. 
In 2006, a report was produced with recommendations for a records 
retention schedule; however, this has not been implemented. As Andrew 
Baumberg, Legal Counsel, put it, the report itself became ‘an archived 
document’.60 He suggested that one of the key drivers for the court in 
relation to the development of records retention policies has been the 
amount of storage space available. As he explained, until around 2013, 
the court kept everything:
57  The Supreme Court of Canada is the first jurisdiction in Canada to establish an institutional 
treatment of collegial documents. The decision to impose a 50-year closure period took into account 
principles of deliberative secrecy, determining that this time period would ensure that judges were 
unlikely to still be alive when the records were made available: Email from Barbara Kincaid to Trish 
Luker, 10 November 2017.
58  The information in this section is based on interviews with Andrew Baumberg, Legal 
Counsel, Federal Court (Ottawa, 6 November 2015) and Lise Albert, Information Management 
Specialist, Information and Records Management Division, Courts Administration Service (Ottawa, 
3 November 2015).
59  Courts Administration Service, 2016–17 Annual Report (2017) 9.
60  Interview with Andrew Baumberg, Legal Counsel, Federal Court (Ottawa, 6 November 2015). 
In fact, the court found it necessary to amend the Court Rules to allow for establishment of a 
retention schedule: Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106, 23.1.
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I think it’s really been something that’s ingrained in the judicial culture … 
you don’t throw things out … We’re in a paper culture which I think has 
actually really started to shift in the last five years.61
As a trial court of record, the Federal Court of Canada has a legal obligation 
to maintain the court records to support the common law requirement 
to follow precedent. However, as Baumberg explains, ‘precedent doesn’t 
seem to require you to keep all the records that were relied on in order 
for the judge to write their reasons’, particularly in modern legal practice. 
Given the court’s enormous volume of cases, many of which do not go 
to a full oral hearing, it is attempting to grapple with concerns about the 
availability of storage space and costs of retaining court files. In 2015−16, 
the Federal Court of Canada consulted with the Canadian Bar Association. 
The Bar acknowledged that court records and files might have historical 
and longer term litigation value. It provided some guidance as to retention 
periods, according to different areas of practice.
In December 2017, the Federal Court of Canada endorsed key parameters 
for a retention schedule based on a policy framework that includes 
specified retention periods for different types of proceedings, with some 
court documents to be retained in perpetuity.62 The court is considering 
an open approach to its sentencing decisions, with the possibility for 
members of the public to make submissions justifying extended retention, 
as well as a small-scale sampling of files for extended retention. Finally, 
the Federal Court of Canada anticipates that the transition to electronic 
records will provide lower cost and more efficient archiving.63
Federal Court of Australia
The Federal Court of Australia was established in 1976 as a superior 
court  of record with trial and appellate divisions. It has extensive 
jurisdiction to deal with most civil disputes governed by federal law 
61  Interview with Andrew Baumberg, Legal Counsel, Federal Court (Ottawa, 6 November 2015).
62  The Federal Court of Canada has endorsed a policy of a seven-year retention period for 
proceedings that were dismissed at leave stage or abandoned/discontinued (ie, not adjudicated on 
the merits); a 15-year retention of documents in other proceedings; and all docket, judgments, orders 
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(other  than family law) and a limited number of criminal matters.64 
In  2015–16, approximately 5,700 causes of action were filed with the 
court. As  discussed in other chapters in this collection, the Court as 
Archive Project has focused specifically on the Federal Court’s archival 
practices. The decisions this court makes in relation to record-keeping, 
including appraisal, preservation, custodianship and access, are themselves 
of public importance, acting as a key indicator of how federal superior 
courts of record might meet their constitutional mandate and broader 
democratic responsibilities.65
In 1994, the first formal agreement between the Federal Court and the 
NAA facilitated the transfer of all court administrative and case matter 
files for storage to the NAA.66 As in Canada, in the absence of a legislative 
requirement, one of the key incentives to establishing an agreement was 
the depletion of storage space within court buildings, resulting in the 
need for off-site facilities. However, in 2000, the NAA informed the court 
that, due to its own depleting storage space, it would no longer be able to 
accept all material.67 At this time, the court was developing its electronic 
court filing system. These two factors were important drivers for the court 
to enter into negotiations with the NAA in the development of an RDA. 
Importantly, the development of the RDA reveals the evolution of the 
court’s own understanding what is meant by ‘the court record’.
During the 1990s, the NAA advocated a methodology for records 
management, referred to as DIRKS (Developing and Implementing 
a Record Keeping System), based on business functions, activities and 
transactions.68 Over a seven-year period, the Federal Court attempted to 
implement the DIRKS system, with limited success. Other government 
agencies were also performing poorly in relation to record-keeping because 
64  The court’s civil law jurisdiction includes administrative and constitutional law, human rights, 
employment and industrial relations, native title, intellectual property, taxation, trade practices, 
corporations, appeals from immigration decisions and bankruptcy.
65  See Chapter 4, this volume.
66  National Archives of Australia, Records Disposal Authority for the Federal Court of Australia, 
Principal and District Registries, Court Records other than Bankruptcy No 1124, 1994. Prior to 1994, 
files were transferred from the Federal Court to the NAA under less formal arrangements; see 
Chapter 4 of this volume for a detailed discussion.
67  Lyn Nasir, ‘Presentation on the Records Authority’ (Speech given at the 9th Australasian Institute 
of Judicial Administration Librarians Conference, Sydney, 21 August 2015); see also Chapter 7, this 
volume.
68  This methodology was developed for the implementation of the international principle of 
the Australian standard for AS4390-1996—Records Management, a codification of ISO15489 for 
international best practice for record-keeping.
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the DIRKS system was complex and resource-intensive. In 2008, the NAA 
changed its approach to appraisal, requiring organisations to take greater 
responsibility at the agency level for identifying documents that defined its 
‘unique business’. The Federal Court determined that as a court of record, 
it was court records, rather than administrative records, that fulfilled this 
role. Further, as a court of record, it determined that the whole of a file 
constituted the ‘record’ that should be retained permanently.69
However, the NAA has resisted accepting all the Federal Court’s case file 
documents. This has meant that the court has had to consider which court 
records it believes should be preserved at the NAA as part of the national 
heritage. It has led to the identification of the criterion of ‘significant 
cases’ as the basis for appraisal. However, giving meaning to this criteria 
has required the court to consider not only its common law role and 
obligations as a court of record, but also how it sees its responsibilities as 
a national institution with obligations to the public record.70 Importantly, 
this has been driven by consideration of some of record-keeping issues 
raised by the unique characteristics of the court’s native title jurisdiction.71 
As Ian Irving, previous Native Title Registrar at the Federal Court points 
out, court files for native title matters may include ‘a rich repository of 
historical and contemporary cultural and other information’, including 
‘claimant genealogies, expert anthropology, history and/or linguistic 
reports, witness statements, photographs and other material’.72 
In  considering its archival responsibilities, the Federal Court has had 
to consider the historical and research value of these records, as well as 
questions about access to the records.
69  At one stage, on the basis of legal advice obtained from the Australian Government Solicitor, the 
Federal Court considered an amendment to the Court’s Rules to define ‘the record’ and the retention 
period, but this was abandoned.
70  Our research into the Federal Court records indicates that, at different times, the court has 
considered the possibility of the concept of ‘significant’ to refer to a discretionary approach based 
on precedent, historical interest (ie, who were the parties, what were the issues), media interest or 
‘special circumstances’; alternatively, a representative sample, limited to 10 per cent, to be selected 
by the judges according to different practice areas, has been proposed. Most recently, the court’s new 
approach to case management, the national court framework, is being considered as a framework for 
identification of significant cases.
71  For further discussion of these issues, see also Chapters 8 and 9, this volume.
72  Ian Irving, ‘Information Held on Federal Court Native Title Files’ (Speech delivered at the Native 
Title Conference 2006, Darwin, 1 June 2006) <http://aiatsis.gov.au/publications/presentations/
information-held-federal-court-native-title-files> ; see also Chapter 9, this volume.
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In 2011, the NAA endorsed the Federal Court’s records authority, which 
sets out the framework for the management and disposal of its case file 
records.73 The authority delineates the requirements for ‘keeping and 
destroying records for the core business area of case management’, as well 
as for the purposes of national preservation. The authority states:
in the interests of accountability and consistent decision making and 
preservation of the archival resources of the Commonwealth, records 
identified as ‘retain as national archives’ are to be transferred to the 
custody of NAA by mutual agreement.74
The authority covers all records of the ‘core business of deciding 
disputes according to law’, including judges’ coram books, papers and all 
administrative tasks performed in the function of deciding a dispute, as 
well as judicial committee matters, a master set of judgments and other 
administrative records.75 Importantly, it specifies that 10 per cent of 
‘significant non–native title Court files’ that have been nominated by the 
judges are to be retained as national archives. The decision to retain a 
case file is made on the basis of its value as precedent, high media profile, 
public interest and case diversity, and that it should represent a cross-
section of cases within a year.
The separate identification and treatment of native title court files, all 
of which are to be preserved and transferred to the NAA, recognises the 
historical and archival value attached to the information contained in 
these records. As Pamela McGrath discusses in another chapter in this 
collection, as a result of native title legal proceedings, the Federal Court is 
in possession of an enormous number of records that contain information 
about thousands of Indigenous people, both living and deceased. The 
onerous evidentiary requirements imposed by the legislation have resulted 
in ‘one of the most substantial government-sponsored research efforts ever 
undertaken with Indigenous Australians’, including genealogical, cultural 
and historical information that is often personal or culturally sensitive.76 
As McGrath argues, providing public access to native title records raises 
73  National Archives of Australia, Records Authority: Federal Court of Australia, No 2010/00315821, 
19 October 2011.
74  Ibid 4.
75  Also exhibit administration, file inspection arrangements, legal assistance, development of policy 
and procedures, research, reviewing and reporting, taxation of costs, remitted or transferred matters, 
judges’ meetings, development of court rules and practice notes, and consultation with stakeholders.
76  Chapter 10, this volume.
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significant and intersecting legal and ethical interests that ‘complicate the 
possibility of making native title records publicly available through either 
archives or publication’.77
The Federal Court is also required to comply with a freeze placed by 
the NAA on disposal of records affecting the rights and entitlements of 
Indigenous people. This was in response to the recommendations of the 
Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody78 and the Bringing 
Them Home report into the removal of Aboriginal children from their 
families and communities.79 These recommendations were intended to 
assist Indigenous people in the process of re-establishing community and 
family links with those from whom they have been separated under past 
government policies.80 The freeze was extended in 2000 to cover records 
still in the custody of a range of government agencies; and again, in 
2009, to cover records that contain information on policy and procedures 
about withholding wages, pensions and allowances from Indigenous 
Australians.81 The Federal Court is included as one of the agencies 
responsible for retention of these files, which is reflected in its policy to 
retain all native title case files.
The Federal Court’s records authority establishes 10 classes of records 
related to case management. Four classes deal with case files—that is, files 
containing material relating to individual proceedings. The default position 
for every case file is that material constituting the ‘court record’, as defined 
by the Federal Court for the purposes of the authority (referred to as ‘Part A’ 
of each file), is retained by the court.82 This is consistent with the court’s 
status, established under Chapter III of the Constitution, as a ‘superior court 
of record’.83 Material that is not part of the court record (referred to as 
‘Part B’) may be disposed of between 10 and 25 years after the end of the 
77  Ibid.
78  Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, National Report, 
Overview and Recommendations (1991), Recommendation 53.
79  Above n 15, Recommendation 21.
80  National Archives of Australia, Records Disposal Freezes and Retention Notices (25 January 2018) 
National Archives of Australia.<www.naa.gov.au/information-management/managing-information-
and records/disposal/freezes/index.aspx#section9>.
81  Ibid.
82 In this category, the authority specifically identifies categories of records: cross-claims and replies; 
fast-track statements and responses; pleadings; requests for particulars and particulars in response; 
where the proceeding is an appeal, the notices; where the proceeding is commenced by way of 
petition, the petition and any answering document; court documents that identify the parties; court 
documents that record the final orders; reasons for judgment (where published) and copies of orders.
83  Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 5.
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proceedings.84 However, certain classes of case files have been identified 
as so important that their entire contents (both Parts A and B) are to be 
permanently retained by the NAA as a national archive. These are specified 
as all native title case files and significant, non–native title files.
The RDA gives the court responsibility for deciding which cases are 
‘significant’, subject to the condition that the number of cases selected 
not exceed 10 per cent of all cases finalised by the court in any one year. 
However, there is less specificity about the rationale for identification of 
what constitutes a ‘significant’ case, and the process and selection criteria 
are still to be finalised. During consultation with the court as part of 
the research for the Court as Archive Project, two general criteria for 
determining a significant case have been suggested: first, precedential cases, 
being cases likely to set a new precedent or change an existing precedent; 
and second, cases likely to have a long-term historical interest due to the 
parties involved in the dispute or issues involved in the case. Further, the 
authority specifies that factors for consideration in identifying significant 
cases should include ‘high media profile’, ‘public interest’ and a ‘cross-
section of cases’.
Preserving cases ‘likely to be of long-term historical interest’ is a wide 
and open-ended criterion that begs for clarification. Further, the factors 
that may be considered in determining the criteria are likely to change, 
reflecting the social and political problems of a particular time. This 
should be appropriately reflected in the nature of the cases selected for 
preservation. As researchers on the Court as Archive Project, rather than 
identify a definitive list of additional factors (which would require review 
over the longer term), we have recommended that attention should 
be directed to the process by which the criteria and factors are applied. 
This process involves the establishment of a committee to oversee the 
identification of significant cases, with membership drawn from the court’s 
judges, senior executive and key committees. In addition, we recommend 
that the committee include experts in Australian history, public law, and 
84 This includes applications for fee waiver or exemption, applications to inspect files, letters to 
and from parties, minutes of orders for directions, consent orders and final orders, as well as exhibits 
that have not been returned to parties, list of exhibits, submissions, legal arguments or interpretation 
of evidence and transcripts of proceedings. Other records included in Part B and subject to disposal 
include audio recordings of court transcripts (apart from native title matters), which are to be 
destroyed 10 years after the date recorded; records documenting the court’s docket system, which 
may be destroyed five years after completion; and records documenting the routine operational 
administrative tasks of the core business of the court, which may be destroyed seven years after 
completion.
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archives and library special collections. The recommendation, in the 
form of a memo delivered to Chief Executive Officer Warwick Soden, is 
included in this collection.85
Conclusion
Tom Nesmith argues that it is not only decisions about what records 
to retain as archival but also what is not preserved, what is disposed of 
through the process of sentencing, that contributes to meaning-making 
processes based on archival practices.86 In this chapter, I have investigated 
the role of courts as archives through an analysis of approaches to appraisal 
of court records. I have argued that courts must carefully consider 
their records disposal policies and practices because they are ultimately 
responsible for the decisions to retain or destroy records. The decision 
to keep or destroy records can have a significant impact not only on 
the parties directly involved in the legal process, but also on how law is 
understood historically and contemporaneously. In Canada and Australia, 
courts of record, including the Supreme Court of Canada, Federal Court 
of Canada and Federal Court of Australia, have begun to grapple with 
these obligations by developing frameworks for archival appraisal through 
records RDAs. This has raised important questions about their legal and 
ethical responsibilities in relation to court records and led to consideration 
of what principles should guide and determine appraisal decisions. It has 
led them to confront a question that goes to the heart of their identity, 
and, ultimately defines their record-keeping responsibilities: ‘What 
is a  court record?’. I have argued that when considering this question, 
courts should go beyond legal principles and obligations to consider their 
archival responsibilities in terms of the deeper public law issues underlying 
their institutional role.
85  Chapter 12, this volume.
86  Nesmith, above n 44, 34.
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Postscript: A Memorandum to the 
Federal Court of Australia
The Court as Archive Project has focused on the Federal Court 
of  Australia as a paradigmatic example of a federal superior court of 
record with responsibility for significant national archives. One of the 
aims of the project has been to develop principles based on empirical 
research to inform the administration of the archives held by the Federal 
Court. The  Court as Archive symposium in February 2016 provided 
an opportunity to engage directly with senior members of the judiciary 
and administrators of the Federal Court: The Hon Michael Black AC 
QC, former Chief Justice of the Federal Court; Warwick Soden OAM, 
Principal Registrar and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Court; and 
Ian Irving, then Native Title Registrar, Federal Court.
Following the symposium, and in response to an invitation from the 
Principal Registrar, we wrote a memorandum to the Federal Court with 
advice on a process for the selection of significant matters for the purposes 
of its records authority. The advice is the culmination of our empirical 
work and thinking on the basis of the research conducted for the 
project. We include it in the collection as a postscript and in its form as 
a memorandum, as an official response from us as academic researchers to 
those charged with the responsibilities of administration of the significant 
files of the Federal Court into the future.
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Memorandum: Federal Court of Australia 
and the National Archives of Australia—
Selection of Significant Matters
The Federal Court of Australia performs a fundamentally important 
role within Australia’s democratic system. The court’s records, gathered 
through its internal workings and the cases that come before it, contain 
a narrative that shapes contemporary understanding of the rights of the 
individual and the role of the state in Australia.
In October 2011, the National Archives of Australia (NAA) endorsed the 
Federal Court’s Records Authority (RA) for the management and disposal 
of the court’s records. The RA delineates the requirements for ‘keeping 
and destroying records for the core business of case management’ as well 
as for national preservation.
Court of Record and Significant Matters
The RA establishes 10 classes of records related to case management. 
Four classes deal with case files; that is, files containing material relating 
to individual proceedings. 
The default position for every case file is that material constituting the 
‘court record’, as defined by the court for the purposes of the RA (referred 
to in the RA as ‘Part A’ of each file), is retained by the court. This is 
entirely appropriate and consistent with the court’s position as a ‘superior 
court of record’ established under Chapter III of the Constitution (Federal 
Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 5). Material that is not part of the 
court record (referred to as ‘Part B’) may be disposed of between 10 and 
25 years after the end of the proceedings. 
Certain classes of case file have been identified as so important that their 
entire contents (both Parts A and B) are to be permanently retained by the 
NAA as a national archive, namely:
• all native title files
• significant, non–native title files
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The court is responsible for deciding which cases are ‘significant’, subject 
to the condition that the number of cases selected not exceed 10 per cent 
of all cases finalised by the court ‘in any one year’.
Selecting Significant Matters
The process and selection criteria for significant cases are still to be 
finalised. There are some general criteria for determining a significant case 
suggested by the court:
1. Precedential cases, being cases likely to set a new precedent or change 
an existing precedent.
2. Cases likely to have a long-term historical interest due to the parties 
involved in the dispute or issues involved in the case.
Factors for consideration include high media profile, public interest and 
cross-section of cases.
As researchers on the Australian Research Council–funded project, 
The  Court as Archive: Rethinking the Institutional Role of Federal 
Superior Courts of Record,1 we have been invited to offer suggestions on 
how the protocol for determining significant cases for national retention 
might be developed by the court. In our opinion, the above two criteria 
are important  and capable of covering most issues and contingencies. 
We  are  also of the opinion that the suggested current factors for 
consideration are relevant, direct and flexible.
However, preserving cases ‘likely to be of long-term historical interest’ 
may require consideration of additional factors. These factors will change 
over time to ensure that social and political problems of a particular 
time are appropriately reflected in the nature of the cases selected for 
preservation. This matters as much for the nature and experience of 
litigants, the conduct of legal practice and changing technologies of court 
administration. As such, and in lieu of identifying a long list of additional 
factors (which would require review over the longer term), we believe 
attention should be directed to the process by which the criteria and factors 
are applied.
1  Discovery Project DP130101954, <http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP130101954>.
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Selecting Significant Matters—Process
The process for determining a significant case for retention by the NAA, 
in our opinion, could be:
1. Utilising the Proposed National Courts Framework
The establishment of the National Courts Framework, and the 
responsibility for certain jurisdictions by specialist judges, should be 
incorporated into the process.
The judge responsible for each National Practice Area could take 
responsibility for the selection process for cases of precedential 
value, applying the appropriate factors for consideration, including 
a proportionate limit of 10 per cent.
Additional cases that could potentially be, in the judges’ opinion, of 
longer term historical interest should be flagged and sent to committee 
(see point 2 below for discussion).
2. Establishment of a Significant Cases Committee
Membership of a Significant Cases Committee could include the Chief 
Justice (or representative), the CEO (or representative) and members 
drawn from the court’s Planning and Policy Committee.
The committee should also include members from outside the court, in 
particular, experts in Australian history (legal, cultural and social), public 
law and archives.
The committee members from outside the court should have the following 
broad skill sets or experience:
• experience in using court materials for scholarly research
• an understanding of the parameters and shifting values of archival 
collections
• an appreciation of importance of the relationship between public access 
and future use of legal materials in fostering public understanding of 
Australian social and political life.
The committee would meet annually to discuss the additional cases flagged 
by the National Practice Areas. At these meetings, additional research and 
preservation considerations could be discussed, reflecting the experience 
of all members, as outlined above.
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